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ABSTRACT
The dissertation analyzes the experience of a small group of professional
planners working for socio-economic development and structural change, in close
relation to the decision-making process, under three different political admini-
strations in Chile from 1958-1973.
This was a dramatic period in Chile's history in which a conservative re-
gime was followed by a "reformist" one, and this by a revolutionary one, in a
sequence of increasing social tension leading to the violent military counter-
revolution of 1973 which killed President Allende and destroyed the political
tradition of representative democracy.
The situation of the planners in this period constituted a natural experi-
ment or quasi-experiment that provided new knowledge about the process of plan-
ning, the planner's role and the content of planning, including the combination
of functional and substantive rationality and the emergence of a new concept of
socio-economic development.
A control group was provided by comparing the attitudes and behavior of
planners with other more traditional professionals in relation to the same
events.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lisa Redfield Peattie
Title: Professor of Urban Anthropology
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THE ARGUMENT OF THIS STUDY
On Planning, Development and Class Struggle.
A Historical Theoretical Framework and Definitions.
"There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins
with experience." (Kant: Critique of Pure Reason)
Introduction
Planning knowledge is based on the practice of planning because it
originates in practice and it is validated by practice. The purpose
of this study is to analyze the practice of planning during the last
three democratic administrations in Chile, of the Presidents: Jorge
Alessandri (1958-1964), Eduardo Frei (1964-1970), and Salvador Allende
(1970-1973); to extract the knowledge which that experience may provide
about the content of planning; the role of planners and the process of
planning.
This was a dramatic period in Chilean history, in which a conser-
vative government was followed by a liberal government, and this by a
socialist one. This resulted in a sequence of growing social tension
leading to the violent counter-revolution of 1973 which destroyed the
democratic political regime and installed the present neo-facist dicta-
torship.
Many authors have analyzed this period, but several among them
have ignored the existence and action of planners and planning in it.
However, planning was an important function of the State, and the State
was one of the major protagonists in the historical process mentioned
above. Planners had influence in the design of the policies and pro-
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grams of the Chilean government; their presence and activities had an
impact on the agencies of the State bureaucracy, and even the same idea
of planning had a role in the national and international politics of
Chile during that period.
Since 1959, the Economic Commission for Latin America of the United
Nationa (ECLA) had been sustaining that planning and structural changes
were needed to carry the Latin American countries from economic stagna-
tion and underdevelopment into a process of industrialization and rapid
economic growth. The theses of ECLA were officially adopted by the
United States and the Latin American countries in the "Charter of Punta
del Este" (August, 1961) which started the Alliance for Progress and re-
quired each Latin American country to engage in planning for socio-eco-
nomic development.
In Chile, planning was introduced as a State function before the
Alliance for Progress, by the creation, in 1939, of the State Develop-
ment Corporation (CORFO) as an instrument of industrialization and eco-
nomic development. Thus, the Chilean government, some months before the
signing of the Charter of Punta del Este, was able to anticipate its re-
quirements by publishing the "National Plan of Economic Development
1961-1970" (the "Ten Year Plan").
The Alliance generated a new emphasis, however, on planning that
led to the organization of a National System of Planning in 1965, headed
by the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN), adviser to the President, and
several sectoral and regional planning offices. During the same years,
a number of Chilean professionals (among them this writer) were trained
in planning, and an important group of international planning consul-
tants went to Chile to assist the government in the new planning tasks.
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An important element in the analysis of this study will be the con-
sideration of ideas as historical role players. Planning may be defined
as the conscious effort to change the present reality to conform it to
an idea of how that reality should be. Several ideas, among them the
idea of planning itself, had a concrete impact on the social reality of
the period under analysis. Mention has been made of the influence of
the ECLA on planning and social and economic development, and that the
Chilean political parties were organized around the ideas which served
better to interpret the traditions and interests of the social classes
which they represented.
The practice of planning is based on the assumption that history
is the result of conscious human actions, and that the decision-making
process of social organizations and institutions would be improved by
the introduction-of scientific rationality and knowledge in it. The
idea of planning, as opposed to free-trade and laissez-faire economic
policies, played a role in national and international politics and was
associated with the functioning and participation of the State in the
process of economic development and social change.
Chile may be characterized as a slow-growing, capitalist, dependent,
underdeveloped country and the practice of planning during the period
under analysis was related to the general objective of achieving rapid,
self-sustaining social and economic development. The three administra-
tions mentioned above and the social forces which supported them, each
had a different concept of socio-economic development and about the par-
ticipation of the State in its achievement. This conditioned the prac-
tice of planning in them and provides the opportunity to compare three
modes of defining and solving planning problems and the role and parti-
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cipation assigned to planners in each one.
For the purposes of this analysis, a mode of planning is a speci-
fic set of relations among planners and planning, the State and the
social classes and their foreign allies, and the role assigned to plan-
ners and planning in that given set of relations. The core of the study
will be the detailed analysis of each of the three modes.
In this study, social classes are not statistical or theoretical
constructs, but concrete social groups differenciated by their relative
control over the means of production, the economic surplus and their
power over the social system. Under the formal appearance of a repre-
sentative democracy until 1973, and in more explicit form since that
year, the Chilean social structure has been a rigid hierarchical system
controlled by a small professional elite. This elite is the external
expression of a dominant class which concentrates wealth and property
and is tied to the international system of the most developed capital-
ist countries and their multinational corporations.
Apart from this dominant class, during the period under analysis,
the Chilean social structure included: a small petty-bourgeoisie inte-
grated by owners of small stores, family business, trucks and mechanical
shops; and a large salaried working class divided into three segments:
white collar employees, blue collar industrial workers, and agricultural
workers. The social organization and participation of these other soci-
al classes were submitted to the formal and informal rules imposed by
the dominant class.
In this study, the Chilean State is considered to include the Exe-
cutive, Congress, the Judiciary and two semi-autonomous institutions:
the Armed Forces and the Comptroller General, this last in charge of
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supervising the legality of the actions of the Executive. Under the
Constitution of 1925, which ruled until 1973, the President of the Re-
public, head of the Executive, and the members of the two branches of
Congress were elected by popular vote. The other institutions were pro-
fessional and specialized bodies which autonomy was protected by self-
generation, tenure or special legal statute. The Executive had pre-
eminence over the other powers of the State but a system of checks and
balances insured that no one of the branches of the State could estab-
lish absolute hegemony over the others.
During the period under analysis, planning was a function of the
Executive which achieved new importance, but planners had to compete
with other power centers already established within the State bureau-
cracy. In addition, the State was only one of the major actors in the
historical process, the others being the social classes, their organi-
zations and their foreign allies. Therefore, the impact of planning
and planners was necessarily marginal, shaping or modifying the deter-
minant social forces but unable to alter their substance. For this
reason, this analysis has to relate the planning experience to the gen-
eral context of the social structure, the class struggle and the parti-
cipation of the State and the foreign sector in it.
1. On Dependency, Class Struggle and the Relative Autonomy of the State.
The functions and institutions of the State are generated by the
social structure. They are designed to serve the political and economic
interests of the dominant class. But the State may achieve some degree
of autonomous development and functioning. In most developed countries
this relative autonomy of the State is resultant from the complexity of
the administration, and is related to the emergence of a group of pro-
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fessionals and managers who some authors consider to be a "new class"
in between capital and labor. In Chile, however, the relative autonomy
of the State was related to the characteristics of the dominant class
and its cultural and economic dependency.
The Chilean dominant class has few of the dynamic and progressive
traits of the industrial bourgeoisie of Europe or the United States.
On the contrary, it is an oligarchy which imitates the old aristocracies
of Europe by its disdain for manual labor and its acute sense of class
distinctions. The Chilean oligarchy has traditionally identified "pro-
gress" with the import and reproduction of ideas, formal models and
fashionable trends generated in the most developed capitalist countries.
This dominant class inherited, from the Spanish colonial admini-
strators, the aristocratic cultural traits and the social structure
based on the exploitation of labor in farms, mines and industries, for
the benefit of a small privileged elite. Since formal independence from
Spain was declared at the beginning of the XIX Century, this same domi-
nant class used foreign ideas and models to shape the institutions of
the new State, and invited foreign experts to assist in this task, with
the purpose of giving Chile the formal appearance of a modern society.
After an early attempt at an autonomous capitalist development, the
Chilean oligarchy has been willing to accept the technical and financial
advantages of the multinational corporations and their predecessors in
the international market. It has allowed them to take control over some
strategic resources and the main exports of the country and to acquire
decisive influence in industry, commerce and communications. In ex-
change, the most developed capitalist countries and international agen-
cies have provided the financial and technical assistance needed to
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maintain the control of the Chilean elite over the social system, and
to organize and develop the institutions of a modern State.
However, this same dependency was the vehicle for the introduction
of institutions and ideas, to the country, which conflicted with the
interests of the dominant class. Such was the case with the political
regime of representative democracy, and of the Liberal, Marxist and
Christian Left ideas which inspired the organizations and political
parties of the other social classes. In addition, the lack of dynamism
of the Chilean oligarchy and its dependency of foreign investors and
entrepreneurs, resulted in the low rate of growth and the extreme vul-
nerability of the Chilean economy to changes in the international mar-
ket.
Thus, a permanent feature of the history of Chilean development is
the tension emerging from three basic structural contradictions. They
are:
1) The class struggle resultant from the class polarization, the
lack of economic growth, and the exploitation of the working class by
the Chilean oligarchy and its foreign allies.
2) The institutional conflict between the rigid and hierarchical
social structure and the democratic principles of the political regime.
3) The ideological conflict between authoritarian and democratic
tendencies within the dominant class, as they responded to the internal
class struggle and the changing influence of their foreign allies.
Many means have been used by the dominant class to solve these con-
tradictions, including the outright use of brute force in the military
repression of the working class. However, until 1973, the Chilean oli-
garchy was interested in maintaining a respectable image in the inter-
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national market, and preferred to apply less crude devices such as the
technical formalization of social problems or the manipulation of the
electoral and legal processes. Most of these means required the inter-
vention of the State, and the increasing complexity of the solutions
implied an expansion of the role of the State and its relative autonomy.
A special example of this was the deep disturbance suffered by the
relations between the Chilean oligarchy and its foreign allies as a con-
sequence of the Depression of the 1930's and World War II, which forced
the Chilean elite to use the State as a source of financing and indus-
trial development and led to the creation of CORFO, the introduction of
planning, and the participation of the State in direct productive acti-
vities.
2. On Foreign Experts, Professionals and Planners.
Among the many means used by the Chilean dominant class to solve
the basic contradictions of the social structure, two are of special
importance for this analysis. They are the role assigned to foreign
experts in the development of Chilean institutions and the training of
Chilean professionals, and also the role of the Chilean professionals
in the administration of the State and other positions of social impor-
tance.
Ever since the independence war against Spain, foreign experts
were invited to assist the Chilean oligarchy in providing the ideas and
models for the building of the Chilean institutions, training the
Chilean professionals for the administration of the State, and serving
as arbiters of the ideological conflicts within the dominant class.
They provided an assumed "objective" scientific or technical rationale
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for the social structure and the decisions of the dominant class, and
contributed the skills and knowledge not existing in Chile for the so-
lution of government problems.
The international planning consultants who arrived in Chile in re-
sponse to the Alliance for Progress were only one chapter in a long
series of similar missions which had a decisive influence on Chilean
institutions and development. Foreign experts designed the Chilean
Civil Code and banking laws, organized the Office of the Budget and the
Central Bank, trained the Chilean military and school teachers, and pro-
vided the models for economic policy, among other many important contri-
butions to the "modernization" of the Chilean institutions.
The imposition of foreign models and formal concepts gave to the
Chilean society, the external appearance of a modern democratic state,
managed by professional standards. However, it also opened the oppor-
tunities for the foreign control over basic resources of the country
and restricted the development of initiatives and original research gen-
erated in Chile.
The same foreign experts mentioned above helped to organize and
develop the Chilean universities, and since the XIX Century, the fami-
lies of the oligarchy adopted the practice of sending their children to
the University to acquire the learned skills needed to rule the country.
It also established the social requirement of being in possession of a
University degree to aspire to high positions in politics or in busi-
ness. This "objective" standard served to legitimize the power of the
dominant class through its association with technical proficiency, and
to make more difficult the access to power for members of other social
classes, since the highly selective educational system and the general
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economic conditions restricted the admission to the University to chil-
dren of the oligarchy.
Chilean professions and professionals followed the European models
by combining the British concept of "liberal professional" with the
"guild" type of organization in the tradition of continental Europe.
They played a role similar to that of XIX Century professionals in
England as developers of the ideology of the ruling class and providers
of a presumably scientific rationale for the legitimacy, decisions and
operations of the established social system. They also incorporated,
later, some of the cultural traits of the so-called "Professional Mana-
gerial Class" (PMC) of the United States as a result of the growing in-
fluence of the US in Chile during the present century.
However, there is an important difference between the Chilean pro-
fessionals and their colleagues in Europe and the United States. While
the Europeans and US professionals constituted a group separated from
the dominant class - if associated with it - which could be qualified
as a "new class" or PMC, the Chilean professionals were part of the do-
minant class itself, and added their monopoly of training and knowledge
to the concentration of wealth and property of the oligarchy.
As University graduates, planners were members of the professional
elite, but they differed from the more traditional professionals in se-
veral ways.
A first such difference was the training of planners. Even though
some of the most prominent members of other professions had been able
to complement their training in Europe or in the United States, the
large body of Chilean professionals were trained by Chilean universities.
By contrast, all planners had international training since until the
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late 1960's, there was no formal academic traning in planning in the
Chilean universities.
In addition, the University in Chile was divided into professional
schools which had no cross registration nor common courses and tended
to isolate each profession within the field of its special knowledge,
while planners are trained to combine diverse specialities in multidis-
ciplinary teamwork.
A second difference between planners and other professionals was
the special association of planners with the State. It is difficult to
consider planners as "liberal professionals" since, even the private
practice of consulting is done for the State or other large social or-
ganizations. And in Chile this private practice was rather restricted.
However, the international training of planners gave them some profes-
sional opportunities which were not open for other Chilean professionals.
Perhaps the most important difference between planners and other
professionals in Chile was the association of planners with social and
economic change. Actually, a small group of professionals had ever
served as introducers and leaders of progressive movements, and even the
parties of the Left which emerged from the organization of the working
class had a number of professionals among their representatives in Con-
gress and their directive organs. However, as it was explained above,
the professions were developed for the support of the system and most of
the professionals supported the political Right, as members they were
of the dominant class.
But planning was the professional expression of the ideology of so-
cial change and economic development which was prevalent among Latin
American intellectuals during the 1950's and 1960's. And planners
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achieved new status with the changes proposed by ECLA and the Alliance
for Progress.
In general, it may be said that planning is a common activity of
all human beings, which means that the boundary between professional
planners and other professionals and decision-makers is not easy to de-
termine. However, this study will analyze the activities of a particu-
lar group of professionals who may be defined attending some of their
most salient distinctive characteristics which are:
a) Training: the planners considered in this study had specific
training for their trade, acquired either at formal schools and courses
in planning, or through extended and continuous practical experience in
planning tasks.
b) Position: most of the planners considered in this study worked
for planning agencies or for planning divisions of State agencies, or
for the planning institutes and centers of the universities and inter-
national institutions located in Chile.
c) Mentality: the planners considered in this study tended to have
a common and distinct perspective towards the issues involved in making
decisions for social organizations and institutions. Some of the basic
elements of this particular professional perspective were: the long term
view by which every short term decision was considered also in its long
term consequences; the comprehensive view by which every specific prob-
lem was analyzed in relation to the whole system in which it was in-
scribed; and the tendency to maximize the formal rigour of analysis even
in non-quantifiable matters.
In addition, it is of the nature of the professional planning work
to be registered in reports and documents, many of which were available
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for this study in their original form or through their use by other com-
mentators of this period. On the other hand, even though the number of
planners expanded considerably during the period, from no more than 50
professionals in 1958 to the near 300 members of the Chilean Society of
Planning and Development (PLANDES) in 1970, still they remained a small
group of professionals with similar training and perspective, who were
located at specific points in the formal organization of the social
structure.
3. Format of this Study.
The situation of the Chilean planners, as a small group with simi-
lar characteristics, doing their professional work in three succesive
different political environments, during a period of increasing social
tension, which ended in a violent change of the system, has some of the
elements of a natural experiment or quasi-experiment. Even a control
group may be provided since the attitudes and behavior of planners can
be compared with those of other more traditional professionals in rela-
tion to the changes suffered by the political and economic environment.
However, this is a dialectical experiment because planners and the other
professionals had an active role in the production of those changes, and
in turn, they were changed themselves by the events of the period.
These features condition the format of this study.
Two chapters will document the factual basis for the historical and
theoretical framework described above, giving a more detailed descrip-
tion of the environment and actors involved, and the core of the study
will be a detailed analysis of the practice of planning in each of the
three administrations of Alessandri, Frei and Allende, in a sequence
that explores the dialectical relationship metioned before, as follows:
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a) Analysis of the general context of the politcal and economic
manifestations of the class struggle at the beginning of each administra-
tion.
b) Analysis of the policies and programs announced and implemented
by each administration, with special reference to the participation of
the State and planning in them.
c) Analysis of the specific tasks carried out by planners within
each administration, in relation with their policies and programs.
d) Analysis of the results of those tasks, policies and programs,
and their impact on the process of socio-economic development and the
class struggle, and
e) Analysis of the consequences of those results for planners and
planning.
This central part of the study will be followed by a chapter on
conclusions in which a comparison will be made of the practice of plan-
ning, the content of planning, and the role of the planners in the three
administrations in relation to the current state of planning theory and
methodology.
My own personal experience working in planning under the three ad-
ministrations was a vantage ground for the direct observation of the
practice of planning during the period. As it can be expected, this ex-
perience gave me definite ideas about the subject of this inquiry. How-
ever, this study is an effort to look anew at the same events with in-
dependent information, making use of the time passed to provide a fresh
and different perspective on the same subject, to validate and to extend
the base of the knowledge acquired.
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For this purpose, two types of sources of information have been
used: original documents, such as the planning documents of Chilean and
international agencies, and analysis of other authors based on these
original documents. Whenever possible, two independent sources have




THE CHILEAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE STATE
Introduction
In Chile, planning is a function of the State, and the functions
and institutions of the State are generated by the social structure, de-
signed to serve the economic and political interests of the dominant
class.
Therefore, the analysis of the practice of planning must be pre-
ceded by a description of the general background in which it takes
place, including the State and the social structure. For this purpose,
this chapter will contain the following sections:
(1) The general characteristics of the Chilean society with particu-
lar reference to the structure of production and the social classes.
(2) The characteristics and organizations of the Chilean dominant
class.
(3) The dependency of the Chilean oligarchy, its impact on the eco-
nomic performance of the country and the cultural and political conse-
quences of it.
(4) The historic development of the Chilean working class and of the
class struggle.
(5) The legal system in Chile, its functions in the social structure,
and the political regime of representative democracy under the Constitu-
tion of 1925, and its response to the processes of the social structure.
These sections could provide by themselves themes for a particular
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study, but are here by necessity reduced to a schematic, if as complete
as possible, description of the economic and political environment, for
the practice of planning in Chile.
1. General Characteristics of the Chilean Social Structure.
In 1970, the total population of Chile was near 10 million, of whom
the registered voters were 3.5 million and the economically active popu-
lation little less than 3 million, while the population growth rate was
estimated to be 2.4% per year for the period 1965-1970. (ODEPLAN, 1971,
p.2 9 3)
The same year, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Chile was esti-
mated to be about $8 billion, and ECLA estimated the rate of growth of
the GDP to be 4.2% per year, and the per capita growth rate 1.7% per year
for the period 1950-1968. These rates were lower than the average rates
for Latin America as a whole which were 5.2% and 2.2% respectively during
the same years. (Prebish, 1970) These figures characterize Chile as a
slow-growing, underdeveloped country.
One of the salient characteristics of the Chilean economy during the
1960's was the extraordinary polarization and concentration in the dis-
tribution of income. On one extreme, 71% of the population received an
income per capita which was less than half of the national average and
had access to only 26% of the total income, while at the other extreme,
only 4.5% of the population perceived 45.5% of the total income and en-
joyed incomes per capita several times larger than the national average.
(ODEPLAN, 1971 Table VII, p.XXXVI)
This polarization of income results from the concentration of owner-
ship and control of the means of production and the financial apparatus
by the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies. The 1965 agricul-
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tural census found that 4.2% of all the units of production (farms)
owned 79% of the total agricultural land, and other studies demonstrated
that 17% of all the industrial and commercial corporations owned 78% of
the total assets of those corporations, while inside them, the ten major
stockholders had more than 50% of the shares in 85% of the said corpora-
tion. (ODEPLAN, 1971, p.XXVII; Stallings, 1978, p.36)
Moreover, this concentration inside each sector was related to in-
tersectoral linkages since a reduced number of conglomerates controlled
the largest productive units in several sectors at the same time. In
personal terms, many members of the dominant class and their direct rela-
tives were simultaneously owners of large agricultural states and con-
trolled stock in banks, industrial and commercial enterprises. Thus,
from 1950 to 1970, only one quarter of the economically active population
were owners of their means of production, and among them only 3% were
employers, while the salaried working class included 75% of the said ac-
tive population. (ODEPLAN, 1971, Tables II and 31; Gil, 1966, p.19;
Stallings, 1978, p.35)
The now classic study of Ricardo Lagos, found in 1958 that eleven
economic groups controlled most of the economic activities in the country
through their interlocking control of the boards of directors and execu-
tive leadership of the seven largest private banks. These banks held
controlling stock in the major industrial, mining and commercial enter-
prises, and concentrated among them 74.4% of the assets and 60% of the
deposits of all private banks in Chile. One of them, Banco de Chile,
oldest among Chilean banks, had 42.8% of the total capital and reserves
of all the 28 private banks existing in Chile at that time. (Lagos, 1961)
This concentration of wealth, property and income in a small group
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of less than 5% of the total population has led historians and social
scientists to qualify the Chilean dominant class as an "oligarchy". In
addition, this dominant class has also concentrated the educational op-
portunities and has restricted the access to higher education so it in-
cludes a large majority of the professionals who manage the agencies of
the State and the big business.
In fact, a study made for the Educational Planning Commission in
1964, found that more than 170,000 children of school age had no access
to the educational system, and that of 100 children who entered the
first grade, only 30 completed six years of basic education, less than
5 completed high school, and only half of these were admitted to the
University; the principal cause of these high rates of student desertion
from school were economic. (Gill, 1966, pp. 2 2-2 3 ; Bonilla & Glazer, 1970,
p.21 2 )
But the Chilean dominant class was not alone in the control of the
means of production and economic opportunities in the country. During
the period considered in this study, foreign corporations controlled
Chile's major exports (copper and nitrates), the telephone company and
international communications, the supply of electricity for the two larg-
est cities, Santiago and Valparaiso, the distribution of oil and gasoline,
car assembly plants and tires and auto parts production, the production
of electronic equipment, and had a large share in all branches of indus-
try, wholesale commerce and finance and banking. (Stallings, 1978, pp.43-
45; De Vylder, 1976, pp.12-17)
Since the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies controlled
most of the means of production, they were also the main source of employ-
ment for the rest of the Chilean population. In 1970, about 96,000 em-
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ployers provided jobs for 1.8 million salaried workers, which added to
the 400,000 State employees and about 600,000 self-employed, constituted
the 2.9 million total economically active population. (ODEPLAN, 1971,
Table 55, p.69; Stallings, 1978, p.34)
This distribution of the active population, as based on the owner-
ship of the means of production and on the social relations of produc-
tion is an objective base on which to analyze the Chilean social struc-
ture and to define the social classes. However this is a crude first
approximation which requires some refinements before it is used for the
purposes of this study. A first such refinement is to add a new variable
to the analysis, the control over the economic surplus as reflected in
the distribution of income in the following table. For the purposes of
this table, "low income" is defined as the income per capita which is 50%
of the national average or less, and "high income" that which is 200% or
more of the national average, "medium income" being the one located be-
tween these two arbitrary limits.
Table 1.a: CHILE: Distribution of Income by Occupational Category, 1968
(in percentages)
Income Occupational Category
Employers Self-Employed White-Collar Blue-Collar Total
Low 3.8 76.4 44.6 87.1 71.5
Medium 34.0 21.3 48.0 11.6 24.0
High 62.2 2.3 7.4 1.2 4.5
100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0
(Source: ODEPLAN, 1971, Table II, p.XXX)
This table shows a correlation between occupational category and in-
come since at one extreme 62.2% of the employers enjoyed a high income,
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while at the other, 87.1% of the blue-collar workers suffered a low in-
come which at that time represented less than $300 per year. This po-
larization is more significant if it is considered that the low-income
blue-collar workers were 1.1 million while the high-income employers
were about 60,000.
In addition, the table above represents the net income received by
individuals actually involved in some economic activity but the polari-
zation of income is accentuated if the analysis is made on a household
basis. On average, each family in 1968 had 5.1 members, and a survey
that year found that all the high income families had at least two in-
come producing members since familiy ties were a traditional mechanism
of social segregation and wealth concentration of the dominant class.
Even if women or old people were not members of the economically active
population, they received rents from real estate or interest from capi-
tal investments. Thus, the same survey demonstrated that the 2% of the
families of highest income had an average family income which was 14
times the national average. (ODEPLAN, 1971, p.XXXVII)
Previous analysts have used the figures above to make a class ana-
lysis of the Chilean social structure, but doing so, they have taken only
one of the variables included in the table.
A conventional analysis projected by the Chilean dominant class with
political purposes, and adopted by some U.S. historians and political
scientists, makes use of income groupings similar to those of the verti-
cal margin of the table above to divide the Chilean social structure in
three classes: an upper "aristocracy", a "middle class", and a "lower
class". (Gil, 1966, p.23)
John Johnson, for example, interpreted the evolution of Chilean
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politics during the present century as showing "the major success achieved
by the urban middle sectors being politically 'entrenched"', and for him
those middle sectors were identified with the military and the Radical
Party. (Johnson, 1958, pp. 66 & ff.) And Federico Gil made a similiar
analysis of the evolution of the social structure from a "fairly rigid
two-class society" into which, at the turn of the century, was inserted
an "emerging middle group" which became "one of the largest segments of
the Chilean society", estimated "in 1949 in roughly one fifth of the to-
tal population." (Gil, 1966, p.2 3) Still in 1977, Paul Sigmund wrote
about "the existence of a relatively 'large middle class'." (Sigmund,
1977, p.21)
However, the same Sigmund added that the "disparity between rich and
poor in Chile was still very great." (idem id.) And Gil, after making a
valiant effort to build a "middle class by mixing together several dis-
parate elements" found that
This middle class lacks the characteristics usually
ascribed to such groups in more developed countries ...
it has yet to develop a distinctive consciousness and
ideology of its own. The urban middle sectors, in gen-
eral, tend to assume upper-class attitudes and to defend
the value judgements of the aristocracy.
(Gil, 1966, pp.26-27)
Actually, the "middle class" myth was an important ideological in-
strument used by the dominant class to divide the working class, reinforc-
ing the legal segregation between white collar and blue collar workers.
Through the multi-class political parties of the "Center", (Radicals and
Christian Democrats) the dominant class was able to organize coalitions
with elements of the petty bourgeoisie and some white collar employees,
especially State employees, to defend assumed "middle class interests"
supposedly threatened by the advances of the labor movement and the organ-
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izations of blue collar workers. (Stallings, 1978, p.38)
Similar political role played the equally mythical "aristocracy"
mentioned by Gil in the quotation above. Some Chilean historians, in
particular Francisco Antonio Encina and Alberto Edwards, and some U.S.
analysts, have identified the Chilean dominant class with an assumed
"Castillian-Basque Aristocracy" of traditional landowners who had embodied
in the past the best qualities of the most glorious pages of Chilean his-
tory. To this mythical aristocracy, the responsibility for the political
stability and the physical and economic expansion of the country during
the XIX century is attributed, and their descendants are the "natural"
leaders of the Chilean people. (Nunn, 1976, pp.8-9, 15-16; Gil, 1966, p.38)
But the Chilean dominant class has never been really aristocratic
nor of "Castillian-Basque" origin or solely based on the the ownership of
agricultural land, even though those characteristics have been used, at
times, as symbols of status. In fact, the Chilean dominant class inher-
ited its aristocratic tendencies from the Spanish colonial administrators
who despised manual labor and exploited workers in the mines and agricul-
tural production - but rarely were noblemen and more often were bureau-
crats and merchants. The most important hero of the Independence war
against Spain and first Chief Executive of independent Chile, Bernardo
O'Higgins, was the illegitimate son of an Irishman who was Colonial
Governor of Chile in the XVIII century. And the reputed "creator" of the
Chilean modern State, Diego Portales, was a bankrupt merchant turned poli-
tician, who was also the son of another Spanish colonial bureaucrat.
(Loveman, 1979, pp.127 & 134; Crow, 1971, pp. 454 & 640-642)
A different approach to the analysis of the Chilean social classes
was taken by Barbara Stallings in her excellent study, "Class Conflict
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and Economic Development in Chile". Making use of the occupational cate-
gories as they appear in the horizontal margin of Table l.a as indicators
of ownership of the means of production and of the social relations of
production, she qualified the employers as "Bourgeoisie", the self-
employed as "Petty-Bourgeoisie", and the white and blue collar workers
as members of the salaried "Working Class". (Stallings, 1978, p.34)
This is a more objective approximation than the artificial construction
of a "middle class" or the acceptance of the aristocratic pretenses of
the Chilean dominant class, but it is still a too simplistic use of sta-
tistical categories for the definition of a complex phenomenon, as the
same table shows.
It is difficult to characterize all the self-employed as members of
the same Petty-Bourgeoisie when three quarters of them appear to have an
income that is less than half the national average. Actually, a large
number of those low-income self-employed were the owners of agricultural
properties so small or poor that they cannot sustain the farmer and his
family (minifundios) who, therefore, increased the pool of unemployed
agricultural workers in search of temporary or seasonal jobs. (ODEPA,
1970, pp.16&l7) The same special consideration should be given to a
large group of urban self-employed who Stallings, herself, considered as
a cover up for much of the disguised unemployment so
prevalent in Chile ... unemployed members of the pro-
letariat tend to become part of the lowest stratum of
the petty bourgeoisie (e.g. street vendors) because
the industrial sector is not capable of generating
enough employment to absorb the growing labor supply.
(Stallings, 1978, p.37)
The previous table requires an explanation of those groups which con-
tradict the general trend, that is the employers with low income and the
salaried workers with high income.
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The same analysis of Stallings made the distinction between the
"monopoly" and "non-monopoly" sectors among employers, in relation to the
high degree of concentration of ownership that has been mentioned before.
The monopoly sector of large enterprises (more than 200 workers) associ-
ated with the multinational corporations, account for most of the large
group of employers with a high income, while the small enterprises of the
"non-monopoly" sector may justify the existence of employers with medium
and low income. However, these can also be the result of induced statis-
tical mistakes resultant from the reluctance of employers to give income
information for official enquires. Large firms had access to foreign
technology and to foreign and national credit which were not easily ac-
cessible to small enterprises, and therefore, tended to be more capital
intensive and also had the economics of scale that the small firms didn't
have. (Stallings, 1978, pp.36-37)
The said large monopolies tended also to have well organized and
highly skilled workers who were able to obtain better wages than other
workers, because of their productivity and because the cost of labor was
a low proportion of the total cost due to the high capital to worker rate.
This may explain the existence of the small group of blue collar workers
with incomes higher than two times the national average and, sometimes,
actually put the workers of the monopoly sector in conflict with the rest
of the working class. The higher wages of the monopoly sector reflected
in higher prices, and the less skilled and lesser organized workers could
not defend themselves against the resultant inflation. (Stallings, 1978,
p.38; De Vylder, 1976, p.48)
Many executives of large corporations, high officers of State agen-
cies, and the professionals working for the State and such corporations
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were included statistically among the white collar workers since this
was the type of employment contract they had for tax and social security
purposes. This explains the 7.4% of white collar employees who appear
to have a high income in the table. Thus, the Chilean dominant class is
not reduced to the "employers" category as in the analysis of Barbara
Stallings, but includes the high income white collar employees and also
the high income self-employed who are most probably wealthy professionals.
2. The Chilean Dominant Class and its Organization
The Chilean dominant class is integrated by three functional groups:
businessmen, professionals, and politicians which correspond to the three
types of organizations of the class for collective action: professional
associations, sectoral associations, and political parties.
Professional associations ("Colegios Profesionales") had some of the
characteristics of the traditional European "guilds" and will be further
analyzed in another section of this chapter.
The traditional associations of wealthy businessmen by economic sec-
tor were created in the past century, the most important ones being:
Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (S.N.A.: National Agricultural Society);
Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA: Industrial Development Society);
Sociedad Nacional de Mineria (S.N.M.: National Mining Society); and
Camara Central de Comercio (C.C.C.: Central Chamber of Commerce). These
sectoral associations were formally tied to each other by the creation,
during the 1930's, of an umbrella organization: Confederacidn de la Pro-
duccion y del Comercio (C.P.C.: Production and Commerce Confederation)
which became the most important organization of the dominant class.
(Stallings, 1978, p.58; Gil, 1966, pp.294-295)
The traditional political parties of the dominant class were origin-
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ally the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, which created in the
XIX century, shared the control of the Executive and Congress until 1939,
and constituted the political Right. Before 1933, the Conservatives,
representing agricultural landlords and traditional Catholics, had dif-
ferences with the Liberals who sustained the separation of the Church and
the State and represented urban industrialists and merchants. However,
both parties supported the same conservative economic policies, and after
1933 entered in an almost continuous coalition until their final fusion
in 1966 in the National Party. (Gil, 1966, pp.245 & ff.; Stallings, 1978,
p.4 1)
But the dominant class had also decisive influence within the two
large multi-class parties which occupied the Center of Chilean politics
during the period analyzed in this study.
One of them, Partido Radical (P.R.: Radical Party), emerged in mid-
XIX century as one of the consequences of the rebellion of liberal ex-
tremists and the provincial bourgeoisie against the authoritarian regime
imposed by the Conservatives of Santiago. The Radicals later evolved
into a social-democracy position and expanded to include while collar em-
ployees. (Gil, 1966, p.257)
The other, Partido Democrata Cristiano (P.D.C.: Christian Democratic
Party), emerged in the 1930's as a small group of progressive Catholic in-
tellectuals and young professionals who split from the Conservative Party
and expanded during the 1950's to include members of all the social
classes, though under the control of the original group. (Gil, 1966,
pp.266 & ff.)
The Radicals controlled the Executive from 1939 to 1952, and were
the largest force in Congress between 1953 and 1963, but were replaced by
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PDC during the 1960's as the main force in the political Centre. Both
Centrist parties were generated by ideological conflicts within the do-
minant class and never lost their links with it. However, they entered
in temporal coalitions with the parties of the Left which represented
the working class, and sometimes adopted progressive and populist posi-
tions. Neither party could solve their internal contradictions and both
divided in the late 1960's, but in the period between 1932 and 1970, they
provided the appearance of a real democratic alternative to the tradition-
al parties of the Right.
In both cases their original ideas were rooted in Europe, but later
they achieved good relations with the U.S. Liberals, first the Radicals
who admired the New Deal of Roosevelt, and then the Christian Democrats
through the Alliance for Progress. (Gil, 1966, pp.257 & ff.; Stallings,
1978, p.41)
A distinctive feature of the Chilean social structure, both in busi-
ness and politics, has been the long term preeminence of some families.
Among the Chilean Presidents between 1828 and 1973, there were four pairs
of father and son: Francisco Antonio and Anibal Pinto; Manuel and Pedro
Montt; Frederico Errizuriz Zafiartu and Federico Errizuriz Echaurrn; and
Arturo and Jorge Alessandri. And several other cases of close relatives
such as President Manuel Bulnes who was the nephew of President Joaquin
Prieto and son-in-law of Francisco Antonio Pinto, or President German
Riesco who was nephew and cousin to the Errizuriz. In addition, six of
the Presidents: Joaquin Prieto, Manuel Bulnes, Manuel Montt, Jose Joaquin
Pgrez, Arturo Alessandri, and Carlos Ibaiiez, performed that office for
two periods which restricted the access to the Presidency even more. One
single extended family, Errizuriz, provided four Presidents and 59 members
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of Congress before 1927, and, in more recent times, the Alessandri family
provided two Presidents, several Senators and Deputies and candidates to
the Presidency in 1920, 1932, 1946, 1952, 1958, and 1970. (Nunn, 1967,
pp.9-10 & 87; Loveman, 1979, p.137)
The power of these families was not restricted only to politics.
The Errazuriz started as major landowners in the richest agricultural re-
gion of the country, and diversified later into urban business and real
estate. Jorge Alessandri, at the time of his election to the Presidency
in 1958, was the Chief Executive of the paper and cellulose monopoly
"Papeles y Cartones", one of the largest industrial corporations of the
country, and of a large distributing firm (CODINA), being director of a
bank and SOFOFA and several other corporations as well as President of
CPC. One of his brothers, a well known corporate lawyer, had for a time
been Dean of the Law School of Universidad de Chile, and another, a phy-
sician, had been Dean of the School of Medicine. By marriage and busi-
ness, the Alessandri family was tied to the Matte family, of large real
estate holdings in downtown Santiago. The Alessandri-Matte group con-
trolled or had direct interests in 69 corporations which, in 1960,
amounted to 16.1% of the total private investments in the country.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.56)
Other families of the dominant class had little interest in elected
offices and concentrated more in their private business, even though they
managed to have decisive influence in politics when they consider it ne-
cessary. A good example is the Edwards family, which acquired preeminance
in financial, industrial and commercial business, but achieved a strong
influence in politics through their ownership of "El Mercurio", the oldest
and most prestigious newspaper in Chile. The Edwards and Matte families
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were also related by family and business and, in 1891, the two were in-
strumental in obtaining financing in London for the rebellion of Congress
against President Jos6 Manuel Balmaceda. More recently, the head of the
family, Agustin Edwards Eastman, Editor of El Mercurio, President of the
Edwards Bank and of the beer and soft drink monopoly, "Cervecerias Uni-
das", arranged, in 1955, the contract of the Klein-Sacks Mission by the
Ibaiez Administration. In 1970 he was President of the Chilean subsidi-
ary of IBEC (Rockefeller), and had 20% interest in the Chilean subsidiary
of Ralston Purina, while Cervecerfas Unidas had the Chilean franchise of
Pepsi Cola. The Edwards group had control over 12 financing companies,
12 major industrial enterprises, 2 large publishing houses, and extensive
urban and agricultural landholdings. (Stallings, 1978, p.36; Roxborough,
1977, p.56)
A later chapter will analyze the important participation of Agustin
Edwards in the mobilization of forces which led to the overthrow of
Allende in 1973.
3. The Dependency of the Chilean Oligarchy
The example of the Edwards family is a good sample of the ties of
the Chilean dominant class with the multi-national corporations.
In the period following Independence from Spain, the Chilean oli-
garchy appeared to have some of the dynamic characteristics of other mo-
dern bourgeoisies. It was engaged in an effort to develop a self-sustain-
ing capitalist economy with nationally financed industrial and mining ven-
tures and the active participation of the State through public works and
State owned finance and transportation services such as the State Rail-
roads. During this period, Chile won two expansionist wars against Peru
and Bolivia in 1836-39 and 1879-82, and acquired two provinces rich in
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mineral resources. However in 1882 the Chilean government, under the in-
fluence of the free-trade and laissez-faire ideas introduced to the coun-
try by the French economist Coursell-Seneuil, decided to turn the mines
back to private ownership, an opportunity which was used by British in-
terests to take control of them. (Hirschman, 1963, p.166)
Nitrate, produced in the mines controlled by the British compaines,
became the most important Chilean export, and export and import taxes
were then the most important State revenues. Before 1918, the expansion
of mineral exports provided a comfortable backing for the laissez-faire
policies of the pseudo-aristocratic Chilean dominant class, because it
was free of income taxes and the land taxes were maintained very low.
The passive nature of the government was very well represented by the fa-
mous phrase of President Ramon Barros Luco,
There are only two kinds of political problems:
those that get solved by themselves, and those that
have no solution at all.
(Hirschman, 1963, p.173)
Favored by the same laissez-faire policies, U.S. interests took con-
trol of the largest copper mines and gradually replaced the British as the
most important foreign influence in the Chilean economy. After the end of
World War I, synthetic fertilizers displaced Chilean nitrate from the in-
ternational market and copper became the most important Chilean export un-
til today. (Loveman, 1979, p.238)
Even though the nitrate crisis and the great depression of the 1930's
forced the Chilean State into a new activism, the Chilean dominant class
was no longer interested in developing a self-sustained capitalist econo-
my. On the contrary, as the example of the Edwards family shows, the
Chilean oligarchy became interested in integrating itself into the inter-
national system of the large multi-national corporations. The subsidi-
33
aries of multinational corporations in Chile provided the opportunity for
members of the Chilean dominant class to join the ranks of the executives
of those such corporations. And the Chilean executives of those subsi-
diaries took care of mobilizing their influence to provide a favorable
political and economic environment in the country for their companies.
The political parties of the Right always sustained the necessity of for-
eign investments for Chilean development, and the need to provide special
incentives to attract such investments. This, in practice, implied a pri-
vilege for foreign investors over national ones.
Actually, in the 1960's, the most important foreign investments were
in mining (copper, nitrate, and iron ore), but 25% of all industrial cor-
porations had some participation of foreign capital and this group repre-
sented 60% of the total capital of industrial corporations. In fact, the
foreign investments were concentrated in the monopoly sector of large en-
terprises, especially the production of electrical equipment (60% foreign
owned), rubber (45%), transportation equipment (43%), and chemicals (38%).
They also controlled 50% of wholesale trade and five private banks, apart
from the telephone and electric companies mentioned previously. (Stallings,
1978, pp.43-4 5; De Vylder, 1976, p.12)
This economic dependency was one of the main factors of the low rate
of growth of the Chilean economy since decisions on investments and pro-
duction policies for an important share of the productive capacity were
taken outside of the country, independent of Chilean needs and intersts
and even in contradiction with such interests and needs. In addition,
the favorable treatment of the foreign investments resulted in a continu-
ous drain of Chilean money and resources. "During the decade of the 1960's,
direct foreign investment totaled $900 million compared with the repatri-
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ation of $839 million in profits and $873 million in depreciation, pro-
ducing a net outflow of $812 million." (Stallings, 1978, p.45)
During the period analyzed in this study, the most important symbol
of the Chilean economic dependency was the case of the large copper mines.
Chile is one of the largest producers and exporters of copper in the
world, and copper accounted for about 80% of the total value of Chilean
exports. The "Gran Mineria" (Large Mines) which produced between 80% and
90% of the total copper exports were owned by two U.S. corporations; Ana-
conda and Kennecott, which hired Chileans as executives for their subsi-
diaries in the country, but decided on their production, refining and mar-
ket policies from their headquarters in the United States, until the
Chilean government decided to participate in them in 1965. (Stallings,
1978, p.43; Loveman, 1979, p.261) The nationalization of the copper mines
by the Allende Administration in 1971 was one of the major factors for the
decision of the U.S. government to support the Chilean dominant class in
its efforts to overthrow the government. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.141-142;
De Vylder, 1976, p.128)
However, as stated previously, the dependency of the Chilean dominant
class was not only economic but scientific, technical and cultural as well.
Ever since the Independence war, foreign "experts" helped the Chilean oli-
garchy to organize the Armed Forces, to create State and legal institu-
tions, and to develop the national educational system, and doing so they
introduced new models and ideas to the country. The historic role of
these foreign experts will be analyzed in detail in a later chapter, but
it is important to note here that even though the adoption of foreign
ideas and models gave the Chilean social structure the formal appearance
of a modern system, it also implied the emergence of ideological conflicts
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within the Chilean dominant class and even the use of foreign ideas
against the interests of the oligarchy. That was the case of the demo-
cratic ideas which served as ideology to the Liberals and Radicals during
the past century, and which were incorporated into the Constitution by
the imitation of French and U.S. institutions, and the Marxist analysis
which was adopted as ideology by the political parties of the working
class. (Gil, 1966, pp. 244 & ff.; Loveman, 1979, p.181)
One special relation of cultural and ideological dependency of the
Chilean social structure with Europe was the Catholic Church. Christi-
anity was introduced in Latin America in the institutional form of Spanish
Catholicism, and as such it was an important part of the imposition of
European ideas on the native population. On July 28, 1508, Pope Julius II
conceded to the Spanish Crown universal patronage over the Church in the
"Indies". The Church became an agency of the royal government, dependent
on the "Consejo de Indias" (Council of Indies) for personnel, finances
and regulations. The King collected the tithe and allocated its distri-
bution, and assigned, to the Church, specific public functions such as
education, health and other social services. The Church reserved for her-
self the matters of doctrine and morality. (F.V. Scholes, in R.E. Green-
leaf, ed., 1971, p.22)
This reserve was the refuge of a persistent, if not very successful,
faction within the Church, which tried ever to raise the ethical consci-
ousness of the colonial rulers on the basis of a Christian humanism. In
addition, the centralized nature of the Spanish administration implied
that few of the Bishops in Latin America were native Americans. This led
to a conflict within the Church in the period during which the Latin Ame-
rican countries were gaining Independence from Spain. While the Bishops
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tended to be royalists and sustained conservative ideas, the lower clergy,
with a large number of native born priests, supported the "criollo" posi-
tion and were more favorable to the liberal ideas associated with it.
(K. Schmitt, in Greenleaf, ed., 1971, pp.157-163)
In Chile, this was a source of division within the dominant class.
Even though a friar, Camilo Henriquez, was a Secretary to the first gov-
ernment, "Junta", in 1810, Bernardo O'Higgins had several conflicts with
the Church during his "Directorate" (1817-1823) and Liberal governments
had many others during the past century, when the issue of the relations
between the Church and the State was the main source of difference between
the Conservative Party on one side and the Liberal and Radical Parties on
the other. Actually, the Church was tied to the State by the Conservative
Constitutions of 1828 and 1833, and "Diego Portales supported the Church
and used it pragmatically as a bulwark of political stability." (Kins-
brunner, 1973, p.53; See also Loveman, 1979, pp.181-182)
In the same way that the humanistic faction of the Church battled to
defend the rights of the Indians in colonial times, and liberal clergymen
joined the patriots in the struggle for Independence from Spain, a growing
group within the Catholic Church in the present century began to provide
a critical analysis of the social structure. Inspired by the social en-
cyclicals of the Popes Leo XIII: "Rerum Novarum" (1891), and Pius XI:
"Quadragesimo Anno" (1931), priests such as Fernando Vives and Jorge
Fernandez Pradel worked to create a social conscience among political
leaders and Bishops, and established a "Social Secretariat" directed to
support the unionization efforts of the workers of Santiago in 1917. In
1923, the Archbishop of Santiago, Crescente Errazuriz (of the same pre-
eminent family mentioned before) entered in negotiations with President
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Arturo Alessandri for the peaceful separation of Church and State which
was formalized in the Constitution of 1925. (Loveman, 1979, pp.306-307;
Halperin, 1965, pp.179-181)
After the death of Archbishop Errazuriz, other less pregressive
bishops tried to declare that militancy in the Conservative Party was ob-
ligatory for Catholics, but Father Vives obtained a letter from the Vati-
can Secretary of State, Cardinal Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII) which es-
tablished that no political party could be considered as the exclusive
representative of the Catholic Church. (Halperin, 1965, pp.181-182)
The same "Social-Christianism" movement inspired in the social en-
cyclicals of the Popes, and the ideas of the French philosopher, Frangois
Maritain, moved a group of young Catholics to form a new political move-
ment inside the Conservative Party. But their ideas put them at odds
with the politics of the Party and, in 1938, they split to form a new po-
litical organization named first Falange Nacional, and after 1957, the
Christian Democratic Party (PDC). After World War II, the Chilean Chris-
tian Democrats established good relations with the parties of the same
name in Europe and joined the international organization of the Christian
Democracy based in Europe. (Gil, 1966, pp. 7 2-7 3 & 266-276; Halperin, 1965,
pp.178-205)
In the 1960's, PDC grew to become the largest single party in Chilean
politics. The government of the Christian Democrat President, Eduardo
Frei, was the one which installed a National System of Planning in 1965,
and it was the division between the Christian Democrats and the Right which
allowed the election of Salvador Allende to the Presidency in 1970.
The example of the Catholic Church is a good demonstration of the im-
pact of ideas during the period under study and how the dependency
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of the Chilean dominant class made it vulnerable to foreign ideas and
models which could be contradictory to its own interests. In a parallel
situation, the labor organizations and the political parties of the Left,
which represented the working class, embraced European Marxism to serve
as the basis of their ideology.
4. The Development of the Chilean Working Class and the Class Struggle
According to the 1970 Census, 47.1% of the working class was em-
ployed in direct productive activities such as agriculture, mining, in-
dustry and construction; 7.5% worked in transportation, communications,
electricity, gas and water services; and 45.3% were employed in commerce,
finance and other services. Besides the 400,000 employees of the State,
the sectors which employed the largest number of workers were agriculture
with 341,000 workers, and industry with 321,000. Other large sectors
were construction (130,000), transportation and communications (118,000),
and commerce (141,000). The same source indicates that 65% of the white
collar employees worked in commerce, finance and other services, while
63% of the blue collar workers were employed in direct productive activi-
ties. (Stallings, 1978, p.35)
White collar employees were divided into two large groups: the
377,000 employees of the public sector (the rest of the State employees
were blue collar workers), and 321,000 employees of the private sector or
"empleados particulares". (ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 253, p.339)
A number of white collar employees had positions of supervision over
blue collar workers and the employees of the public sector were associated
with the power of the State in the eyes of the public. Moreover, as it
was mentioned before, many executives of private corporations, profession-
als and high officers of State agencies, were included statistically among
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white collar employees because that was the type of employment contract
they had. In addition, the legal segregation between white collar and
blue collar workers resulted 'in higher average salaries for white collar
than blue collar employees as the Table l.a on page shows. All of this
tended to give the white collar workers a subjective identification with
the dominant class while, objectively, they were at its service.
In fact, the real opportunities for upward mobility of white collar
employees were severely restricted due to the reservation of higher posi-
tions for professionals, politicians and, in the private sector, for re-
latives of the owners of the firms. In addition, the great expansion of
the tertiary sector during the last fifty years, led to the creation of
many white collar positions subordinated to the dominant class but with-
out direct control or supervision of other workers. Actually, in 1968,
more than 70% of the white collar workers had an income per capita below
the national average, and most of them had little hope of improving their
position by promotion. (ODEPLAN, 1971, Table II, p.XXX)
For these reasons, even though the white collar employees demonstrated
some ideological ambiguity and served as basis for the two large political
parties of the Center (Radicals and PDC), they showed no lack of solidari-
ty with the labor movement in the class struggle. Actually, white collar
organizations served as leaders of the labor movement in 1948 against the
conservative economic policies implemented by Jorge Alessandri as Minister
of Finance of the Administration of President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla.
Since the organizations of blue collar workers were in disarray due
to the repressive measures of the "Defense of Democracy Law" (better known
as "ley maldita" in the labor movement), State employees organized in the
Associaci6n Nacional de Empleados Fiscales (A.N.E.F.: National Association
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of Public Employees) and employees of the private sector organized in
the "Confederaci6n de Empleados Particulares de Chile" (C.E.P.CH.) formed
a coordinating committee presided by Clotario Blest, an employee of the
Treasury and leader of ANEF. Bank employees started the strike which
expanded and developed into a general strike that led to the dismissal
of the Minister of Finance and to the end of his conservative policies,
in 1950. (Hirschman, 1963, pp.189-1 9 0 ) Shortly after, the same organi-
zations were instrumental in the creation, in 1953, of the most important
organization of the working class, "Central Unica de Trabajadores de
Chile" (C.U.T.: Unified Workers Central) whose first president was
Clotario Blest.
However, the oldest and strongest organizations of the working class
were the labor unions of the blue collar workers and the political parties
of the Left.
At the end of the past century, the concentration of large numbers
of workers, subject to miserable working and living conditions in the iso-
lated locations of the mines, provided the natural environment for the
emergence of the Chilean labor movement. Nitrate and coal miners, to-
gether with the railroad workers who linked them (the coal mines were in
the south and the nitrate mines were in the north of the country), staged
the first general strike registered in Chile in 1890. (Loveman, 1979,
p.206)
The first national organization of workers, "Federacion Obrera de
Chile" (F.O.CH.) was founded in 1909, and the first enduring political
party of the working class was "Partido Obrero Socialista" (P.O.S.: So-
cialist Workers Party) organized in 1912, which was closely related to
FOCH, sharing leaders and strategy with the labor organization. (Gil,
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1966, p.55; Loveman, 1979, pp.2 16-2 2 8) Even though the first labor
leader elected to Congress in 1906, Luis Emilio Recabarren, was deprived
of his seat on a technicality, POS continued to present candidates, and
in the 1920's had four Deputies.
From the beginning, the labor movement was in contact with the
foreign linkages of the Chilean social structure because of the impor-
tance of British interests in the nitrate mines, and later the control
of U.S. capitalist of the largest copper mines. However, the working
class was seriously damaged by the tendency to follow the traits of the
dominant class in the adoption of foreign ideas and models.
During the 1920's and parallel to FOCH and POS, an anarchist move-
ment achieved strength among longshoremen and construction workers by de-
nouncing any compromise with the existing system. And in 1921, Luis
Emilio Recabarren, leader and founder of POS and FOCH, went to Moscow and
affiliated the Chilean labor organization to the Red International of
Labor Unions (R.I.L.U.). Upon his return to Chile in 1922, POS changed
its name to "Partido Comunista de Chile" (P.C.: Communist Party), and
officially adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the organizational
principle of "democratic centralism", created by Lenin for the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. This resulted in the division of the party
and the labor movement, and the reproduction, in Chile, of the interna-
tional conflict between "Stalinists" and "Trotzkysts" which had little
relation with the objective conditions of the Chilean working class, but
had long lasting consequences for the labor movement and the ensuing
course of the class struggle. (Gil, 1966, p.60; Loveman, 1979, pp.
2 1 7 &
227-228)
Divided, the labor movement was unable to make use of the paralysis
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of the established system which led to the military coup of 1924 and to
the adoption of a new Constitution in 1925.
The Communist Party achieved a strong international organization and
discipline but was deprived of revolutionary dynamism and flexibility to
react to the objective conditions of Chile and, in 1932, denounced the
short-lived "Socialist Republic" as a bourgeois movement. (Halperin, 1965,
p. 4 3 ; Roxborough, 1977, p.23)
In 1933 the same group of military officers, intellectuals and young
professionals who failed to establish a socialist republic, together with
the Trotzkyst faction divided from the Communists, organized the second
large party of the working class and the political Left, "Partido Social-
ista de Chile" (P.S.: Socialist Party). (Roxborough, 1977, p.23-24;
Stallings, 1978, p.2 9)
Salvador Allende was one of the founders of the Socialist Party and
the differences between Socialists and Communists had an impact on the
period analyzed in this study, and therefore merit a further short expla-
nation.
Both parties had a genuine base within the working class, even
though the Socialists had a more diversified composition than the Commu-
nists, and both parties sustained a Marxist ideology. However, the Soci-
alists rejected any affiliation with international organizations centered
in Europe, while the Communists were members of the international organi-
zations based in Moscow and tended to follow their general strategy. As
a result, even though the Socialists ever tended to develop a "Chilean
way to Socialism", they also received many elements who had left the Com-
munist Party as a consequence of international conflicts, from the
Trotzkysts who founded PS to the Chilean followers of the Yugoslavian or
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Chinese splits from the Soviet influence. (Halperin, 1965, pp.135-144;
Gil, 1966, p.286)
In addition, the Communists had traditionally adopted the strategy
of the "peaceful road to socialism", that is, of working through the es-
tablished political regime of representative democracy, while the Soci-
alists were born of an aborted revolution and sustained a much more cri-
tical position in relation to the established system. They tended to
consider that the representative democracy, established by the Constitu-
tion of 1925, was an instrument to maintain the power of the dominant
class, and even though they were willing to follow, for a time, the
"peaceful road" of the Communists, they were always waiting for the oppor-
tunity to achieve power through radical changes in the established system,
which placed them at the left of the Communists. (Halperin, 1965, p.143;
Gil, 1966, pp.286-287)
As it was seen above, the original base of the labor movement was
among miners and the railroad workers, but during the 1920's and 1930's
it expanded to include industrial workers, white collar employees and
peasants. Still, in 1936, the Workers Confederation of Chile (C.T.CH.),
which replaced FOCH as a national labor organization, was a blue collar
organization, but the creation of CUT in 1953 unified all sectors of the
working class. It was estimated that during the Allende Administration,
CUT included all the workers who could legally be organized. (Stallings,
1978, p.40; Roxborough, 1977, p.32)
The response of the Chilean dominant class to the growing organiza-
tion and mobilization of the working class was conditioned by the ideolo-
gical conflicts inside the oligarchy and by the changes in the economic
situation of the country. As a result, the working class suffered peri-
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ods of harsh repression alternating with others in which they enjoyed
a restricted measure of freedom. In most cases the repression was di-
rected against blue collar workers and peasants, but white collar em-
ployees were also affected after their organizations joined the labor
movement in 1948.
In the first period, from 1890 to 1910, the rule was the crude mi-
litary supression of the labor movement in actions which culminated in
the senseless killing of 3.600 miners and members of their families by
the Army in the school, Santa Maria, in Iquique in 1907. (Loveman, 1979,
p.226; Stallings, 1978, p.27) This was followed by a period in which
the laissez-faire policies of the government were extended also to the
labor movement. But the crisis of the nitrate mines after World War I
resulted in a great increase of unemployment and labor conflicts which
led to a new period of repression that extended from 1920 to 1936 with
new massacres in San Gregorio (1921), La Corua (1925) and Ranquil (1934).
In La Coruaa, the Army killed 1,200 nitrate miners and destroyed
their houses with artillery barrages. In Ranquil, the national police
(Carabineros) machine gunned a large number of peasants who were pro-
testing the loss of their small lots of land. (Loveman, 1979, pp.2 39-2 4 6
& 270; Roxborough, 1977, pp.19-22)
However, this second period of repression was accompanied by a
parallel effort to institutionalize the labor conflict by the creation of
a social security system in 1924, the recognition of the voting rights of
workers in the Constitution of 1925, and by the dictation of the Labor
Code and its subsequent enforcement in 1931. (Loveman, 1979, pp.243-249;
Roxborough, 1977, pp.21-22)
After 1937, the dominant class, internally divided by its ties with
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both sides in World War II, took a more conciliatory approach to the
labor movement, trying to tame it, to divide it or to compromise with it
rather than confronting it.
In 1937 the Radical Party entered in a coalition with the parties
of the Left to form a "Popular Front" that won the Presidency for the
Radical, Pedro Aguirre Cerda in 1939. The Popular Front government
created CORFO and introduced planning as a State function in Chile.
However, to obtain acceptance for its project in a Congress dominated by
the Right, the Executive negotiated an agreement between the dominant
class and the labor movement by which the rural areas were excluded from
unionization efforts. Thus, the agricultural workers were not allowed
to organize, and the existing organizations were destroyed by government
action. This led to a destruction of the Popular Front and to a conflict
between Communists and Socialists. (Loveman, 1979, pp.270-280; Roxborough,
1977, pp.25-27; Kaufman, 1972, p.26)
In 1946, Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, considered to be the leader of the
left wing of the Radical Party, obtained the highest number of votes
among four candidates in the presidential elections, with the support of
the Communists. Since none of the candidates obtained a majority of the
popular vote, Congress had to choose between the two highest pluralities.
This led Gonzalez Videla to get an agreement with the Liberal Party to
achieve its support in Congress, and resulted in the strange situation
of a government coalition which included the party of businessmen and
the Communists together. (Gil, 1966, p.72; Loveman, 1979, p.283)
In 1947, President Gonzalez Videla went to Brazil to participate in
the Inter-American Conference which adopted the "Rio de Janeiro Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance" (the Rio Pact), and enrolled Chile in the
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Cold War, helped by U.S. financial aid for the Huachipato steel mill and
some hydroelectric projects. When the Communists tried to respond
through a series of strikes in the copper, nitrate and coal mines, the
Executive, with the support of the Rightist majority in Congress, passed,
within 48 hours, the "Defense of Democracy Law" which deprived the Com-
munists of their civil rights, and sent many labor leaders to concentra-
tion camps or to exile. (Gil, 1966, p.72; Johnson, 1958, p.87)
The Defense of Democracy Law, known also as "Ley Maldita" by the
labor movement, started a new period of repression which lasted for ten
years. However, it led to a new unity of the Left, by forcing the Com-
munists and Socialists to forget their sectarian squabbles. This was
reflected in the organization of CUT in 1953 and by the creation of a
new permanent political alliance, "Frente de Accion Popular" (FRAP: Pop-
ular Action Front) in 1957. (Gil, 1966, p.276; Roxborough, 1977, pp.31-
32)
In addition, the "Ley Maldita" marked the end of the compromise of
1939 between the dominant class and the labor movement, and led to a new
emphasis within the labor movement for the organization and mobilization
of agricultural workers. Communists and Christian Democrats, in parti-
cular, were very active, and organized in the vineyard region of Molina,
the first large scale strike of agricultural workers in 1953. When the
government of Carlos Ibanez, abrogated the "Ley Maldita" just at the be-
ginning of the period analyzed in this study, which coincides with the
last period of relative freedom of the working class before the brutal
repression of the present military dictatorship.
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5. The Law and the Democratic Regime in Chile before 1973.
One important characteristic of the Chilean social structure was
the legal formalism which permeated all social relations.
Almost any agreement, social grouping or organization was conceived
as a formal contract which assigned well defined rights and obligations.
And the social conventions which surrounded any social relation were as
rigid as legal norms, including details as proper attire and ways to do
things. (Condon, 1961, pp.5 & &) There was a widely held expectation
that the law could solve most of the social problems.
This resulted in a great number of formal rules (near 20,000 valid
laws in 1970) and the extended preeminence of lawyers in all the spheres
of social action. Such legal formalism was used as a symbol of the uni-
versal legitimacy of the established social system, and together with
the formal political regime of representative democracy, constituted a
source of nationalistic pride until 1973, distinguishing the "Chilean
way" from other Latin American countries ruled by arbitrary dictator-
ships. (Gil, 1966, p.viii; Loveman, 1979, pp.6-7)
The Constitution of 1925 that ruled until the counter-revolution of
1973, "insured to all the inhabitants of the Republic equality before
the law." (Art. 10, No. 1) But in practice, the dominant class made use
of the law as an instrument of control of the social system and to give
a caste-like organization to the social structure with well defined so-
cial classes and little social mobility between them. In direct contra-
diction to the Constitutional rule, the diverse social groups were di-
vided not only by class and function, but also by the particular legal
statute applied to each of them.
The class nature of the legal system was clear in its origin. The
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law was produced by the State and the State was controlled by the domi-
nant class under the appearance of a representative democracy. As a re-
sult, the members of the dominant class tended to consider their own
rights as preceding the law, and the value of the law as dependent on
its functional utility. In contrast, the members of the working class
tended to consider the law as the only source of rights recognized by
the dominant class. Paradoxically, this meant that the law had more im-
portance for the working class, who were submitted to it, than for the
dominant class, who used the law as an instrument of social control.
A good example of the class orientation of the legal system is
given by the Civil Code adopted in 1855. The Civil Code defined the law
and gave the rules for its validity and interpretation. In accordance
to its Article 7, "the law rules since its publication in the 'Diario
Oficial' (Official Daily) and after this publication, it is presumed
known by everybody, and no one may allege ignorance of the law". And
later, the same code ruled that the first criteria for the interpreta-
tion of the law is the fidelity to its literal text, not its spirit or
objective. (Art. 19)
At the same time that the Civil Code was adopted, nearly 80% of the
Chilean population was illiterate (Gil, 1966, p.19) which meant that the
Civil Code was putting the law at the service of the educated elite.
Even though, later, most of the Chilean population became able to read
the law, the added complexity of a great number of rules and the elabor-
ate language, used in legal texts, required the intervention of lawyers
for its interpretation, and most of the lawyers were members of the do-
minant class and at its service.
The Civil Code is probably the most important piece of legislation
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for the dominant class and it is still in force after several political
regimes and big social changes have taken place in the country. In
fact, aside from the rules on definition, validity and interpretation
of the law, it contains the rules of property rights and created the
"Registro del Conservador de Bienes Raices: (National Registry of Real
Estate), regulates contracts and personal obligations, and defines fami-
ly rights and inheritance rights.
Given the concentration of wealth and property by the dominant
class, these rules were obviously very useful to its members, but they
were practically useless the great mass of the population.
Another important code of the XIX century was the Criminal Code
("Codigo Penal"), which defined crimes and penalties in a rigid system
of mandatory sentencing which has been criticized by its mechanical ap-
proach to criminal cases, and by its scales of weight of penalties which
allowed judges little discretion and tended to give more importance to
crimes against property than crimes against persons.
But the most important body of legistlation for the working class
was the Labor Code of 1931, which regulated labor conflicts and formal-
ized the segregation between employers and employees and among different
types of workers. The Code defined the "Contrato de Trabajo" as an in-
dividual work contract which included some mandatory features and di-
verse rights for employers more than for workers. It also contained the
rules about labor organizations and about labor conflicts, and author-
ized legal strikes after such cumbersome requisites that most strikes,
after the Code was adopted, were technically "illegal". (Roxborough,
1977, p.61)
But the most important social impact of the Labor Code was the for-
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mal segregation established by it among white collar employees ("emple-
ados"), blue collar workers ("obreros"), and agricultural workers
("obreros agricolas"). These categories were reduced to only two by
Law 16,250 of 1965, which eliminated the differences between agricul-
tural and industrial workers. (Loveman, 1979, p.2 4 5; Stallings, 1978,
p.3 8 )
The same Labor Code provided the formal mechanism by which an oc-
cupational role was to be classified ("Junta Clasificadora de Empleados
y Obreros") and the criteria to be used for such classification, being
the distinction between "intellectual" and "physical" work. White col-
lar "intellectual" workers were given, by this code and subsequent legis-
lation, more rights and better benefits than blue collar "physical"
workers, in matters of wages, organization and social security, with
agricultural workers being the "less privileged" of the three groups.
(Gil, 1966, p.23; Stallings, 1978, p.38)
White collar employees were authorized to organize, regionally or
nationally, by trade and could negotiate collective agreements on that-
basis. Blue collar workers could only organize by shop or factory and
their regional and national organizations were "illegal". Before Law
16,625 of 1967, it was practically impossible for agricultural workers
to organize within the legal framework. (Loveman, 1976, p.259)
The minimum salary for white collar employees (Sueldo Vital) was
fixed each year by a commission in which the employees were represented
together with representatives of the employers and the State, after a
survey had been carried out to estimate the cost of living for a typical
employee family. By contrast, the minimum wages for blue collar workers
were fixed by law on an irregular basis since they depended on the wil-
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lingness of Congress and the Executive to legislate. Until 1965, the
minimum wages for agricultural workers were lower than those of indus-
trial workers because it was assumed that agricultural workers received
some benefits in kind.
The different categories of workers also had diverse systems of
social security which provided better benefits for white collar than
blue collar workers. The social security funds were also important be-
cause they were related to medical insurance and to the financing of
housing for the respective workers. (Gil, 1966, pp.179-183)
The legal segregation described above resulted in the differences
in income of the occupational categories which appear in Table l.a. Ac-
tually, the income of white collar employees was, on average, three
times the income of blue collar workers during the period of 1960-1969.
(ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 34, p.48)
These differences were instrumental in restricting the possibili-
ties of a unified organization of the working class, and added to the
previously mentioned distinction between workers of large firms and
small enterprises, to create conflicts among the immediate particular
interests of each category of workers and the long term interests of the
working class as a whole. (Stallings, 1978, p.38)
The classification of Chileans was completed by the special statute
of the civil service ("Estatuto Administrativo") which ruled public em-
ployees, giving them different rights and obligations than the workers
of the private sector, and by the special "fuero" of the military who
had their own legislation ("Codigo de Justicia Militar") and their own
Military Courts.
All these legal statutes added to the economic differences and re-
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stricted educational opportunities to create a complex system of pre-
defined roles, in which each Chilean was assigned, at birth, a position
in the social structure, and had great difficulties to move out of it.
The period analyzed in this study includes an effort, first to make
this system more flexible and open through the reforms of the Frei Ad-
ministration, and later the attempt of the Allende Administration to
change the entire system, before the counter-revolution in 1973 made it
more rigid and arbitrary under the military dictatorship.
Only two of the basic components of the Chilean State were chosen
by popular election, until 1973, and even though in appearance they were
the most important ones, in practice they were not strong enough to de-
termine the long term role and direction of the State by themselves. It
is not a coincidence that the electoral process was eliminated entirely
by the counter-revolution in 1973. The dominant class used the demo-
cratic regime to solve its own internal conflicts and to achieve inter-
national respectability by following the models of more developed coun-
tries, but was willing to discard any pretenses of democratic procedures
as soon as they became a threat for the established social structure.
Historically, this was not necessary before 1970 because many means,
incorporated into the system, insured that the regime was maintained un-
der control by the dominant class. Until that year, the regime of con-
stitutional representative democracy corresponded to the description of
Frederick Pike:
Actually what we have praised as democracy in Chile
since 1920 has amounted to little more than a system
in which a small privileged class has been gentlemanly
in determing, through very limited electoral processes,
which of its members would rule the country.
(Pike, 1963, p.XXV)
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In fact, several features of the constitutional system were instru-
mental in maintaining the control of the dominant class, notwithstanding
the ever growing electorate, and the access gained by representatives of
other social classes to the politcal process before 1973.
A first such institution was the system of proportional representa-
tion and the staging of different dates and periods for the elections of
President and Congress. The system of proportional representation, es-
tablished in the Constitution and the electoral laws, favored party
fragmentation and coalition politics. Added to the different dates and
periods of election, the election of a President and Congress frequently
resulted in hostility to each other. (Sigmund, 1977, p.16; Kaufman, 1972.
p.16)
Related to the former was a second Constitutional rule which helped
the dominant class to maintain control of the system. It was the elec-
tion of President by Congress in the event that none of the candidates
achieved the absolute majority of the popular vote. The contradictory
tendencies inside the two large parties of the Center, the tendency to
to divide into a large number of small parties, and the continuous
squabbles between Socialists and Communists before 1957, resulted in the
presentation of more than two candidates in all the presidential elec-
tions after 1932. In these conditions, only twice, in 1939 and in 1964,
one candidate obtained the majority of the vote, and all the other Pre-
sidents had to negotiate their elections with the majority of Congress,
where the dominant class had ever a strong representation. (Gil, 1966,
p.2 2 7 ; Sigmund, 1977, p.15)
Of special importance were two cases of these negotiations. The
already mentioned case of the election of Gabriel Gonzslez Videla in
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1946, in which the Liberal Party entered government to neutralize the
influence of the Communists who had helped to elect the President, and
the "Act of Constitutional Guarantees" that Salvador Allende had to sign
with the Christian Democrats in 1970, to achieve their votes in Congress,
and which contained restrictions to his future government actions. (See
Chapter 5.)
Another mechanism of control of the dominant class over the system,
in spite of the democratic regime, was the inclusion of representatives
of the traditional associations of landlords and businessmen (SOFOFA,
SNA, etc.) in the directive boards of the agencies of the State. A good
example of this was the Board of the Central Bank, integrated by 13
members of who two were appointed by the President, two by the Senate,
two by the Chamber of Deputies, three by private banks, two by the asso-
ciations mentioned above, one by private shareholders, and one by labor
organizations. A similar situation in other policy making agencies of
the State, such as CORFO or the State Bank, gave inside information and
formal influence to the dominant class in the design of economic policy,
independently of the political tendencies of the elected officials.
(Stallings, 1978, p.58; Loveman, 1979, pp.220-222)
The most direct means used by the dominant class to maintain control
was the manipulation of the electoral processes. During the past century
and until 1948, the main instrument used was the restriction in the ac-
cess to voting rights, to the point that in 1927 only 10% of the popula-
tion was eligible to vote and less than half of this number actually
voted. (Nunn, 1976, p.158)
The concentration of economic power by the dominant class also gave
it an advantage in the electoral process which was fully used to main-
55
tain its control. The traditional paternalistic organization of the
"latifundio" system in agriculture, made the landowners political bosses
of the peasants who owed them their jobs, their houses, and had no other
contact with the rest of the world. Attempts of other political forces
to penetrate the rural areas were successfully resisted by the landowners
until the 1950's. This was associated with the distortion introduced by
the manipulation of census figures and administrative divisions which
gave undue weight to the regions in which the dominant class had tradi-
tional political control. (Gil, 1966, p.208)
The economic power of the dominant class was felt as political in-
fluence in the cities also in several ways. The high rates of unemploy-
ment and the extreme poverty of a great majority of the working class,
made it susceptible to the bribery and pressures of the employers. This
was complemented until 1958 by the electoral law which allowed the out-
right buying and controlling of votes before the reform of that year.
(Gil, 1966, pp.223-224; Loveman, 1979, p.235) More "sophisticated" means
were used to tame or "convert" populist leaders, as in the case of
Gonzalez Videla who was compensated by his turn from Leftist leader into
anti-communist zealot by being appointed, after his presidential period,
Chief Executive of the Chilean subsidiary of RCA, Vice-President of the
French and Italian Bank for South America, and consultant for Ford
Motor Company in its Latin American operations. (Loveman, 1979, pp.289-
290; Rojas, 1976, p.55)
In addition, the dominant class was favored by its control of the
means of mass communications. In 1970, three chains printed 750,000
daily newspapers all over the country, sustaining the views of the domi-
nant class, while only 280,000 were published supporting other ideas in
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papers published mainly in the large cities. The most powerful and ex-
tended radio broadcasting networks were also property of organizations
of the dominant class (Sociedad Nacional de Mineria, Sociedad Nacional
de Agricultura, La Cooperativa Vitalicia) compensated only by one strong
radio controlled by the State Bank, and weaker and scattered local ra-
dios. Two large publishing houses (Lord Cochrane and Zig Zag), owned by
economic groups of the oligarchy, accounted for 95% of the magazine mar-
ket, and published 2.7 million copies per week, included the Spanish
version of The Reader's Digest, in competition with the 20,000 copies of
the Leftist "Punto Final" and the lesser number of printed copies of the
Jesuit owned "Mensaje". (Feinberg, 1972, p.93)
Even though the TV channels were reserved to the State and the uni-
versities by law, the lack of local production facilities and resources
meant that the programs were heavily dependent on U.S. and European
series and docummentaries. Only some talk shows of large audiences,
during the 1950's, provided the opportunity for the public to compare
diverse political views in relation to the national issues.
The control of communications and information by the dominant class
was useful not only in electoral campaigns, but on a more permanent ba-
sis, served as a continuous instrument of formation of public opinion
favorable to the viewpoint of the dominant class in policy matters. It
also contributed, together with the educational system, to obtain that
the values and norms of the dominant class permeated the whole social
structure and legitimized the system in spite of its objective contra-
dictions.
However, the Constitution of 1925 opened the opportunity to vote to
all men older than 21 who could read and write, and even though it was
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difficult to register, especially for workers who could not abandon their
jobs on the few days and hours fixed for registration, the number of
voters grew steadily. (Gil, 1966, p.207)
In 1949, the same Gonzalez Videla Administration which deprived
the Communists and Labor Leaders of their civil rights by the "Defense
of Democracy Law", formally compensated the repression of the working
class by giving full political rights to women who were, until then, re-
stricted to vote only in municipal elections. This resulted in a great
expansion of the electoral rolls, and also provided the Right with a
head-start in the political organization of women. This proved to be
very important in 1958, when the feminine vote assured the election of
Jorge Alessandri to the Presidency while Allende obtained more votes
among men. (Gil, 1966, pp.212-215)
Finally, in 1958, a coalition of the Centrist parties and the Left
passed an electoral reform which restored the political rights of the
Communists and made permanent the registration process. It also changed
the electoral procedures to eliminate the buying and control of votes.
These measures led to an explosive expansion of the electorate, from
less than half a million in 1946 to 1.5 million in 1958, and to 4.5 mil-
lion registered voters in the last free elections which took place in
Chile in 1973. (Gil, 1966, Table 9, p.213; Stallings, 1978, Table A.1)
Together with this expansion of the electorate, a competition de-
veloped between the Christian Democratic Party and the parties of the
Left, for the organization of these new political participants, in parti-
cular the rural population and the recent migrants to the cities who
lived in the large "poblaciones" which circled major urban areas. Mem-
bership in labor unions grew from 276,000 in 1958 to 551,000 in 1970,
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and the increase was particularly remarkable among agricultural workers
whose labor unions had only 2,000 members in 1958 and jumped to 114,000
in 1970.
Many other forms of grass-roots organizations such as neighborhood
councils ("Juntas de Vecinos"), "mothers' centers", community commands,
and consumer and production cooperatives were also supported by the above
mentioned political parties to create a basic network capable to mobilize
the great mass of the working class during the 1960's. (Cusack, 1977,
pp.21-22; Stallings, 1978, Table A.4)
This organization drive of the Left and the Christian Democrats was
reflected by the electoral results as the following graphs clearly show.
The traditional parties of the Right and the Radicals, whose organiza-
tions were created in the past century, were unable to compete with the
younger and more modern activism of the Left and PDC. On their side,
the Christian Democrats, after the rapid upsurge between 1950 and 1967,
started a decline after they identified their policies with the Right,
while the Left had a continuous growth after the big depression resultant
from the "Defense of Democracy Law" (1948-1957).
The meaning of electoral results in Chile was obscured by the con-
tinuous succession of elections of different natures, which enhanced the
importance of short term changes. Politicians, press reporters and even
social scientists, such as Barbara Stallings, Paul Sigmund and Federico
Gil, mixed in their analysis the results of presidential, congressional
and municipal elections, as if they were compatible data indicating the
public reaction to government policies.
However, even though the Chilean electorate was the same, it was
levied very different kinds of choices in the diverse types of elections.
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Presidential elections were choices among individual candidates repre-
senting coalitions of parties and general approaches to national issues.
Congressional elections, by contrast, were choices among lists of candi-
dates representing each list a political party, and the issues were a
mixture of national problems with regional and local concerns. And the
municipal elections were also choices among lists of candidates by par-
ties, but were much more concentrated on local issues than national ones.
(See Gil, 1966, Chapter 5, pp. 2 0 6 & ff.)
Thus, to combine the results of these three types of elections in
the same analysis is of doubtful validity for scientific purposes, and
actually confuses the basic structural changes by mixing them with prob-
lems of individual personality, party allegiance and local problems.
The comparison between elections of the same nature eliminates most of
these distortions and allows to perceive the long term trends shown by
the two graphs above.
In fact, these graphs show the basic reason why the Left took the
electoral way instead of the violent one to change the system. They also
indicate the basic reason for the counter-revolution of 1973, since the
long term trends demonstrate the inability of the dominant class to con-




OF FOREIGN EXPERTS, CHILEAN PROFESSIONALS, PLANNERS AND PLANNING
Introduction
The previous chapter presented a description of the general back-
ground for the practice of planning in Chile during the period under
study. This chapter focuses on the particular aspects of such back-
ground more directly related to planners and planning.
Two basic characteristics of planners and planning are analyzed
here:
a) Planners as members of the Chilean educated elite of profession-
als, and
b) The strong relations of planning and planners to the foreign
sector through the international training of Chilean planners, the par-
ticipation of foreign experts in the practice of planning, and the in-
troduction of planning in Chile in response to international events.
For this purpose, the Chapter will be divided into four sections
which are:
1) The Foreign Experts and the Development of the Chilean Institu-
tions
2) The Chilean Professionals and Planners
3) CORFO and the Introduction of Planning in Chile
4) ECLA, The Alliance for Progress and Planning
These sections should serve to place planners and planning in their
particular context of being dependent on the Chilean dominant class while
opposed to its interests. This peculiar position came about because
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planning was reluctantly accepted by the Chilean dominant class under
external pressure, and planners were members of the dominant class who
served as agents of change of the established social structure.
1. Foreign Experts and the Development of the Chilean Institutions.
A fundamental cultural tradition of the Chilean dominant class was
to consider itself more European than native American because its mem-
bers were a mixture of descendants from the old Spanish colonial admini-
strators and more recently arrived European immigrants. One of the im-
portant consequences of this cultural trait has been the extraordinary
influence that foreign experts have had in all aspects of the develop-
ment of Chilean ideas and institutions.
In colonial times, the centralized nature of the Spanish Empire
discouraged local innovations and required that all cultural, legal and
technical values and norms responded to those of the metropolis. In the
XVIII century, the presence of the Bourbons on the Throne of Spain
changed the organizations of the colonies, and French ideas began to
challenge the old Spanish traditions; but still, these changes imposed
from Europe were passively accepted by the "criollos". Actually, the
Independence from Spain came at the beginning of the XIX century, not as
the result of the strong local desire for self-determination, but as a
consequence of the Spanish King's imprisonment by Napoleon. (Loveman,
1979, pp.100-11 9 ; Crow, 1972, pp.337-343)
Independence did not change the Chilean social structure nor the
cultural traditions of the dominant class, even though it opened the
country to other influences. In fact, it was during the war for Inde-
pendence that the Chileans had the first opportunity to make use of for-
eign experts and ideas. In the first stage of the war (1810-1814), the
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patriots were divided into two factions. One was headed by the Presi-
dent of the Revolutionary Junta, Jose Miquel Carrera. Carrera had the
direct assistance of the Consul of the United States, Joel R. Poinsett,
who participated "more or less directly in almost all the public affairs
of Chile, and even accompanied Carrera in his first campaigns against
the Spaniards." (Stuart, 1955, p.380) The other faction was led by
Bernardo O'Higgins, who had been educated by his father in Europe.
O'Higgins made use of his dominion of the English and French languages
by reading "revolutionary books" which he interpreted for his friends.
When O'Higgins, with the help of the famous "Liberation Army" of Jose de
San Martin, finally defeated the Spanish colonial army, he appointed a
British "expert", Thomas Lord Cochrane, to organize the Chilean Navy and
to help San Martin in his expedition against the Viceroy of Lima.
(Stuart, 1955, pp.379-382; Crow, 1972, pp.468-469)
Independence was followed by a series of experiments. Through the
use of foreign models, the Chilean dominant class tried to give shape to
new Chilean institutions. French and U.S. political institutions were
especially imitated in several Constitutions, including a "federalist"
one in 1926, and a "liberal" one in 1928. This period of experimentation
ended when a conservative group, which included Mariano Egafia, Manuel
Rengifo, and General Joaquin Prieto, under the leadership of Diego
Portales, took control of the country and started to implement the au-
thoritarian and centralized regime known as "autocratic republic" or "de-
mocracy of the oligarchy" which lasted until 1925. (Crow, 1972, pp.
6 4 0 &
ff.; Gil, 1966, pp.36-37) It was at the beginning of this regime that
Mariano Egafia invited the well-known Venezuelan man of letters, Andr6s
Bello, to Chile.
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Bello had been sent to England together with Bolivar in 1810 to
procure funds for the Venezuelan patriots in their struggle against
Spain. They failed, and the Spanish repressed the patriots which left
Bello stranded in England. For the next 18 years, he taught Spanish,
served as tutor to the children of Lord Hamilton, published a literary
and political magazine of liberal ideas, married an English woman,
Elizabeth Dunn, and met many Latin Americans who, like himself, passed
through London in search of help against Spain. Among them were the
Chileans who later invited him to their country. (Crow, 1972, p.643)
In Chile, Bello was first appointed Under-Secretary of Foreign
Relations, and later was in charge of organizing Universidad de Chile,
founded in 1842, where he was the first Rector (President). In the
meantime, he was preparing the project of Civil Code which was presented
to the government and approved by Congress in 1855. This code has
served since them as the basic statute of the dominant class, because it
contains the legal rules on property rights, contracts, family relations,
inheritance, and the validity and interpretation of the law itself.
(Crow, 1972, p.6 4 4 ; Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p.ll3 )
As a professor, Andres Bello introduced his students to the ideas
of Bentham and James Mill, which became the ideology of the so-called
"Generation of 1842". This was a group of liberal intellectuals, led by
Francisco Bilbao and Joss Victorino Lastarria, who inspired the Liberal
rebellion against the autocratic regime. (Crow, 1972, p.644; Loveman,
1979, p.153)
During the same year, 1842, another foreign scholar and educator,
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who was later President of Argentina, was
appointed first director of the first school of teachers existing in
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Chile, the "Escuela Normal de Preceptores" (National Normal School).
Since Universidad de Chile had at the same time the superintendence over
all the educational system, Chile was then the first Latin American
country to have a public national educational system. The two major
institutes within the system, however, were directed by foreign experts.
(Gil, 1966, p.14)
As Rector of the University, Bello hired several other foreign ex-
perts. Perhaps the most important of them was the French economist,
Jean Gustave Courselle-Seneuil, who arrived in Chile in 1855 as the
first Professor of Economics of the University and later became adviser
to the Minister of Finance. Courselle-Seneuil has been described by
Albert 0. Hirschman as "a fervent partisan of free trade and laissez-
faire". Hirschman added:
Poor Courselle-Seneuil! His one-man technical assis-
tance mission could hardly have been more successful
according to ordinary standards of performance. His
advice was punctiliously followed, the laws he drafted
were passed, his bust stands in the University of Chile
and his influence as a teacher and publicist came to be
widely felt. But just because of that, virtually every
serious ill subsequently experienced by the Chilean
economy, from inflation to monoexportation, has been
traced to him. (Hirschman, 1963, p.166)
In fact, Courselle-Seneuil was the author of the extremely liberal
banking law of 1860 which is reputed to be the cause of the first act in
the history of Chile's secular inflation. This law produced a real an-
archy of speculative credit just before both the closing of the markets
for Chilean products in California and Australia and the war of 1879
against Peru and Bolivia, which required the most financial discipline.
(Hirschman, 1963, p.16 7)
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The members of the Chilean government commission, who decided to
transfer the nitrate mines in the provinces conquered by Chile after the
war in 1882 to private interests, were also disciples of Courselle-
Seneuil, perhaps more royalist than the King. The mines had previously
been expropriated by the Peruvian government, who paid their former
owners 20 year bonds. During the war, the bonds depreciated and were
acquired by speculators, especially the British financier, John T. North.
Because of this decision of the Chilean government, North became "King
of Nitrates". The commission of the Chilean government, integrated by
former students of Courselle-Seneuil such as Zorobabel Rodriguez and
Marcial Gonzales, rejected the State's control of the mines in the name
of laissez-faire and free trade principles. Instead, they allowed their
control by British interests. (Hirschman, 1963, pp.165-166; Loveman,
1979, pp.197-198 )
The same war was followed by other important elements of foreign
influence, especially in the Armed Forces and in the educational system.
After 1882, the Chilean government was interested in maintaining
strong Armed Forces for several purposes. The Indians in southern pro-
vinces had used the government's involvement in an external war as an op-
portunity to start a rebellion. The rebellion repeated many episodes of
the same kind which had occured since colonial times, and the government
used the Army in the hope of achieving a "final solution" to the Indian
question. At the same time, an unsolved border dispute with Argentina
and the lack of a final treaty with Peru and Bolivia constituted exter-
nal threats which impeded the total demobilization of the military.
These problems served to justify a huge program of modernization and pro-
fessionalization of the Armed Forces that included contracting German in-
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structors for the Army and British instructors for the Navy.
Probably the most important of these military foreign experts was
the German Lieutenant Colonel, Emil Koerner, who arrived in Chile in
1885 as Sub-Director of the Military School, and the next year founded
the "Academia de Guerra" (War College) as an institute of advanced
studies for high ranking officers. In this effort, Koerner used the
Prussian Army and military institutions as a model, and even included
armaments and uniforms. (Loveman, 1979, pp.195-196; Nunn, 1967, pp.249-
250)
The German influence was also felt in the educational system. A
first group of German teachers arrived in Chile in 1885. They had been
contracted by Jose Abelardo Niinez, the Chilean educator who had been
sent to U.S. and Europe to study the means of improving the elementary
schools. The German teachers took over the direction of the Normal
schools that existed in the country, and imposed their Herbatian tech-
niques of instruction. (Gil, 1966, p.17; Silvert & Reissman, 1976, pp.
128-129)
A similar process was followed by secondary education under the in-
fluence of Valentin Letelier, who in 1889 founded the "Instituto Peda-
g6gico" (Pedagogical Institute) with six German professors. The French
model of "lycee", which had been used for secondary education since the
beginning of the XIX century, was then changed to the German "gymnasium",
with some Swedish inserts in physical education and manual training.
(Gil, 1966, p.18 ; Silvert & Reissman, 1976, pp.129-132)
It is not surprising that some analysts found the Chilean education-
al system "extrajerizado" (foreignized). As Clark C. Gill wrote:
The Normal Schools reflected German objectives. Dis-
cipline, methods, plans and programs were German imi-
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tations. German influence had pervaded the secondary
and technical schools as well.
(Gill, 1966, p.19)
Gill added:
A foreign spirit alien to Chilean realities, was im-
posed on the schools, as evidenced in the rigid mon-
archical concept of discipline. By their aristrocratic
orientation, the German professors inspired even greater
class cleavage in Chilean society and within the schools
created inflexible barriers among pupils, teachers and
directors.
(Gill, 1966, p.17)
What Gill does not appear to perceive is that probably those aris-
tocratic tendencies of German teachers were what led the Chilean domin-
ant class to contract them in the first place. "Modernizing" schools
through the German professors resulted in an intelligent device to re-
inforce the caste-like nature of the Chilean structure and the control
of the dominant class over it.
The German Director of the Academy of War, Emil Koerner, together
with the financing of the British and the assistance of the British
Navy instructors, were instrumental in 1891 in organizing the forces of
Congress against President Balmaceda. Balmaceda was trying to recover
the nitrate mines for the State as a first step in a program of economic
development, and the help of the foreign advisers and British financing
were the essential elements that led to the victory of Congress over the
President. (Loveman, 1979, pp.20 8-2 0 9 ; Nunn, 1976, pp.77-78) After the
Civial War, Koerner became Chief of the Chilean General Staff. In 1894,
he went to Germany to inspect armament recently acquired by Chile, and
returned with thirty-six German officers who served for two years as in-
structors of the Chilean Army. They were replaced by another twenty-
seven German officers in 1897. Some of these instructors remained in
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the country until 1910 and succeeded Koerner as Director of the Academy
of War until that year. (Nunn, 1967, p.111)
In addition, the best students of Koerner and his German military
instructors were sent to Europe on study trips until the 1930's, which
strongly linked the Chilean Army with the European miliary, especially
the Germans. (Nunn, 1967, pp.111-112)
The next chapter in the series of important foreign experts corres-
ponds to the Kemmerer Mission. In 1920, Arturo Alessandri was elected
president with a populist platform which included some concessions to
the working class, administrative and constitutional reforms, and a new
activism of the State in economic policy including controls on banks and
insurance companies. The Conservative majority of Congress stalled his
proposals and denied him necessary legislation; in a supreme act of de-
fiance, they raised their own salaries while depriving the Executive of
resources to pay the public employees, including the Armed Forces. This
led to the revolt of the young officers of the Army and Navy who, in
1924, "rattling their sabres" in the galleries of Congress, pushed the
approval of several important pieces of legislation in 24 hours. (Gil,
1966, p.58; Loveman, 1979, pp.242-243)
Alessandri resigned and left the country, but he was called back by
the military after they had dissolved Congress. Free from parliamentary
opposition and empowered by the military to legislate by decree, he en-
gaged in a program of basic reforms which included the new Constitution,
approved by plesbicite in 1925. But as Graham H. Stuart wrote:
One of his first acts was to invite a commission of
financial experts, headed by Professor Edwin Kemmerer




As described by Hirschman:
Upon arrival at the Santiago railroad station, the North
American professor was received by five or six civilians,
officials of the Finance Ministry, and about 300 officers
in military uniform and formation!
(Hirschman, 1963, p.176)
As Courselle-Seneuil before him, Edwin Kemmerer and his associates
were entirely successful in technical assistance. The Mission arrived
in July of 1925, and most of the bills it drafted were enacted before
the end of that year. They included such important matters as the estab-
lishment of graduated income taxes for the first time in Chile; the cre-
ation of the Central Bank; a General Banking Law which created the Super-
intendent of Banks and gave rules for the functioning of the banks under
the control of the State; a monetary law which established the Gold Ex-
change Standard and fixed the parity of the Chilean peso; the creation
of the Office of the Budget and the regulation of the yearly procedures
for preparing and approving the Budget, and the creation of the Comptrol-
ler of the Republic to supervise the fiscal and legal management of the
State.
Naturally, the U.S. institutions served as models for these laws
and institutions, and the Kemmerer Mission may be taken as an indicator
that the old tradition of dependency on Europe for models and ideas was
being replaced by the influence of the United States. (Stuart, 1955,
p.407; Hirschman, 1963, pp.175-178; Gil, 1966, p.97)
Carlos Ibaiez, who was one of the leaders of the military coup of
1924, arranged to succeed Alessandri with an authoritarian regime modeled
after the European examples of Mussolini and Primo de Rivera. But he
maintained the good relations with the U.S. through the Kemmerer Mission
and the same Edwin Kemmerer returned to Chile in 1927 to supervise the
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implementation of the policies he had designed. The strict adherence to
these policies and the growth of the Chilean exports in the late 1920's
gave Ibaiiez backing for easy access to credit from U.S. banks, which he
used for a large program of public works and modernization of the rail-
roads. This, together with the repression of the working class, served
to attract foreign investments to the extent that, in 1930, "foreign ca-
pital exceeded the total of national investment in manufacturing and in-
dustry, as well as mining, and was not far behind native capital in com-
merce." (Pike, 1963, p.198)
Thus, as in the case of Courselle-Seneuil and the other foreign ex-
perts mentioned before, the Kemmerer Mission was not only a product of
the dependence of the Chilean dominant class, but it also reinforced the
same dependency. Moreover, as in the case of Courselle-Seneuil, the ri-
gid attachment of Chilean followers to the ideas of Kemmerer in matters
of gold exchange standard and commercial credit was disastrous because
it actually increased the impact of the international depression of the
1930's by delaying necessary protective measures in the name of economic
principles. The gold value of Chilean exports declined by 88% between
1929 and 1932. With the exports went the imports, which were reduced to
the barely essential. Import and export taxes were the main source of
fiscal revenues, and foreign capital was the origin of most of the in-
vestment capital. The disappearance of both taxes and foreign credit
led to the practical paralysis of the country, and Ibdiez was overthrown
in 1931. (Hirschman, 1963, p.179; Loveman, 1979, pp. 2 5 1- 2 5 3 )
Courselle-Seneuil and Kemmerer were not blamed for the bad experi-
ences associated with them. After the Depression and World War II, the
Chilean dominant class resumed the tradition of calling in foreign ex-
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perts to solve the problems of the country. However, this tradition
took a curious turn in 1949 when a request was made to the United Na-
tions for technical assistance to fight inflation. The U.N. designated
two well-known European economists, Professors Iversen and Lindhal.
But the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made its displeasure at being
excluded from, what it considered, its own area of competence known.
The Chilean government hastily extended an invitation. The IMF sent
another mission, headed by its Director of Research, Edward M. Bernstein.
The competition of these two prestigious groups of experts produced two
contrasting reports, neither of which was implemented because, in the
meantime, the policies of the Chilean government had changed due to in-
ternal political pressures. (See page ) (Hirschman, 1963, pp.190-191)
This situation became a common feature of the following period in
the field of technical assistance. The emergence of the U.N. as a source
of technical assistance provided the opportunity to evaluate one foreign
expert against the other. The experts from the U.N. tended to have a
different perspective than the IMF, the World Bank or other internation-
al agencies controlled by the United States, as it will be further ana-
lyzed later in this study.
After the treason of Gonzalez Videla of the working class, and the
failure of the conservative economic policies of his Minister of Finance,
Jorge Alessandri in 1950, the confusing political environment provided
the opportunity for the former dictator, Carlos Ibdiiez to be elected
President in 1952 with a populist platform and an unorganized support of
47% of the vote in a field of four. (Gil, 1966, p.77) But when his con-
tradictory economic policies resulted in 84% inflation for the year 1955,
the dominant class obtained from the government, through the offices of
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the publisher of El Mercurio, Agustin Edwards, the contract of the
Klein-Sacks Mission, a group of consultants headed by the retired Vice-
President of the National City Bank of New York, Prescott Carter, and
included two former officers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
(Hirschman, 1963, p.203)
The Klein-Sacks were an assumedly "impartial group of experts" (as
presented by El Mercurio) who would advise the Minister of Finance as
how to put the finances of the State in order and to control inflation.
But as in the case of the Kemmerer Mission before them, the Klein-Sacks
did much more than that. Since it was not convenient for the "populist"
Ibaiiez to appear allied to the parties of the Right, the Klein-Sacks
Mission served as an instrument which allowed Ibanez to adopt conserva-
tive policies on technical grounds, and the dominant class could support
those policies without entering into an open coalition with the govern-
ment. In the vacuum left by the Iba'aez Administration, the Klein-Sacks
experts took over and pushed monetary policy through memoranda to the
Minister and direct lobbying in Congress. In addition, the Mission
served as a direct link between the Chilean government on one side, and
the IMF and the U.S. government, the Eisenhower Administration, on the
other.
But the implementation of the policies of the Klein-Sacks Mission
produced a deep recession which affected even the business of the oli-
garchy and led to the urban riots of 1957. Thus, the Klein-Sacks Mission
became a scapegoat that was criticized by all parties in the electoral
campaign for the presidential elections of 1958. (Hirschman, 1963, pp.
202-207; Gil, 1966, pp.190-191)
74
In the following chapters of this study the participation of for-
eign experts in the practice of planning in Chile from 1958 to 1973 will
be analyzed in detail. But the Chilean dominant class's practice of im-
plementing foreign ideas and models is more recent still.
Together with the military dictatorship which emerged from the
counter-revolution of 1973, a group of conservative economists associated
with El Mercurio and the School of Economics of the Catholic University
in Santiago, assumed control of the higher economic positions in govern-
ment. This group was popularly known as the "Chicago Boys" because se-
veral of its members were graduated from the Department of Economics of
the University of Chicago through an interchange program between that
department and Catholic University. In 1975 and 1976, they invited
Milton Friedmann and Arnold Harberger, their former professor in Chicago,
to come to Santiago to supervise the implementation of their own ideas.
Both U.S. professors, as monetarists, were pleased, according to El
Mercurio, to see their models implemented; Milton Friedmann even recom-
mended an intensification of the same policies in what he called a "shock
treatment". But others have qualified the same policies as "economic
genocide" because they consist basically in the repression of labor and
the reduction of wages in real terms, to attract foreign investments.
(Sigmund, 1977, p.265; The Economist, February 2, 1980; Gunder Frank,
1976)
As indicated by the description above, the foreign experts have
played several important roles in the historical development of Chilean
ideas and institutions. They actually designed many of these institu-
tions, helping to provide the Chilean State with the appearance of a
modern organization administered according to professional standards, in
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spite of the traditional caste-like social structure.
Sometimes the foreign experts served as "neutral" arbiters who
could give an "objective" solution to social conflicts; in other cases
they were used as convenient scapegoats to be blamed for the problems
of the country. In both roles, they allowed the Chilean dominant class
to elude the responsibilities resulting from its privileged status.
(Hirschman, 1963, pp.207-20 8)
However, the most important role of the foreign experts was their
instrumental participation in the dialectical process of cultural and
economic dependence. As it was mentioned before, the influence of for-
eign experts was a product of the cultural dependence of the Chilean do-
minant class; but, at the same time, it served to perpetuate and deepen
that dependence by presenting opportunities for foreign capital to take
over strategic resources of the Chilean economy and to introduce the
ideas and models which helped to reproduce the process.
To adopt the ideas and models introduced by the foreign experts
was a kind of strict initiation rite leading to a symbolic membership in
the intellectual and scientific community of Europe and the United
States. This may explain the almost fanatic adherence of Chilean fol-
lowers to the ideas of Courselle-Seneuil, Kemmerer, Friedmann and
Harberger. By contrast, ideas generated in Chile were not accepted un-
less they were actually adopted by some of the foreign experts, as it
happened with several of the policies implemented by the Kemmerer and
Klein-Sacks Missions. (Hirschman, 1963, p.206)
2. Chilean Professionals and Planners.
The deepest and most permanent influence of the foreign experts as
instruments of cultural dependence was the participation of many of them,
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from Andres Bello to Friedmann and Harberger, in the Chilean educational
system.
The aristocratic character given by German experts to elementary
and secondary schools was indicated before. In addition, access to
school was severely limited, mainly because of economic factors and so-
cial rigidities; the educational methods were "based on memorization
rather than thinking"; and scientific knowledge was something learned
from books or at school, not the product of original research. (Gil,
1966, pp. 5 8-5 9 ; Pike [in Petras, ed.], 1968, p.216)
In spite of the 1920 law which provided for compulsory elementary
education, and the declaration in the Constitution of 1925 that "educa-
tion is a priority concern of the State", studies published in 1964
found that over 170,000 children, aged 7 through 15, were not attending
school. The principal reason was the lack of schools to attend. This
situation was worse in rural areas where elementary schools were scarce,
in poor buildings, and offering no more than three of four grades for
lack of personnel and physical facilities. (Gill, 1966, p.46)
Secondary schools were concentrated in the large urban centers, and
the lack of transportation and the absence of scholarships put them out
of reach for the rural population. In addition, the under-staffed and
overcrowded schools located in low income neighborhoods had difficulties
meeting the standards fixed by the Ministry of Education, and promoting
their students to higher levels. Moreover, the low income of peasants
and blue collar workers required the participation of their children in
the work force at an early age for the support of themselves and their
families. Thus the opportunities for secondary education were restricted
for all but the children of the oligarchy and some members of the petty-
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bourgeoisie. (Bonilla & Glazer, 1970, p.214; Gill, 1966, pp. 4 8 & 58)
More rigid still was the highly selective process of admission to
the university. In fact, to enter the university, a student had to com-
plete secondary education and pass a national general examination,
called "Bachillerato" until 1966 and "Prueba de Aptitud Academica" (Aca-
demic Aptitude Test) after that year. This general examination elimi-
nated about half of the candidates, and in addition, the most prestigi-
ous University Schools had admissions tests which further restricted the
access to them. (Bonilla & Glazer, 1970, p.217; Gill, 1966, pp.77-78)
The results of these restrictions are shown in the table below.
Table 2.a: CHILE: School Age Population in Schools by Grades









1st. Year University 1.5 2.3
(Sources: For 1940-42: E. Grassau, 1959. For 1960: National Commission
on Educational Planning, 1964)
It is clear that the restrictions existing for low-income families
to send their children to school were not present for the families of
the dominant class who had the economic means to send their children to
private schools and to hire tutors, if necessary, to insure their access
to the university. Therefore the children of high income families were
the great majority of the small group of students who actually completed
high school and were able to enter the university. (Gill, 1966, p.4 8;
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Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p.135)
The different access of social classes to educational opportunities
in Chile was the result of a conscious decision of the educational au-
thorities. As explained by Oscar Vera, (UNESCO expert and chief educa-
tional planner of the administration of Jorge Alessandri), after Inde-
pendence the problem was posed: education for the elite or education for
the people. The solution was a highly stratified educational system,
or more properly, two parallel educational systems. The elite had ac-
cess to private elementary schools and public or private secondary
schools, after which to university could follow. The people, meaning
especially blue collar workers and peasants, had access to inadequate
public elementary schools and to a few limited possibilities for second-
ary and vocational education afterward. (Bonilla & Glazer, 1970, p.215;
Gill, 1966 p.16)
The rationale for this system was provided by another foreign ex-
pert, the Polish scientist Ignacio Domeyko, who participated in the pre-
paration of the Education Organic Law of 1860, and was the third Rector
(President) of Universidad de Chile. He sustained that only the child-
ren of the governing class should be allowed to enter secondary and
higher education, supported the literacy requisite for voting, and ar-
gued that certain occupations should be reserved only for secondary
school graduates. (Silvert & Reissman, 1976, p.120)
However, Domeyko had an "enlightened conservative" ideology which
is common among Latin American intellectuals and foreign experts. He
sustained the necessity to provide elementary education to all classes
because, as he wrote,
Only learning can let men know that, beyond natural
rights, they also have social obligations which are
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arranged and determined by the form of the institutions
themselves. In this way ... man will enjoy his inner
liberty, he will know how to aspire to every national
freedom without warping existing relations or changing
the reality of the world in conformity with utopias.
In a word, the true perfection to which a people should
aspire through its public education consists in submis-
sion to order and law through conviction.
(As quoted by Silvert & Reissman,
1976, p.121)
Thus, the 1860 law made elementary education free, separated from
the supervision of Universidad de Chile, and postulated the goal of one
school for boys and one school for girls for every 2,000 inhabitants,
which has still not been fulfilled 100 years later. (Gill, 1966, pp.15-
16)
Actually, the restricted educational opportunities had in Chile a
definite relation to the access to positions of power. By law, military
officers and public employees had to be graduates from secondary school,
and the high positions in the State bureaucracy were reserved for indivi-
duals holding a university degree, the so called "professionals".
Following the pattern of cultural dependency described before, the
professionals and professions in Chile followed the European and U.S.
models, combining the British concept of "liberal professional" with the
"guild" type of corporate organization which is traditional in continent-
al Europe. However, while translating foreign institutions into the
Chilean conditions, they reproduced not the process by which the insti-
tutions had emerged, nor the original meaning of them, but the finished
form of their models.
In Europe, the rise of modern professions was one of the component
elements of the revolution of the liberal, capitalistic, industrial,
bourgeoisie against the aristocratic "ancient regime". In this context,
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the professions represented a "collective mobility project" which strug
gled to achieve a higher status for their members against the aristocra-
tic system of "purchase and patronage", in competition with the indivi-
dual agressiveness of merchants and industrialists, and with the bureau-
cratic regulations of the expanding modern state. (Reader, 1966, pp. 7 3
& ff.; Larson, 1977, pp. 9 & 67)
In this struggle, the European professions had to solve the contra-
diction between their ideological support of free competition against
aristocratic privilege, and their interest in restricting inclusion and
protecting their monopoly of a share of the market. They solved it by
their emphasis on the special knowledge that served as basis for their
social legitimacy, and by calling the state to "protect the consumer"
against unqualified practitioners. For this reason, in Europe and in the
U.S. the development of the professions has been closely related to the
expansion of scientific and technical knowledge. (Larson, 1977, pp.50-54)
In Europe and the United States, professionals do not fit into any
of the two main social classes of a capitalist system, the capitalists
and the proletariat. Because they are often salaried employees and be-
cause of their relative autonomy, they cannot be identified with the ca-
pitalists. Their privileged position sets them apart from the rest of the
salaried working class. Therefore many social analysts have included pro-
fessionals in a new class, the "Professional-Managerial Class" (PMC),
which is "educated labor", necessary for the reproduction of capitalist
social relationships. (Barbara & John Ehrenreich in P. Walker, ed., 197 ,
pp.5 & ff.)
Formally the Chilean professionals filled the attributes of the
sociological ideal type mentioned above. They had a special knowledge of
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an esoteric nature, acquired through a long period of training and soci-
alization, since they, as Chilean professionals, had to be university
graduates.
But knowledge in Chile has been something learned at school or in
books, not the result of original research. Patricia Weiss Fagen wrote:
The universities in Chile up to now have been efficient
vehicles for the transmission of foreign influence ...
Instead of an intellectual and scientific community
determined to break away from concepts and disciplinary
models inappropriate to the stage of national develop-
ment, Chile has been supporting a university community
whose frame of reference is provided by North American
and European academic leaders. This identification,
in turn, has strongly affected choices of research
areas, teaching orientations, and selection of channels
of publication and dissemination.
And she added:
it is true that for most of them (Chilean scientists)
the practicability and the very concept of a "national
science" has been something of an absurdity.
(Fagen, 1973, pp. 16-17 & 25)
The public service orientation of Chilean professionals was impli-
cit in their role as functional group of the dominant class in charge of
the administration of the State and the big business. As Fagen put it:
The traditional university in Chile has served, as
elsewhere, to train and socialize the national elite
for eventual leadership. It had assured the preserva-
tion of the cosmopolitan society, transmitted inter-
national, largely humanistic culture to the upper
classes, and reinforced the cultural and social dif-
ferentiation of the elite from the masses.
(Fagen, 1973, p.9)
Even though during the present century, and especially after World War II,
entrance to the university was open to other than members of the tradi-
tional oligarchy, still their admission was a privilege for the few, as
Table 2.a has shown. Only at the end of the 1960's in the University
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Reform during the Frei Administration, was an effort made to extend the
opportunities for university education to a larger number; but this pro-
cess was reversed by the counter-revolution of 1973. (Fagen, 1973, pp.4 0-
46)
In more specific terms there was a close relationship between some
professions and certain sectors of the state administration in which
high positions were reserved for such professionals. Aside the profes-
sionalization of the Armed Forces and the traditional association between
lawyers and the judiciary, in the Ministry of Public Works, the high po-
sitions were reserved by law for Engineers; similar rules related physi-
cians to the Ministry of Public Health. Most of the high rank positions
in the Ministry of Housing were filled by architects, and those of the
Ministry of Agriculture were agronomists, while secondary school teachers
and principals were also expected to be university graduates.
The personal calling or vocation of professionals to an occupation
or career, which relates practitioners to each other and to a particular
corporate organization and code of ethics, was reinforced in Chile by the
discrete formal separation of specialized professional fields, and the
vertical integration of each professional institution.
The Chilean universities were divided into professional schools
which had little interchange or relation with each other. There were no
common courses or cross registration, nor a period of general education
common for all students. Professional socialization followed a pattern
of "transformation of the lay conceptions of the outsider into the techni-
cal orientation of the insider through the emphasis in the mastery of
technical skills and knowledge as a prerequisite for professional status."
(Bonilla & Glazer, 1970, p.241; Gill, 1966, pp.74-75)
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Only during the 1960's were some interdisciplinary research centers
created at the graduate level, starting new lines of inquiry which achieved
great importance during the University Reform of 1967-1969. But these
centers were imposed over the traditional structure without changing it,
and were practically suppressed after the counter-revolution of 1973.
After graduation, the segregation among the different professions
was continued by their organization in semi-public corporations on the
tradition of the medieval guilds called "Colegios Profesionales". These
"Colegios" were incorporated by special law which regulated the respect-
ive professions. They were given power to rule the ethical conduct of
their members, to advise and assist the State in both setting relevant
policies and in appointing the professionals to reserved positions.
University schools, Colegios and the State participated in most
cases together in the accreditation and certification of new profession-
als. The State agencies not only provided employment for the already
graduated professionals, but also offered opportunities for the profes-
sional practice required in most professions before graduation.
The law formally protected the "autonomy" of universities and pro-
fessional "Colegios", but this autonomy was more nominal than real, due
to the integration of professions within State agencies to the growing
dependency of the universities on State financing. (Gill, 1966, pp.75-56)
In addition, the State, the universities and the professional or-
ganizations were all managed by the same relatively small group of indi-
viduals who knew each other personally within each profession, and who
had family or business ties with members of other professions. Thus, the
autonomy of professions and universities was really the result of their
being elements of the organization of the dominant class, not independent
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from it or from the State. Actually the status of "professional" was an
instrument of political control used by the dominant class to restrict
access to the higher positions of the social structure, and to legitimize
itself by its identification with technical proficiency.
The "objective" standard adopted by the dominant class was to con-
sider professionals as better qualified to occupy high ranking positions.
This was accepted even by the political parties of the Left and caused
the direct representation of the working class in Congress and in the
Executive to be restricted. It has been mentioned before that the Soci-
alist Party was founded by a coalition of young professionals and
Trotzkyst workers, and this determined the future social composition of
the party. But during the 1930's the Communist Party also received a
group of professionals who had been student leaders like Carlos Contreras
Labarca and Pablo Neruda. In the period 1965-1969, among the Deputies of
the Left to Congress, only 30% of the Socialists and 20% of the Communists
were blue collar workers, while 39% of the Communist Deputies were profes-
sionals. (Gil, 1966, pp. 6 4 &284; Kaufman, 1972, p.80)
The three Presidents whose administrations will be analyzed in this
study were professionals, as well as all the individuals who served as
Ministers of Alessandri and Frei, and 44 out of the 55 persons who served
as Ministers under Allende. Only during the Allende Administration were
there any Ministers who were blue collar workers, peasants or labor
leaders. (Stallings, 1978, p.61)
Even though the presence of professionals in the parties of the
Left may be seen as an indicator of the relative autonomy of the profes-
sions from the dominant class, it should be better considered as the re-
sult of the dominant class's ability to impose its own values and norms
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on the whole country. The electoral surveys of Eduardo Hamuy demonstra-
ted that 70% of the professionals voted for the Right in the last two
presidential elections, and the professional "Colegios" were an important
instrument of the dominant class in its struggle against the Allende
government. (Stallings, 1978, pp. 55 &141; Sigmund, 1977, p.18 5 )
As it was mentioned before, the Chilean professionals played a si-
milar role to that of XIX century professionals in England, as developers
of the ideology of the dominant class and providers of a presumably "sci-
entific" rationale for the decisions and operations of the established
social system. (Jones, 1971, pp.240-270)
A good example of the ideology of the Chilean dominant class as
formulated by professionals in scientific terms, is given by the book,
Checkmate to UnderdeveZopment, by Fernando Monckeberg, a pediatrician
and nutrition expert, who became the most important scientific adviser of
the military dictatorship after 1973. The book was published in 1975 as
part of the effort of the author to obtain international support for his
nutritional research. However in the preface of the U.S. edition, Luigi
Einaudi introduces the author and presents the book as
reflecting the growth of a professional class sensi-
tized to the foundations of social and economic pro-
gress elsewhere, and increasingly demanding of a co-
herent approach to the development of Chile's own po-
tential. (78)
Monckeberg mixes his own research with references from research published
in professional journals to "scientifically demonstrate" that low income
people suffer from low I.Q. and high malnutrition indexes.
But the key ideas are clearly expressed.
To say today that all men are equal is utter nonsense
that will not stand up the most cursory scientific
analysis. ... A minority stand out of all the mass of
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human beings because of some exceptional traits that
each of them has and can develop. ... The human race
has always been led by this elite which has guided
and channeled the masses by many different means and
ways. (79)
It is clear that for Monckeberg, the "exceptional traits" of the
elite cannot emerge from the "flat and gray environment" of the working
class. He explains that in Chile the elite should emerge from "that 20
or 30 per cent of the population, ... the middle and higher strata ...
who have a standard of living which resembles that of most of people in
the developed countries". (p.80)
He argues that this elite has failed until now to carry the country
"on the road to prosperity" because the people from the middle and high
strata "see no advantages in and feel no need for an elite that will lead
to substantive change", and "pulling-at-coattails" will reduce any indi-
vidual who excels in his own field "to the level of an equalitarian medi-
orcracy under the mask of social justice". (p.81)
The book ends by repeating some well-known conservative thesis
about development. The final objective is socio-economic development for
the benefit of all, but to achieve this objective a previous requisite is
to support the immediate interests of the dominant class. In Monckeberg's
words:
Development calls for advanced technology ...
we have to develop human resources in the fields
of science and technology. ... We must take all
necessary steps to provide select scientists and
research workers with an adequate environment. And
because we need capital ... that must come from




The ideas above would be of little importance if Monckeberg were an
isolated fringe conservative, but his book is fairly representative of
the prevalent ideas among the thinking elements of the Chilean dominant
class, and includes concepts which are commonly used in Latin America.
In fact, his last argument about development is a reproduction and
reformulation of the platform of Jorge Alessandri in the presidential
elections of 1958. (See page 145 The idea on the inability of the lower
classes to overcome their depressed situation by themselves was used be-
fore him in a 1965 Latin American Seminar on Planning to explain the dif-
ficulties confronting planners when they attempted to make technical and
political values and norms compatible. (ILPES, 1966, p.29) Actually this
is the argument of Liberals to sustain the need for State intervention
and planning.
Apart from the clergy and the military, traditionally in Chile the
most important professions were Law, Medicine, and Engineering. In 1960
there were about 6,000 lawyers in the country, who in addition to having
control of the Judiciary, had high positions in all the State agencies,
where the "Fiscal" or "Chief of the Legal Section" was generally the se-
cond or third in command. Most of the politicians, including the major-
ity of the members of Congress, were also lawyers. Civil engineers, who
were about 3,200 in 1960, tended to be associated with private business
not only in technical matters but also as executives, and had control
over State investment and construction activities including the Ministry
of Public Works and the State Economic Development Corporation (CORFO).
There were also some 7,000 technical engineers. The 5,000 odd physicians
were probably the most successful practitioners as "liberal profession-
als". Most of them combined a lucrative private practice with part-time
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employment in the public health services that they controlled. By a cu-
rious coincidence, the three presidents whose regimes will be analyzed in
this study were representatives of these three professions. (Alberti,
1966; UCLA: Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1971)
Today, in Chile, the most important specialized professionals are
the officers of the Armed Forces, who, since the counter-revolution of
1973, took control of the State and replaced all the political powers
with their own military dictatorship. But previously the military was
assumed to be under the control of the civilian government and the Con-
stitution of 1925 excluded them from participation in politics. The Con-
stitution said that the Armed Forces are bodies "essentially obedient"
and "non deliberating", which respond to the President as Supreme Chief
Commander.
The most important armed bodies of the State were four: the classic
Army, Navy and Air Force, and the national militarized police, "Carabi-
neros". In 1970, the Army consisted of about 40,000 officers and men;
the Navy had 15,000; the Air Force had 8,000, and the Carabineros 15,000.
(Nunn, 1976, note 3, p.325) The Carabineros was a fully professional in-
stitution which legally was under the Ministry of Interior and was cre-
ated in 1928 by the Ibanez dictatorship as a militarized and technically
specialized corps, out of the fusion of all preceding police forces.
(Nunn, 1976, p.171) The other more conventional armed forces related to
the Executive through the Ministry of Defense and consisted of a perma-
nent body of professional military men, and the military recruits. The
recruits were, by law, 18 year old Chilean men who were trained each year
to serve at least six months. (Nunn, 1976, p.112)
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His analysis in Arms and Politics in Latin America, Edwin Leuwin
put Chile among the group of Latin American countries where the "Armed
Forces are Non-Political". (Leuwin, 1961, p.168) He added (together with
other analysts) that the intervention and failure of the Chilean military
in extramilitary functions in 1925 had "burned their fingers" and led
them to "withdraw from politics and resume their traditional professional
orientation." (id. p.169) However, Leuwin stated that the Chilean armed
forces were
not really under the control of the civilian government.
True, governments can call the military to preserve in-
ternal order, but where institutional military matters
are concerned, the civilian authorities have no control.
In addition, he describes the situation as
a sort of gentleman's agreement by which the govern-
ment allows the armed forces to function unmolested
and to look after their own affairs and the share of
20 to 25 per cent of the national budget is not revised
downwards, and need have no fear they will seize control.
(Idem id. p.169)
The President could retire the high officers of the Armed Forces,
but for appointments had to follow the internal seniority rules of the
institutions to avoid an open conflict; and in both cases he had to re-
quest the approval of the Senate, where the military always had powerful
friends. In addition, the military had "fuero"; that is, it was ruled by
its own legislation (Code of Military Justice) applied by specialized
Military Judges and a "Martial Court", and had jurisdiction over all mat-
ters affecting military men during peace times and the whole population
in times of war of state of siege. (Gil, 1966, pp.101-102)
Actually the "traditional professional orientation" of the Armed
Forces is by nature political since it deals with essential elements of
power in society. In the Chilean case, the military was historically no
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less political than the Judiciary, which was described above as an auto-
nomous professional institutions of the State.
The first Chilean military school was created by Bernardo O'Higgins
in 1817 in the midst of the Independence War against Spain, and was re-
organized in 1832 as an elite school in which "entrance requirments were
prohibitive to all but the best-educated aspirants to cadet status. (Nunn,
1976, p.42) A similar school for the Navy was founded in 1845 in
Valparaiso, and in 1886 the Academy of War was organized as an institute
of high studies for the members of the General Staff of the military. A
number of other schools were also established for technical specialities,
non-commissioned officers, and corresponding schools for the Air Force
and Carabineros. (Nunn, 1976, p.73)
During the past century, the Chilean Armed Forces served a dual
purpose closely related to the interests and policies of the dominant
class, of which the military officers were members. In the Independence
War and in two expansionist wars against Peru and Bolivia, the Chilean
military fulfilled the needs of national identity and defense against
foreign enemies, and added two provinces rich in minerals to the national
territory. In between the foreign wars, the Armed Forces insured the in-
ternal order of the country by battling rural bandits, the Mapuche Indi-
ans and the political opponents of the government. Until 1851, all the
presidents were military men; after 1851 the civilians controlled the
Executive even though the military maintain its political importance.
Since 1928, Presidents were under constitutional rule. (Nunn, 1976, pp.
38-79; Loveman, 1979, pp.193-195)
After the second war against Peru and Bolivia, ("War of the Paci-
fic": 1879-1883) the tension resulting from Chile's occupation of terri-
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tories that had been controlled by the defeated countries, and a poten-
tial conflict with Argentina because of border disputes, served as a
justification for civilian support of strong Armed Forces, professional
upgrading, and modernization of equipment. German instructors were hired
for the Army, and British instructors for the Navy. The Academy of War
was founded and the compulsory military service was mandated. Since that
time, the Defense Minister became the civilian agent of the military in
charge of insuring that the traditional 20 to 25 per cent of the national
budget allocated to the military was not reduced. (Leuwin, 1961, p.147;
Nunn, 1967, pp.249-250)
But no war came, and the main role of the Armed Forces turned in-
ward. They were instrumental in repressing the working class and the
labor movement through a long series of violent actions, which included
the senseless massacre, commanded by Colonel Silva Renard, of 3,600
striking miners and their families in the school Santa Maria in Iquique
in 1907. Similar episodes in Valparaiso (1903), Antofagasta (1906), San
Gregorio (1921), and La Coruna (1925) where more than 1,200 workers were
killed and their houses destroyed by artillery shelling. (Loveman, 1979,
pp.226 & 246)
The military also served as final arbiters of the conflicts inside
the dominant class. This was the case of the Navy and the German in-
structors of the Army who took party with Congress to defeat President
Balmaceda and to install the parliamentary regime in 1891. The same par-
liamentary regime ended in 1924 when the military supported the populist
measures proposed by President Arturo Alessandri against a stalling Con-
gress, dissolved Congress, prepared the conditions for the adoption of a
new Constitution in 1925, and ruled the country until 1932, when the De-
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pression led to their substitution by a new civilian government headed by
the same Arturo Alessandri. (Nunn, 1976, pp.109 & 131; Loveman, 1979,
pp.203 & 242)
Since then, the Armed Forces legally took control of the country on
election days, crushed an attempted coup of Nazi civilians in 1939, and
continued to exert violent control over the working class and the labor
movement in Ranquil (1934), over the railroad workers (1936), in the coal
mines (1948), in Jose Maria Caro (1962), in El Salvador (1966), and in
Puerto Montt (1969). They sustained a revolt in 1969 against the mili-
tary policies of the Frei Administration, and in 1973, finally decided to
end the rule of the same Constitution they had helped to adopt in 1925
when they found that the civilian politicians of the dominant class were
no longer able to control the established regime by themselves. (Loveman,
1979, pp.270-271; Stallings, 1978, pp. 9 0 & 105)
Since 1886, the professional upgrading of the Armed Forces Chilean
officers through foreign instructors and study trips to Europe and later
to the United States, made the military an important link between the
Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies.
After World War II, the Chilean Armed Forces joined the Interamer-
ican Defense System and were enrolled in the Cold War by a bilateral
Military Assistance Pact with the United States in 1951. (Leuwin, 1961,
pp.196-201) As a consequence, the Chilean military has been trained in
the U.S. and in the U.S. bases of the Panama Canal Zone, where no less
than 3,667 Chilean military were trained between 1950 and 1968. At the
same time, nearly 50 U.S. military were in permanent U.S. Missions in
Chile. (NACLA, 1972, p.53)
93
Through these interchanges, the Chilean military incorporated the
professional doctrine of "National Security" sponsored by the U.S. ad-
visers and instructors. Actually this was a fitting rationale for the
traditional attitude of the Chilean Armed Forces toward the working class
and the labor movement, as has been described before. This doctrine gave
as much importance to the "internal enemies" as to the external ones, and
sustained the need to fight the "subversive" activities of Marxist ele-
ments contrary to the values of the "Western Christian Civilization".
(Leuwin, 1961, pp.232 &242; Rojas, 1976, pp.60-61)
In Chile, new professions associated with the traditional ones
frequently emerged, as in the case of economists whose original univer-
sity degree was "Commercial Engineering" or the many lawyers who became
sociologists or political scientists before the respective university
schools were formally created. A similar case was that of planners,
since until the 1960's, there were no formal studies in planning in Chile,
except some individual courses in the schools of engineering, architecture
or economics.
Even though since 1939 CORFO was charged with preparing a national
development plan, and since 1940 the municipalities had to prepare a kind
of master plan called "Plano Regulador" to receive financial and techin-
cal assistance from the Ministry of Public Works, CORFO delayed the ful-
fillment of that function until 1960. The city planning consultants pro-
vided by the U.S government to help in the reconstruction of the region
affected by the earthquakes of May of the same year complained of the
lack of professional training in planning of their Chilean counterparts.
One of them wrote:
The lack of a city planning curriculum in the univer-
sities of Chile allows each individual (sometimes with
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disastrous results) to form his own philosophy concern-
ing the profession. The emphasis on architectural so-
lutions in planning tends to underplay the economic and
social aspects. ... Here, because there is a limited
scientific background, geology, landscape architecture,
geography, sociology, economics, and anthropology are
neglected in favor of architecture.
He added:
This is readily understandable since the architect
practically single-handedly furthered city planning
in Chile for the last three decades, in a development
parallel to the "City Beautiful" movement in the United
States from 1880 to 1910.
(Condon, 1961, p.10)
Another of the same group of city planning consultants found that
he had to work in regional planning for Puerto Montt, even though he was
a consultant in city planning, because CORFO, which was in charge of such
regional planning, only had experts in economic planning and therefore
was unable to complete the work. (Navarrete, 1962, p.7)
At the time when the above mentioned consultants arrived in Chile,
there were no more than 50 professionals with training or good experience
in planning in the country. Ten years later, there were about 300 pro-
fessionals working in planning offices, many of whom had training in plan-
ning in the U.S., in Europe, or in the courses of the Latin American In-
stitute for Social and Economic Planning of the U.N. (ILPES), and there
was training of planners at the graduate level in the Universidad de Chile
and Universidad Cat6lica de Chile in Santiago. (See Chapters 3 & 4)
As university graduates, planners were members of the professional
group within the Chilean dominant class but they had several differences
with the more traditional professions.
One such difference was in training. While most of the other pro-
fessionals had only the undergraduate training received in Chilean uni-
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versities, and only the most prominent of them had been able to comple-
ment their studies in Europe or the United States, most planners had in-
ternational training since there was no planning education in Chile until
the late 1960's. Training in planning was at the graduate level, which
meant that planners added more comprehensive education of U.S and European
universities to their original degree obtained in Chile. In addition,
the traditional orientation of professional education in the Chilean uni-
versities had been directed to differentiate and segregate one profession
from the other, while the professional orientation of planners led them
to attempt to coordinate the different specialized fields into multidisci-
plinary team work.
These characteristics put planners in a high status, but in a po-
tential conflict with the most traditional professions jealous of protect-
ing their own fields of expertise and the privileges achieved. As ex-
pressed by Germanico Salgado in his 1967 analysis of planning in Latin
America:
In a nutshell, from the point of view of the interests
of certain pressure groups forming part of the ruling
classes which wield power in several countries and also
from the angle of organization and administration, plan-
ning is still foreign to the institutional experience
of many Latin American countries.
(U.N./E.C.A., 1967, p.50)
This tension is reflected in more specific terms in the second major
difference between planners and other professionals: their relations with
the State.
As it was explained before, in Chile there was a close integration
of some professions with some agencies of the State, and this integration
was not only at the highest level. Entire services were "professional-
ized" as in the cases of the Judiciary, the higher ranks of the Armed
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Forces, the Comptroller General, secondary education, and the public
health services, which meant that near 70% of the university graduates
entered to work for the State. As Osvaldo Sunkel wrote: "The liberal
professions, as they exist in the United States and other countries, are
fairly insignificant in Chile, since they are largely confined to the
government bureaucracy." (In C. Veliz, ed., 1969, p.130)
The traditional orientation of the professionals perceived the main
function of the State to be the support of the interests of the dominant
class, because, "originally, the public administration was constituted
as an extention of the power structure of patriarchal families and their
circle of protegss..." (ILPES, 1966, p.33) More recently this public
administration has expanded and,
the traditional structure of Chilean society has al-
lowed a limited degree of social mobility ... undoubt-
edly selective, which has contributed to the strength
of the same social structure by incorporating new ta-
lent and wealth, and creating the illusion of an "open"
society. On the other hand the newcomers have not
changed the traditional system, since subordination
to the existing Establishment appears to be the very
condition of entry into it.
(Sunkel, in Veliz, ed., 1969, p.131)
The expanded public administration
retains the characteristics of every phase of its evo-
lution and tends to have a double loyalty: on one side
the particularistic interests which open the access to
State employment and give political support to the pub-
lic officers, and on the other, the general interests
of the community which the government should represent.
(ILPES, 1966, p.33)
Moreover, for the professionals in Chile, State employment was a
source of social security benefits and health insurance, but was far from
being their only source of income. As David Condon found: "The Chilean
professional employed by the government necessarily must supplement his
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modest salary with outside contracts." However as the same author noted,
the professional salary was not "modest" in relation to the general level
of income in Chile, since it could be $450 per month (at 1961 prices)
while "a common laborer's daily wage was seldom over $1.50". (Condon,
1961, pp. 2 & 10) Therefore, this meant that professionals employed by
the State added to the double loyalty mentioned above the separation be-
tween their role in the public administration and their individual pro-
fessionals goals.
In contrast, planners considered this double loyalty as "irration-
al", and postulated that "the first task of planners at the level of the
State administration is to reform it by subordinating the particularistic
interests to the general interests." (ILPES, 1966, p.34) As Condon ex-
plained:
The Chilean professional employed by the government
who conforms and makes no changes, has the best op-
portunity to retain his position, independence, soli-
tude and salary. But the planner, whose vocation re-
presents change, cannot, by nature, be dormant.
(Condon, 1961, p.2 )
In fact, as it was indicated before, the Chilean professionals were
created to support the established system; but planning, in the period to
be analyzed, was associated with the general ideology of development and
structural changes. This ideology was developed by ECLA and became pre-
dominant in Latin America after the Alliance for Progress.
The opportunities in Chile for working in planning as a private
consultant were restricted, and most planners were employed directly by
the State, especially after the installation, in 1965, of a national sys-
tem of planning which included a National Planning Office (ODEPLAN), se-
veral sectorial planning offices and regional planning offices.
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Because of their early links through CORFO and the Housing Division
of the Ministry of Public Works, most of the Chilean planners were re-
cruited from among economists, engineers and architects. But the pre-
eminence of some government programs of the 1960's such as the Agrarian
Reform and the Educational Reform, gave other professionals, particularly
agronomists, educators, and social scientists, entrance to the planning
field. Since the Comptroller General did not recognize degrees obtained
in foreign universities, planners had to maintain their original profes-
sional affiliation to be employed by the State. However, they developed
their own professional organization: "Sociedad Chilena de Planificaci6n
y Desarrollo" (PLANDES: Chilean Society of Planning and Development) and
published their own professional journal: PLANDES Bulletin.
Even though the possibilities for planners to work as "liberal pro-
fessionals" in Chile were practically non-existing, the two centers cre-
ated during the 1960's in Universidad de Chile (CEPLA) and Universidad
Catolica (CIDU) provided alternative work opportunities for planners. In
addition, most of Chilean planners never lost their links with ILPES or
the other international agencies and foreign universities to which they
had been affiliated as employees or students. Therefore, many of them
had the possibility of working outside of the country if they, due to po-
litical reasons, could not work for the Chilean State, as they did before
1958 and have done after 1973.
3. CORFO, and the Introduction of Planning in Chile.
As it happened with other institutions of the Chilean State, the
introduction and practice of planning as an official State function was
associated with the international situation and its impact on the Chilean
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social structure.
The Great Depression of the 1930's and World War II changed deeply
the channels of relation between the Chilean dominant class and the more
developed capitalist countries. The U.S. influence which had been grow-
ing since the beginning of the century, took a more definite and formal
shape, and a conflict developed inside the Chilean oligarchy between the
most elite and authoritarian of its members who sympathized with Nazi
Germany, and the more liberal elements who followed the traditional links
with Great Britain and the United States. (Loveman, 1979, pp. 2 5 0 & 275;
Gil, 1966, p.66)
The second Presidency of Arturo Alessandri was inaugurated in 1932
during the worst period of the Depression, and after a period of political
anarchy which followed the fall of the dictatorship of Carlos Ibinez in
1931. With a coalition of Conservatives, Liberals and Radicals which
gave strong support to the government in Congress, and with the help of
an armed group of civilians named "Milicia Republicana", the Alessandri
government was able to achieve control of the military, and through harsh
repression by the police, forced the labor movement to submit to the
rules of the Labor Code. (Loveman, 1979, pp.264-2 70 )
In the economic field, the government dissolved COSACH, the nitrate
company created by Ibaiez, and replaced it with a State controlled corpor-
ation: "Corporaci6n de Ventas de Salitre y Yodo" (COVENSA: Nitrate and
Iodine Sales Corporation) that had the monopoly of exports of both pro-
ducts and started a search for new markets. (Stuart, 1966, p.407;
Kinsbrunner, 1973, p.134)
In addition, the repressive labor policies were associated with
fiscal austerity and government stimulus to construction and industry.
100
The shortage of imported goods due to the Depression represented an op-
portunity for national industrialists, who with the financial help of
the State and a source of cheap labor in the large number of unemployed
mine workers, started a process of industrialization for the substitution
of imports. The increases in industrial production and construction res-
cued the economy from the worst effects of the Depression and reduced the
number of unemployed workers from 262,000 in 1932 to only 13,600 in 1935.
(Kinsbrunner, 1973, p.134; Loveman, 1979, pp.264-265 )
However, the same process of industrialization moved the focus of
the labor movement from the mines in retired regions to the cities in the
center of the country. The prices which had been low and stable during
the early depression years, began to rise again, while the salaries were
maintained low. The Radical Party felt that the Conservatives and Liber-
als were taking advantage of their support to the government without be-
nefits for the petty bourgeois and white collar elements who served as
basis to the Radicals.
For that reason they accepted the proposal of the Communists to or-
ganize, together with the Socialists, an "anti-facist" Popular Front, si-
milar to the European coalitions of the same name. The harsh repression
of a railroad strike by the government in 1936 was the opportunity which
led to the formation of the first executive committee of the Popular
Front. (Loveman, 1979, pp.265- 2 72 ; Kinsbrunner, 1973, p.135)
The Chilean "Frente Popular" had a first test in the congressional
elections of 1937, in which "the Rightist parties managed to preserve
their majority in Congress but thanks only to systematic bribery and
wholesale vote buying." (Gil, 1966, p.6 8) The great gains of the Social-
ist Party in these elections convinced the Radicals of the coalition's
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benefits, in spite of the internal opposition of the right wing of the
Radical Party.
As the largest party in the Popular Front, the Radicals were in po-
sition to dominate the coalition, and after long and tough bargaining
they were able to convince the Socialists to retire their candidate,
Marmaduke Grove, and support the candidacy of the Radical Pedro Aguirre
Cerda for the presidential elections of 1938. Aguirre Cerda was a lawyer
and owner of a large farm near Santiago, and had been Minister of Inter-
ior of Arturo Alessandri's first administration. At the time of his can-
didacy, he was Dean of the School of Economics and Commerce of Universi-
dad de Chile and was considered one of the leaders of the conservative
wing of the Radical Party in its opposition to the formation of the Popu-
lar Front. (Gil, 1966, pp.68-69; Johnson, 1964, p.83)
In contrast with the Left that selected a centrist from the domi-
nant class as their candidate, the Right, divided by the influence of the
Nazis, elected an extreme conservative as candidate, the Minister of Fi-
nance, Gustavo Ross. He was considered a financial wizard by the Right,
but was despised by the general population because of his incredible lack
of social sensibility and his assurances to the dominant class "that he
would know how to buy the required number of votes." (Hirschman, 1963,
p.183; Gil, 1966, p.68)
A third candidate, the former dictator Carlos Ibanez was presented
by the Nazi Party. When this candidacy failed to attract public support,
the leader of the Nazis, the Deputy Jorge Gonzalez Von Marees, attempted
to kill President Alessandri. While Alessandri read the State of the
Country message to Congress, Gonzalez Von Marees fired shots at him. The
government applied the security laws to the Nazis and prosecuted Gonzailez
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Von Marcees. He was convicted and due to enter prison on September 8,
1938. On September 5, the Nazis tried to overthrow President Alessandri
through armed rebellion, directed also to the elimination of Ross and
Aguirre Cerda. They expected that Army unit sympathizers of Ib~nez
would support them, but this support never materialized. The government
crushed the rebellion and summarily executed the rebels after they sur-
rended. From prison, Ibniez and Gonzalez Von Marees ordered their fol-
lowers to vote the candidate of the Popular Front which produced the
unique situation of an "anti-facist" Popular Front supported by the Nazi
Party. (Gil, 1966, p.69; Halperin, 1965, pp.45- 4 6 )
Aguirre Cerda won the Presidency with 212,000 votes against the
199,000 votes received by Ross; the small difference was recognized after
Ross failed to convince the Army to back a recount. (Nunn, 1976, pp.235-
236; Loveman, 1979, p.273)
Aguirre Cerda had great admiration for the New Deal of Roosevelt.
His position in economics was clearly Keynesian, as he sustained that the
key to development was the expansion of demand resulting from increases
in salaries and wages. (Hirschman, 1963, p.185) The platform of the
Popular Front combined these ideas with economic nationalism and State
intervention under the slogan "Pan, Techo y Abrigo" (Bread, Housing and
Clothing). (Loveman, 1979, p.277; Roxborough, 1977, pp.26- 27)
But Aguirre Cerda had to deal with a hostile Congress where the
parties of the Right had majority, and no congressional election was due
until 1941. In addition, in January, 1939, two months after the inaugur-
ation of the Popular Front Administration, an earthquake devastated
Chillan, Concepcion, and the adjacent provinces, killing 50,000 and ren-
during many times that number injured and homeless. (Loveman, 1979, p.276)
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The government sent Congress a double package requesting reconstruc-
tion of the earthquake-affected region, and a six-year plan of national
economic development which included low-cost housing nad industrializa-
tion. Congress rejected the package, arguing that its high cost repre-
sented higher taxes, inflation and an expanded State bureaucracy. In ad-
dition, S.N.A., the traditional association of agriculturalists and land-
lords, complained to the government that the efforts of Socialists and
Communists to organize labor unions among agricultural workers was pro-
ducing "the initial elements of a state of revolution". (Loveman, 1979,
p.27 8 )
Aguirre Cerda, the Popular Front, and the labor organizations
reached a compromise with the dominant class in a new package designed by
the Minister of Finance, Roberto Wacholtz. Two agencies were created:
one for reconstruction and the other for economic development. Represent-
atives of the traditional associations of businessmen were incorporated
in the directive board of both to insure that they were not used for poli-
tical purposes by the Popular Front. The financing of the two agencies
was charged to a copper export tax and to external credits to avoid an
internal tax increase. In addition, the government ordered the illegal
suspension of labor union organizations in the countryside.
The Minister of Interior, Arturo Olavarria, devised a system to de-
stroy the existing labor unions of agricultural workers that he called
"el juicio final" (judgment day). If rural workers declared a strike the
police called them to a meeting where they were asked if they were wil-
ling to continue the movement. Those giving affirmative answers were put
on the left side, while those willing to return to work were grouped to
the right. Then the "bad" men of the left were ordered to take their
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families and belongings and were evicted from the farm. Thus, the pea-
sants were forced to pay for the industrialization and economic develop-
ment of the country. (Loveman, 1979, pp.277-279; Garcia, 1970, p.284)
The new legislation for economic development and industrialization
did not change the existing institutions, but added to them a new, impor-
tant, and innovative agency: "Corporacion de Fomento a la Producci6n"
(CORFO: Economic Development Corporation). (Hirschman, 1963, p.184)
The Kemmerer Mission had created a center of power in economic
matters integrated by the Ministry of Finance, the Office of the Budget,
and the Central Bank. CORFO, as an autonomous agency with its own finan-
cial resources, and with the Minister of Economy, who was also the State
regulator of commerce and industry, as chairman, constituted a new and
independent focus of economic power within the system. (Gil, 1966, pp. 7 8
& 135; Loveman, 1979, p.259)
Since the Radical Party had the control of the Ministry of Finance,
and the Socialist Party was originally opposed to the compromise with the
Right, a Socialist, Oscar Schnake, was designated Minister of Economy,
and the Socialists were given a large level of participation to staff the
new agency. (Roxborough, 1977, p.27; Gil, 1966, p.289)
With some precedence in the special banks created by the Ibinez
dictatorship to help finance the new industrial, mining or agricultural
ventures, CORFO was the first State Economic Development Corporation of
Latin America, and was endowed with a far-reaching authorization which
made it the "key state mechanism for the planning and promotion of econo-
mic development." (Glade, 1969, p.438)
The mandate of CORFO included industrial development, agricultural
improvement, balance of trade strengthening, private and public capital
105
the industrial proletariat is the dynamic force of economic development
and the revolution toward a classless society. But without industriali-
zation such proletariat does not exist, and therefore the first step to-
ward progress is the development of an industrial base. Since the past
had demonstrated that the Chilean dominant class was unable or unwilling
to industrialize the country, a planned State action was needed to expand
the industrial sector where a revolutionary proletariat could emerge.
(Roxborough, 1977, pp.26- 2 7; Stallings, 1978, p.32)
On their side, the Radical Party was impressed with the New Deal of
Roosevelt and admired T.V.A. At the same time, the members were inter-
ested in expanding the State action to provide jobs for the petty-bourge-
oisie and white collar workers who were the base of the party. The eco-
nomic policies of the dominant class tended to restrict the professional
and white collar positions. (Stuart, 1966, p.408 ; Gil, 1966, p.26 1)
From a third viewpoint, the dominant class, after a reluctant first
moment, was attracted to the possibility of using CORFO as an instrument
to expand its economic base without risks. In fact, in practice CORFO:
a) invested in activities which required large amounts of capital and had
a low rate of return and a long period of maturity, such as hydroelectric
power, oil exploration or steel production; b) endured the initial costs
and risks of new ventures, to sell after the established enterprises to
private investors; or c) was backed with the collateral guarantee of the
Chilean State, the foreign loans for Chilean private corporations. (Gil,
1966, p.135; Stallings, 1978, p.31)
CORFO was mandated to collaborate and coordinate with other State
institutions, but an action-oriented and flexible institutions such as
CORFO was able to do more things faster than the centralized agencies of
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formation, technical consulting, and project machinery and equipment
imposition. CORFO was authorized to contract credits in the country or
in the international market; it could develop policies and execute them
by itself or by contracts, could organize and initiate companies to oper-
ate them directly or in partnership with private investors, give loans to
private firms, and make equity investment. CORFO was managed by an Exe-
cutive Vice President responsible to the Board of 21 members who included
representatives of business associations, and the professional organiza-
tion of Engineers, aside from government representatives and a represent-
ative of labor organizations under the Presidency of the Minister of Eco-
nomy. (Gil, 1966, p.135; Glade, 1969, p.439)
The creation of CORFO implied the introduction of planning as an
official function of the State in Chile. CORFO was directed to colla-
borate with other institutions to devise programs for the promotion of
production, and
was also charged with drafting a comprehensive plan
for national development which would embody a due
regard for intersectoral and interregional balance
while strengthening the country's balance of payments
position.
(Glade, 1969, p.439)
CORFO was organized into five divisions: Industries, Agriculture,
Mining, Finance, and Studies and Planning. The technical staff of CORFO
was mainly integrated by engineers and economists, and before 1960,
"CORFO's record in the development of Chile's national industries is of-
ten cited as the most successful example of national economic planning
in Latin America." (Gil, 1966, p.163)
In the creation and charter of CORFO, three different philosophies
were mixed. From the Marxist point of view of Socialists and Communists,
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the traditional bureaucratic organization created to serve laissez-faire
economic policies. Because of this, CORFO in practice many times dupli-
cated the functions of those traditional agencies to serve its own pur-
poses. (Barraclough, 1974, pp.219-220)
These problems were multiplied when other State agencies with the
same perspective of economic activism as CORFO were created for different
functions. For example, the State Bank, created in 1953 by the fusion of
several pre-existing smaller agencies, stated in its charter that
in addition to providing a full range of commercial,
mortgage, savings and investment services for firms
in agriculture and industry, it was authorized (a) to
establish and to operate deposit warehouses, fertilizer
plants, and agricultural processing installations, (b)
to intervene in the management of industrial enterprises,
(c) to engage in domestic and foreign trade, and (d) to
carry on other operations of an agricultural, industrial
and commercial character.
(Glade, 1969, p.434)
The same year, 1953, the Mining Credit Institute (CACREMI) started
operations of a copper smelting plant through a subsidiary named "Empresa
Nacional de Fundiciones: (ENAF: National Foundries Enterprise). The "In-
stituto Nacional de Comercio" (INACO: National Commerce Institute) was
organized to manage the State monopoly on the import of basic foodstuffs
and to regulate the internal market of essentials. (Gil, 1966, p.136;
Glade, 1969, pp.433-434)
In its initial stages until the early 1950's, CORFO engaged in a
fruitful series of sectoral and project plans for industrial development,
and created subsidiaries for their implementation. Such was the case of
ENDESA (National Electric Enterprise), in charge of the National Plan of
Electric Power; ENAP (National Petroleum Enterprise), in charge of oil
exploration; CAP (Pacific Steel Co.), in charge of the construction and
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management of the Huachipato steel mill; HONSA (National Hotel Co.), in
charge of the construction and administration of tourism facilities;
SEAM (Agricultural Machinery Service), in charge of importing and oper-
ating agricultural machinery, and IANSA (Sugar National Co.), in charge
of implementing a program of sugar beet production and processing.
In this period CORFO also entered into joint ventures with private
investors, either Chilean, as in MADECO (copper mill and wire plant) and
MADEMSA (household appliances), or foreign as in INSA (tires and rubber
products) with General Tire. In addition,
in the course of its operations, CORFO loans were
granted to hundreds of enterprises in a wide vari-
ety of fields, and up to the end of 1958, invest-
ments had been made in the stock of some 66 companies,
in 41 of which CORF0 had held a majority interest.
(Glade, 1969, p.4 4 0 )
The action of CORFO had a sensible impact on the economy of the
country. Industrial production grew 50% between 1946 and 1955 and the
share of industry in the national income went up 42% in the-period 1940
to 1955. (Gil, 1966, p.162; Roxborough, 1977, p.26 )
As it was expected by the parties of the Left, the growth of in-
dustry originated the growth of the industrial proletariat. "In the
years betwen 1940 and 1952, the number of workers employed in manufactur-
ing jumped from 298,000 to 408,000, from 15% of the working population to
19%." (Roxborough, 1977, p.27) This growth was capitalized on by the
Communists, because the Socialist Party, after the Popular Front, entered
into a deep crisis of splits and personality conflicts. (Roxborough, 1977,
p.29; Gil, 1966, p.71)
The growth of the Communist Party reached a climax in 1946. In co-
alition with the Radicals, the Communist Party helped to elect Gabriel
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Gonzalez Videla and joined his government during the first year. But
afterward, the Communists were neutralized and badly affected by the
"Defense of Democracy Law" which deprived them of civil rights and de-
clared their organizations illegal in 1948. However, the dominant class
realized that notwithstanding the repression of the labor movement, CORFO
was an independent conglomerate which was threatening their control of
the economy of the country. Through CORFO, the State economic action had
expanded and acquired a relative autonomy. Thus, the dominant class
started a campaign to reduce State expenditures and to divest CORF0 of
its subsidiaries. An important share of the CORFO enterprises were then
transferred to private control. That was the case of INSA, MADEISA,
MADECO and CAP.
After this, CORF0 was directed to provide financing and technical
assistance to private investors rather than to invest by itself. (Gil,
1966, p.135; Stallings, 1978, pp.48-49)
In addition, the copper exports which were the base of CORFO finan-
cing through the export tax, declined from a high of 500,000 tons in
1942 to less than 400,000 in 1952. The U.S.-based copper companies ar-
gued that the combination of domestic inflation, discriminatory exchange
rates and high taxes made Chile a less profitable place from which to ac-
quire copper than elsewhere. In 1954 the Ibanez Administration negoti-
ated an agreement with the companies to solve some of the problems men-
tioned above by simplifying exchange rates and reducing export taxes
("Nuevo Trato"). This agreement set the price of copper according to the
London market as a basis to fix the export tax, but the price dropped
from 56 cents per pound in 1956 to 20 cents in 1958. All this reduced
the stability and volume of the resources available to CORFO. (Glade,
110
1969, p.441; Gil, 1966, p.158)
Without the action of CORFO the growth of the Chilean economy was
reduced to the point where per capita growth rates were negative between
1953 and 1956. It is not surprising that the inflation rate went to 84%
in 1955, but the dominant class was not willing to activate CORFO again
and chose instead to arrange the contract of the Klein-Sacks Mission fol-
lowing the tradition of calling upon foreign experts when in trouble.
(ECLA, 1966, p.92)
In planning, CORFO did not produce the National Plan of Development
mandated by its charter until 1961, but many other activities prepared
the way for this task. As it was seen above, in the beginning the empha-
sis was on sectoral planning and projects. At the same time, the Divi-
sion of Studies and Planning was preparing Economic Geography of Chile
which was first published in 1950, and developing a system of National
Accounts with the technical assistance of the United Nations.
In 1954 CORFO published Plan for Agricultural and Transport Deve-
lopment which was never implemented because it was heavily dependent on
foreign aid which was never obtained. (Glade, 1969, p.439; Gil, 1966,
p.154)
However this plan began the series of studies which later produced
the Program of Livestock Development (1961) and the Program of Fruit Pro-
duction (1962), which were carried out by the Agricultural Division of
CORFO. The first included the genetic improvement of cattle for milk and
meat production, and the construction of modern slaughterhouses, meat
packing and storage facilities, and milk processing plants in the produc-
ing regions. The second financed the expansion of orchards and the fruit
processing plants for internal production export. (ODEPA, 1970, p.XXV)
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But the new emphasis in planning during the 1960's came as a re-
sult of the ideas developed by the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA), especially as a result of the U.S. policy change towards
Latin America after the Cuban revolution. This requires further expla-
nation.
4. ECLA, The Alliance for Progress and Planning.
At the end of World War II, Chile and the other Latin American
countries agreed with the United States proposal to support the creation
of the United Nations Organization, but insisted on the necessity of a
regional organization of economic cooperation to substitute the old Pan
American Union, in the "Act of Chapultepec" of 1945. (Levinson, 1970,
p.37; Bailey, 1967, p.77)
Chile also joined the Bretton Woods agreement which created the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1944, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, thus formalizing the Chilean participa-
tion in the international capitalistic system organized under the hega-
mony of the United States. (Blake, 1976, pp. 12-1 3 & 46-47)
In addition, Santiago was chosen by the United Nations as the seat
of its regional offices in Latin America, which meant installing the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the regional offices of F.A.O.
and several other international agencies in the Chilean capital. The af-
filiation with the international organizations and the internationaliza-
tion of Santiago, fitted well with the cultural traditions of the Chilean
dominant class; but the U.N. agencies represented a new source of ideas
and models different from those of Europe and the United States.
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Probably the most important idea to achieve importance through the
existence of the United Nations was the concept of economic development.
Before the U.N. provided the world with a series of standard statistical
indicators, there was no way to compare one country with another on a
common ground. Concepts such as "progress", or the qualification of
countries as "advanced" or "primitive", "modern" or "backward", were as-
sociated with subjective feelings of nationalistic pride or historical
prestige rather than scientific measurements. But the U.N. produced an
assumedly "objective" measuring instrument by which the different coun-
tries could be compared, and this instrument was promptly used to clas-
sify countries into two large groups according to indexes of their eco-
nomic performance: "developed" and "underdeveloped". This comparison and
classification led to a couple of basic questions: Why did some countries
have higher levels than other countries in all the indicators? How could
those countries with low levels reach the same high levels of the others?
It was assumed that all countries could reach reasonably high levels and
all the national societies considered those high levels as a desirable
goal.
The issue of economic development became a focus of competition be-
tween different political systems, and led to the emergence of other as-
sociated concepts such as "economic and technical assistance". Actually
the technical agencies of the U.N. grew out of the need for a better de-
finition and response to the basic questions postulated above, and the
most powerful nations developed their own mechanisms of international as-
sistance and cooperation as a means of increasing their influence on other
countries. As a consequence of their different political interests, the
organisms of the U.N. frequently developed a technical approach offered
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by individual countries.
In Latin America, ECLA represented a source of ideas and models
with a Latin American perspective, alternative to the ideas and models
generated in Europe and the United States. Under the direction of Raul
Prebisch, the staff of ECLA made a critical analysis of the conventional
capitalistic way of thinking about economic development, using the his-
tory of Latin America as a base for proposing a new thesis on the roots
of underdevelopment and the ways to overcome the obstacles for economic
growth. These ideas constitute a general view of the political economy
of development known as the "structuralist" position, in contrast with
the "monetarist" position of the IMF and the World Bank, that is the in-
ternational agencies dominated by the U.S. (Perloff, 1969, pp.9-10;
Hirschman, 1963, pp.212-214)
The classical and neo-classical economic theory of development sus-
tained by the IMF and World Bank postulated that the growth of exports
would produce the surplus capital required to make the necessary invest-
ments for future development. The same theory maintained that free com-
mercial interchange in the international market leads to an international
division of labor, which, due to the principle of "comparative advantages",
is mutually beneficial for all the participant countries. Therefore, the
best way to induce development is to eliminate tariffs and other obstacles
to the free interchange of goods and money among countries. (A good pre-
sentation of this traditional conservative theory is contained in the
Chapters 32 to 37 of the 6th edition of Samuelson's Economics.) This
theory served as ideology of GATT, an organization directed to facilitate
the free interchange of goods, and of IMF as the international financial
agency with the objective of facilitating the free interchange of money.
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(Blake, 1976, pp.12-13)
The analysis made by ECLA of the historical trends of the foreign
trade of Latin American countries demonstrated that those historical
trends were in contradiction to the postulates of the traditional econo-
mic doctrine presented above. The division of labor, which allocated the
production of primary goods to the underdeveloped countries of Latin
America and the production of manufactured goods to the developed coun-
tries of Europe and the U.S., resulted historically in a secular deteri-
oration of the terms of trade. From 1870 until World War II, and again
after 1950, the prices of agricultural products and minerals which con-
stituted the bulk of Latin American exports had grown at a slower rate
than the prices of the industrial goods imported by the Latin American
countries from Europe and the United States. (Blake, 1976, pp.31-33)
This was to continue in the future because the new technologies
would reduce the demand for raw materials, and because of the impact of
"Engel's Law" on the income elasticities of primary products and manu-
factued goods. (Perloff, 1969, p.9; Glade, 1969, p.404)
As it has been observed by Joan Robinson,
there are two broad categories of markets in which the
relations of supply and demand for particular commodi-
ties operate differently. ... In the first type the
producer offers his goods to a dealer and takes what-
ever price they will fetch; in the second, the producer
sets his price and sells as much as the market will
take.
The first market corresponds to primary products and the second to indus-
trial goods. (Robinson, 1973, pp.147-148)
In the analysis of ECLA, this observation was complemented with
another: The oligopolistic organization of industrial production and the
strength of labor unions in most developed countries would translate the
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productivity gains in the export sector would result in price decreases
that would benefit the consumers in more developed countries. (Glade,
1969, p.405; Blake, 1976, p.31)
Three other elements were added by ECLA in this analysis of the ob-
stacles for development. They were: the latifundio pattern of ownership
of agricultural land, the uneven distribution of income, and the small
size and lack of competition of the internal market in Latin American
countries. (ECLA, 1966, pp.14-15)
Owners of large tracts of agricultural land (latifundios) were not
interested in increasing production and productivity because they ob-
tained a high income from the extensive cultivation of part of their
land. The intensive cultivation of all their land would require higher
production costs and would increase supply in an already depressed export
market, resulting in lower prices. They'd prefer to cut production so
that, at least in the internal market, the prices would be high and their
production costs would be low. This combined with the deterioration in
the terms of trade mentioned above resulted in chronic deficits in the
balance of trade and internal inflation. (Prebish, 1970, pp.177-179)
The skewed distribution of income prevalent in Latin American coun-
tries compounded the problems by reducing the population's potential for
savings. The large groups of low income people could not save because
they were pressed to satisfy their essential needs, while the ruling
classes had an excessive propensity to consume as a result of the infla-
tionary process and their desire to reproduce at home the environmental
niceties of the more developed countries. As a consequence of this, the
rate of savings in Latin American countries has been historically insuf-
ficient to finance a process of accelerated industrialization and develop-
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ment. (Hirschman, 1963, p.213; Prebisch, 1970, p.123)
The small size of the internal market and the monopolistic organi-
zation of it left Latin American countries with poor allocation of re-
sources, idle production capacity and increased costs of production.
This situation precluded the appearance of innovation, distorted the
structure of the labor force and impeded the introduction of modern tech-
nologies especially suitable for large scale operations. (ECLA, 1966,
pp.14-15; Prebisch, 1970, pp.221-222)
ECLA postulated that the industrial sector is the most dynamic fac-
tor of economic development. Therefore, ECLA felt that the main compo-
nent of a development policy should be an agressive program of industri-
alization to substitute imports and to diversify exports toward a
stronger position in the international market. The same analysis made it
clear that free market forces allowed to follow their course would not
provide such a program. On the contrary, they would intensify the prob-
lems by deepening the trends which historically have been demonstrated
to be contrary to the interests of the Latin American countries. (Glade,
1969, pp.405-406; Perloff, 1969, p.10)
In addition to this industrialization program, the policy proposals
of ECLA included the creation of two major international institutions and
several structural changes inside each Latin American country.
In the international field, ECLA reinforced the old aspiration of
the Latin American countries for a regional financing agency which could
provide capital for investments in soft terms and without the ties of the
World Bank and the Exim Bank with the U.S. policies. An Inter-American
Bank would be more responsive to the needs of the Latin American countries
and more open to the search for appropriate technologies and better prices
117
than those of the U.S market. (Perloff, 1969, pp.10-ll; Levinson, 1970,
p.40)
ECLA also proposed the idea of the economic integration of the
Latin American countries, following the example of the European Common
Market, to provide the large market required for many industrial activi-
ties to achieve the necessary and efficient economies of scale. (Prebish,
1970, pp.164-165)
The most important internal structural alteration proposed by ECLA
was the Agrarian Reform geared to change the large latifundios into fami-
ly, collective, or cooperative farms, thereby making a more intensive
use of the agricultural land, increasing agricultural production and pro-
ductivity, and raising the income of the rural population. This would
increase the internal market for industrial products, would provide food
for the urban population and would reduce the pressure over foreign ex-
change resources. (Prebisch, 1970, pp.178-179)
Such a complex package required the intervention of the State and
the introduction of planning in the Latin American economies; ECLA was
providing technical assistance in planning since 1949 at the same time
that it was introducing the idea among professionals and politicians of
the necessity for the structural changes and the State action described
above. (UN/ECA.102, pp.20 & 43)
ECLA ideas were influential in generating a Latin American position
on development issues which was significant in the internal debate of
each Latin American country during the 1950's, and more so in the rela-
tions between Latin American countries and the U.S.
Chilean economists like Anibal Pinto, Jorge Ahumada or Osvaldo
Sunkel, used the background material provided by ECLA's annual Economic
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Survey of Latin America to criticize the "monetarist" policies applied
by the Klein-Sacks Mission and the I.M.F., and to propose alternative
"structuralist" solutions to the same problems of inflation and economic
development. (Hirschman, 1963, pp. 213-2 14 )
However, the U.S. policy-makers were slow to understand the process
that was taking place by the influence of ECLA. Even though in the 1940
Habana Conference of Latin American Foreign Ministers the U.S. accepted
the idea of an Inter-American Bank that would obtain from Latin American
countries a common front before the European conflict, after World War II
was over, that idea was postponed or rejected. (Levinson, 1970, p.36;
Stuart, 1966, pp.33-34)
In 1948 in Bogota, the Inter-American Conference approved the
charter of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) which replaced
the old Pan American Union. But, "Secretary of State, George Marshall,
explained that the United States could not simultaneously undertake the
economic reconstruction of Europe and provide massive assistance to the
underdeveloped world." (Levinson, 1970, p.37; See also Bailey, 1967,
pp.78-83)
Even as late as the Tenth Inter-American Conference of Caracas in
1954, the center of interest of the meeting was the rather bullyish per-
formance of the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in political
matters. In two days, he and all the military dictators of the Hemi-
shpere pushed a declaration which stated that a Communist regime in any
of the Latin American countries was to be considered a threat to the se-
curity of all 0.A.S. countries in the terms of the Rio Pact of 1947. In
this way, he obtained some legitimacy for the C.I.A. intervention in
Guatemala the same year, but left the issue of economic cooperation pend-
119
ing until a later meeting that would take place in Quitandinha, Brasil.
(Bailey, 1967, pp.94-95; Perloff, 1969, p.10)
To prepare the Quitandinha Conference, which took place in November
1954, Raul Prebish called a conference of experts, headed by Eduardo Frei
(then Senator and later President of Chile) and including Carlos Lleras
Restrepo (later President of Colombia) as spokesman. These experts pre-
pared a report on the basis of the analysis and proposals of the ECLA
staff. The report was submitted to the 0.A.S. meeting after previous
circulation among the delegates of the different countries. This report
anticipated the Alliance for Progess in its recommendations which in-
cluded:
1) The creation of an Inter-American Fund for agriculture, mining
and industrial development, which later became the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, I.D.B.;
2) Foreign financing of investments at the level of $1 billion per
year for 10 years, through the Inter-American Fund, the World Bank and
the EximBank;
3) An agreement on price stability for the most important Latin
American export products; and
4) National planning to determine priorities and to allocate public
and private investments. (Levinson, 1970, pp.39-4 0 ; Perloff, 1969, p.11)
The report was supported by the Latin American delegates; among
them were Roberto Oliveira Campos, who was later Minister of Planning of
Brasil, and Felipe Herrera, then Minister of Finance of Chile and later
President of the IDB.
But the U.S. government, represented by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, George Humphrey, rejected the report and repeated the traditional
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statements urging the Latin American countries to attract private foreign
investments through the control of inflation and "realistic" exchange
rates. He declared his "firm determination to maintain a strong healthy
economy in the United States and an international system of free trade".
A similar position was taken by Eugene Black, the President of the World
Bank. He commented on the figures of the report saying:
In the presentation of calculations of this kind,
little attention is usually paid to the heavy bur-
den that would be imposed on the foreign financiers
of countries that follow them.
(Levinson, 1970, pp.41-42; Perloff,
1969, pp.ll-1 2)
The U.S. position started to change after the violent reception of
Vice President Richard Nixon in a "goodwill tour" of Latin America which
took place in April and May of 1958. In September of the same year the
foreign Ministers of OAS approved the creation of the IDB and accepted
the idea of President Kubistcheck of Brasil to massively attack the
socio-economic problems of the Latin American countries. He called his
idea "Operation Pan America". (Levinson, 1970, pp.44-45; Perloff, 1969,
p.13)
Shortly after, the actions of ECLA resulted in the organization of
the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) as a first step toward
the organization of a Common Market among the countries of the region.
The Treaty of Montevideo signed in February, 1960, and ratified by all
the countries of South America and Mexico, created a process of gradual
reduction of tariffs and other restrictions on trade among the signata-
ries which put the basis for the Common Market before 1972 following the
recommendations of ECLA. (Prebisch, 1970, pp.164-165; Glade, 1969, p.472)
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LAFTA was the first organization of Latin American countries with-
out the participation of the United States, and as such it was considered
initially in less than favorable terms by the U.S. government. In addi-
tion, critics from the Left denounced LAFTA as an instrument of the rul-
ing classes, as a union of governments and not of people. In practice,
the opposition of businessmen interested in maintaining protection of
their monopolies through high tariffs, the extreme differences between
countries, and the complexities of the system of product by product nego-
tiations led to the paralysis of LAFTA in 1968. (Perloff, 1969, pp.182-
183; Levinson, 1970, p.181)
However LAFTA created a consciousness about the common problems of
the region and provided a technical forum where those problems could be
treated in practical terms. Moreover, it generated a more active coop-
eration among some of the member countries, such as the "Acuerdo de
Cartagena" signed in 1968, toward the planned economic integration of
the countries of the "Andean Region" which includes Bolivia, Colombia,
Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. (Glade, 1969, pp.437-482 ; Prebisch,
1970, pp.166-167)
After the violence suffered by Nixon on his trip, the triumph of
Fidel Castro in Cuba at the beginning of 1959 heightened the concern of
the U.S. and the ruling classes of Latin America over the revlutionary
potential throughout the region. Now the proposals of ECLA and
Kubistcheck appeared as attractive and sensible alternatives to the
spread of socialist and anti-imperialist movements. As President Kennedy
said: "If the only alternatives for the people of Latin America are the
status quo and Communism, they will inevitably choose Communism."
(Levinson, 1970, p.56)
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Kennedy made U.S.-Latin American relations a campaign issue, and in
a policy speech in Tampa, Florida, used the Spanish expression, "Alianza
para el Progreso", for the first time. The phrase had been coined by
Richard Goodwin to symbolize his concept of a new era of cooperation be-
tween the U.S. and "our sister republics". After his inauguration,
Kennedy designated a group of experts with Adolf Berle, from Columbia
University, presiding. Including Lincoln Gordon of the Harvard Business
School, Robert Alexander of Rutgers, Arthur Witaker of The University of
Pennsylvania, and two "hispanos": Teodoro Moscoso, former head of the de-
velopment program of Puerto Rico called "Bootstrap", and Arturo Morales
Carrion, the group was directed to study a new policy toward Latin Ameri-
ca. Richard Goodwin served as personal link with the President.
(Levinson, 1970, pp.51-54; Perloff, 1969, p.20)
But the President also called the Ambassador of Venezuela in
Washington, Jose Antonio Mayobre, and asked him to organize a parallel
group of Latin American experts. Mayobre acceded and organized a group
that included Raul Prebisch of ECLA, Felipe Herrera, President of IDB,
and Jose A. Mora and Jorge del Sol of OAS. This group prepared a state-
ment of four points which was given to the President. The U.S. group met
three times and prepared a report entitled "Alliance for Progress: A Pro-
gram of Inter-American Partnership". Based on both, the President pro-
posed the Alliance for Progress in a speech to an audience of Latin
American diplomats in Washington on March 1961. (Levinson, 1970, pp.55-
56; Perloff, 1969, p.20)
One of the basic themes of the President's speech was planning.
He said:
I propose that the American republics begin on a vast
new ten-year plan for the Americas, a plan to trans-
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form the 1960's into a historic decade of democratic
progress.
He added:
I will shortly request a ministerial meeting of the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council, a meeting
at which we can begin a massive planning effort which
will be at the heart of the Alliance for Progress.
For if our Alliance is to succeed, each Latin nation
must formulate long-range plans for its own develop-
ment, plans which establish targets and priorities,
ensure monetary stability, establish the machinery
for vital social change, stimulate private activity
and initiative, and provide for a maximum national
effort. These plans will be the foundation of our
development effort, and the basis for the allocation
of outside resources.
(The text of the speech is included
as annex to Levinson, 1970)
The repeated mentioning of planning and "vital social change" indi-
cated Kennedy's acceptance of the structuralist ideas of ECLA. However,
before the meeting announced in the speech could take place, the Bay of
Pigs fiasco made it clear that the change of policy was far from complete,
and the new partnership did not include the possibility of accepting a
socialist regime in one of the Latin American countries.
Actually the Alliance for Progress was conceived, and was reaffirmed
after the Bay of Pigs adventure as a response to the threat of a socialist
revolution in the Hemisphere. (Perloff, 1969, p.19; Levinson, 1969, p.5 1)
The meeting requested by President Kennedy took place in August,
1961, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. All the countries were represented by
their respective Ministers of Finance. The U.S. delegation was presided
by the Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon, and the Cuban delega-
tion was led by Che Guevara; the political debate of the Conference cen-
tered around the statements of both.
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A message from President Kennedy opened the conference announcing
that the United States would allocate more than $1 billion in aid for
economic development during the first year of the decade of the Alliance
for Progress. His message also called on the Latin American countries to
engage in land reform, tax reform and other social changes necessary to
mobilize the internal resources for self-sustaining growth, and to dis-
tribute more equitably the benefits of development. Dillon added that
the Latin American countries could expect as much as $20 billion in ex-
ternal resources during the decade if they took the required internal
measures.
Guevara responded by challenging Dillon to make his offer of $20
billion more than a single promise, reminding the delegates that many
such promises had never been ratified back in Washington. He joked that
the loans of the Alliance would "bear the stamp of Cuba", and finally at-
tacked the Alliance as an instrument of economic imperialism, defying the
delegates of other countries to meet again in 1980 to compare their own
countries' economic and social development with that of Cuba. (Levinson,
1970, pp.65-67; Perloff, 1969, p.22; The Acts of the Conference were pub-
lished by OAS.)
The agenda and the working papers of the Conference had been Dre-
pared by four "task forces" organized by a committee integrated by Jorge
Sol (OAS), Felipe Herrera (IDE) and Raul Prebisch (ECLA).
The task forces were integrated by Latin American experts and their
U.S. counterparts, a group of faculty members of Harvard and MIT headed
by Lincoln Gordon. Each of the task forces prepared position papers on
their respective topics which were: economic integration, primary commo-
dities, public participation, and planning and development. This last
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one, planning and development, was in practice the most important one
since it tried to give institutional implementation to the "structural-
ist" ideas refined since Quitandinha. It was presided by Felipe Pazos,
former President of the Cuban Central Bank during the first year of the
Revolution, and included as U.S. experts, Albert 0. Hirschman, Harvey
Perloff and Gerhard Colm. (Levinson, 1970, pp.62-63; Perloff, 1969, p.21;
Gordon, 1963, p.4)
The Conference participants, with the exception of Cuba, approved
a Declaration to the People of the Americas, which established the gener-
al goals of the Alliance, and the Charter of Punta del Este, establishing
an Alliance for Progress within the framework of the Operation Pan Ameri-
ca. (Both the Declaration and the Charter have been published by OAS)
The general goals of the Declaration were specific and detailed in
the objectives of the Charter. The language of Walt Rostow was present
in the first of these objectives which postulated the achievement of a
growth rate of no less than 2.5% per capita per year so as to attain "at
the earliest possible date, levels of income capable of assuring self-
sustaining development." The other objectives of the Alliance according
to the Charter were:
2) a more equitable distribution of national income;
3) balanced diversification in national economic structures;
4) to accelerate the process of rational industrialization;
5) to raise greatly the level of agricultural productivity
and output;
6) to encourage ... programs of comprehensive agrarian reform
leading to the effective transformation, where required, of
unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use;
7) to eliminate adult illiteracy and by 1970 to assure,
as a minimum, access to six years of primary education
for each school age child in Latin America;
8) to increase life expectancy at birth by a minimum of
five years, and to increase the ability to learn and pro-
duce by improving individual and public health;
9) to increase the construction of low cost housing for
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low income families;
10) to maintain stable price levels, avoiding inflation
or deflation;
11) to strengthen the existing agreements on economic
integration; and
12) to develop cooperative programs designed to prevent
excessive fluctuations in foreign exchange earnings ...
and to facilitate the access of Latin American exports
to international markets.
In relation to the methods to be used, Lincoln Gordon wrote: "There
are two points of special importance: systematic planning for economic
and social development, and the principle of self-help and institutional
reform." (Gordon, 1963, p.13)
In fact, the Title II of Chapter II of the Charter contained the
agreement of the Latin American countries to formulate national plans of
economic and social development which responded to the proposal of Presi-
dent Kennedy and the expert advice of ECLA. The same Charter described
what elements should be included in such national development plans:
1) establishment of mutually consistent targets ...
in expanding productive capacity in industry, agricul-
ture, mining, transport, power and communications, and
in improving conditions of urban and rural life includ-
ing better housing, education and health;
2) assignment of priorities and the description of methods
to achieve the targets;
3) the measures which will be adopted to direct the public
sector and encourage private action to support the plan;
4) the estimated cost in national and foreign currency
of the plan;
5) the estimated available internal resources, private
and public, for the execution of the plan;
6) the direct and indirect effects of the plan on the
balance of payments and the estimated external financing
required;
7) the policies to be followed to permit the implementa-
tion of the plan within a framework of price stability; and
8) the machinery of public administration to be used in
carrying out the plan.
(Charter of Punta del Este, Title II,
Appendix; See also Perloff, 1969,
p.28)
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In the original draft of the Charter, these national plans were to
be evaluated by a Committee of Experts to assure that the external finan-
cial aid was allocated for purposes coincident with the goals of the Al-
liance, and that its amount was technically justified. But a strong op-
position was presented by the big countries (Brasil, Argentina and Mexico)
on grounds that this was restrictive to their sovereignity. The role of
the Committee of Experts in the Charter became an advisory one. In ad-
dition, moved by the urgency given by Kennedy to the Alliance tasks, a
mission integrated by Teodoro Moscoso and Richard Goodwin bypassed the
requirements of the Charter by giving loans to Chile and Argentina at the
beginning of 1962. (Levinson, 1970, pp.10 8-lll; Perloff, 1969, pp.30-37)
Small countries, on their side, resisted the idea of planning on
the basis of their lack of sufficient technical personnel. In response,
the U.S. agreed to include in the Charter a provision for financing tech-
nical assistance in support of the national development plans. The
Charter mentioned in particular, experts to be contracted by governments
to prepare investment projects; agreements with ECLA, IDB and OAS to or-
ganize the countries' national planning agencies; or to formulate devel-
opment programs such as: agrarian reform, health, education, housing,
cooperatives, tax reform and institutional reform. (Charter, Title II,
Chapter IV)
The Charter gave the Latin American countries eighteen months to
formulate their national plans of development and submit them to the Com-
mittee of Experts which would designate an ad-hoc committee to analyze
each plan. Sixteen countries submitted plans during the first five years
of the Alliance, but some of the larger countries (Brasil and Argentina)
never bothered to do so, and some of the plans submitted were useless.
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(Perloff, 1969, p.36)
The Committee of Experts, commonly known as the Committee of Nine
or "the nine wise men", was integrated by Jorge Sol of El Salvador, Raul
Saez of Chile, Hernando Agudelo of Colombia, Jorge Grieve of Peru,
Ernesto Maleccorto of Argentina, Manuel Noriega of Guatemala, and Felipe
Pazos, a Cuban exilee in the U.S., and Paul Rosestein-Rodan and Harvey
Perloff of the United States. (Levinson, 1970, p.109; Perloff, 1969,
pp.31-32)
The Committee was deprived of effective power to implement the pur-
poses of the Charter; but the financial assitance agencies, such as AID
and IDB, tended to implement the planning requirements of the Alliance
through the individual applications of the countries, and in practice re-
quired such an amount of information for each individual project, that it
was very difficult to obtain it without the systematic comprehensive plan-
ing assumed by the Alliance. (Perloff, 1969, pp.32-33) At the same time
the Committee of Nine was able to lobby for the creation of a more power-
ful multilateral organ of the Alliance and was finally replaced by the
Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress of the 0.A.S. (CIAP)
created in 1964. (Perloff, 1969, pp.37-40)
The Charter of the Alliance for Progress provided legitimacy to the
"structuralist" ideas introduced by ECLA, and represented a fairly com-
plete description of the concept of socio-economic development and what
was later designated as the "desarrollista" (developmentist) approach to
the problems of the underdeveloped countries. (Prebisch, 1970, pp.18-19)
Until Punta del Este, ideas such as planning or agrarian reform had
been rejected as "socialist" banners, but now they were incorporated into
the accepted set of government actions. In dependent societies such as
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the Latin American ones, the fact that these ideas were supported by the
U.S. government made them a kind of intellectual fad of the Latin American
ruling classes. As observed in a seminar on planning in Santiago in 1965:
"The concept and idea of planning are in fashion in Latin America. ... As
any concept which becomes fashionable, its application has been outspread
in an excessive way..." (ILPES, 1966, p.5 . In Spanish in the original)
In Chile, the Alliance had a deep influence because the ground had
been prepared by the actions of CORFO and by the presence of ECLA in
Santiago. In addition, the possibility of the democratic election of a
socialist as President in 1958, led the United States to give special at-
tention to the country. But this influence is better analyzed when put
in the context of the last three democratic administrations that ruled
Chile before the counter-revolution of 1973, as it will be in the follow-
ing chapters of this study.
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Chapter III
ALESSANDRI (1958 - 1964) AND "RELUCTANT" PLANNING
Introduction
At the end of the fifties the political debate in Chile was con-
centrated on the issues of inflation and economic development. The 84%
rate of inflation for 1955 and the subsequent calling of the monetarism
of the Klein-Sacks Mission were followed by a recession in which per ca-
pita income actually declined and social tensions erupted in the riots of
April 1957 in Santiago.
Chilean economists of the Left, based on the studies of ECLA, cri-
ticized the Klein-Sacks Mission and its policies from a structuralist
point of view according to which inflation and economic stagnation were a
result of basic elements within the existing social structure such as the
latifundio system of agricultural landholdings, the skewed distribution
of income, and the dependency of the Chilean exports on one single pro-
duct: copper.
The Chilean dominant class developed its own structuralist position
which was sustained by Jorge Alessandri, the Presidential candidate from
the Right in 1958. Alessandri agreed with the structuralist criticism
of monetarism which he considered naive. But for him the structural fac-
tors consisted of the excessive intervention of the State in industrial
activities which increased taxes, deviated resources that should have
been directed to public works, and deprived private investors of incent-
ives to develop production. He sustained the need to reduce the inter-
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vention of the State and to increase the "efficiency" of the State machi-
nery to reduce taxes so the private industrialists could regain the ini-
tiative for economic development that had been taken from them by the
State.
With these ideas as platform, Alessandri was elected President in
1958 in a contest which confronted him with his successors in the Presi-
dency, Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende.
Together with Alessandri, a new group of the dominant class entered
to occupy government positions displacing the traditional politicians of
the Right. They were the "gerentes", that is the executives of industri-
al and commercial enterprises who were supposed to introduce their mana-
gerial expertise in government operations and provide the climate of con-
fidence necessary for private investors to develop production. The pri-
vate sector, freed from the unfair competition and interference of the
State and assisted by a friendly government, was assumed to be the dyna-
mic force for economic development. The resultant increases in produc-
tion would, in time, eliminate the inflation produced by insufficient
supply, and would also carry with them income increases which would
trickle down from the dominant class to the rest of society.
The new team, under the leadership of Alessandri and his Minister
of Finance, Roberto ("El Ruca") Vergara, implemented policies to elimi-
nate State controls on foreign trade and capital movements, to reduce
State expenditures and taxes and to restrict wage increases. These poli-
cies were accompanied by spectacular measures such as the introduction of
a new monetary unit ("Escudo" (Eo.) and the unification of exchange rates
fixed at Eo. 1.05=US $1).
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At the beginning, these policies appeared to work. Industrial pro-
duction had a strong recovery in 1959, and in August of that year the
prices stopped rising for the first time in twenty years. But the domi-
nant class did not respond to its own economic model. The growth of pri-
vate investment in direct productive activities was not enough to compen-
sate for the reduction in public investments of the same kind. Even more,
domestic private investment declined in absolute and relative terms every
year after 1959.
This lack of development added to the tax cuts made to encourage
investments, reduced the internal revenues, and the State had to get new
and increased foreign loans to balance the budget. The foreign debt grew
from $569 million in 1958 to $1,896 million in 1964.
This dependency on foreign financing made the Chilean government
extremely vulnerable to the pressures of the U.S. government and the in-
ternational lending institutions such as the IMF and the IDB, in matters
of economic policy. These pressures forced the Chilean government to ac-
cept the idea of development planning in spite of its strong laissez-
faire ideological bias. Upon returning from a 1959 trip to the United
States, where he arranged loans for $130 million, Roberto Vergara ordered
CORFO to prepare a National Plan of Development. This helped the Chilean
government to anticipate the requirements of the Alliance for Progress;
the Ten Year Development Plan was published in January, 1961. But the
Plan was criticized by the World Bank and by the Committee of Nine of the
Alliance for Progress because of its lack of social elements, particular-
ly strong agrarian reform, income distribution and employment programs
and policies. (Committee of Nine, 1962)
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On their side, the IDB, under the presidency of Felipe Herrera,
approved any project contingent upon its inclusion of a plan of regional
development. AID directed part of the $135 million in emergency aid pro-
vided by the U.S. on the occasion of the 1960 earthquake, to contract
U.S. consultants in city and regional planning to work in the reconstruc-
tion projects.
In response to the Alliance for Progress, the Alessandri Admini-
stration designated a National Commission on Educational Planning. The
executive secretary was Oscar Vera, on loan from UNESCO. This Commission
received, in 1963, a substantial grant from the Ford Foundation. The
same Ford Foundation provided assistance in rural development and commu-
nity development facilities planning for the Maule Norte Plan, a regional
development plan required by the IDB in relation to a $40 million loan
for an irrigation project. The Ford Foundation also provided assistance
in city planning and community facilities for the housing projects fi-
nanced by AID.
The foreign influecne in the new emphasis on planning in Chile was
complemented by the installation, in Santiago, of the Latin American In-
stitute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES), organized by ECLA with
the financial assistance of IDB. ILPES started operations in 1962 in re-
sponse to the needs of the Latin American signataries of the Charter of
Punta del Este. ILPES reflected the ECLA perspective on development and
constituted an intellectual center for Latin American planners which ba-
lanced the influence of AID advisers and U.S. trained planners. In Chile,
ILPES had a strong influence due to the permanent contact between ILPES
personnel and trainees, the Chilean university professors, and government
experts.
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As seen above, planning during the Alessandri Administration was
not a product of the government philosophy, but a result of external
pressure, policy failures, and natural catastrophe. As such, planning
served as a formal justification and rationalization of decisions already
made rather than a rational method of arriving at decisions. In practice,
planners had the opportunity of being trained "on the job", collecting
and analyzing information and providing requested reports to the inter-
national lending agencies. In this sense, the role of the Chilean and
foreign planners working under Alessandri was similar to that of U.S.
city planners preparing proposals to obtain Federal grants.
However, the Chilean planners, as professionals, were members of
the Chilean dominant class, and therefore were able to make use of their
knowledge. They collected information in a more effective way than local
planners in the U.S. In fact, planners had an important role in the de-
sign of the platform of the two main contenders for the presidential elec-
tions of 1964, and both platforms were aimed at structural changes for
economic and social development. The two of them also included planning
as a necessary tool to achieve these objectives.
All these points will be detailed and documented in the following
sections of this chapter.
1. Inflation, Development and the Presidential Campaign of 1958.
Inflation has been a permanent feature of the Chilean economy ever
since the past century. But inflation has a different character for the
different components of the Chilean social structure. For the working
class, whose only source of income is a wage or salary, inflation is a
real problem affecting the ability to cope with basic needs; for the do-
minant class it is mainly a symbolic and instrumental issue. (Hirschman,
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1963, pp.160-161; Committee of Nine, 1962, p.65)
In fact, the concentrated control of the productive structure of
the country allowed the merchants and industrialists to raise prices at
least as fast as wages and salaries, while their access to credit expanded
the supply of money for them without the corresponding increase in produc-
tion and productivity. Since only a small group actually had access to
credit, this expansion of money represented the appropriation by that
group of the net results of the economic cycle, while the great mass of
salaried workers was reduced to the yearly fight to recover, through ad-
justments of wages and salaries, the purchasing power lost by inflation
during the preceding cycle.
Inflation was used by the dominant class to control, on a technical
level, the raises in wages and salaries demanded by the labor organiza-
tions. In this sense, any such raise was denounced as "inflationary".
But inflation was also used by the dominant class to control the relative
autonomy of the State by making use of the principles established by the
Kemmerer Mission. Kemmerer had fairly rigid ideas in matters of monetary
stability, which he expressed in three principles: 1) Gold Exchange Stan-
dard; 2) Balance of the budget; and 3) Regulation of the money supply in
accordance with the needs of business through discount of short-term
paper, supplemented by open market operations. According to these prin-
ciples, the Central Bank, until 1950, believed that credits to commerce
and industry were "organic", that is non-inflationary, because they would
be self-liquidating. By contrast, credits to the State, even those given
to the State's development agencies were "inorganic" by definition.
(Hirschman, 1963, p.181)
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It is not surprising that the effort made by Jorge Alessandri, as
Minister of Finance of the Gonzalez Videl Administration in 1948, to con-
trol inflation through budget surplus and wage and price freezes, was a
failure. The money supply continued to grow as a result of the extensive
use of credit by the merchants and industrialists who had access to it.
(Hirschman, 1963, pp.189-190) Actually, the anti-inflationary policies
were technical dressing which accompanied the harsh repression of labor
organizations under the "Defense of Democracy Law". Through this law the
dominant class tried to reverse the process of income distribution,
started by the Popular Front, in favor of white collar and industrial
workers. (Roxborough, 1977, p.32)
On that occasion, Jorge Alessandri went too far in his reactionary
drive. White collar employees had been defending themselves against in-
flation by the yearly calculation of the "Sueldo Vital" (see page )
and by mortgage acquisitions through pension funds. Alessandri suspended
the cost of living adjustment of salaries, and used the pension funds to
balance the budget. This led the white collar employees to revolt in a
general strike which resulted in the dismissal of the Minister of Finance.
But Alessandri became a leader of the dominant class. (Hirschman, 1963,
pp.189-190; Roxborough, 1977, p.32)
He was very well endowed to assume such a leadership. His father,
Arturo Alessandri, had been president twice and gave Jorge Alessandri
and his brothers a well known name and a good position in the dominant
class. The Alessandri family became one of the most powerful groups in
Chilean politics. Three of the brothers were Senators, one was Dean of
the Law School of Universidad de Chile and eminent corporate lawyer
(Arturo), and another (Hernan) was Dean of the School of Medicine; still
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another Alessandri (Fernando) was candidate of the Right in the presiden-
tial elections of 1946, as was his brother-in-law, Arturo Matte, in the
1952 elections. The Alessandri-Matte group had control of sixty-nine
corporations which amounted to 16.1% of the total Chilean capital assets.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.56)
Jorge Alessandri was an engineer who had avoided partisan politics
to become the Chief Executive of one of the largest industries of the
country, the paper and cellulose monopoly "Papeles y Cartones", and one
of the largest distributing firms (CODINA). He was also director of
SOFOFA and president of the most important organization of the dominant
class, the "Confederaci6n de la Producci6n y del Comercio" (C.P.C.:
Commerce and Production Confederation was the coalition of the organiza-
tions SOFOFA: industrialists; S.N.A.: agriculturists; S.N.M.: mining in-
terests, and C.C.C.: merchants), Because of his lack of participation
in partisan politics he could be presented as an "independent", and had
an image of honesty and austerity which was carefully cultivated by the
publicity of the dominant class. (Stallings, 1978, p.60; Feinberg, 1972,
pp. 9 4-9 5 )
The 1958 presidential elections marked a regrouping of the politi-
cal parties after the confusing period of the Ibaiez Administration.
After the repression of labor organizations and the divisions of the So-
cialist Party at the beginning of the 1950's, the Left was unified again
in 1957 to organize the "Frente de Accion Popular" (FRAP: Popular Action
Front). However, they had still a weak showing in the congressional
elections of that year. The political center was divided between Radi-
cals who were trying to recover from the bad image created by the Gonzalez
Videla Administration, and the Christian Democrats who were growing ra-
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pidly. The Right, after considering the possibility of supporting the
Christian Democrat, Eduardo Frei, decided to present the candidacy of
Jorge Alessandri. (Gil, 1966, p.80; Stallings, 1978, pp.7 8-79 )
The background for the issues debated in the 1958 campaign was pro-
vided by the impact of the Klein-Sacks Mission.
As it was seen before, (see page 73 ) when the effort of the Ibanez
Administration to apply populist policies without affecting the interests
of the dominant class led to an inflation of 84% in 1955, the Klein-Sacks
Mission was hired to control inflation, to serve as contact between the
Chilean government and the Eisenhower Administration in the U.S., and to
serve as a device to allow the populist Ibanez to adopt conservative po-
licies which the Right could support in Congress without entering into
formal agreements with the Executive. (Hirschman, 1963, pp.204-205)
Helped by the financial assistance of the IMF and the U.S. government in
loans adding to $75 million, the Mission achieved some success in con-
trolling inflation by restricting salary adjustments to only 60% of the
rise in the cost of living of the previous year, plus tighter restric-
tions on bank credit, simplification of exchange rates and the provision
of advance deposits for imports. (Hirschman, 1963, p.205; Gil, 1966,
p.191) In 1957 the inflation rate had declined to 17%, but the Chilean
economy fell into a recession in which "the minimum wage fell by 15 per
cent, and the pay of government employees by 41 per cent between 1955
and 1958 (in real terms)". (ECLA, 1966, p.31 1) The most important factor
of this recession was the exclusion of the construction business from
bank credits which led to massive lay-offs of construction workers and
contradiction in the building materials and other ancillary industries,
and the restriction in demand resulting from the reductions in the real
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income of the working population. (ECLA, 1966, pp.314-3 15 )
This recession produced social tensions which led to the violent
riots of April, 1957, in Santiago and to the renewed unity of the Left
mentioned above. The resentment about the direct intervention of the
Klein-Sacks Mission in Chilean politics was reinforced, and all this gave
strength to the "structuralist" critics of monetarism. The Left and the
Christian Democrats maintained that inflation was a symptom of deeper
problems which affect the economic structure in itself. Monetary poli-
cies have impact only on the propagating factors of inflation such as
credit expansion and salary adjustments, but they leave the underlying
structural factors untouched. ECLA and the Chilean economists believed
that the major structural problems were: low productivity within the agri-
cultural sector due to the latifundio pattern of landholding; the skewed
distribution of income which led the low income masses to exert pressure
on food consumption and the high income elite to conspicuously consume
imported goods, both of which pressed on the revenues in foreign exchange;
and the extreme dependency of the Chilean economy on one export product,
copper. The metal was subject to extreme price fluctuations in the in-
ternational market, and its production and distribution was directed from
the headquarters of the U.S.-based corporations that owned the mines.
(Hirschman, 1963, p.213; Kaufman, 1972, pp.32-3 3)
But the conservative economists working for SOFOFA developed a
rightist version of structuralism which was presented by Jorge Alessandri
in the campaign for the 1958 elections. This position sustained that the
structural factors of inflation were all related to the excessive growth
of the State and its intervention in direct productive activities.
Alessandri agreed with the structuralist criticism of monetarism saying:
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"It is naive to think that the problem of inflation in Chile could be
solved essentially through credit measures, without an attack on its fun-
damental causes." (As quoted by Hirschman, 1963, p.214) But for him, the
structural factors consisted of state intervention in industrial activi-
ties. Through increased taxes and by misdirected resources that should
have been better employed in more traditional public works, private in-
vestors were deprived of incentives to develop production. Alessandri
said:
We cannot and should not limit government spending
on public works: this is the proper domain of the
State. Where the government role must be cut is with
respect to industrial activities. The State is not
efficient as a producer. It should limit its activi-
ties to assisting and stimulating the private sector.
(Stallings, 1978, p.65)
He sustained that the intervention of the State in the industrial sector
implied ignorance of requirements of construction and maintenance of
roads, ports, schools, irrigation and water purification projects; it
constituted unfair competition for the private sector, required higher
taxes from it, and led people "to expect the government to solve all
their problems when, in reality, they can only be solved by the people
themselves." (Stallings, 1978, p.64)
Alessandri apparently was sincere in this position and, as director
of SOFOFA, had advocated sanctions against private enterprises which
sought or accepted financial assistance from CORFO during the 1940's.
But most of the members of the dominant class had made use of the devel-
opment funds of the State, and they used the argument only to oppose any
action of the State in favor of other social classes and to restrict the
relative autonomy of the State. (Stallings, 1978, pp. 4 8 & 64; Roxborough,
1977, pp.54-55)
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However, neither the personality of Alessandri, his skillful pre-
sentation of the issues, nor the strong and well financed publicity cam-
paign, were enough to insure his election. In the last year of the
Ibanez Administration, a coalition of the Left, Radicals and Christian
Democrats, was formed in Congress against the Right. This informal co-
alition was known as "TOCOA" (Standing for "Todos Contra Alessandri":
All Against Alessandri), with the support of Ibinez, revoked the Defense
of Democracy Law returning the Communist Party to legality. A reform of
the electoral law was passed which was directed to open registration and
to eliminate the possibility of the traditional pacts and means of vote
control that favored the Right, especially in rural areas. (Stallings,
1978, p.79; Loveman, 1979, p.297)
Only the division of the other political forces among three candi-
dates: Allende (FRAP), Bossay (Radical Party), and Frei (Christian Demo-
crats), and the appearance of a strange fifth "populist" candidate, who
competed with Allende for the same electoral base, allowed the election
of Alessandri. He obtained only 33,500 votes more than Allende in a to-
tal polling of 1,250,350 votes. In fact, Alessandri obtained 31.2% of
the votes, followed by Allende with 28.6%, Frei with 20.5% and Bossay
with 15.5%; the so-called "Cura de Catapilco", Antonio Zamorano, obtained
3.3%. Zamorano was a defrocked priest who had been elected in 1957 to
the Chamber of Deputies on the FRAP ticket and ran a campaign of defense
of the poor against the rich. His apparently good financing and surpris-
ing publicity, in spite of his lack of partisan organization and support,
led many to suspect that his candidacy had been supported by the Right
and the CIA to take votes from Allende. In fact, his 41,000 votes were
more than the difference which separated Alessandri from Allende, and his
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votes were obtained in the same social base which generally supported the
Left. (Stallings, 1978, p.79; Sigmund, 1977, p.25)
The election of 1958 had also the peculiarity of confronting the
political forces and ideas of the three men who succeeded each other in
executive control during the next fifteen years. But the different poli-
tical forces were in different positions and perspectives. As it was
seen before, the Left was in a process of reorganization after the Defense
of Democracy Law, and the campaign was instrumental in establishing a na-
tional network which included, for the first time, the rural areas that
had been controlled exclusively by the traditional parties of the right.
Also in ascendance, the elections showed Frei getting many more votes
than the Christian Democrats had obtained the year before in the congres-
sional elections and the campaign represented the opportunity to organize
the Christian Democrat Party at the national level. In contrast, the Ra-
dical Luis Bossay obtained a far lower percentage of the vote than his
party had in the congressional elections (15.5% instead of 21.5%), and
even Jorge Alessandri's 31.2% was lower than the percentage obtained by
the Conservative and Liberal Parties in 1957. (Stallings, 1978, Table Al,
p.242) The traditional parties: Radical, Liberal and Conservative, ap-
peared to lose ground while the Christian Democrats and the Left were
growing. This trend was confirmed in the 1961 congressional elections,
but the electorate gave Alessandri initial support by reducing the votes
of the Left in the municipal elections of 1960. (Stallings, 1978, Table
A1, p.242)
On the other hand, the closer that Allende and the Left were to
getting the largest plurality of the vote, the more alarmed the dominant
class and its supporters in the U.S. became. It was clear that the two
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main factors of the Allende defeat this time, the candidacy of Antonio
Zamorano, and the feminine vote (32.4% of the men voted Allende but only
22.3% of the women) were not permanent factors. The electoral campaign
had been a forum which invalidated the old slogans and replaced them
with a fairly reasonable analysis of the national problems and possible
solutions. (Loveman, 1979, p.297; Roxborough, 1977, p.37)
These considerations were instrumental in determining the position
of the parties of the Right afterwards, and favored the replacement of
the politicians by businessmen and technocrats in the new government. In
fact, the first team which accompanied Alessandri into government was in-
tegrated by industrialists, landowners, and professionals who worked for
private corporations. Some of the most important members of SOFOFA, in-
cluding Luis Marty in economics, Jorge Fontaine in mines and Patricio
Huneuus in transportation, were given subsecretarial positions in the
economic sector of the administration. With outstanding industrial and
commercial executives under Alessandri, the administration became known
as "gobierno de las gerentes", and had hopes of introducing efficiency
in government operations. It is not surprising that in Alessandri's
first three years, the members of SOFOFA had better access to government
than the old politicians of the Right. (Stallings, 1978, p.80; Hirschman,
1963, p.218)
2. Ideology and Policies in the Early Years of Alessandri.
The general philosophy of the government of Alessandri was to iden-
tify the national interest with the interests of the dominant class,
especially the industrialists associated with SOFOFA. Abelardo Silva,
named Chairman of the important Foreign Exchange Committee of the Central
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Bank, informed SOFOFA of his intention "to direct all his actions to the
national interest and therefore to be at the orders of SOFOFA in all ac-
tivities that have to do with the industrial sector." Members of SOFOFA
were also advised to channel all their suggestions directly to the Minister
of Finance, not through their representatives in Congress as before.
(Stallings, 1978, p.80)
It is one of the traits of the dominant classes to confuse the pub-
lic or national interests with their own particular interest, as expres-
sed in the famous phrase of the French King: "L'Etat c'est moi." But in
the case of the administration of Jorge Alessandri, this general tendency
was rationalized in economic terms. Since the Chilean oligarchy attri-
buted inflations and economic stagnation to excessive State intervention,
its policy for stabilization and economic growth rested basically on pri-
vate investments and activities. The private sector, represented by
SOFOFA and the other organizations of the dominant class, was assumed to
be the dynamic force which, once liberated from the burden of State regu-
lations and taxation, would develop production. Increases in production
would, in time, eliminate the inflation resulting from insufficient sup-
ply, and would produce increases in income that would trickle down from
the dominant class to the rest of society. The general ideas of the
Alessandri Administration contrasted with the Klein-Sacks policies in two
major elements: the first, that inflation was produced by shortages of
supply, rather than by excess demand as Klein-Sacks maintained; and the
second, that:.Alessandri considered tax cuts to increase the capital a-
vailable for private investments while Klein-Sacks unsuccessfully pro-
posed to increase taxes for high income groups to cut their propensity
for consumption. To make up for the revenues lost by cutting taxes,
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while maintaining the level of public investments necessary to provide
infrastructure, the Alessandri government had two options: to increase
the internal debt through the Central Bank which had produced inflation,
or to contract foreign loans. The latter way was chosen by the admini-
stration. (Stallings, 1978, p.81; Roxborough, 1977, p.38)
Even though the Alessandri platform for the 1958 elections did not
include a detailed economic program, his basic ideas were well known.
Shortly after his inauguration, the leader of his economic team, Roberto
Vergara, who had been appointed to three Ministries: Finance, Economy,
and Mines, presented to Congress a package of policies directed at achiev-
ing two expressed substantive goals: stabilization and economic growth.
The package contained four general policies, some short-term measures,
and a request for extraordinary powers to carry them out. (Stallings,
1978, pp.8 1 - 8 2 ; Hirschman, 1963, pp. 2 18 - 2 19 )
The four general policies were: (1) wage increases only in line
with productivity increases (with the exception of the first readjustment
of salaries mentioned below); (2) elimination of the fiscal deficit
through reduced expenditures and foreign loans; (3) establishment of a
single exchange rate and elimination of controls on foreign trade, and
(4) elimination of state controls on foreign and domestic capital.
(Stallings, 1978, p.82)
The short-term measures were directed to reactivate the stagnant
economy; they consisted of a 33% wage and salary readjustment, which was
equal to the cost of living increase in 1958, and an increase in govern-
ment investments in public works and low-cost housing. (Stallings, 1978,
p.83; Roxborough, 1977, p.38)
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The anti-inflationary drive was undertaken in two stages: first, in
early 1959, through a process of recuperation from the recession utilizing
the short-term measures described above, and second, a later clamp-down on
inflation through credit controls, liberation of foreign trade, and reduc-
tion adjustments of wages. (Hirschman, 1963, pp.21 8-219; Stallings, 1978,
p.8 3 )
SOFOFA participated actively in the discussion of specific measures
and asked its members to absorb the cost of these readjustments by stabi-
lizing prices as a demonstration of support for their own government. On
the other side, CUT, the Central Labor Organization, criticized the pack-
age and authorized its executive council to call a general strike if ne-
cessary. Alessandri denounced the opposition of labor organizations as a
"call to sedition" and promised to act with "inflexible rigidity" against
any attempt to "subvert the public order". But CUT, perceiving an adverse
public climate did not call a strike, and Congress approved the policies
and measures, and granted the extraordinary powers requested in April,
1959. (Stallings, 1958, p.82)
The approval by Congress was followed by a series of spectacular
measures. A new monetary unit was introduced called "Escudo" (One
escudo = Eo.1 = 1,000 old pesos), and exchange rates were unified and
fixed at Eo.1.5 = $1 (U.S. dollar). Foreign trade controls were elimi-
nated except that heavy import deposits were set on many goods that were
prohibited before. (Those deposits were gradually reduced during 1960
and 1961.) The Central Bank stopped rediscounting for the commercial
banks, for the Treasury, and the State Bank; the government and the Cen-
tral Bank revised and strengthened the system of credit control. State
controls and regulations on foreign and domestic investment capital were
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practically eliminated while the existing exemptions in taxes and import
duties for investments were maintained. (Hirschman, 1963, p.219; Gil, 1966,
p.191)
In May of 1959, Roberto Vergara came to the United States to nego-
tiate the external financing required by the policies and measures de-
scribed above; he also arranged loans for $130 million from the IMF, the
U.S. government and private banks. These loans were used to absorb the
impact of the liberalization of foreign trade, and to finance public in-
vestments without raising taxes. The same Vergara predicted that U.S.
public and private capital would enter Chile in large amounts over the
next three years in response to the climate of confidence created by the
Alessandri Administration. To make the environment still more attractive
for foreign investors, the extraordinary powers granted by Congress were
used to dictate two measures in 1960 and 1961, which gave tax exemptions
and guarantees of repatriation of profits and capital as incentives.
(Stallings, 1978, p.87; Roxborough, 1977, p.38)
These new measures and the new economic policy were adopted within
the existing institutional framework, but the dominant class's control of
the State was reflected in the operation of those institutions. Vergara,
as Minister of Finance, concentrated all foreign exchange operations in
the Central Bank and filled the executive positions of the Bank with peo-
ple responding to him. In addition, through the Office of the Budget, he
assumed direct control over all the decisions in matters of public invest-
ments. An announcement was made that CORFO would stop investments in di-
rect productive activities and would be a provider of credit, financial
backing and technical assistance to private investors in the future.
Thus, the Bank and CORFO, which were maintained during previous govern-
148
ments as autonomous agencies directed by a Board in which the oligarchical
organizations had control, now were put under the centralized control of
the new team. (ECLA, 1966, p.321; Stallings, 1978, p.86)
By the use of the extraordinary powers conceded by Congress, The
Executive enacted through two decrees (DFL 2 of July, 1959, and DFL 205
of April, 1960) legislation which gave a big push to create and develop
Savings and Loans associations, and provided incentives for the construc-
tion of houses and apartments by private investors. The same statute con-
centrated all the operations related to housing construction by the public
sector under the Housing Corporation (CORVI). (CORFO, 1965, p.709)
At the beginning, these policies and measures appeared to be effec-
tive. Industrial production had a strong recovery in 1959, and SOFOFA
advised its members that "they had the duty to end the system of calculat-
ing their costs of production with excessive margins of protection and
security and, on the contrary, they must make sacrifices" as a demonstra-
tion of support for their own government and the stabilization program.
As a result, even though inflation was more than 30% for the whole year,
prices stopped rising in August for the first time in twenty years.
(Stallings, 1978, p.83; Hirschman, 1963, p.219)
After the lack of direction of the Ibanez Administration, the
Alessandri team appeared to know what they were doing. This was reflected
in a generally favorable public opinion of the government. Thus, in the
municipal elections of April, 1960, the Left and the Christian Democrats
were set back, while the parties of the Right and the Radical Party which
informally supported the government, were sustained. In fact, while
Allende, in 1958, got nearly 30% of the vote, now the parties of the Left
obtained less than 20%. While Frei had reached more than 20% in the pre-
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sidential elections, the Christian Democrat Party obtained only 13.9% of
the vote in the 1961 elections. On the other side, the Right obtained
29.5% of the vote and the Radical Party returned to its position as larg-
est individual party by receiving 20.5%. (Gil, 1966, pp.233-234;
Stallings, 1978, Table A.1, p.242)
This public support allowed the government to propose a wage and
salary readjustment of only 10% for 1960 when the rate of inflation for
the preceding year was more than 30%, and to protract the debate of such
a measure until November, 1960. However, the labor organizations pro-
tested with a series of strikes. When the police killed two workers and
wounded 35 others in an attempt to repress a public demonstration organ-
ized by CUT, FRAP and CUT called for a general strike and a mass demon-
stration in honor of the victims on November 7. The strike was a complete
success and led to negotiations and a final settlement in which the gov-
ernment conceded a 15% wage and salary readjustment, retroactive to Jan-
uary, 1960, and dropped charges against the President of CUT, Clotario
Blest and other leaders who had been detained during the incidents.
(Stallings, 1978, p.84)
The increasing social tension that was compounded by the Chilean
oligarchy's lack of response to its own economic model led the Alessandri
Administration to encounter increasing difficulties which led to its fi-
nal failure.
Most of the production increases in 1959 were the result of full
utilization of the existing plants that were previously idle, not of new
investments in fixed capital. In fact, domestic private industrial in-
vestments declined in absolute and relative terms every year after 1959
as noted in Table 3.a. The Chilean dominant class followed its tradition
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of avoiding the risks of large long-term investments, and choose instead
to make use of the opportunities provided by the Alessandri Administration
to get rent and tax shelters through urban and rural real estate invest-
ments.
The housing policy, directed to attract private capital, offered
readjustment of the investment capital and dividends according to the rate
of inflation, and exempted the taxes on interest earned from capital in-
vested in housing through the savings and loans associations. This policy
was successful and housing construction grew from less then 9,000 units
per year during the last three years of the Ibanez Administration to
36,000 unites in 1959. A similar volume remained during the rest of the
Alessandri period, with a peak of 43,000 units in 1962. More important
for the philosophy of President Alessandri, however, was the growth of
private construction which reached an all-time high in 1963, surpassing
public housing construction in the last three years of the Alessandri Ad-
ministration. (ODEPLAN, 1971, pp.326-330; CORFO, 1965, p.701)
On the other hand, farmland investments provided social status and
a means of evading income taxes. Income from farmland was taxed on a pre-
sumptive basis in relation to the land assessment. Since these assess-
ments were far below the commercial vaue of the land, industrialists and
merchants who were owners of agricultural states, were able to attribute
their high income to agriculture, declare a loss in their industry or com-
merce, and thus pay little or no income tax. In addition, the commercial
value of agricultural land did rise with the inflation rate, which made
it a choice investment against monetary instability. (Gil, 1966, pp.174-
175; Stallings, 1978, p.86)
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Thus the private capital directed at housing construction or real
estate investments was subtracted from the total private capital which
was assumed to be the dynamic force of industrial development. It is not
surprising, then, that private industrial investments did not substitute
the role previously played by CORFO; they tended to decay after 1959
through reduced participation, and were substituted by public investments,
as well as foreign private investments in the last year of the Alessandri
period, as shown below.
Table 3.a: CHILE: Investments in Fixed Capital in Industry, 1961-1964
(in millions of 1965 escudos)
Year Investments
Public Private Domestic Foreign Total
1961 50 317 312 5 367
1962 42 299 280 19 341
1963 79 278 269 9 357
1964 161 246 182 64 407
(Source: ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 105, p.155; Stallings, 1978, Table A.7)
However, the foreign investors were very slow to respond to the in-
centives offered and the optimistic predictions of Roberto Vergara men-
tioned before. Chile was a small market opened to the competition of im-
ports, and therefore it was not very attractive to multinational corpora-
tions in search of large markets or monopolistic positions. The tradi-
tional foriegn investments in the country had been in mines and utilities,
not in industry; therefore the proper connections were lacking. Moreover,
in 1961, the changes in policy introduced by the Kennedy Administration
and the Alliance for Progress established new rules for the economic re-
lations with Latin American countries. The private corporations waited
to evaluate the impact of these new rules before including Chile in their
own investment plans. For all these reasons, foreign private investments
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in industry did not reach any important volume until 1964. In this last
year of the presidency of Alessandri, the U.S. government threw all its
support behind the presidential candidacy of Eduardo Frei in the presi-
dential elections of that year.
In addition, the Chilean oligarchy made use of the liberalization
of foreign trade to satisfy its tendency to imitate the consumption pat-
terns of high income people in Europe and the United States. As a result,
the imports of consumer goods and luxury items expanded rapidly and pro-
duced a growing negative gap in the balance of trade. This led to a cri-
sis in December, 1961, when the Central Bank found its supply of foreign
exchange depleted and had to suspend foreign exchange operations. In
fact,
the imports of consumer goods increased from an average
of 140 million dollars in 1956-58 to 158 million in
1959-61. Their contribution to total imports also
rose from 29.4 to 32 percent between the two periods
considered.
(ECLA, 1966, note 84, p.320; see
also Stallings, 1978, p.88)
The increases in imports of consumer goods helped to maintain the
stability of prices in the internal market, but added to the speculation
over exchange. Flight of capital of the Chilean dominant class became a
continuous drain on the foreign exchange reserves, and was not compensated
by the steady but slow growth of exports, nor by the rapid expansion of
the foreign debt which nearly trebled between 1958 and 1964. (See Table
3.b) In fact, the loans provided by the international agencies and the
U.S. government were substantial, but were not enough to fill the nega-
tive gap in the balance of payments, as the following figures show:
153
Table 3.b: CHILE: Balance of Payments 1959-1963 (Millions of dollars)
Year 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Current Account -24.7 -140.8 -245.6 -142.4 -128.4
Capital Account +41.9 +96.7 +110.7 +71.5 +98.9
Balance +17.2 -44.1 -134.9 -70.9 -29.5
(Source: ECLA, 1966, Table 309, p.320)
The favorable balance in the capital account reflects the continu-
ous inflow of foreign loans during the period, since foreign investment
capital, as seen before, was negligible until 1964.
The pressures on the foreign sector, and the lack of industrial de-
velopment shown in 1960 when industrial production actually decreased,
made it impossible to maintain monetary stability without external help.
This situation was accentuated by two earthquakes in the southern provin-
ces in May, 1960, which killed more than five thousand and produced dama-
ges estimated at $400 million. (Sigmund, 1977, p.27; Roxborough, 1977,
p.38)
The growth of the foreign debt during the Alessandri period is shown
in the following table:
Table 3.c: CHILE: Estimate of the Foreign Currency Debt, 1958-1963
(Millions of dollars)
1958 1960 1963
Public Sector 388.9 424.0 1,126.3
Private Sector 180.1 379.3 550.8
Total 569.0 803.3 1,677.1
(Source: ECLA, 1966, Table 308, p.318)
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The Alessandri Administration entered into new and increased foreign
loans which led the Chilean economy to a complex cycle of debt payments.
New loans were needed to pay the original credits, since the service of
the debt was making use of an increasing share of the export revenues.
As explained by the Minister of Finance in November, 1964:
the total commitments contracted by Chile as of
December 31, 1963, represented an outflow of for-
eign exchange of about 335 million dollars in 1964.
To appreciate the full magnitude of this amount it
should be borne in mind that Chile's total exports
of goods during the present year will be below 600
million dollars; hence, considerable more than half
its export earnings will have to be earmarked for ser-
vicing earlier commitments.
(As quoted by ECLA, 1966, p.318,
note 68)
This dependency on foreign financing made the Chilean government
extremely weak, lowering its resistance to the influence of the U.S. gov-
ernment and the international financing institutions such as the IMF, the
World Bank, and the IDB in matters of economic policy. The laissez-faire
policies and the personal style of Jorge Alessandri and his Minister of
Finance, Roberto Vergara, did not fit well with the detailed justifica-
tion and technical evaluations that had to be attached to loan applica-
tions. The Alessandri Administration was willing to reduce the State in-
tervention in economic activities, but the international agencies and
U.S.A.I.D. were pushing some planning even before the Alliance for Pro-
gress. The amount and kind of information they requested implied more
State control, not less. In addition, there was a conflict between the
policy of the international financing institutions of favoring the deve-
lopment of capital investments, and the requests of the Chilean govern-
ment that included the financing of current expenditures.
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Thus, a combination of lack of response of the Chilean oligarchy,
social tension, external pressures, and natural phenomenon, led to the
change of policy analyzed in the next section of this chapter.
3. From Laissez-Faire to Reluctant Planning: the 1961 Crisis.
As observed by Harvey Perloff, the Alessandri Administration "was
not particularly keen on planning". (Perloff, 1969, p.229) As it was ex-
plained before, its original policies responded to a philosophy of lais-
sez-faire, and were directed to achieve two substantial objectives: mone-
tary stability and economic development through the action of a free mar-
ket, liberated from State intervention. Alessandri and Vergara believed
that by providing an environment of monetary stability, and eliminating
State controls, private capital would be the dynamic force of economic
development.
However, even though Jorge Alessandri was one of the leading indus-
trialists, his economic team was integrated by members of SOFOFA, and the
policies implemented were clearly favorable to private capitalists; the
members of the Chilean dominant class were not responsive to their own
government. (Stallings, 1978, p.86)
In addition, very early on the Alessandri Administration realized
that the reliance on foreign financing for the program of monetary stabi-
lity and free trade implied some constraints which were not compatible
with the policy of liberation of controls and restricted State action.
For example, IDB, under the presidency of Felipe Herrera, approved any
credit project contingent upon its inclusion in a plan of regional deve-
lopment. This was not only to follow the general recommendations of ECLA;
it was also a safeguard for the bank to avoid financing isolated projects
with no relation to the general development of the country, and for the
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expensive public works to which military dictators give priority for pub-
licity purposes. Thus, the pressure of international financing agencies
forced the Chilean government to accept, at least in formal terms, the
concept of development planning. (Glade, 1969, p.509)
On the other hand, some of the professionals working for the gov-
ernment considered planning to be a necessary component of the State's
effort to increase efficiency. For this reason, the DFL 2, which central-
ized all the housing construction activities of the public sector into
the Housing Corporation (CORVI), created the Department of Planning and
Economic Studies of CORVI. It's goal was "to orient and dictate the
norms for the implementation of the Housing Plan." (CORFO, 1965, p.710)
And Roberto Vergara, upon his return from the United States in 1959,
ordered CORFO to revise and complete the studies that the Corporation had
been doing in preparation for a national development plan, as directed by
its statute in 1939. Through this effort, the Chilean government antici-
pated the requirements of the Alliance for Progress and prepared for fu-
ture financial aid negotiations. This plan would provide the technical
information requested by international agencies and the formal justifica-
tion for future financial aid applications, even if it was never imple-
mented. (Perloff, 1969, p.229)
Internally, also, the plan would give the appearance of concern for
economic development at a time when the State development activities were
reduced. This was especially important in order to maintain the support
of the Radical Party whose votes were needed in Congress to pass legis-
lation proposed by the Alessandri Administration. In fact, the extended
struggle over wage and salary adjustments, and the lack of industrial de-
velopment in 1960 gave base to the critics of the government to "claim
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that just as in 1956-57 (with the Klein-Sacks Mission), stability was
again being bought at the price of 'development'." (Hirschman, 1963,
p.219)
The failure of the private sector to respond to governmental poli-
cies also led to increasing tension between the "gerentes" of the team of
Roberto Vergara and the traditional politicians of the Right. Vergara,
as a triple Minister (of Mines, Finance, and Economy), was the focus of
the resentment created by both the economic policies and "his high-handed
and self-assured methods of operating". (Hirschman, 1963, p.2 20)
His clear decision to make the working class pay for the stabili-
zation program through the delay in salary adjustments because of infla-
tion, and his unwillingness to increase State expenditures, even when the
southern earthquakes made it imperative, led to an open conflict with
Congress, and finally his resignation in September, 1960. (Hirschman,
1963, p.220; Stallings, 1978, pp.84- 85) But the plan he had ordered
CORFO to complete was published in January, 1961, as "National Plan of
Economic Development 1961-1970", also known as the Ten Year Plan.
The publication of the Ten Year Plan was coincidental with the in-
auguration of John F. Kennedy as President of the United States, and
started a year of events in the field of planning in Chile.
On March 13, Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress in a speech
to the Latin American Diplomatic Corps accredited in Washington. In that
speech he emphasized the need for development planning. The following
day he sent a "Special Message to Congress" requesting appropriations for
the Inter-American Fund for Social Progress and for reconstruction in
Chile. The message mentioned that the U.S. had provided $35 million in
emergency aid to the regions affected by the earthquakes of May, 1960,
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and asked Congress to appropriate $100 million, previously authorized for
long-term construction and rehabilitation. (Levinson, 1970, p.347)
Part of the $135 million was directed to contract U.S. consultants
in City and Regional Planning, and reconstruction projects, if included
in a long-term development plan for the respective city or region, were
approved for financing by USAID and the IDB. In June, 1961, the U.S.
planning consultants attached to reconstruction aid arrived,
to act as advisors on planning in the earthquake de-
vistated areas of southern Chile, and to assist Chilean
technicians in the develoDment of Regional Long-Term
Development Plans.
(Navarrete, 1962, p.2)
The congressional elections of March, 1961, marked the end of the
public support initially enjoyed by the Alessandri Administration. The
opposition registered gains in voting of the municipal elections the year
before, and the parties of the Right lost the number of Deputies and Se-
nators needed to sustain presidential vetoes in Congress. To solve the
problem, the Right tried to formalize the Radical Party's informal sup-
port of the administration. But the Radicals were about to occupy gov-
ernment responsibilities. They were seeking some basic changes in eco-
nomic policy, including the full adjustment of salaries and wages to com-
pensate for inflation, and a program of agrarian reform. Finally, the
coalition of the Radicals with the Right was formed and four Radicals en-
tered to occupy Ministries in August, 1961. Among them the then Dean of
the School of Economy of Universidad de Chile, Luis Escobar, a confessed
structuralist. (Kaufman, 1972, pp.51-52; Stallings, 1978, p.85; Hirschman,
1963, p.220)
That same month, the Charter of Punta del Este, which institution-
alized the Alliance for Progress and made the use of development planning
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not only legitimate but imperative, was signed by the U.S. and all the
Latin American countries except Cuba. (Levinson, 1970, pp.349-371)
However, the free market philosophy of the administration did not
disappear with these changes. The lack of controls of foreign and in-
ternal trade, and free movements of capital were maintained until Decem-
ber, 1961. But the sustained growth of imports and remittances of capi-
tal to the exterior led to the end of this policy too. As seen in Table
3.b, the deficit in the current account of the balance of payments multi-
plied by ten between 1959 and 1961, from $24.7 million to $245.6 million,
and the favorable balance in the capital account did not grow enough to
compensate for that increase. The resultant deficit of $135 million in
the balance of payments of 1961 consumed the existences of foreign cur-
rency of the Central Bank and made it impossible to maintain the rate of
Eo. 1.049 per dollar which had been fixed in 1959. (ECLA, 1966, pp.318-
320; Stallings, 1978, pp.88-89)
The Central Bank suspended all operations of foreign exchange for
three weeks in December, 1961, and applied many of the controls which had
been discarded in 1959, including import prohibitions and import deposits
when this period was over. A dual exchange rate was established, one for
imports and the other for tourism and capital remittances, and this rate
was devaluated to 34%. However, the discussion about the devaluation of
the rate for imports extended for most of 1962, affecting even the repu-
tation of Jorge Alessandri as a strong-willed and honest man.
Organized salaried workers who were afraid of the inflationary im-
pact of a devaluation, and industrialists and merchants who had heavy
debts in dollars (see Table 3.c) were opposed to devaluation. The IMF,
the U.S. government and other industrialists and exporters pressed the
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Chilean Executive for devaluation. Alessandri appeared for a long time
unable to decide, and some members of his inner circle made use of their
inside information to speculate with foreign exchange a few days before
the President finally announced, on October 10, that the escudo was al-
lowed to float, which meant, in practice, a devaluation. (Stallings, 1978,
p.8 9 )
The devaluation indicated the end to the original stabilization
program of the Alessandri Administration. Inflation., which had been
maintained at a relatively low rate of 11.6% in 1960, 7.7% in 1961, and
13.9% in 1962, shot up to 44.3% in 1963 and 46.0% in 1964. (Average an-
nual consumer price increases, from ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 25, p.39)
During the same month in 1962, the Chilean government received the
Evaluation Report of the Committee of Nine of the Alliance for Progress
on the National Economic and Social Problems of Chile, that is, the Ten
Year Plan as modified to adapt to the requirements of the Charter of
Punta del Este.
4. The Ten Year Development Plan and the Alliance for Progress.
As it was explained before, the statute of CORFO in 1939, charged
the corporation with preparing a national plan of economic development.
However, for fifteen years, CORFO concentrated on sectorial plans for
electrification, steel production, petroleum, agriculture and transport.
Only in 1955 did it start the preparation of an over-all plan of economic
development for the decade 1960-1970. The plan was completed in 1958,
but was not published until Roberto Vergara ordered it revised in 1959,
in view of the requirements of the international financing agencies.
(Perloff, 1969, p.229; Committee of Nine, 1962, p.1)
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The plan, as it was "adopted" by the Chilean government in 1961,
postulated, as a general goal, a rate of increase of the GDP of 5.5% per
year during the decade, which represented a rate of 3% per capita per
year given the rate of population growth of 2.4%. (ECLA, 1966, Table 343,
p.356; Gil, 1966, p.193) The general objectives of the plan were
to create the necessary conditions for maintaining
price stability, proceeding with import substitition,
diversifying exports, substanially increasing agricul-
tural production, deriving the fullest advantage from
the possibilities offered by the traditional mining
exports, and effeiciently directing investments.
(ECLA, 1966, p.355)
It postulates that the basic dynamic factors are the expansion of agri-
cultural production and of exports, and that the achievement of the ob-
jectives above requires the full utilization of the installed capcity
and a significant increase in the rate of investments from 10% of the
GNP in 1959 to 18% in 1970. (ECLA, 1966, p.356)
But following the philosophy of the Alessandri Administration, the
original plan did not propose any structural change. Even the increase
in the rate of investments was a marginal one because those investments
included "primarily major projects which were either under way or about
to be implemented." (ECLA, 1966, p.357)
Upon publication in January, 1961, the Chilean government submitted
the plan to the World Bank and requested it be examined as background for
future financial aid applications. The bank designated a commission of
experts who, after sixteen months of study and analysis, submitted their
report in April, 1962.
The report comprises not only an over-all evaluation
of the plan, its financial implications and the policy
that should be pursued, but also detailed studies of
sectoral programs. (Committee of Nine, 1962, p.2;
Perloff, 1969, p.229; The emphasis is mine.)
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However, in the meantime, Chile had signed the Charter of Punta
del Este, which changed the rules for financial aid to Latin American
countries. Therefore, before receiving the bank's report, on February
26, 1962, the Chilean government:
officially transmitted to the Secretary-General of
the Organization of American States (OAS), through
the Secretary-General of the Inter-American Economic
and Social Council (IA/ECOSOC), the National Economic
Development Program, for evaluation by an ad-hoc com-
mittee, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter
of Punta del Este, Title II, Chapter V,3.
(Committee of Nine, 1962, p.1)
The ad-hoc committee consisted of three members of the Committee of Nine
of the Alliance for Progress: Hernando Agudelo, Felipe Pazos, and Paul
N. Rosestein-Rodan, and three other experts: Gerhard Colm, Rodrigo Gomez
and Flavian Levine. (Committee of Nine, 1962, p.1)
Soon after the transmittal of the plan for evaluation to the Com-
mittee of Nine, a mission of the Government of the United States, headed
by Richard Goodwin and Teodoro Moscoso, the two most important men in
charge of the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Administration, went
to Santiago. In an official statement issued on March 9, 1962, they de-
clared that the U.S. government was to grant $350 million in financial
assistance for the first five years of the plan,
provided that the program were evaluated by the Panel
of Nine, and that in addition, the Panel annually re-
view the status of the development plan to ascertain
whether it was being satisfactorily implemented and
whether the necessary social and structural reforms
were being expeditiously carried out.
(Committee of Nine, 1962, p.4)
The ad-hoc committee saw its task facilitated by the evaluation al-
ready being done by the World Bank, and did not duplicate these studies.
In fact, the committee
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concentrated its attention mainly on examining the
consistency of the economic and social aspects of the
program with the principles of the Act of Bogota and
the Charter of Punta del Este.
Even though the report of the committee had differences with the report
of the bank,
mainly because the studies of the committee are based
on more recent figures, ... the committee feels that
the two reports ... are mutually complementary.
(Committee of Nine, 1962, pp.3-5)
Actually both the bank and the committee recommended changes in the
plan toward a better definition of its social development component and
inclusion of structural reform programs. As expressed in the report of
the committee:
Admittedly, the program displays some shortcomings,
especially inasmuch as it does not expressely include
plans for certain social sectors (education, health)
covered by the commitments assumed under the Charter
of Punta del Este, and fails to specify the instru-
ments of implementation and the policies to be applied
in fields of basic importance such as agrarian reform,
taxation, etc.
(Committee of Nine, 1962, p.43)
However, the committee found that these gaps were due mainly to the fact
that the plan was prepared before the Alliance for Progress started, and
that the Chilean government was trying to fill the gaps with new studies
and projects in tax reform, agrarian reform and educational planning.
Actually the plan, as originally published, was compatible with the
original philosophy of the Alessandri Administration and included the po-
licies already described. The World Bank and the Committee of Nine re-
sponded to a different ideology without being entirely hostile to the
position of the Chilean government.
Of special interest in relation to this were the targets postulated
for exports and imports in the plan, as the following figures show:
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Table 3.d: CHILE: Annual Cummulative Rates of Economic Growth as Pro-
jected by the Ten Year Plan for the Period 1961-1970.
(percentages)
Item Past rate Plan Targets in relation Total Plan
1950-59 to base year Period
1955-65 1965-70
Supply
GDP 3.2 4.8 5.5 5.5
Imports 4.7 6.6 1.1 3.4
Demand
Consumption 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.3
Investment 1.3 12.0 8.8 9.2
Exports 1.7 5.5 5.2 6.5
(Source: ECLA, 1966, Table 343, p.356)
In fact, even though the plan postulated a decrease in the rate of
growth of imports from the historic 4.7% of the previous decade to 3.4%
for the period of the plan, the target for 1959-65 actually increased the
rate of growth to 6.6%. In part, these notes may be justified by the
need for imported capital goods derived from the high investment rate
that was postulated for the same first half of the decade. However, they
also reflect the explosive growth of imports resulting from the policies
of trade liberation adopted by the Alessandri Administration, which left
Alessandri's successor the difficult task of reducing the growth of im-
ports to only 1.1%.
The committee changed the projections, and without entering to a
detailed forecast for the period 1966-1970, estimated "that an average
annual increment of 3% should be enough to cover the needs of the econo-
my." (Committee of Nine, 1962, p.174)
Another difference the committee found with the original plan
was in the distribution of investments assigned to the different sectors,
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as shown in the figures below:
Table 3.e: CHILE: Distribution of Total Gross Investment 1961-1970
(in percentages)
Sector Private Public Total
Agriculture 6.3 2.9 9.2
Mining 6.6 0.2 6.8
Industry 15.9 4.0 19.9
Energy and Fuels 2.7 8.4 11.1
Building 5.8 18.0 23.8
Urbanization &
Communications 1.1 3.4 4.5
Transport 4.3 9.4 13.7
Liason & Unforseen 2.4 2.5 4.9
Inventories 4.9 1.2 6.1
(Source: ECLA, 1966, Table 348, p.358)
This distribution responded to the reduction of State intervention
in direct productive activities and to the larger role of the private
sector, assigned in the original policies of Alessandri. The largest
single item, building, reflects the importance given by the Alessandri
Administration to the construction business and housing programs, while
the low percentage of public investment in agriculture responds to the
lack of an agrarian reform program in the original plan.
The World Bank actually changed these figures by increasing the
public investments in agriculture by almost three times the original
amount, raising the investments in housing construction by 10%, and re-
commending that all the houses built with public funds should be for low
income people, excluding the housing for middle income families consider-
ed in the original plan. (Committee of Nine, 1962, Table 2) The commit-
tee did agree with the World Bank that the Housing Plan, being ambitious,
was "only sufficient to curb the progressive deterioration in low-cost
housing facilities which had been taking place during the last two or
three decades". (id., p.59)
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The committee also raised the figures of investment in agriculture
in relation to the proposed program of Agrarian Reform, from 150 million
escudos, as proposed by the World Bank, to 700 million. At the same time
it reduced the sums estimated for import of agricultural machinery during
the first years, postponing them for the later years of the plan. In ad-
dition, the committee added 44 million escudos for a proposed oil refin-
ery, and modified the distribution between public and private investments.
It projected public investments to be 60% of the total investments in
1963, decreasing this proportion gradually to 52% at the end of the de-
cade of the plan. In this matter the committee recommended the opposite
of the policy adopted originally by the Alessandri Administration.
The committee is certain that much can be accomplished
... if, for instance, CORFO were to reassume the role
it played in the forties, when the great hydro-electric,
petroleum and steel projects were developed...
(Committee of Nine, 1962, p.116,
also Table 6, p.358, and Table 8,
p.ll3)
The committee took note of the plan's lack of reference to the
problems of income distribution and unemployment, and detailed the recom-
mended measures in agrarian reform, tax reform and educational reform
which should have been included in the plan. Also, the committee made a
special reference to the immediate problem:
Given the very low level of savings which the country
is generating at the present, in 1963 all sectors of
Chilean society will be called upon to make the need-
ful sacrifices in order to increase available invest-
ment resources as envisaged in the plan. The higher
income groups will have to shoulder a heavier tax bur-
den; entrepreneurs will have to absorb a substantial
share of the rise in costs; and workers will be ob-
liged to moderate their demands for wage increases.
(Committee of Nine, 1962, p.7)
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The committee added:
If the necessary sacrifices are made, the goals of the
program may be reached. But no illusions should be
cherished as to the thorny path that will have to be
pursued.
(id., p.8)
However, with all these reservations, additions and modifications,
the committee concluded:
The current development program reinforced by external
resources to supplement the country's own effort, should
constitute an effective instrument wherewith to rescue
the Chilean economy from the stagnation of the past de-
cade, channel an increasing flow of domestic savings to-
ward investment, relieve social tensions, strengthen in-
ternal and external finances, and lay the foundations
for a development which will permit a rapid improvement
in the level of living of the population.
(id., p.6)
As a result of this conclusion, the committee recommended external
financial assistance, although not in the amounts considered by the
Chilean government. In fact, for the period of 1963-65, the revised
plan contemplated a foreign financing total of $760 million, and for the
five years 1966-70, an average of $200 million per year, which totalled
$1 billion. Of the total $1,760 million, 60% was projected as loans to
the public sector, and the balance would be split between foreign invest-
ment and loans to the Chilean private sector. (id., p.10) But the com-
mittee recommended only $638 million for the period 1963-65 and $649
million for 1966-70. This totalled $1,287 million, of which $1,070 mil-
lion (or 83%) was reserved for the public sector. The total financial
aid recommended represents 18% of the total investment of the plan for
the period 1963-1970; but the committee concentrated the financial as-
sistance in the first three years to an amount representing 30% of the
total investment "in the aim of enabling Chile not only to increase its
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volume of investment, but also to raise its level of domestic savings."
(Committee of Nine, 1962, pp.181-1 83)
Thus, the Ten Year Plan achieved the objective of justifying the
requests of the Chilean government for external financial assistance; at
the same time, it served as a vehicle for the external pressures on the
Chilean government to change it policies. Because of its importance to
the exterior, the plan achieved prominence in official documents, and the
Chilean government made the proper moves to appear in compliance with the
requirements and recommendations of the World Bank and the Committee of
Nine.
As it was mentioned before on page 152, the Radical Party, in 1961,
decided to enter into a coalition with the Right to support the govern-
ment of Alessandri on the condition that a program of Agrarian Reform was
studied and implemented. This condition was sustained by the commitments
assumed by the Chilean government when the Charter of Punta del Este was
signed. The Radical Party was not as related to landowning interests as
the other parties of the coalition were, and needed to conipensate their
support of a conservative government with some populist measure. Radicals
felt threatened in their dominant position at the center of the political
spectrum by the emergence of the Christian Democratic Party, and one of
the banners of the Christian Democrats and of the Left was Agrarian Re-
form. (Kaufman, 1972, p.51)
After the Radicals entered the cabinet in August, 1961, a commis-
sion, consisting of representatives from the three governing parties, was
formed to prepare agrarian reform legislation. The intra-party bargain
was hard, and the traditional organizations of landowners took a militant
position against any agrarian reform. But they could not resis the pres-
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sure of the politicians and the government, and finally accepted the idea
after a meeting of the National Society of Agriculturalists (SNA) reached
a standstill on the matter in January, 1962. Two projects were sent to
Congress, one was on agrarian reform, and the other was a constitutional
ammendment that would allow the deferred payment of expropriations. The
Agrarian Reform Law (Law 15,202) was enacted in October, 1962, soon after
the Chilean government received the report of the Committee of Nine on
the Ten Year Plan. The constitutional reform was passed in 1963.
(Kaufman, 1972, pp.53-66)
The Alessandri Agrarian Reform Law was denounced by the opposition
parties as the "flowerpot reform". (Loveman, 1976, p.235) The constitu-
tional reform restricted the maximum deferred payment term to fifteen
years and the only lands which could be expropriated were those that had
been abandoned or poorly cultivated. Lack of a clear definition of
"abandoned" or "poorly cultivated" land left the process of expropriation
subject to long delays. The affected landlords could dispute both the
condition and the assessment of their land, in order to fix the price
of expropriation legally. (Loveman, 1976, pp.225-230; Kaufman, 1972,
pp.66-69)
Actually, the Alessandri Administration did not expropriate any
farmland. The law was applied only to lands previously owned by the
State or lands which were acquired in very good conditions by the selling
landowners, offered for voluntary sale. As a U.S. analyst put it:
For Alessandri, the reform was viewed as a device to
elicit funds from the United States. Thus, the poli-
tical value of the expropriations provision was sym-
bolic rather than operational. The expropriation pro-




In fact, of nearly 60,000 Has. affected by the Agrarian Reform be-
fore 1965, 40,000 Has. pertained to a single "latifundio" owned by a pub-
lic agency, the "Hacienda Mariposas" in San Clemente, Province of Talca.
Another U.S. researcher wrote that "the Alessandri 'reform' consisted of
geographically isolated, high-cost showcase colonies (colonias)." (Loveman,
1976, p.235)
But Law 15,020 had other important consequences. The debate over
and subsequent approval of the Agrarian Reform Law changed the perspec-
tive of the different actors in Chilean politics. The concept of struc-
tural reforms was legitimized and a new relation between the urban and
rural areas of the country was provided. At the same time, the failure
of the laissez-faire philosophy of Alessandri's initial program was marked.
Law 15,020 also changed the relations within the bureaucracy of the
State by strengthening the Ministry of Agriculture, which until then had
been considered a less important component of the administration. The
Law created two new agencies: CONSFA (Consejo Superior de Fomento Agro-
pecuario), and planning and coordinating agency for the agrarian sector,
and the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA), in charge of administering
and implementing the agrarian reform program. A pre-existing agency of
the centralized services of the State, the Council for Agricultural De-
velopment and Research (CONFIN), was transformed into an autonomous agen-
cy. Renamed the Agricultural Development Institute (INDAP), its purpose
was to provide credit and technical assistance to owners of small farms,
and to organize cooperatives among them.
These three agencies were conceived as executive elements, while
the traditional functions of the Ministry of Agriculture in technical as-
sistance, agricultural extension, and pest control, were concentrated in
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the Administration for Agriculture and Fisheries (DIAP) as a branch of
the central administration of the State. (Loveman, 1976, pp. 2 3 2-2 3 5)
The functions of CONSFA are especially significant for this study
since it was a planning agency. According to the law, the formulation of
regional plans for the division, consolidation and recovery of land, and
the improvement of the condition of life of the peasant population were
functions assigned to CONSFA. The law also specified, in Article 5, the
standards for the regional plans of agricultural development which would
allow expropriations on a regional basis. This provided CONSFA with co-
ordinating powers to direct public agencies and institutions toward the
implementation of said regional plans, to carry out the studies, and to
direct the implementation of better systems of land tenure, rural devel-
opment and agricultural production. In addition, CONSFA could authorize
CORA's creation of special centers of agricultural production in zones
of land division or consolidation of minifundios, and could "propose the
norms under which agricultural credit should be available in the country,
to whom and in what amount, amortization periods and interst rates..."
On paper, at least, CONSFA was a planning agency with implementa-
tion powers that could be a strong tool of State action. As expressed
by Loveman:
Formally, CONSFA had authority to alter dramatically
the terms of agricultural production and to authorize
the establishment, at least experimentally, of differ-
ent types of propietary arrangements in the rural sec-
tor. (Loveman, 1976, p.233)
However, as in the issue of expropriations mentioned before, the
letter of the law was one thing and the actions taken by the Alessandri
Administration were another. The responsibilities of the three develop-
ment-oriented agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture, CONSFA, CORA and
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INDAP were distributed among the three parties of the government coali-
tion. The executive direction of CORA was assigned to the Conservative
Party which had the strongest ties to the traditional land tenure system.
This way, the landowners were assured that Law 15,020 was not going to
affect that system. The Radical Party took control of INDAP, while the
Liberal Party, comprising of industrialists and free traders, took con-
trol of the planning agency, CONSFA. This way the bureaucratic rivalries
among agencies were compounded with political patronage to make the co-
ordination necessary for an efficient State action very difficult.
The Alessandri Administration not only refused to expropriate any
farm; the only regional plan formulated by CONSFA was the Maule Norte
Plan, developed in response to IDB's requirements for a $40 million loan
which would fund an irrigation project of benefit to the same region
where the Hacienda Mariposas (mentioned before) was located.
In the two other main areas of the Ten Year Plan which the World
Bank and the Committee of Nine noted, the lack of both a tax reform and
an educational program, a similar pattern was followed.
In the matter of taxes, the Committee of Nine's own report states:
The Government (of Chile) does not think it possible
in the first stage of the tax reform, to replace the
existing taxes on categories, or schedular tax system,
by a single progressive tax covering all personal in-
come, although it feels that this would be the most
satisfactory procedure. It considers that to bring
about so drastic a transformation of the system at a
single stroke would be inadvisable...
(Committee of Nine, 1962, p.73)
Thus, the only income tax reforms implemented during the Alessandri per-
iod were a simplification and reclassification of the existing categories
and a progressive adjustment of income and inheritance taxes to compen-
sate for the effect of inflation.. Unifying income taxes for corporations
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not only made collection easier, but it also replaced several taxes that
amounted to an average of 35% with a single tax that amounted to 30%.
(Committee of Nine, 1962, p.74)
Changes in land taxes were also deferred until the completion of
the aerophotogrametric study which was being prepared with the assistance
of OAS. This study technically evaluated the agricultural potential of
the different lands, and was not completed until 1966. (Idem., p.71)
In the issues of education, after the Charter of Punta del Este was
signed and the Radical Party joined the government coalition in 1961, a
commission was designated to study and propose the "General Bases for
Planning Education in Chile". The report of the commission was very im-
portant because it called attention to some of the grave problems affect-
ing the educational system. In particular, it focused on the large per-
centage of students who dropped out of the system before completing their
education; the lack of educational facilities in the rural areas; and the
lack of relevance in educational content. These problems were cited as
the reasons behind the need for economic and social development. (Gill,
1966, pp.134-135)
After this report and the observations of the Committee of Nine
about the need to include a program of education in the Ten Year Plan,
the Chilean government decreed the formation of the Commission for the
Integral Planning of Chilean Education at the end of December in 1962.
The commission was composed of important members of government and con-
gress, and had, as Executive Secretary, Oscar Vera. He was on loan from
UNESCO, where he was Chief of the Latin American Division of the Depart-
ment of Education. (Gill, 1966, p.135)
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In 1963, the commission started a series of research studies on
the following topics:
1) The attitudes of the different social groups toward education
and the values they attached to it.
2) Educational personnel.
3) Human resources and the needs of development plans.
4) Student enrollment at all levels.
5) School maps showing the location of the educational services
in relation to the community to be served.
In addition, the commission organized technical task forces to
study the problems of different levels of education and to propose solu-
tions in order to organize the educational system as a whole. (Gill, 1966,
p.135 )
The importance of all these studies was to provide material to the
following administration so that a real educational reform could begin in
1965. They also served to provide proof that Alessandri followed the re-
commendations of the Alliance for Progress, even though these recommenda-
tions had little application during his administration.
Even the more conventional elements contained in the original Ten
Year Plan were not able to change the established trends, and the Ales-
sandri government gave them little help.
Administration of the plan was given to the Committee for Economic
Programming and Reconstruction (COPERE), consisting of some Ministers and
top economic officials with the secretary of CORFO and under the presi-
dency of the Minister of Economy. Later, the Provincial Development Com-
mittees were created to carry out the regional aspects of the plan. How-
ever, COPERE had little more than a formal function since the State de-
velopment agencies maintained their autonomy and the high officers in-
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volved rarely had the opportunity to analyze any proposal or project in-
depth, leaving this task to the technical personnel of each agency. The
Provincial Development Committees were to integrate representatives of
the public and private sectors in each of the 25 Provinces under the pre-
sidency of the respective Intendente, with the technical coordination and
assistance of CORFO. Since CORFO had little experience or expertise in
regional planning, and the technical assistance to the committees was
provided on a part-time basis because there was no special budget for
them, the committees had a precarious existence. (ECLA, 1966, p.34
1 ; Com-
mittee of Nine, 1962, p.29)
The difficulties in implementing the Ten Year Plan were reflected
in the comparison between the targets projected by the plan and the actu-
al results of the economic activity during the Alessandri years.
In spite of the strategic importance attributed to the sector by
the plan and the emphasis of the World Bank and the Committee of Nine,
agricultural production continued to show a growth rate which was lower
than' the rate of population growth. This weak rate reduced agriculture's
participation in the total product during the period of 1960-1964. "Al-
though the evolution of industry has been more favorable, it cannot be
called satisfactory." (ECLA, 1966, p.95) By contrast, during the same
period, the share of the services sector grew at a fast, sustained rate,
especially in trade and finance. Services in these areas grew from 23.2%
of the GNP in 1960 to 27.1% in 1963. (ECLA, 1966, Table 94, p.94)
The rate of growth of the GNP went down from 6.2% in 1961 to 5% in
1962, 4.7% in 1963, and 4.3% in 1964, instead of the 5.5% growth rate
projected by the plan. (ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 1, p.1)
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Thus, the plan served as a yardstick by which the achievements and
failures of the policies and actions of the government could be measured.
Because of this, the plan attained political importance in spite of the
Alessandri Administration's lack of interest in implementing it. Of
special significance were the studies made by CORFO after the Committee
of Nine observed the Ten Year Plan's lack of reference to the problems
of income distribution. (Committee of Nine, 1962, pp.50-51)
In fact, the studies provided a fairly clear picture of who was
favored and who was losing, as a result of the policies of the Alessandri
Administration.
Table 3.f: CHILE: Indices of Income per Capita Distribution and Growth
1960-64 in Real Terms. (1960=100)
Year National Income Employers and Salaried Workers
per capita Proprietors Total- Blue Collar- White Collar
1960 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1961 110.6 107.9 109.3 110.3 105.9
1962 115.2 144.4 112.4 114.1 105.6
1963 114.4 168.2 107.4 112.5 97.4
1964 116.4 186.0 108.7 115.3 95.9
(Source: ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 38, p.50)
Table 3.f shows that income per capita practically stopped growing
after 1962, which did not impede the dominant class benefitting from a
raise of more than 40% in per capital income during the same years. The
salaried workers' income, however, grew less than the national income
and, in the case of white collar employees, actually decreased from 1962
to 1964. The difference is more striking still if the base figures of
the indices are considered. In fact, in 1960, the income per capita of
blue collar workers was Eo. 1,847 per year, and for white collar employ-
ees was Eo. 6,375, while the income of employers and proprietors was Eo.
51,837 per capita per year. (ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 37, p.50) Far from the
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policy of shared sacrifices proposed by the Committee of Nine, the Ales-
sandri policies resulted in a regressive redistribution of income in fa-
vor of the oligarchy, rather than economic development. This situation
was similar to the mood of 1947, when Alessandri was Minister of Finance.
Again, as in 1947, the impact of these policies was reflected in
the results of the electoral polls. The municipal elections of April,
1963, showed that the parties of the Right, Conservative and Liberal,
had reduced their share of the vote from more than 30% in 1961 to 23%.
The Radical Party, with 20% of the vote, had lost its position as the
largest individual party, because the Christian Democrats had risen from
15% in 1961 to 23%. On their side, the Communists and Socialists together
now formed a block as strong as the block of the Right with another 23%
of the electorate. (Gil, 1966, pp.237-238; Stallings, 1978, Table A.1,
p.242)
After the municipal elections, the political forces started to pre-
pare 1964 presidential election campaigns. The Right, aware of the poli-
tical realities, decided to support a Radical, and the Radicals elected
Senator Julio Duran as the standard-bearer of the coalition name "Demo-
cratic Front". The Christian Democratic Party appointed Eduardo Frei
again and the Leftist coalition (FRAP) named Salvador Allende as their
candidate.
On paper, this appeared to be a safe solution for the dominant
class, but in March, 1964, a by-election, called to replace a deceased
Deputy in the province of Curico, demonstrated that in a field of three,
the Left could be a winner. In fact, while in the municipal elections,
the parties of the Democratic Front had obtained 49% of the vote in the
said province, against 29% for FRAP, and 22% for the Christian Democrats.
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In the by-election, the candidate of FRAP, Dr. Oscar Naranjo, won with
40% of the vote, followed by the Christian Democrats with 27%. (Stallings,
1978, p.94; Sigmund, 1977, p.29) Julio Duran, who had called this by-
election "a national plebiscite", was abandoned by Conservatives and Li-
berals who decided to support "the lesser of two evils", Eduardo Frei,
the Christian Democrat. (Levinson, 1970, p.93; Sigmund, 1977, p.29)
At the end of the Alessandri period, the failure of the Chilean
oligarchy appeared to be complete. The dominant class had shown its in-
ability to govern within a democratic framework. The favorable condi-
tions at the beginning of the period had only served to redistribute the
national income by increasing the share of the upper class and reducing
the purchasing power of salaried workers. They did not provide the basis
of self-sustained development, nor did they attract foreign investments.
The efforts toward monetary stability had resulted in an explosive in-
crease of the external debt. In addition, the Chilean oligarchy had
shown its inability to adapt to the new international conditions created
by the Cuban Revolution and the Alliance for Progress.
While some elements within the dominant class made a valiant effort
to modernize and submit to the requirements of long-term development in a
complex society, most of them tried to use their position to get high
profits in short-term operations. They took either a fatalistic and
pragmatic position ("apres moi le deluge") or became radicalized, inte-
grating new ultra-rightist movements dedicated to the fanatic support of
the status-quo. (Stallings, 1978, p.95)
Not only the Right and the Radical Party suffered the consequences
of being unable to solve the basic problems they had set to solve. Clas-
sical economics and LMF recipes were also discredited, and a new consci-
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ence was being created over the relation between development and economic
dependence, particularly regarding the foreign ownership of strategic re-
sources, like the copper mines. (Sigmund, 1977, p.30) Even the Committee
of Nine considered it "unwise" to base targets of development on projected
investments which depended on foreign-owned mines. (Committee of Nine,
1962, p.118) On the contrary, increased State action and development
planning were emerging as potential solutions, where classical economics
and laissez-faire had failed.
5. Planning and Planners During the Alessandri Period.
As it was explained before, planning during the Alessandri Admini-
stration resulted from external pressures and natural catastrophes,
rather than from any conviction of the policy makers. However, planners
worked, and their work had some consequences.
A good indication of the state of planning in Chile at that time
is given by the experiences of the U.S. planning consultants who arrived
in 1961 "to act as advisors on planning in the earthquake devastated
areas of southern Chile:, and "to assist Chilean technicians in the de-
velopment of Regional Long-Term Plans". (Navarrete, 1962, p.2) In fact,
the "final reports" of these consultants contained not only a description
of the tasks accomplished and recommendations for future action, but also
included an analysis of the planners' impressions on the conditions of
planning work at that time in Chile.
Two agencies of the Chilean government appeared to have the re-
sponsibility for planning in the region affected by the earthquakes:
CORFO, in charge of regional planning; and the Division of Architecture
and Urbanism of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP), in charge of city
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planning. (Condon, 1962, p.1; Navarrete, 1962, p.7) Urban municipalities
had also a kind of Master Plan ("Plano Regulador") which did not contain
zoning divisions, but was attached to an urbanization and construction
ordinance as an instrument of.implementation. Municipalities also had
some professional staff of architects and engineers with little, if any,
training in planning. (Molther, 1962, p.1)
One of the consultants found that
the lack of a city planning curriculum in the univer-
sities of Chile allows each individual (sometimes with
disastrous results) to form his own philosophy concern-
ing the profession. ... Here, because there is a limited
scientific background, geology, landscape architecture,
geography, sociology, economics, and anthropology are
neglected in favor of architecture.
(Condon, 1962, p.10)
Some of the consultants found that even the municipal architects who had
some knowledge of planning tended to be of the "city beautiful" tradition
and had little concern for 'social or economic problems, and that CORFO
professionals tended to concentrate on economic planning with little re-
gard for ecological or social issues in spite of the urgency given to
these problems by the earthquakes. (Navarrete, 1962, pp.7-9; Condon,
1962, Note 4, p.10)
The U.S. planners trained in the tradition of home rule and self-
reliance, had a difficult time adapting themselves to the strong central-
ization of the Chilean social system.
A community is not encouraged to solve its own prob-
lems, but to look first to the (national) government
for solutions. Under the tax system in Chile, it is
financially impossible for the locality to manage its
own municipal services. The centralization of author-
ity vested in Santiago is acute.
(Condon, 1962, p.10)
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Another U.S. planner later wrote:
The apparent internal unity of Chile as a nation is
therefore impressive. But it is a unity achieved
primarily through the overwhelming power of the na-
tional government which, from its seat in Santiago,
presides over a poorly articulated and dependent pe-
riphery. ... The survival of secondary centers in the
periphery derives more from their ability to focus the
attention of the national government upon themselves
than from an autonomous, political will to manage their
own resources in the interest of local populations.
(Friedmann, 1969, p.22)
From the same perspective, another author pointed out that the re-
gionalization of development policies and decentralization of decision-
making, in Chile, had resulted from problems of national security (as in
the case of Arica and Magallanes), political pressure of resource rich
provinces (such as Antofagasta), or natural catastrophes like the 1960
earthquakes. (W. Stochr, in J. Friedmann, ed., 1969, p.55)
In fact, CORFO created regional offices in the regions affected by
the earthquakes and gave contracts to consulting firms to design regional
development plans for areas such as the Chiloe Islands. But the decree
of 1962 which created the provincial development committees for the im-
plementation of the Ten Year Plan in the whole country, was never sup-
ported with the resources necessary for the committees to work, as it
was seen before.
One of the U.S. consultants working in Puerto Montt found that
since CORFO had not done any regional planning for the area, he had to
prepare some guidelines in regional planning for the Chilean profession-
als to use, even though his specific task was to advise in matters of
city planning. He was able to give some training in planning to the pro-
fessionals of the region and to convince the local authorities to create
Chile's first City Planning Commission, in September, 1961. (Navarrete,
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1962, p.9) But he and some other consultants found that the government
agencies did not coordinate with each other at the local level; neither
did they submit their own projects to local planning.
As the controlling center of all technical work, the
Ministry of Public Works is responsible for the deve-
lopment of most governmental work projects. Within
this framework, little coordination occurs among the
various sub-divisions of this ministry, or among this
and other ministries. Throughout the government this
process pyramids. At the local level the results are
costly and disastrous.
(Condon, 1962, p.7)
Special coordination problems were found between the Housing Cor-
poration (CORVI) and the Municipality of Puerto Montt, and between CORVI
and the highway work of MOP in Concepcion. Particular criticism was di-
rected to housing projects of CORVI which did not include any provision
for schools, recreational facilities, shopping areas, or civic centers.
(Condon, 1962, p.8)
Another consultant found that the municipality of Valdivia was not
willing to provide him with an office, even though he was supposedly
working for that city. It was only after long negotiations that a part-
time assistant was provided for him. He was finally installed in a MOP
office and was given the distant support of the Division of Architecture
of the Ministry in Santiago.
He described his role in three points: 1) to assist in the estab-
lishment of a permanent planning office in Valdivia; 2) to advise the
MOP architect-planner and the municipal architect-planner in their tasks
of reconstruction and planning; and 3) to help strengthen the administra-
tive process for planning the reconstruction and long-range development
of Valdivia. He added:
In describing the U.S planner's role project, the term
consultant or advisor is perhaps misleading. Due to
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the small staff and the grass roots nature of the
project, it was necessary to assume responsibility
and take direct actions which were not anticipated
in the original concept of the job.
(Fogle, 1962, p.6 )
While on two different missions advising the Chilean government on
the matter, all the consultants mentioned the need for professional train-
ing in planning at the Chilean universities. The first presentation was
by Francis Violich, who in 1960 produced a report entitled "Education for
Urban and Regional Planning in Chile". The second was by the U.N. expert,
Paul Brenikov, Professor of Town Planning of the University of Liverpool,
who at that time was collaborating with the School of Economics of Uni-
versidad de Chile. One of the consultants, David Condon, thinking that
the University of Concepcion would be an appropriate place for the loca-
tion of the first school of city and regional planning of Chile, encour-
aged Professor Brenikov to interview David Stitchkin, the Rector of the
University. But Stitchkin stated "that he was not interested in intro-
ducing such a curriculum". (Condon, 1962, p.11)
In spite of the short term of their contracts and the difficulties
they encountered, the U.S. consultants had an impact in the development
of planning in Chile. This was particularly significant for the archi-
tects associated with the Division of Housing and Urbanism of MOP, whose
Planning Department was then directed by Juan Honold and Amador Brieva.
Probably the most successful of the consultants from this point of view,
was David Condon, the planner in charge of preparing an Intercommunal
Plan (Plano Regulador Intercommunal) for the metropolitan area of Con-
cepcion, the third largest city in Chile. Condon had the advantage of
working in a large city with more resources than the other consultants,
and of being nearby another of the consultants, Frank Molther. Molther
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was in charge of preparing the plan for Coronel, one of the municipalities
included in the metropolitan area of Concepcion. Condon was able to get
his contract extended and attained a good working relationship with Cesar
Burotto, the Chilean architect who was chief of the office of the Inter-
communal Plan, and served as his counterpart. Making good use of these
advantages, Condon was able to put the seeds of what later became ORPLAN
Bio-Bio, one of the three regional planning offices which showed some ef-
fectiveness during the Frei Administration. (Condon, 1962, p.9; Friedmann,
1969, p.42)
His work in the Intercommunal Plan of Concepcion also served Edmond
Hoben and Ivan Alten, the chiefs of the USAID Housing and City Planning
Program in Chile, in promoting the first city planning seminar in Chile
with the participation of Chilean professionals who later had important
roles in the development of planning, such as Ricardo Jordan. In both
the Intercommunal Plan for Concepcion and in the Coronel Plan, students
of Universidad de Chile received "on the job" training in planning re-
search and methods. (Condon, 1962, p.9; Molther, 1962, p.2)
Finally, his observation about the lack of community facilities in
the housing projects of CORVI mentioned above, led USAID which was fi-
nancing part of the project, to request the Ford Foundation's assistance
in planning complementary facilities such as schools, playgrounds, civic
centers and shopping areas for the housing projects. (Friedmann, 1969,
p.3)
At that time, Ford Foundation was already involved in planning in
Chile through a substantial grant conceded to the Commission for Planning
Education, and through the rural housing and community facilities compo-
nent of the Maule Norte Plan. After the request of USAID, the Foundation
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provided assistance to create the new Office of Community Facilities Plan-
ning of the Division of Architecture of MOP in 1964, and granted fellow-
ships for Chilean professionals (among them this writer) to follow gradu-
ate studies in planning in the United States. After the presidential
elections of 1964, this program expanded under the direction of John
Friedmann, to give technical assistance for the creation of the National
System of Planning, the Ministry of Housing and it Planning Division, and
the Interdisciplinary Center for Urban Studies (CIDU) of Universidad
Catolica. (Clark Gill, 1966, p.132; John Friedmann, 1966, pp.3-16)
On the other hand, since 1962, training for planners and technical
and intellectual interchange among planners was facilitated by the in-
stallation in Santiago of the Latin American Institute for Economic and
Social Planning (ILPES), organized by ECLA with the financial support of
IDB in response to the needs of technical personnel associated with the
planning requirements of the Alliance for Progress. The Charter of Punta
del Este required every Latin American country to formulate a national
development plan. Most of the countries did not have enough technically
prepared personnel to carry out this task. Even though ECLA had been
publishing technical manuals for development planning and carrying courses
and seminars on the matter sine 1950, the Charter of Punta del Este im-
plied a much more intensive program of training. ILPES was a necessary
progression. (ECLA, 1966, p.333)
ILPES reflected the ECLA perspective on development issues and con-
stituted, for Latin American planners, an intellectual center that balan-
ced the influence of USAID advisors and U.S. trained planners. ILPES had
influence throughout Latin America because of its trainees, seminars and
workshops and its publications through major publishing houses in Mexico
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and Buenos Aires. In Chile, this influence was stronger because of the
direct and permanent contact between the staff and trainees of ILPES and
the experts working for the Chilean government and professors in Chilean
universities.
The influence of ILPES in Santiago was complemented by other U.N.
supported institutions such as the School of Sociology of the Latin Amer-
ican Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO); the Latin American Institute of
Demography (ILADES), and special agreements between UN agencies and Chilean
universities in fields such as agricultural economics, public health, or
educational planning. (Gill, 1966, pp.129-1 3 1 )
Given the discredit of the laissez-faire policies in the late years
of the Alessandri Administration, a general climate favorable to the idea
of planning was present in Chile, as well as in the rest of Latin Ameri-
ca. As one observer put it:
Those who formulated the Alliance for Progress had
an almost mystical belief in the power of planning
to solve Latin American problems, reform its social
structures and stimulate its economic growth.
(Levinson, 1970, p.187)
At a seminar of ILPES in Santiago in 1965, it was observed that "the con-
cept and idea of planning are in fashion in Latin America". But in Chile
not only the environment was favorable to the idea of planning, there was
also an on-going program of technical assistance by a number of experts
who helped the following administration to put together a national plan-
ning system. This was reflected in the presidential campaign for the
elections of 1964 in which both major candidates, Allende and Frei, pre-
sented to the voters elaborate platforms prepared by their respective
teams of experts. Both of them considered planning as a necessary tool
for social and economic development.
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However, the same popularity that planning acquired after the
failure of the free-market policies of Alessandri included some traits
which made the practice of planning more difficult.
The Alessandri Administration tended to use planning formally, with-
out any real interest in implementation. In spite of the interest expres-
sed at the beginning for improving the efficiency of the State bureaucra-
cy, Alessandri, Vergara, and their team of "gerentes" carried to govern-
ment more the habits of personalized leadership which they exerted in pri-
vate business, rather than the interdisciplinary teamwork and functional
rationality of planning.
A good example of this was the location of a copper foundry in
Ventanas, near Valparaiso. For months, the experts traded technical ar-
guments, even in the daily press, about the comparative costs and bene-
fits of different location spots, but President Alessandri decided on
political grounds. The province of Valparaiso had given him the first
plurality of the vote in the presidential elections while the other lo-
cations were in the province of Coquimbo which gave more votes to Allende.
The experts had to adapt their techincal analysis to justify the presi-
dential decision in spite of their previous studies and discussions.
In addition, the Alessandri Administration had a different view of
planning than the U.S. advisors or ECLA experts. While the planning ex-
perts considered planning as a function of the local or national govern-
ment, and most of them agreed with the idea of the U.S. liberals of the
State who saw planning as a "neutral" apparatus at the service of the
public interest, the Alessandri government considered planning (and even
the southern earthquakes) as a source of new opportunities for the pri-
vate business of government contractors and consultants.
188
In addition, while some people considered planning to be a magic
cure for all the problems of development, and tended to formulate simpli-
stic, comprehensive, yet unrealistic solutions, others found the word
"planning" fashionable and applied it to any human activity without re-
ference to its proper content. (ILPES, 1966, p.5) On their side, many
professionals with little or no training at all in planning, found it
convenient to assume the title of "planner" to achieve access to a field
which appeared to be potentially profitable. This view was fed by the
officers of government agencies who were accustomed to awarding govern-
ment contracts to a few engineering or architectural firms owned by mem-
bers of the dominant class.
When the IDB, for example, requested a regional plan of development
to justify financial aide for the reconstruction and long-term develop-
ment of the Chiloe Islands, CORFO gave the task to an engineering con-
sulting firms that had previous contracts with the corporation but had no
trained personnel in planning, nor experience in regional development.
The established professions tried to capture the benefits of the
new popularity of planning. Competition developed between engineers,
architects, economists and even lawyers, to demonstrate that theirs was
the most adequate expertise for the practice of development planning.
This was reinforced by the traditional association of separate government
agencies with the diverse professions such as the predominance of agro-
nomists in the Ministry of Agriculture, of architects in the Division of
Architecture and Urbanism of MOP, of economists in the Office of the Bud-
get and some sections of CORFO, and of engineers in other sections of
MOP and CORFO. When these agencies assumed planning functions, they
tended to favor the respective profession with contracts and employment
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opportunities. Because of this, the Alessandri Administration sometimes
tried to avoid political problems with the professional organizations by
distributing the different components of a planning job to diverse agen-
cies.
In the case of the Maule Norte Plan, for example, the general co-
ordination and responsibility was assigned to CONSFA, the planning agency
of the Ministry of Agriculture, where agronomists and agriculture econo-
mists were prominent. But engineers got a share of the project through
the participation of the Direccion de Riego (Irrigation Works Division)
of MOP; and the special unit of community facilities planning of the Di-
vision of Architecture supported by the Ford Foundation was put in charge
of rural housing and community facilities what opened the opportunity for
the participation of architects in the project.
This distribution may appear justified on functional grounds, but
the tendency of each profession and agency to protect its own interests,
and the lack of any tradition of multidisciplinary work led each agency
to produce its own isolated version of the entire plan, which was detri-
mental for the necessary coordination and efficiency of the whole plan-
ning effort. As it was observed by ILPES, this tended to dilute the
basic content of planning and the specific attributes of the planning
activities. (ILPES, 1966, p.5) Moreover, the established interests of
the traditional professions in the respective university schools delayed
the possibility of planning training at the graduate level until the
late sixties. The lack of interest on the part of the President of the
Universidad de Concepcion mentioned earlier, illustrates this point well.
In fact, until the creation of interdisciplinary centers of re-
search in planning matters such as CEPLA in Universidad de Chile and CIDU
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in Universidad Catolica, the only professionals with formal training in
planning existing in Chile were foreign advisors or Chileans trained
abroad or at ILPES. These planners had a hard time gaining recognition
among the great number of self-proclaimed experts. Their difficulties
consisted of having to convince the members of traditional professions
of the need for and benefits of interdisciplinary cooperation and team
work in planning projects. Although these difficulties did not disappear
entirely, even after the installation of a national planning system, the
development of the above mentioned centers contributed to the clarifica-




FREI (1964-1970) AND "INDICATIVE" PLANNING
Introduction
The Frei Administration considered planning as a necessary tool for
social reform and economic development.
Following the formulations of ECLA and the Alliance for Progress,
the reform of the social structure was a requisite for economic growth.
The existing social structure was a main reason for the low rates of eco-
nomic development and a major obstacle in the path to overcome economic
backwardness. 'But for this reform to take place, the State had to play
an active role which was different from the traditional activities of the
public agencies.
Given the objectives of socio-economic development, planning was a
means of improving the efficiency and of guiding the actions of the State
bureaucracy in carrying out the needed structural changes.
The Frei Platform for the elections of 1964 contained programs on
Agrarian Reform, Popular Promotion, Educational Reform, Housing for Low-
Income People, and Redistribution of Income, the implementation of which
were started by the Frei government in 1964.
Together with these programs the government installed a National
System of Planning integrated by the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN),
which served as advisor to the president, several sectorial planning of-
fices serving the ministries, and a number of the Regional Planning Of-
fices (ORPLAN), as well as 36 Municipal Programming Offices (OPC) through-
out the country, which were under the central coordination of ODEPLAN.
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The installation of the planning system represented a considerable
increase in the number of planners working in Chile. In 1964, they were
a small group of no more than 50 professionals, concentrated mainly in
the Division of Planning of CORFO and at the Planning Centre of Universi-
dad de Chile (CEPLA). In 1970, there were nearly 300 professionals work-
ing in the different planning offices plus CEPLA and the Center created
in 1966 in the Universidad Catolica (CIDU).
The Chilean planners were reinforced by a number of international
experts, especially from the Latin American Institute of Socio-Economic
Planning (ILPES) of the U.N., and the Ford Foundation Program of "Urban
and Regional Development in Chile" (URDAPIC). These same programs served
to train Chilean planners in the United States or in courses at ILPES,
while others received training at the two planning centers of Chilean
universities mentioned above, or through their own work in one of the
planning offices.
Planning was defined by the Frei government as being "directive"
for the State bureaucracy, but "indicative" for the private sector. The
agencies of the State were expected .to implement the plans as designed,
as they would any other governmental mandate. But private citizens and
corporations were not coerced to comply with the plans. For them the
plans served as guidelines of desired action. Voluntary behavior in ac-
cordance to the guidelines was made more attractive by indirect incen-
tives.
The emergence of any new set of government agencies in the midst
of a well-established bureaucracy, as the Chilean one in 1964, was due
to stimulate a reaction from the existing agencies. In the case of the
planning offices, the new agencies were in charge of guiding and coordi-
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nating the action of the old ones. Even though the planning offices in
general enjoyed the strong support of the President and Ministers, the
established bureaucratic power centers were reluctant to accept the new
role of the planning system.
On the other hand, the private sector was polarized by the imple-
mentation of the structural reform programs, especially the Agrarian Re-
form. During the second half of the Frei Administration, social tension
increased among members of the ruling oligarchy affected by or afraid of
the Agrarian Reform and other measures in favor of other social classes,
and among the grass roots organizations of peasants and urban dwellers
impatient about the "gradualist" approach of Frei's reforms.
In this environment, the private sector was not amenable to respond
to the indirect incentives and constraints of indicative plans.
Moreover, the strong effort for implementation of the programs of
structural reform during the first two years of the Frei Administration
were coincident with the period of establishment and organization of the
planning offices. But in 1967, the Frei government changed its basic di-
rection toward more conventional and conservative economic measures.
Thus, when the planning offices were in a better institutional position
to provide a technical input the process of structural refom and economic
development, they were submitted to provide short-term solutions for
emerging problems and a rationalization for conservative policies.
In front of this situation, the planners divided into three groups
with different tendencies:
One group sustained that the authority of planners would be based
on the quality of their technical advice, insisting on the need for so-
phisticated models and computerized information systems.
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A second group maintained their loyalty to the Administration and
served as it demanded, providing technical backing for the policy deci-
sions made until the end of the Frei presidency.
A third group sustained that the ethical duty of the planners was
to have a commitment to economic development and structural change. They
accompanied the so-called "Rebel" group which had split from the Christi-
an Democratic Party of Frei, to join the Leftist coalition in support of
the candidacy of Allende for the elections of 1970.
In practice, because the planners were unable to solve the contra-
dictions of the Frei Administration, all the basic programs fell short
of the expectations created at the beginning, which opened the way for
the victory of Allende.
All this will be detailed and docummented in the following sections
of this chapter.
1. The Electoral Campaign of 1964, the Christian Democratic Party and
Its Ideology.
The campaign for the presidential elections of 1964 reflected the
international situation in the American Hemisphere. Allende represented
the socialist alternative to the problems of socio-economic development,
with definite relations to the Cuban Revolution, while in a different
context and by different means.
Frei was considered to be a representative of the structural
changes proposed by the Alliance for Progress in response to the impact
of the Cuban Revolution. As such he received strong support from the
United States, and the CIA destined $2.6 million to cover more than half
of the costs of his well-financed campaign. (U.S. Senate, 1975, "Covert
Action in Chile 1963-1973", pp. 9 & 15)
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In the campaign, the word "revolution" achieved social legitimacy.
Conservatives were in retreat not only because of the failures of the
Alessandri Administration, but because their lack of support for the new
policies of the U.S. (Roxborough, 1977, p.39)
Allende was supported by a coalition of the Socialist and Communist
Parties named Popular Action Front (FRAP). FRAP organized a team of ex-
perts called Central Planning Office (OCEPLAN) headed by the economist
Max Nolff, to prepare a detailed program that would be used as a campaign
platform, and as action guidelines for the forthcoming administration
should Allende win. (Gil, 1966, p.300)
At the beginning of his campaign, Frei was supported only by his
own party, the Christian Democratc Party. But after a by-election in the
province of Curico in March of 1964 showed the strength of FRAP as a sure
winner among three candidates, the parties representing the ruling oli-
garchy of Conservatives and Liberals decided to support Frei. (Sigmund,
1977, p.29)
A "Technical Committee of Professionals", chaired by Raul Saez,
one of the nine "wise men" of the Alliance and a personal friend of Frei,
prepared a "blue book" similar to the platform of the Left. This pro-
gram had input from the oligarchy through the "Committee of Independents"
organized by Edmundo Perez Zujovic, an engineer and businessman who was
also a personal friend of Frei. (Stallings, 1978, p.91)
On April 28, 1963, Frei said, in an interview published by The New
York Times, that the Christian Democrats and FRAP had the same objectives
but FRAP would rely on dictatorship while the Christian Democrats favored
democracy. In this way he opened the anti-communist propaganda of his
candidacy with the slogan "A Revolution in Liberty".
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Frei was to define those objectives later in an essay published by
Foreign Affairs in April, 1967. He wrote:
The Latin American revolution has clearly defined objec-
tives: the participation of the people in the government
and the destruction of the oligarchies; the redistribu-
tion of land and the ending of the feudal or semi-feudal
regimes in the countryside; the securing of equal access
to cultural and educational facilities and wealth, thus
putting an end to inherited and artificial class divi-
sions. Finally a main objective of the revolution is
to secure economic development coupled with a fair dis-
tribution of its product and the utilization of inter-
national capital for the benefit of the national economy.
(E. Frei, 1967, "The Alliance that
Lost its Way")
In spite of this revolutionary language, the platform of Frei was
clearly softer than the Allende one. While Allende's platform called for
nationalization of the copper and nitrate mines, the Frei program contain-
ed a proposal for association between the Chilean State and the copper
corporations. Where the Allende platform included the nationalization of
banks and insurance companies, Frei's talked about some minor "banking
reform". The two programs coincided in their emphasis on development
planning and industrialization, but the Allende proposals gave the State
the main role while the Frei platform leaned toward the State guidance of
private investments, and mixed public-private ventures.
The coincidence of the two programs was more complete on issues such
as Agrarian Reform, elimination of unemployment and of the existing defi-
cit in housing, health and educational services, and redistribution of in-
come in favor of the working class. (Gil, 1966, pp.298-302; Sigmund, 1977,
pp.30-34)
Perhaps the most important difference between the two programs was
in their concept of the role of the State as a means to achieve the ob-
jectives described above.
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The Left, from its Marxist perspective, considered economic develop-
ment to be a function of the labor of the working class, and the State to
be a class instrument. Allende postulated a "profound democratization"
of the Chilean society, meaning rescuing the State from the hands of the
ruling oligarchy, to put it at the service of the great majority of the
Chileans, the working class. (Stallings, 1978, p.90)
On their side, the Christian Democrats tended to consider the State
as a "neutral" arbiter of the class struggle. (Sigmund, 1977, p.31) More-
over, a group of social scientists associated with Frei and the Christian
Democrats developed a center-periphery model for the analysis of the socio-
economic problems of development. In it, the concept of "marginality"
was substituted for the idea of class struggle. (Roxborough, 1977, p.41)
Based on the social teachings of the Catholic Church and on the
ideas of the French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, this ideology criti-
cized the Marxist concept of conflict as the motor of history and sus-
tained that history is a vehicle with two motors: conflict and solidarity.
(Jorge Ahumada, 1958, "En Vez de Miseria") The State shouldn't be con-
sidered as a class instrument but as a means to achieve the common good
of society as a whole and of every one of its members. (E. Frei, "1968
Message to Congress" as quoted in Stallings, 1978, p.65)
In this ideology, low-income people were "marginal" elements de-
prived of participation in the social system and of the benefits deriving
from such participation. The task of the State was to open opportunities
for these "marginals" to be integrated to the whole of society, because
socio-economic development is a function of the participation and solida-
rity of all the elements of the national community.
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This "popular promotion" function of the State has three compo-
nents:
a) the internal integration of marginal people into grass roots or-
ganizations;
b) the collaboration between the State and the marginal people at
programmatic and institutional levels; and
c) the reform of the existing institutions and the creation of new
ones for the integration of marginal people into the global society.
The same condition of marginality impedes marginal people to over-
come their own situation. For this reason, "popular promotion" is a
function of the State which, as administrator of the common good, should
serve as an external force to break the vicious circle of marginality.
(Vanderschueren, 1971, in Johnson,ed., 1973, pp.260-261; See also
Veckmans, 1969, in Burnell, ed., 1972, pp. 5 1 & ff.)
This ideology was a practical basis for the Christian Democratic
Party to penetrate the working class. In the model, organized labor uni-
ons were already incorporated into the social system. But in Chile, at
the beginning of the sixties, no more than 40% of the industrial workers
were unionized and peasant organizations were practically inexistent.
(Stallings, 1978, Table A.4) Thus, the Christian Democrats could charge
the labor unions controlled by the Left with being a "labor aristocracy",
more concerned with their own particular interests that with the welfare
of the working class as a whole. (Roxborough, 1977, p.41)
The Marxist belief that the industrial proletariat was the most im-
portant force for social change was challenged in this way, and the Chris-
tian Democrats set about creating a series of grass roots organizations
under its own control. These "communitary" organizations, such as pea-
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sant councils, neighborhood committees, mothers' centers, and consumer
cooperatives, had a functional or territorial basis. (Sigmund, 1977,
p.33)
This ideology was especially effective among practicing Catholics
who could perceive the unjust nature of the social system but rejected
the materialism of the Marxist position. In fact, the great majority of
the Chilean population was nominally affiliated with the Catholic Church,
and the founders of the Christian Democratic Party based their reformist
political position on the social teachings of the Popes Leon XIII and
Pius XI. Even though not many of those who declared themselves to be
Catholics were active in the Church, the influence of the condemnation of
communism and denunciation of capitalism as un-Christian, and the call
for social justice of the Popes' teachings was strong, especially among
the youth and the women. (Roxborough, 1977, p.4 0; Sigmund, 1977, p,31;
See also Gil, 1966, pp.266-276)
For the same reason, the work of the Christian Democrats was helped
by the cooperation of some social action institutions of the Catholic
Church, like the Institute for Rural Education (IER), the Institute for
Trade Union and Social Training (INCASIS), and the Chilean Labor Action
(ASICH). At the other extreme of the social structure, the "Social Union
of Christian Businessmen" (USEC) served as a link between the Christian
Democrats and the ruling class, and as a complementary expression of the
solidarity among classes proposed by the ideological model. (Stallings,
1978, p.91)
With this ideology, through these mechanisms, and with the financial
support first of the European Christian Democrats and later of AID and
CIA, the Christian Democratic Party emerged in the late fifties and early
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sixties as "the only real multi-class party in Chile". (Stallings, 1978,
p.42) In fact, the Party (PDC) had support from each social class in ap-
proximately the same proportion that each class had in the whole social
structure, except that in the working class women tended to favor PDC
while men tended to support the Left. (See Stallings, 1978, Table A.2;
Also Gil, 1966, p.214)
These characteristics made PDC the natural center of the Chilean
political spectrum, able to attract an important share of the working
class and also the modern elements of the ruling class. The sophistica-
ted ideology and progressive position was especially attractive to a
group of young professionals who developed Frei's platform and later
served as the core of his Administration. (Gil, 1966, pp.272-273; Stal-
lings, 1978, p.99)
The ability of PDC to utilize the mass mobilization techniques
which previously had been used only by the Left, made the Christian Demo-
cracy a good prospect as a force capable to stop Communism. This led the
U.S. to join the Catholic Church in supporting the Frei candidacy and the
Christian Democratic Movement.
After the first meeting of the Latin American Bishops Conference,
which took place in Brasil in 1958, the international Catholic foundations
for social action such as Caritas and Misereor provided funding for the
training and organization of "marginals". At the same time, the Chilean
Bishops started agrarian reform on the rural properties of the Church and
created their own agrarian reform institute (INPROA) which provided a mo-
del for the policies and the trained personnel who were employed later by
the Frei Administration. Actually the INPROA guidelines were reproduced
in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1967 (Law 16,640) and the personnel of
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INPROA were taken by the government agencies after 1964. (Petras, 1971,
pp.150-153)-
In 1963, USAID and the International Development Foundation (IDF),
a front organization of the CIA, also began to fund popular promotion pro-
jects. (See National Catholic Reporter, July 29, 1977) As reported by
Lawrence Stern in the Washington Post (April 5, 1973 and July 11, 1974):
"AID found itself suddenly overstaffed, looking around for peasant groups
or projects for slum dwellers". More than $20 million, according to the
same source, was spent by the U.S. in the effort to influence the result
of the presidential elections, and "at least 100 special personnel were
sent from Washington and other Latin American countries to provide assist-
ance". (See also U.S. Senate, 1975, "Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973")
With this help and with the support of his own party and the poli-
tical parties of the ruling oligarchy, Frei was the first and only presi-
dent to be elected by the absolute majority of the votes in an election
under the rule of the 1925 Constitution. He got 1,406,002 votes (56.1%
of the total vote) against Allende's 975,692 votes (38.9%) and Duran's
124,869 (5%) in the elections of September, 1964. (Gil, 1966, p.304)
Carried by the momentum of this electoral victory, the Christian
Democrats achieved another first in the congressional elections of March,
1965. This time PDC alone, and against the emerging opposition of the
Right and Left Parties, won 82 out of the 147 seats of the Chamber of De-
puties. It was the first time in this century that a single party at-
tained majority in one of the two branches of Congress. PDC also won 12
of the 21 seats of the Senate up for renewal, but could not achieve ma-
jority in the upper chamber because only half of the Senators were elected
every four years. However, with the majority in the Chamber of Deputies
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and with 41% of the popular vote, the Christian Democrats felt that they
had a mandate to put into practice in the program they had announced for
the presidential elections. (Gil, 1966, pp.308-309)
2. The Program of Frei and the Early Years of his Administration.
As it was presented to the public during the electoral campaign,
the program of government of the Frei Administration attempted to find
a harmonic combination of social justice and economic development in a
comprehensive set of reforms which included:
1) Agrarian Reform, to increase agricultural production and produc-
tivity and to give land to 100,000 peasant families.
2) "Chileanization" of the copper, nitrate and iron mines owned by
foreign companies. This meant the acquisition by the Chilean State of
controlling interest in the mining corporations; the control by the State
of the sales of their products in the international market; the expansion
of copper production to 900,000 tons per year, and the refinement in Chile
of all the copper produced in the country.
3) Expansion of industry through public investments and joint ven-
tures with foreign private capital to high technology levels.
4) A housing program directed to the construction of 60,000 units
per year, for which purpose a new Ministry of Housing and Urbanism was to
be created.
5) Educational Reform to give opportunities to all school-aged
children to receive at least 8 years of basic education, and to modify
the curriculum of elementary and secondary education to make it relevant
to the needs of modern technology and economic development.
6) A Wage Policy directed to reduce the difference among the differ-
ent categories of workers (white-collar, blue-collar, peasants, etc.) and
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to redistribute the national income in favor of wage earners.
7) Popular Promotion to organize "marginals" and to give them ser-
vices and opportunities to be integrated in the mainstream of the Chilean
society.
8) In the Foreign Sector, to support the Latin American Integration
Process (LAFTA) and open relations with all the countries of the world.
To these points, the Minister of Finance, Sergio Molina, added two
more in his first presentation in Congress in November, 1964. They were
the gradual control of inflation, and the increase in public expenditures
for Health Services. (Stallings, 1978, pp. 7 0 & 97-99; Gil, 1966, p.302;
Levinson, 1970, p.302; Sigmund, 1977, pp.42-4 4 )
To carry out all these programs in a coordinated way and to control
their implementation, one of the first measures of the Frei Administration
was to organize a National System of Planning. The head of the system
was the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) created by law in 1965, advis-
ing the president and coordinating the sectorial planning offices such
as CORFO (industrial development planning), the Superintendence of Edu-
cation, the Division of Planning of the Ministry of Housing (created by
law in 1965) and the Agricultural Planning Office (ODEPA).
Frei had help in these tasks. Chile received economic development
loans, grants and other types of aid in amounts which made it the largest
recipient of economic aid per capita in Latin America between 1964 and
1967 (see table below). Actually, Chile was one of the three major reci-
pients of aid under the Alliance for Progress programs. (Levinson, 1970,
pp. 204-207)
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Table 4.A: Economic Assistance to Chile, 1964-1967 (1)
(millions of dollars)
U.S. Government Export-Import InterAmerican
Year Grants Loans Bank World Bank Bank TOTAL
1964 14.0 97.4 15.3 22.7 16.6 166.0
1965 19.4 102.4 8.2 4.4 4.9 139.3
1966 10.4 93.8 0.1 2.7 62.2 169.2
1967 13.2 9.2 240.9 60.0 31.0 354.3
57.0 302.8 264.5 89.8 114.7 828.8
(1) Does not include military aid or re-financing of previous debts.
(Source: NACLA, 1972, pp.48,49, based on official data)
In addition to this direct economic aid, Chile was able to reduce
the burden of foreign debt payments. Early in 1965, negotiations with
eleven creditor nations resulted in their granting Chile a grace period
of three years for 75% of the outstanding debt, which would be paid in
five years beginning in 1968. This represented an additional aid of about
$100 million for that grace period. (Edards, 1972, p.16)
On their side, private foreign investors who had been scarce during
the Alessandri Administration, in spite of the favorable legal rules and
tax exemptions, began to make use of these incentives in 1964, increased
their investments to achieve a climax in 1967, and remained strong until
the end of the Frei period. In fact, the foreign private investments,
which during the three years 1961-1963, reached only an average of Eo. 11
million per year, grew to Eo. 66 million per year in the period 1964-1966,
and to Eo.124 million per year in the period 1967-1969 (all figures in
1965 Escudos). The foreign private investments which represented the 6%
of total investments during Alessandri's administration, increased to 20%
of the total investments during the Frei Administration. Of special im-
portance were those investments in a petrochemical complex (joint venture
of Dow and the Chilean State), in truck and car assemblies (Ford), elec-
205
tronic equipment, and paper and cellulose plants. (Stallings, 1978, Table
A.7)
In matters of techincal assistance, the Frei Administration enjoyed
the good will of many sources. The U.N. agencies, IMF, OAS, the U.S. and
Western European countries, and even Israel sometimes cooperated and
sometimes competed with each other to participate in one or several of
the "Revolution in Liberty" programs.
In the case of the Agrarian Reform, for example, a detailed analysis
of the situation, entitled "Land Tenure and the Socio-Economic Develop-
ment of the Agricultural Sector", was made by the experts from "Inter-
American Committee on Agricultural Development" (CIDA) under the direction
of Dr. Solon Barraclough. (CIDA, 1966) The same Dr. Barraclough became
the International Director of ICIRA (Institute for Training and Research
on Agrarian Reform) as a result of an agreement between the Chilean govern-
ment and FAO to provide the former with a permanent instrument of techni-
cal assistance in agrarian reform matters. (An excellent summary of the
work and ideas of Solon Barraclough is contained in his essay, "Agricul-
tural Policy and Strategies of Land Reform", in I.L. Horowitz, ed., 1970,
pp.95 & ff.)
As it was mentioned before, INPROA, the agrarian reform institute
of the Catholic Church, provided trained personnel and a model of a gradu-
al process of transference of land tenure. This model was followed by the
Frei Administration in the project submitted to Congress, which became
law in 1967. At the same time, IER, the training institute of the Catho-
lic Church for peasants, entered into an agreement with the Ministry of
Agriculture to collaborate with the government in training the rural popu-
lationto participate in the structural changes of the rural area.
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At the time of his designation, the Minister of Agriculture, Hugo
Trivelli, was an expert officer of FAO. Many of his collaborators were
either former members of international agencies as well, or on leave from
them to work with him. At the same time, Hernan Santa Cruz, a Chilean,
was the Regional Director of FAO for Latin America. This provided the
conditions for a close collaboration between the agencies of the Ministry
of Agriculture and the agricultural experts of FAO, ECLA, and IICA (the
Agricultural Research Institute of OAS).
Jesus Gonzalez, an expert from FAO and ILPES, and a team of agri-
cultural economists, all on leave from the same institutions, organized
the Agricultural Planning Office and designed the methodology for the
Agricultural Development Plan, 1965-1980. In addition, Jacques Chonchol,
who had also worked for FAO, was appointed chief executive of INDAP and
was helped by Paulo Freire, then working for UNESCO, to develop a program
of adult education in rural areas.
This involvement of foreign or international experts was repeated
in almost all the Christian Democrat programs. While the Educational Re-
form had the technical assistance of the Harvard School of Education,
DESAL (Latin American Development Institute) provided the model for "Pop-
ular Promotion". This research center, under the direction of the Jesuit
Roger Veckemans, a Belgian sociologist, carried out a research program on
"Marginality and Development in Latin America". Veckemans was the founder
of the School of Sociology of Catholic University in Santiago and was a
member of the "Belarmino Center", a meeting place where the intellectual
Jesuits published Mensaje, an influential magazine. (Veckemans's ideas
are well represented in his essay on "Traditionalism and Polarization",
in E.H. Burnell, ed., 1972, pp. 5 1 & ff.)
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DESAL was financed with grants from Misereor, the social action
foundation of the German Catholic Bishops, and later from USAID and IDF
(International Development Foundation), the front operation of the CIA.
(National Catholic Reporter, July 29, 1977)
On the other side, some techincal assistance programs had differ-
ent branches which put them in contact with several aspects of the Chilean
government action at the same time. This was the case of URDAPIC (Urban
and Regional Development in Chile), the program of Ford Foundation di-
rected by John Friedmann from 1965 to 1969. This program provided assis-
tance to the Chilean government in organizing the Regional Planning Di-
vision of ODEPLAN and of some Regional Planning Offices; had experts
working with the National Council of Popular Promotion and the Rural
Housing Division of INDAP; was involved in the development of the new
Ministry of Housing and Urbanism; and had advisors working in he Housing
Corporation (CORVI) in Community Facilities Planning. At the same time,
the program was providing financial support to the Interdisciplinary
Center for Urban Studies of Catholic University and was providing fellow-
ships for Chileans to be trained in planning in the United States. (A
complete description of URDAPIC is contained in John Friedmann's Urban
and Regional Development in Chile, published by the Ford Foundation in
Santiago in 1969)
At the beginning of the Frei Administration, all this help was
fruitful and the years 1965 and 1966 were full of events related to the
implementation of the program described above. In fact, the agrarian
reform was started, making use of Law 15,020, dictated under Alessandri,
and a new project was introduced in Congress. Negotiations were comple-
ted with Kennecott and Cerro Corporations for the "Chileanization" of the
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copper mines program. The Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU) was
created by law. The educational reform began with a crash program of
teacher's training, massive enrollment of children, school meals, scho-
larships, and school construction. The Council of Popular Promotion was
organized and a bill introduced in Congress about grass-roots organiza-
tions. Law 16,250 was passed in April of 1965, giving peasants the same
minimum wage and social security benefits as urban workers. A real re-
distribution of income took place through a combination of salary and
wage adjustments, strict enforcement of tax laws, and increases in the
budget of public services. Inflation rates approached the targets (down
from 46% in 1964 to 18% in 1967), and the indicators of economic develop-
ment showed a definite upturn, while a package of Constitutional Amend-
ments was presented to Congress to define the concept of the "social
function" of property rights, and to facilitate expropriations and the
deferred payment of them. These Constitutional Amendments and the Agra-
rian Reform Law (No. 16,640) were enacted in 1967. (Stallings, 1978, pp.
97-108; Sigmund, 1977, pp.36-50; Roxborough, 1977, pp.44-45)
Some of these measures did not require a new law and were carried
out through existing institutions. This was the case with educational
reform. But because most of them had to pass through Congress, Frei fol-
lowed a clear tactical path. Before the Congressional elections of March
1965, the Administration sent Congress a package of bills which included
authorization for the copper "Chileanization" program, institutionaliza-
tion of Popular Promotion, a wealth tax, and a Constitutional Reform,
which would give the President power to call a popular plesbicite in case
of conflict with Congress. (Sigmund, 1977, p.36)
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The rejection of these bills by the combined opposition of Right
and Left in the lame-duck Congress served as propoganda for the Christian
Democratic candidates in the elections by dramatizing the need for a sup-
porting Congress.
After the new Congress was elected, the lack of a working majority
in the Senate forced Frei to play one side against the other to pass the
most important legislation. He expected to have the support of the Right
to approve the copper legislation which he called the "continuous girder"
(viga maestra) of his program, and to have the support of the Left for
the Agrarian Reform and other social programs. (Sigmund, 1977, p.39)
Immediately after the inauguration of the Frei government, in Novem-
ber of 1964, the negotiations were started with the copper compani.es.
They were promptly successful with Kennecott Corporation, which owned
the second largest mine in Chile "El Teniente" and with Cerro Corpora-
tion, owner of "Rio Blanco" mine. But Anaconda refused to enter into
negotiations for the two most important mines it owned in Chile, "El
Salvador" and "Chuquicamata". The latter was the largest copper mine in
the country, the two together accounted for more than half the total
Chilean production of copper. In this first stage, Anaconda agreed to
participate with the Chilean government in the new mine, "La Exotica".
A specially created State corporation (CODELCO) was put in charge
of the partnership which the Chilean government entered into with Kenne-
cott by acquiring 51% equity in "El Teniente" mine. The price was more
than twice the book value of the mine. The $80 million was to be inves-
ted by CODELCO to expand production from 180,000 tons to 280,000 tons per
year in 1970. For this "loan", Kennecott received 5.75% interest, plus
a reduction of taxes from 86% to 44%, and maintained control of the sales
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and operations through a management contract. The Chilean government
loaned $20 million and international agencies gave another $100 million
to finance the expansion program of the joint corporation. Cerro sold
30% of its mine "Rio Blanco" to the Chilean government and Anaconda did
the same with 25% of "La Exotica". In exchange, both received reductions
in their tax rates. (Perloff, 1969, pp.231-233)
Before the agreements were sent to the Chilean Congress, they were
presented to the shareholders of the corporations in the U.S. as highly
favorable to their interests. To avoid the creation of a bad image for
the Frei government as the result of the "nationalization" of the copper
mines, the State Department publicized the agreements as clearly favor-
able to the companies and the U.S. interests. (Perloff, 1969, p.231)
The "soft" stance of the Chilean government was very well received
in the United States and helped the Frei Administration to attract for-
eign private investments. But it gave rise to wide opposition inside
the country. Even within the Christian Democrats, some members of the
original team of negotiators resigned and had to be replaced. The arro-
gant behavior of Anaconda worsened the situation, and when, in 1969, the
government decided to get tough and force the sale of Chuquicamata and
El Salvador, it was too late. A national consensus had developed concern-
ing the need for a complete nationalization. The delays in Congress had
reduced the expansion of copper production to only 12% of the goals ex-
pected in 1964. (Edwards, 1972, p.50)
Moreoever, the government appeared to be in conflict with the work-
ing class when in March of 1966, a strike of the copper workers at "El
Salvador" mine was violently repressed by the Army. A group of soldiers
under the command of the then Colonel Augusto Pinochet, opened fire over
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a meeting of miners and their families, killing six men and two women,
and wounding more than 30 others. "El Salvador Massacre" became a sym-
bol used by the Left to show the "real nature" of the Frei government
after Frei defended the troops and blamed the Marxist parties for "in-
citing the violence". (Sigmund, 1977, p.50; Stallings, 1978, p.105)
On the other hand, the delays in the copper legislation allowed
the parties of the Right to relate their support of it to their opposi-
tion to the Agrarian Reform. In practice they conditioned their final
approval of the copper agreements (April, 1966) on property concessions
made by the Frei Administration in the Constitutional Amendments and in
the Agrarian Reform bill. (Sigmund, 1977, p.49)
Two pieces of legislation passed, in 1965, confronted little con-
troversy. The creation of ODEPLAN had the support of the Left and little
opposition from the Right, since it did not affect the interests of the
ruling class and did respond to the new policy of the United States in
the Alliance for Progress. The creation of MINVU did not change the re-
lations between the State and the sector of the ruling oligarchy tied to
the contruction business. Frei had personal friends among the high of-
ficers of the "Camara Chilena de la Construccion", in particular, Raul
Deves who served as official link between the Frei Administration and the
private sector of business. (Stallings, 1978, p.59) On the other side,
the Left was not opposed to a better organization of the State to carry
out the housing program which was similar to their own platform.
However, two major bills were submitted and delayed over a long de-
bate in Congress: the Popular Promotion and the Agrarian Reform.
The Popular Promotion bill suffered the worst treatment. Neither
the Right not the Left were willing to provide the government with machi-
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nery for the expansion of its own political base and organized constitu-
ency. The Right was ideologically opposed to the organization of the
people outside the traditional channels and politically unwilling to al-
low the creation of institutions outside the control of the ruling oli-
garchy. The Left rejected the idea that marginals were unable to organ-
ize by themselves. In political terms, the function of the grass roots
organizations proposed by the Christian Democrats, was seen by the Left
as competitive with labor unions and a fragmentary to the working class.
Only in 1968 did the government attain from Congress a legal statute for
grass roots organizations (Law 16,780) in an effort to establish legal
controls over the already existing neighborhood councils and other such
organizations. But Congress rejected the creation of the Popular Pro-
motion Council as a permanent State agency. (Vanderschueren, 1971, pp.
277-278; Sigmund, 1977, p.69)
Although the Agrarian Reform bill, together with the constitutional
amendment on property rights which was associated with it, was also sub-
mitted to a long process of debate, including a split among the Christian
Democrats themselves. Law 16,640 of 1967 contained real powers to change
the land tenure system in the countryside, but its discussion and imple-
mentation was an important element in the conflict which developed inside
the Frei Administration and the Christian Democratic Party. For that rea-
son it is convenient to expand its analysis here. (Kaufman, 1972, pp.79-
113; Petras, 1971, pp.128-163; Sigmund, 1977, pp.48-49)
A group of young professionals and politicians headed by Jacques
Chonchol and Julio Silva had sustained inside PDC that an agrarian reform
had to be "massive, rapid and drastic", and the phrase was incorporated
into the party platform. (Kaufman, 1972, p.88) The bill submitted to
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Congress in 1965, and finally approved in 1967, contained provisions to
fulfill only the first of these three conditions. In fact, it authorized
to expropriate any farm larger than 80 "basic" hectars. (This is 80 irri-
gated hectars of the Maipo Valley, near Santiago or their equivalent in
other regions according to a table contained in the law.)
However, pressed by his contacts with the ruling oligarchy, Frei
emphasized the need to increase agricultural production and productivity,
and used the model of a "gradualist" process provided by the Catholic
Church. (Petras, 1971, pp.151-152)
In this model, the large farms were maintained as productive units
under the administration of a partnership between CORA (the Agrarian Re-
form Corporation) and the peasants after expropriation. This partnership,
named SARA (Agrarian Reform Society), was to last during a "transition"
period of up to five years, "asentamiento" (settlements) to provide training
and managerial experience to the peasants who would also have time to de-
cide if they were willing to form a cooperative or some other collective
enterprise, or divide into small separate farms. Former landowners had
the right to retain a parcel of the expropriated land as "reserve" which
could be up to 80 "basic" hectars, plus the machinery and equipment exist-
ing in the old farm. (Kaufman, 1972, pp. 88-97; Petras, 1971, pp.151-153)
This procedure tied the financial and human resources of CORA in a way
that made a "massive, rapid and drastic" process of expropriations impos-
sible, and preserved the land base and organizational resources of the
ruling class in the countryside. (Kaufman, 1972, pp.99-102)
The conflict around the Agrarian Reform took place not only in the
discussion of the bill in Congress but in the implementations of the agra-
rian reform by the agencies of the State and between organizations of
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peasants and landlords.
The Christian Democratic Administration received the institutional
organization of the Ministry of Agriculture and the other agencies re-
lated to the agricultural sector as they had been organized by Law 15,020
during the Alessandri Administration. (See chapter 3) Under the Ministry
of Agriculture, there was a planning and coordinating agency (CONSFA) and
a large centralized service: DIAP (Agriculture and Fisheries Services);
an Institute for Agricultural Research, and two decentralized ("autono-
mous") corporations: the Institute of Agricultural Development (INDAP)
and the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA). (Loveman, 1976, pp.232-235)
In addition, several important State agencies dealing with strategic
functions of agricultural development were out of the control of the Mini-
ster of Agriculture. Such was the case of the Agricultural Division of
CORFO, which had subsidiaries and development programs in agricultural
machinery (SEAM); research and conservation of natural resources (IREN);
sugar beet extension; technical assistance and processing (IANSA); and
technical and financial assistance to producers in cattle, dairy products
and fruits. CORFO was legally tied to the Ministry of Economy which was
also in charge of fixing prices for agricultural products, and regulated
the foreign trade and internal market of the same products through the
Agricultural Commercial Enterprise (ECA). The State Bank (BECH), formally
tied to the Ministry of Finances, was in charge of agricultural credit and
the import and distribution of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, small ma-
chinery and other basic agricultural inputs. The Ministry of Public Works
(MOP) had a special division in charge of the planning and construction
of irrigation projects. (ODEPA, 1970, pp.119-121)
The different agencies of the agricultural public sector aligned
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themselves in the controversy around the agrarian reform issue according
to the position of their senior staff and their ties with "client groups".
Thus the professional personnel of CORFO, BECH and DIAP were critical of
the idea of an agrarian reform. They continued to provide technical and
financial assistance to the traditional landlords following their estab-
lished policy of gradual modernization of the existing structure in spite
of the official policy of structural change. (Petras, 1971, pp.164-168)
They were helped by the gradualist approach adopted by the Frei
Administration in the process of expropriations, since at the end of the
Frei period, only 18% of the irrigated land and 12% of the non-irrigated
agricultural land had been expropriated. (Loveman, 1976, p.272)
On the other hand, since the beginning of the Frei Administration
CORA and INDAP took the lead in implementing the structural changes pro-
mised in the platform. CORA, under the direction of Rafael Moreno, car-
ried out expropriations using the existing law (Law 15,020) until the ap-
proval of the new legislation in 1967. The lawyers of CORA, together
with the Minister Hugo Trivelli, concentrated on the preparation and dis-
cussion of the new law in Congress. INDAP, under the leadership of
Jacques Chonchol, developed a strong program of peasants' training and
organization of labor unions and cooperatives in the countryside. CORA
and INDAP served as an institutional base for the progressive elements
within the administration that looked upon the agrarian reform program
as a first step for a general transformation of the Chilean society; as
the basic structural change which was a pre-requisite for economic de-
velopment. (Petras, 1971, pp. 16 3 & ff.; Loveman, 1967, pp.243-244;
Kaufman, 1972, pp.86-88)
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But there was a difference between the heads of these two agen-
cies.
Jacques Chonchol, the head of INDAP, who was 38 in 1964, had a
fairly complete technical preparation and experience. An agricultural
economist of Universidad de Chile, he had graduate studies in planing
and economic development at the London School of Economics at the Uni-
versity of Paris, after which he served as Chief of the Department of
Agricultural Economics in the Ministry of Agriculture, and as expert of
FAO in Mexico and in Cuba, where he spent two years as technical assist-
ant to the agrarian reform. He had a deep conviction expressed in books
and essays which had made him one of the leaders of the younger genera-
tion and the left wing of PDC. (A good summary of the ideas of Chonchol
in matters of agrarian reform is contained in his essay "Land Tenure and
Development in Latin America", in Veliz, ed., 1969, pp.75-90)
Rafael Moreno, the chief executive of CORA was only 26 in 1964,
and even though he had a university degree in agricultural economics, his
short experience was more in the field of politics (he was a former lead-
er of the Christian Democratic Youth) than in technical matters. Like
all the young leaders of PDC at that time, he was openly committed to
structural changes, but his main asset in the job was his personal friend-
ship with President Frei. (Kaufman, 1972, p.87)
These personal differences are important because Chonchol and Moreno
as chiefs of autonomous agencies, had relatively free reign in the selec-
tion of their collaborators and authority to appoint the senior staff of
the respective agency down to the level of executive positions of INDAP
and CORA with people who enjoyed their confidence and formed well-inte-
grated teams that followed their leadership. (Petras, 1971, p.176)
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But the agrarian reform issue was important enough to carry into
the internal debate of the Frei Administration officers who had only a
marginal relation to the agricultural sector. Edmundo Perez Zujoyic,
Minister of Public Works, and Raul Saez, the chief executive of CORFO,
served as links between the president and the traditional ruling class.
As such, they pressed Frei for moderation in the agricultural changes.
They were joined by the Minister of Labor, William Thayer, whose Ministry
resented the activist role taken by INDAP in the unionization of peasants.
(Loveman, 1976, p.257; Petras, 1972, pp.154-157)
Hugo Trivelli, as Minister of Agriculture, was the general manager
of the government project during the discussion of the Agrarian Reform
bill. He had a strong personal commitment to structural changes in the
agricultural sector, but despite his personal prestige as international
expert and Professor of Agricultural Economics of Universidad de Chile,
he had no constituency of his own. He was successful in coordinating the
agricultural public sector in policy and programming matters, but to a-
chieve this he had to serve as broker between the conflicting factions.
He was loyal to the president and was one of the Ministers who accompa-
nied Fried during the six years of his period.
At the beginning of this Administration, President Frei supported
the activities of CORA and INDAP, and pressed for the new Agrarian Reform
Law. In this way he maintained the unity of the Christian Democratic
Party and balanced his "soft" stance in the copper agreements. (Kaufman,
1972, p.94) But after the approval of the new law in 1967, he turned to
the right and tried to restrain the activities of CORA and INDAP which
led to the open conflict with Chonchol and his resignation in 1968.
(Kaufman, 1972, p.102)
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The conflict with the administration was parallel to that existing
in the countryside. Actually, both conflicts were related to each other
through the attitude of the public officers in front of the peasants and
landowners. This attitude varied according to the political position of
the agency to which the officers were affilitated. Professionals and
technicians serving in the agencies of the agricultural public sector
tended to adopt a paternalistic attitude, akin to that of the ruling oli-
garchy, in their relations with peasants and small farmers. CORA and
INDAP tried to change these attitudes to a more democratic mode, more in
agreement with the expressed objectives of raising the status of the ru-
ral population contemplated in the agrarian reform program. (Petras, 1971,
pp.168-169)
On the other hand, Chonchol and INDAP were able to maintain pres-
sure on the agrarian reform process through the training and organization
of peasants and small farmers. INDAP was instrumental in the organiza-
tion of the National Confederation of Peasant Cooperatives, the Confeder-
ation of Indian Organizations, and the largest national confederation of
peasant labor unions, "El Triunfo Campesino". In these activities, INDAP
confronted the competition of the Marxist parties ("Ranquil" Confedera-
tion), and of the CIA financed, "independent" Confederation Libertad.
(Petras, 1971, pp.205,206; Kaufman, 1972, pp. 1 3 3 & ff.)
In fact, a group of nominally Christian Democrat activists, with
the support of the Minister of Labor, William Thayer, and other conser-
vative elements in the Frei Administration, and with the financial as-
sistance of AID and CIA (through IDF) transformed a group of small Church
supported organizations into a national confederation, first known as
CNC (National Peasant Confederation) and later as "Libertad". (Kaufman,
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1972, p.133; Feinberg, 1972, p.71)
This division of the peasant movement was legalized by an amend-
ment introduced by the Deputy Emilio Lorenzini, one of the founders of
"Libertad", to Law 16,625 of 1967 on labor unions of agricultural work-
ers. The law established the commune (municipality) as the territorial
base for rural labor unions, and the amendment allowed the existence of
parallel organizations within the same commune. The amendment was sup-
ported by the traditional organization of landowners (SNA) and by the
Minister of Labor, William Thayer, in the name of "freedom" to organize.
Against the amendment was the left wing of the Christian Democrats and
the parties of the Left who argued that the principle of unity was neces-
sary to the strength of the peasants' organizations. The amendment pas-
sed and as a result of it two or three labor organizations divided and
diluted the peasant movement in many localities. (Kaufman, 1972, p.143)
By contrast, the threat of the agrarian reform had the effect of
unifying all the traditional landowners, even those who had farms smaller
than the legal limit for expropriations. Organizationa like SNA and CAS
(Consortium of Southern Agriculturists) increased their membership and
joined forces in a common front to oppose legally and practically the
agrarian reform with a unified strategy. (Loveman, 1976, pp.321-322;
Kaufman, 1972, pp. 1 6 2 & ff.)
The conflict and controversy around the agrarian reform program
was one of the main components of the environment created by the "acti-
vist" first half of the Frei Administration. Until 1967, the Christian
Democratic government appeared decided to put into practice, the objec-
tives of the "revolution in liberty", and the agrarian reform was one
example of structural change really implemented. In fact, the other ac-
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complishments of Frei's first years were directed to either a long-term
change, like the educational reform; marginal changes in the existing si-
tuation, such as the wage policy and the housing program; or were incom-
plete measures like the copper agreements and the Popular Promotion pro-
gram. The changes in policy adopted in 1967, restricted the activism of
the administration drastically, but didn't reduce the conflict, as will
be seen later.
3. The Installation of the National System of Planning.
The analysis above of the situation during the first years of the
Frei Administration shows the environment in which the national system
of planning was installed and organized.
The center of the system was the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN),
created by law in 1965 to serve as advisory and technical staff to the
president. ODEPLAN had two divisions, one in charge of global planning
and the coordination of the sectorial planning offices created to serve
the ministries, and the second in charge of regional planning. The first,
division, with the technical assistance of the U.N., took over the per-
sonnel and national planning functions, which until then were carried out
by the Planning Division of CORFO, especially the national accounts. The
second division of ODEPLAN, with the technical assistance of URDAPIC (the
Ford Foundation technical assistance program), divided the country into
eleven regions and a metropolitan area (Santiago); in each was organized
a regional planning office (ORPLAN). (ECLA, 1966, p.341; Friedmann, 1969,
p.57)
In the Christian Democratic Administration, the planning system was
an important part of the strengthening of the State as a "neutral" appara-
tus located above the social struggle. The technical information, compre-
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hensive perspective, and coordinating action of the planning offices
would enable the President and the Ministers to overcome the tradition-
al bureaucracy's lack of response the to the new policies, The ruling
oligarchy, to maintain control over the State, had divided the same
functions among different agencies, even different Ministries, and had
created autonomous agencies which duplicated the functions of central-
ized services. In this way, the State bureaucracy was deprived of the
rational efficiency required for concerted action, and its many compo-
nents tended to serve the specific requirements of diverse "client"
groups. (ODEPA, 1970, pp.17 & 23; ILPES, 1966, pp.32-33)
As one of the experts of URDAPIC found in the Ministry of Housing:
In charge of the Ministry were men eager to make inno-
vations and to make the Ministry live up to its exalted
mission of formulating the implementing comprehensive
housing and urban development policies for the entire
country. But the mass of bureaucrats serving under
them did not sense a similar urgency and were accos-
tomed to a bureaucratic culture that was peculiarly
inappropriate for innovative undertakings.
(Friedmann, 1969, p.125)
On the other hand, the concentration of the ruling classis economic
power had been reflected by the extreme centralization of the machinery
of the State. Local and regional authorities were entirely dependent
on Santiago in any important matter. As a consequence, the local in-
terests and needs had a low priority in national policies and programs
unless a natural catastrophe or a threat to the national security called
the special attention of the central government. (Friedmann, 1969, pp.
22-24; Veckemans, 1969, in Burnell, 1972, pp.5 2-53)
In view of this situation, the planning system was given two ap-
parently contradictory tasks in relation to the State bureaucracy. One
was to reinforce the central authority of the President and Ministers
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by providing a coherent and comprehensive line of action, and by coor-
dinating the executive agencies for its implementation. The other was
to decentralize the machinery of the State by the creation of regional
and local centers of information and decision-making.
Actually, the second task was a means by which to achieve the first.
In the Christian Democratic ideology, decentralization was a solution to
the physical marginality which was another dimension of the social mar-
ginality. (Veckemans, op.cit.) In theory and from a planner's viewpoint,
decentralization was a requirement for balanced development and a more
rational use of the provincial resources. For example, ORPLANs were
perceived by John Friedmann as the institutional seeds of "growth poles".
(Friedmann, 1969, p.62) However, in practice, they served the President
to bypass the traditional channels of communication, mechanisms of re-
presentation, and sources of information established by the ruling
class, including Congress and the political parties. Local and regional
leaders found in the planning system a new way to reach the highest exe-
cutive officers, and the President received technical summaries prepared
by the Regional Planning Division of ODEPLAN prior to his visits to the
provinces. (Friedmann, 1969, p.61; See also John Miller, in Friedmann,
ed., 1969, p.111)
The installation of the national system of planning represented a
great expansion in the number of positions open to planners in Chile.
But the number of trained planners existing in the country was too small
to cover all the positions. In part, the deficit was covered by the in-
ternational experts already mentioned, and the same programs of techni-
cal assistance included the opportunity to train planners in the courses
of ILPES in Santiago or abroad. URDAPIC, for example, provided fellow-
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ships for seven Chilean professionals to follow graduate studies in
planning in the U.S., and financed short-term educational trips for
another 29, especially officers of the Regional Planning Division of
ODEPLAN and the chiefs of CIDU. (Friedmann, 1969, pp.107-111) The same
program helped the Ministry of Housing to achieve an agreement with the
Peace Corps by which Corps' volunteers with a Master in City Planning
complemented the staff of the 36 offices of municipal programming (MPC)
installed in the country. (F. Earwaker, in Friedmann, ed., 1969, p.122)
Many other young professionals were trained "on the job" by the in-
ternational experts or by the former members of the staff of the Plan-
ning Division of CORFO, and some of them later had the opportunity to
formalize their training at CIDU or CEPLAN. Thus, from a group of less
than 50 professionals with some training in planning existing in the
country before 1964, the number of professionals working in planning
was nearly 300 at the end of the Frei Administration. They even organ-
ized their own professional body in the Chilean Society of Planning and
Development (PLANDES) which, in 1968, had 240 members (though not all
of them would be considered planners by international standards), pub-
lished a bulletin and organized seminars and meetings.
Within the planning system staff, there were three views on the
character of the planning function. One group sustained an "indicative"'
mode of planning in which the authority of the planning offices would
be based on the quality of their technical advice. This group pushed
for sophisticated econometric models and computerized information sys-
tems, and approached operational programming from a formalistic view-
point. (W. Stohr, in Friedmann, ed., 1969, p.66) A second group had
a mixed perspective in which the planning system had a "directive"
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function in relation to the State bureaucracy and an "indicative" mode
for the private sector. This group tried with some success to use the
budgetary process to control the action of the State agencies, and their
technical sophistication was focused on the incentives and constraints
for the guidance of private action such as taxation and price policies.
(See Hugo Trivelli's "Introduction" in ODEPA, 1970) Finally, a third
group tended to consider the planning system as a component of the
authority of the State, and therefore was "directive" as that authority
was. Their expertise was concentrated on the means for the State to
play a leading role in economic development, on political development,
and in the field of public participation in the design of development
policies.
In practice, since ODEPLAN was technical staff to the President,
as the sectoral planning offices to the Ministers, the planning system
identified with the political orientation of the administration. Be-
cause of this, the general mode of the planning process changed along
with the political position of Frei, from a more "directive" orienta-
tion at the beginning to a more and more "indicative" mode towards the
end of the presidential period. In formal terms, the legal statute of
the planning offices coincided with the second position mentioned above,
while giving them enough flexibility to increase or reduce their direc-
tiveness in accordance with the political direction of the Executive,
(See the legal statute of ODEPA in Law 16,640)
In relation to the State bureaucracy, the same identification of
the planning offices with the President and Ministers gave them power
to request information and to participate in the budgetary process of
the other agencies. However, the planning offices were deprived of
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executive powers. In formal terms, the link between the chiefs of the
planning offices and the President and Ministers was the same as that
of the heads of autonomous agencies and public services. For this
reason, the coordination between the planning offices and the rest of
the administration for the implementation of the planning proposals,
had to take place at the highest level. Even though the planning of-
fices in general enjoyed the strong support of the President and Mini-
sters, the established power centers in the bureaucracy were reluctant
to accept the new role of the planning system unless the Ministers or
President forced them to do so. (F. Earwaker, in Friedmann, ed., 1969,
p.127; See also ECLA, 1966, p.332; and G. Salgado, in U.N. 1967, p.49)
As it was mentioned before, there were two major centers of deci-
sion for economic development policy and implementation in the estab-
lished institutional organization of the State. The oldest one was the
Ministry of Finances, created in the XIX century and modernized in 1925
with the additions of the Office of the Budget and two autonomous agen-
cies, the Central Bank and the State Bank. The other was the Ministry
of Economy, created in this century to carry out the industrial develop-
ment State policy and the State intervention in the market, which in-
cluded supplying essentials and fixing prices. Two major autonomous
agencies depended formally on the Minister of Economy, CORFO and ECA.
In the past, whenever the economic situation was critical, the
same Minister had been in charge of both ministries to insure a coor-
dinated action. That was the case of Oscal Herrera during the admini-
stration of Carlos Ibanez in 1955-1956, and Roberto Vergara during the
first years of the presidency of Jorge Alessandri in 1958-1961. But
these strong Ministers appeared to have more power than the President
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himself, and they were abruptly dismissed when they seemed to be suc-
cessful. (Hirschman, 1963, p.211)
Frei followed a different path. He took the Planning Division of
CORFO to build ODEPLAN as advisory channel to the President, and put
the programming department of the Office of the Budget under the coor-
dination of ODEPLAN. The Economic Committee, whose chairman was the
President or the Minister of Finance in his absence, was integrated
also by the Ministry of Economy, the Chief Executives of CORFO, the
Central Bank and the State Bank, the Director of ODEPLAN, and usually
the Minister of Agriculture. This committee, "the chief governmental
organ for economic matters", in 1967,
transferred most of its technical work to ODEPLAN,
which also took primary responsibility for the com-
patibility of both the short-term and long-term ob-
jectives and the formulation of the policies adopted
to attain them.
(C. Ossa, 1974, pp.94-95)
Thus, since 1967, ODEPLAN was not only in charge of the long-term
planning studies, it was also the conductor of the studies directed to
prepare the annual budget and analyze the current conditions and policy
statements contained in the presentation that the Minister of Finances
made to Congress every November. (C. Ossa, 1974, pp.96-9 8)
However, some of the established agencies with strong links to the
ruling class, and independent sources of financing, such as CORFO or
the Central Bank, continued serving the "clients" in the old ways in
spite of the efforts of the Frei Administration to make them cooperate
with the new policies. The Central Bank Board, as was seen before in
Chapter 1, was composed of 11 members. They were also very influential
in the Board of CORFO, especially because of the affinities they had
with the Chief Executive of the Corporation until 1968, Raul Saez.
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(Stallings, 1978, pp.59, 114 & 161)
In other cases the obstacle to the planning role and the new po-
licies was simply bureaucratic inertia which resisted the change of old
established practices, standards and procedures, as it happened with
the National Institute of Statistics (INE). While other agencies which
were in a process of self-definition, like CODELCO, or serving as
spearheads of the "Revolution in Liberty", like CORA and INDAP, consi-
dered the planning offices as a threat or an obstacle to their own de-
velopment as political or economic centers of power.
Two good examples of these difficulties in establishing an effi-
cient planning system are provided by the further analysis of the sec-
torial planning offices and the respective agencies in the Ministries
of Housing and Agriculture.
The Ministry of Housing and Urbanism was created in 1965 and com-
bined functions in the field of housing construction and urban services
previously distributed among some twenty-four public agencies in eight
different Ministries. The new organization included the Ministry it-
self, with a planning and budget office, and five large autonomous cor-
porations, the Housing Corporation (CORVI), in charge of housing con-
struction; the Housing Services Corporation (CORHABIT), in charge of
financing and distributing housing solutions for low-income people; the
Urban Development Corporation (CORMU), in charge of site purchasing and
urban renewal projects; the Urban Works Corporation (COU), in charge of
construction and control of urbanization services, including water,
sewer, telephone, electricity and gas; and the Central Savings and
Loans Bank, which was in charge of financing and controlling all the
Savings and Loans Associations of the country. (Ch. Frankehoff, in
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Friedmann, ed., p.18 9; R. Merrill in Grindley & Merrill, 1971, p.4)
MINVU and its planning office tried to decentralize the system of
gathering information and allocating investments. For this purpose,
MINVU entered into formal agreements with the municipalities of the
most important urban centers (excluded Santiago) to create Communal
(municipal) Programming Offices (OPC). MINVU provided the technical
personnel, and the municipalities provided office space and clerical
help for the OPCs which were due to become a full part of the municipal
organization after MINVU financed the starting period. MINVU also at-
tained an agreement with the Peace Corps by which volunteers with ex-
pertise in City Planning were assigned to the OPCs. But the municipal-
ities in practice never financed the OPCs. Due to the budgetary con-
straints of MINVU the total number of OPCs was restricted and their
responsibilities expanded to serve more than one municipality at the
same time. In 1969, there were 36 OPCs serving 80 municipalities. To
provide them with technical background, MINVU financed a series of
"pre-investment studies" by Chilean and foreign city planning consul-
tants. These studies gave comprehensive and detailed information about
the respective city and a long-term perspective about the city's deve-
lopment and its housing needs. (F. Earwaker, in Friedmann, ed., 1969,
pp. 122-122)
With the technical assistance of URDAPIC, MINVU planners designed
an annual budgeting process by which the local and regional needs were
reported by the OPCs and integrated into the investment allocation and
operational programs of the corporations. While the Ministry was con-
cerned with the population needs and the long-term perspective of ur-
ban development, the corporations were interested in short-term targets
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of production "efficient" housing solutions, and distribution procedures
which meant cheap and easy operations. (F. Earwaker, id., p.127)
On the other hand, CORVI had long established links with private
contractors who were concentrated in Santiago, and many of them had dif-
ficulty moving to work in the provinces. The majority of the "clients"
of CORHABIT were also located in Santiago and could storm the offices
of the corporation if their demands were not satisfied, as they actually
did sometimes.
Because of this, the institutional separation between planning and
implementation resulted in a lack of coordination which frequently re-
quired the intervention of the Minister as the only authority capable of
making the corporations respond to the guidance of the planning office.
As Frank Earwaker wrote,
The fact is that the Corporations are not involved in
LLe formulation of the macro-plan of the sector, and
therefore, do not feel any loyalty is due to it.
(Op.cit., p.127)
The planners in MINVU were in a very special situation. On one
hand, they were associated with the creation of the Ministry and before
1965, there was no agency in the Chilean government in charge of design-
ing long-term comprehensive policies for the sector. On the other hand,
the construction of low-cost housing and the control of urban expansion
were functions that had been assigned to the State government for long
time before the Frei Administration. As a matter of fact, CORVI was
created in 1953 as a descendant of another agency established in 1943.
The program of housing was one of the few areas in which the Alessandri
Administration found the necessity for full State participation in pro-
ductive activities. (Gil, 1966, p.184) As it happens when a new insti-
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tution is created, there is uncertainty because of the scarcity of ex-
perienced personnel who feel secure enough to take appropriate action in
the- new roles. As John Friedmann wrote,
To put the matter in its simplest terms, the Ministry
(of Housing) was ill-prepared to administer even rou-
tine programs. It was even less prepared to act as a
major innovator in housing and urban affairs.
(Friedmann, 1969, p.126)
But the Corporations were full of experienced personnel with "most of the
old bureaucratic habits and modes of operation that are typical of such
institutions in Chile". (id., p.125)
However, the same Friedmann found that the deficiencies of MINVU
provided a favorable climate for the experts of URDAPIC to introduce
their own ideas about the organization and policies of the Ministry.
A finely honed instrument of bureaucratic management
... might well have offered far more intransigent re-
sistance than was, in fact, the case.
(id., p.131)
The experts of URDAPIC were in a similar position to that of the Kemmerer
Mission in 1925 or the Klein-Sacks Mission of 1956. That is, they were
assuming government functions in the vacuum left by Chilean politicians
and bureaucrats, and eventually serving as brokers between conflicting
interests or as scapegoats for governmental failures. (Hirschman, 1963,
pp.206-207)
According to Freidmann, the ideas of URDAPIC experts included the
creation of the OPCs, the regionalization of the budget, the introduction
of a computerized information system, the incorporation of community
facilities in housing projects for low-income people, and the shift in
policy from the construction of complete houses to a "sites and services"'
approach. "URDAPIC can take credit for having been the originator of
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many of these ideas and for helping make them operational." (Freidmann,
1969, pp.131-132) With some degree of arrogance, he noted
URDAPIC advisors to MINVU generally had a clearer
view of the future than their Chilean counterparts.
No group within the Ministry was sufficienty power-
ful to effectively block an innovation.
(Id., pp. 128 & 133)
Perhaps the most important idea of those mentioned above was the
change in policy toward a sites and services program. Probably the same
lack of resistance alluded to before was the cause of this being a case
of "oversteering" mentioned by Friedmann, making use of the terminology
of Karl Deustch that means to qualify a corrective action which goes
too far. (Id., p.127)
The observation made by John Turner and others, that low-income
people can make substantial contributions to the solution of their own
housing requirements if they are provided with the security of a perma-
nent site, constitutes a sound theoretical basis for a sites and services
strategy. (Van Huyck, 1971, p.ii) In practical terms, if a government
is short of funds to provide a complete house to each low-income family
in need of it, a second best solution is to give the family a site and
the basic services which will allow them to build and to improve their
own house.
The Frei Administration had promised to build 60,000 new houses per
year but only achieved 52,566 in 1965, and 27,761 in 1966, (see Table 4.b
below) and in 1967 was trying to reduce public expenditures. The solu-
tion proposed by URDAPIC experts was to put a new emphasis on an existing
sites and services program called "Operacion Sitio", and to unify its
implementation through an administrative program called "Popular Savings
Plan" (PAP), under the control of CORHABIT. (C. Frankenhoff, in Friedmann,
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ed., 1969, p.185; Also F. Vasquez,id., pp.235 & 237)
From 1967 on, low-income families could apply for one of five al-
ternative "basic plans", according to the amount of their previous sav-
ings and their actual income. These alternatives were: Plan 1 - semi-
urbanized site; Plan 2 - completely urbanized site; Plan 3 - basic unit;
Plan 4 - family unit; and Plan 5 - family apartment. (Van Huyck, 1971,
p.31) The impact of the policy change may be seen in the figures of the
following table.
Table 4.b: CHILE: Construction of Dwelling Units versus Improved Sites
1965 - 1970








(Source: R. Merrill, 1971, based on official MINVU statistics)
As explained by Robert Merrill,
the sites and services program directed the efforts
of MINVU and its member agencies to serve a vastly
large proportion of low-income families. The scale
of the program was so large that almost all existing
squatter slums (callampas) in Santiago were eradicated.
(R. Merrill, 1971, p.14)
In fact, the combination of complete dwelling units and sites and ser-
vices provided a far larger number of housing "solutions" than the for-
mer effort. Since 1961, the Chilean State was directing 30% of its in-
vestments to the building of low cost housing. In spite of this, the
construction of housing units until 1966, "accounted for 71% of the hous-
ing goals (of the Ten Year Plan, 1961-1970) which in turn covered only
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69% of the predicted ten-year cumulative need". (Id., p.12)
It is important to mention that thanks to the decentralization at-
tempt on program formulation and implementation mentioned before, a sub-
stantial amount of the sites provided were in urban centers other than
Santiago. For example, half of the sites assigned in 1968 were in pro-
vincial cities. (R. Merrill, 1971, pp.2 & 4)
On the other hand, neither CORVI not the municipalities were flex-
ible enough to change their standards of housing construction and build-
ing regulations to allow for self-help building in the distributed sites.
This was reinforced by the lack of funds available for housing improve-
ment loans. (R. Merrill, 1971, p.16) In addition, CORHABIT was unable
to absorb the increased administrative load and failed to mount an effi-
cient system of collection. For this, among other reasons, a high rate
of payment arrears increased the total cost of the progam much over what
the planners expected. (R. Merrill, 1971, p.18)
The malleable, newly formed organization found by foreign experts
in MINVU, was not present in the agricultural sector. The most impor-
tant innovation in agriculture was the agrarian reform, but the Agricul-
tural Planning Office (ODEPA) had little relation to its design and im-
plementation. However, some of the same bureaucratic difficulties faced
by the planning system were also present in the agricultural sector.
Actually, agricultural planning during the Frei Administration had
something in common with the agrarian reform. ODEPA began to work under
the old legislation (Law 15,020) and its new form and functions were in-
stitutionalized by Law 16,640 in 1967. In fact, until 1967, ODEPA used
the legal statute and attributes of CONSFA as a planning and coordinat-
ing agency with implementation powers which has been described before.
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(See Chapter 3; Also Loveman, 1976, p.233) It also used the technical
assistance of a team of experts from ILPES who had worked before on the
Agricultural Development Plan for Uruguay (1963). The group was directed
by Jesus Gonzalez, integrated by Antonio Perez, Danilo Astori, Jose G.
Gimeno, and reinforced on specific issues by Fernando Fuenzalida and
Francisco Giner. (ODEPA, 1970, pp.V-VII)
The staff of ODEPA was integrated by about 40 young professionals,
most of whom were agronomists, agrarian economists or economists, but
included also several lawyers, veterinarians, forestry experts, a group
of them had formal training or experience in planning and served as lead-
ers of the work groups which were formed within the four departments of
ODEPA, Production Programming, Agricultural Policy, Financial Resources,
and Institutional Organization. They were assisted by an Administrative
Department with a staff of about 25 persons. (Id., p.V & VI)
The first task of the ODEPA professionals was to prepare a complete
analysis of the agricultural situation of the country which included:
a) a technical analysis of the potential of Chilean soils, water re-
sources and climate for agricultural production, which used the aeropho-
togrametric studies made previously by IREN as a basis; b) a statistical
analysis of the trends of agricultural production during the 30 years be-
fore 1965 for all the products, including grains, vegetables, fruits and
vineyards, meat, dairy products, vegetable fibers and wool, and the pre-
sent use of resources, including natural resources, artificial inputs,
human labor and financial resources; and c) a diagnostic analysis which
related the performance of agricultural production to institutional, eco-
nomic and political factors, using the findings of the CIDA studies on
land tenure and agricultural development as a point of reference. (ODEPA,
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1970, pp.5-18)
At the same time ODEPA prepared and lobbied for the chapter of the
Agrarian Reform bill which regulated the public agricultural agencies.
This chapter of Law 16,640, in addition to the new statute of ODEPA it-
self, contained the introduction of the legal concept of "Public Agri-
cultural Sector", through which the Minister of Agriculture attained su-
pervisory powers over the policies and programs of all the public agen-
cies dealing with agricultural issues, whether or not dependent on the
ministry. (ODEPA, 1970, p.119)
In the same law, ODEPA was defined as a service of the Ministry of
Agriculture, directly dependent on the Minister, and as a sectorial of-
fice within the national system of planning under the technical super-
vision of ODEPLAN. In general, the functions of ODEPA were:
a) to formulate the Agricultural Development Plan;
b) To advise the minister in the design of agricultural policy and
in the discussion of the programs and budgets of the diverse public agen-
cies of the agricultural sector;
c) To coordinate the activities of these agencies and to supervise
the implementation of the Plan; and
d) To coordinate the foreign techincal assistance offered to the
agricultural sector. (ODEPA, 1970, pp. 1 1 9 & 121)
As in the case of MINVU mentioned before, planning and implementa-
tion were separated functions in the agricultural sector; but ODEPA had
more and distinct powers than other similar sectorial planning offices
to make the other agencies responsive to the planner's guidance. The
Agricultural Development Plan was defined as indicative for the private
sector, but the law made it imperative for the public sector. (ODEPA,
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1970, p.XXVII)
Moreover, the coordination among public agencies for planning and
implementation purposes took place at three levels:
1) The Plan Administration Committee was integrated by the highest
executives of the agencies of the Agricultural Public Sector (QDEPA in-
cluded) under the presidency of the Minister of Agriculture;
2) The Programming Offices of each of the agencies of the Sector
were in charge of the budget and operational program of the agencies in
coordination with ODEPA; and
3) The Zonal Agricultural Development Committees was integrated by
the regional executives of the public agencies of the agricultural sector
in each one of the fifteen zones designated for the territorial decentral-
ization of the said agencies. (ODEPA, 1970, pp.12 1-12 2 )
Previously, the agencies had different territorial distribution from
each other. ODEPA proposed the unified designation of fifteen zones ad-
justed to the regional division of the country adopted by ODEPLAN, and
all the agencies of the sector adapted their internal organization to the
new regional distribution. (ODEPA, 1970, p.12 1)
Even though the nature of the agricultural activities made decentral-
ize operations and decision-making in the agricultural sector easier than
in other sectors, still a disproportionately high number of public officers
were destined to Santiago. (Barraclough, 1974, p.2 2 2)
Formally ODEPA fulfilled its legal functions. The "Agricultural De-
velopment Plan 1965-1980" was published in 1967, and many of the policies
contained in the plan were adopted as the official policies of the Chilean
government for the agricultural sector even before its publication. (ODEPA,
1970, p.XXVII)
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The advisory function was made easier by the personal interest that
Minister Trivelli had in planning. In practice, Minister Trivelli and
ODEPA mutually supported each other to achieve control and coordination
of the agencies in the sector. Hugo Trivelli was a friend of Jesus
Gonzalez and had been professor of agricultural economics of many of the
members of the staff of ODEPA. He closely followed the studies made to
prepare the plan, and frequently communicated with ODEPA's senior staff.
The combination of experts from ILPES with young, well-prepared and strong-
ly motivated Chilean professionals gave a good technical backing to the
policy design and coordination effort.
The plan, published first in 1967 with a second edition in 1970, in-
cluded a presentation by the Director of ODEPLAN and an Introduction by
Minister Trivelli, and was divided into two sections. The first contained
the "Objectives, Strategy and Goals of the Agricultural Development", and
the second was entitled "The Instruments of Agricultural Development".
The first section was divided into nine chapters which contained a
summary of the analysis of the historical development of the sector; the
objectives and strategy of the plan; projections to 1971,1975, and 1980
of the supply and demand of the diverse agricultural products at the na-
tional level, resources and factors at the farm level, volume and distri-
bution of income, foreign trade balance, and some investments in facili-
ties for marketing and techincal development; and the basis for the evalu-
ation of the plan.
The second chapter was divided into four chapters containing insti-
tutional reforms; structural reforms; policy of economic incentives; and
financing of the investments and subsidies included in the plan. (The plan
was published in two forms. One was an extensive edition in three volumes,
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and the other was a reduced version in one volume. For this analysis,
the second edition, 1970, of the reduced version is used. The language
of the plan is Spanish, and the translation is mine.)
Two basic objectives of the plan were defined as a) economic: to in-
crease production, meaning 44% growth of the physical output of agricul-
ture between 1965 and 1971, and 134% growth between 1971 and 1980; and
b) social: "to promote fundamental changes in the rural community" toward
a "greater participation of peasants in the social, political, economic
and cultural life of the country". (p.20)
The achievement of these objectives would attain a change in the
qualitative composition of the structure of production through an increase
in the relative importance of cattle and dairy products, fruits, sugar
beet, and vegetable oil; an improvement in the diet of the general popu-
lation; and a radical change in the balance of the foreign trade of agri-
cultural products, which in the past showed increasing deficits.
For this purpose, the plan proposed a change in the use of resources
toward intensifying the use of available land (more hectars to be culti-
vated and higher yields to be attained), a better use of the work force
(under-utilized at the time), and an increase in the capital invested and
the use of technical inputs. (pp.22-23)
The second section of the plan identified the instruments to be used
to these ends. They included reforming the institutions of the public
sector toward a better coordination and more efficient service to agricul-
tural producers; the agrarian reform to change the existing land tenure
system considered an obstacle for the economic and social development of
the sector; and a series of economic policies (prices, marketing, foreign
trade, taxes, and technical input supply) directed to provide incentives
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for the agricultural producers to follow the guidance of the plan. (pp.
24-25)
The detailed study of the agricultural potential of the country made
for the plan was an extraordinary advance over the former estimates. It
combined soils, climate and water in territorial "units of use", and cal-
culated the potential yields of the different products for each unit of
use at diverse levels of technology. The comparison between the "poten-
tial use" of the land, and the "actual use" of it, detected by the Agri-
cultural Census of 1965, provided the basic parameters for the project-
tions of production. (pp.42-44)
The projections of demand were based on demographic trends, and in-
come level and distribution variations, and made a good effort to incor-
porate improvements in the composition of the diet. But the growth of
population expected by the plan was larger than the real growth and the
income elasticities used by the plan were weak indicators. (pp.26-31)
While the plan detected an extreme case of inequality in distribution
of income within the agricultural sector, it only projected a gradual
change of that distribution. In fact, the plan found that 3% of the
families of the rural population had access to 40% of the income of the
sector, while 75% of the families received only 33% of the income. (p.16)
In 1965, 48% of the net product of the sector went to pay labor, while
52% of that product payed the rent of the land, of capital and of the
managerial activities. The plan proposed to raise the share of labor to
50% in 1971. (pp.84-89)
The old centralized service of the Ministry of Agriculture, DIAP,
was transformed by Law 16,640 into an autonomous agency, the Agriculture
and Cattle Service (SAG). SAG was in charge of technical assistance for
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agricultural production, extension, soil conservation and improvements,
and plant and animal pest controls. Minister Trivelli conceived SAG to
be the main service for the implementation of the plan. In theory, at
least, it was the public agency in contact with most of the agricultural
producers, and was capable of influencing them through extension and tech-
nical assistance. Thus, the Zonal Directors of SAG were designated Exe-
cutive Secretaries of the Zonal Agricultural Development Committees, and
Zonal Coordinators for Planning. In addition, the Division of Statistics
of SAG was designated as the center for the information system of the
Agricultural Public Sector. (pp.120,12 2 )
But CORA provided its own technical assistance to the productive
units of the reformed area, and INDAP gave the same technical assistance
to small farm owners and their organizations. This restricted the con-
tact of these two groups of producers with SAG and prevented the profes-
sionals of SAG from competing with the technical assistance provided by
CORFO or one of its subsidiaries, or by the State Bank, since the techni-
cal assistance of these agencies was associated with financial or market-
ing arrangements which SAG could not match.
CORA and INDAP professionals and technicians were young, enthusiastic
innovators. Those from CORFO and BECH were traditionally related to the
most progressive faction of latifundio owners. But the professionals and
technicians from SAG, the older technical agency of the agricultural sec-
tor, were mostly in contact with the more conservative group of latifundio
owners; that is, the group most susceptible to the effects of agrarian re-
form. (Petras, 1971, pp.186-1 8 9; Feinberg, 1972, p.67)
In INDAP, Jacques Chonchol, under attack from the right wing of the
administration, was willing to have an understanding with Minister Trevilli.
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He accepted the budgetary supervision of ODEPA and the services of the
planning office as brokerage in the relations between INDAP and the Of-
fice of the Budget and other financial authorities. However, the plan
contained no policies or programs in the main areas of action of INDAP,
so INDAP's role in implementing the plan was marginal and indirect.
(Petras, 1971, p. 1 5 8 & note 84, p.218)
Protected by its formal autonomy, CORA was reluctant to follow the
directives coming from ODEPA. Rafeal Moreno solved its budgetary prob-
lems by going directly to the President; since CORA was busy with the
individual problems of each expropriation and each "asentamiento", it had
little use for the regional and national production figures contained in
the plan. (Petras, 1971, p.169)
However, some of the agencies independent of the Ministry of Agri-
culture showed interest in the plan as a general guideline of the poli-
cies to be followed by the Agricultural Public Sector. Actually, the
plan did not change the programs already being implemented by those agen-
cies; instead, it facilitated implementation by making them compatible
with each other, and with the general objectives and polices of the agri-
cultural sector. For this purpose, members of the technical staff of
those agencies were called on to collaborate in the respective sections
of the plan. (ODEPA, 1970, pp.VI & VII)
In fact, the plan adopted the programs of CORFO and its subsidiaries
in fruits, sugar beet, dairy cattle, and agricultural machinery imports
and services, with little or no modification. It also supported the in-
vestment programs of CORFO and ECA in slaughterhouses, warehouses, silos,
and other facilities for storing, marketing and processing agricultural
products. (pp.101-10 6 )
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Neither additions to the plan changed the irrigation projects under
construction or programmed by the Ministry of Public Works (MOP). But
MOP was not easily convinced that its Irrigation Division had to be in-
cluded in the Agricultural Public Sector. Only after long and difficult
negotiations did MOP accept that this division was an autonomous state
enterprise still under its authority but represented by the Ministry of
Agriculture on the directive board. (pp.66-67 & 120)
The Agricultural Commercial Enterprise (ECA) had been the target of
strong public criticisms because of the assumed lack of programming of
its operations. Varied useless and damaging claims had been made that
lack of opportunity and erroneous estimates about the needed volumes had
opened purchasing powers and fixed support prices and imports of agricul-
tural products by ECA. Because of this, ECA was willing to discharge part
of its responsibility by following the general policies of the plan re-
garding the annual program of imports, seasonal opening of purchasing
powers, fixing of support prices, and regional priorities for internal
productions established by ODEPA. (pp.135-141)
The plan detected that there was poor coordination between the dif-
ferent State agencies that provided credit to agricultural producers. It
proposed the gradual concentration of agricultural credit operations in
the State Bank and the coordination of credit policy through the creation
of the National Agricultural Credit Board. The Board was chaired by the
Minister of Agriculture and integrated by the chief executives of the Cen-
tral Bank, BECH, CORFO, CORA, INDAP, and SAG. The executive secretariat
was ODEPA. (pp.120 & 169) The plan also expanded the role of BECH to in-
clude distributing seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, which was well re-
ceived by the bank.
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But ODEPA had great difficulties each year in achieving acceptance
of the proposed policy on agricultural prices from the Ministry of Econo-
my. The plan conceived the price policy as an instrumental incentive to
guide production toward the desired goals, while the Ministry of Economy
was more interested in reducing the impact of inflation on the urban popu-
lation. Most agricultural prices were submitted to some kind of regula-
tion, either as maximum prices to the consumer or as minimum prices for
the producer, or both. Therefore, the implementation of the policy of the
plan required complex and laborious yearly negotiations between ODEPA and
DIRINGO, the agency of the Ministry of Economy in charge of price controls.
These negotiations often resulted in delays in publishing official prices,
making them irrelevant to the agricultural season. They also produced
short-term confusing trends which obscured the long-term objectives of
the plan. In fact, the plan postulated an increase of prices to the pro-
ducer of 5% in 1975 and 6% in 1980 in real terms (discounted inflation
and the changes in productive costs) over the level of prices of 1966.
But the agricultural prices for 1967 were 5% lower than the 1966 prices
in real terms. (pp.128-131)
With the technical assistance of ILPES's international expert, Jose
M. Gimeno, ODEPA made an in-depth study of the taxes imposed on agricul-
tural producers, and Law 16,640 gave the Ministry of Agriculture the man-
date to design a general taxation policy for the agricultural sector. In
response to it, the plan contained a taxation policy directed to three ob-
jectives: 1) to increase the fiscal revenues generated by the agricultural
sector; 2) to serve as an instrument of re-distribution of rural income;
and 3) to serve as a tool for economic development. But the Ministry of
Finances delayed the acceptance of such a policy until its own agencies
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could complete the study of a general tax reform in which they were en-
gaged. Since this last project was never completed or approved, the agri-
cultural taxation proposals were never implemented. (pp.143-153)
The detailed analysis of the actions of planners in MINVU and in the
agricultural sector presented above is a good example of the role of the
planning system during the Frei Administration, and of the difficulties
encountered by the planning offices within the old bureaucracy of the
State. Even where planning was well established, as in the cases examined
before, the response of the old agencies was uneven, at best, and negative
many times. The planning system was far from being well established in
all its components. Most of the sectorial offices were less developed
than ODEPA or CORFO and there were important gaps in the system. In fact,
in spite of the high importance of the mining sector for the Chilean eco-
nomy, there was no planning office at the Ministry of Mines or in any
other place which could serve for it. On the other hand, only three of
the ORPLANs -- those of Bio-Bio, Arica and Magallanes -- were really ful-
filling their role. The rest were "little more than decorative elements".
(Friedmann, 1969, p.42)
Moreover, in 1967, when the planning system had achieved institution-
al stability and was beginning to exert influence on the operations and
policies of the State, the Frei Administration changed its general direc-
tion. (Sigmund, 1977, Ch.4; Stallings, 1978, p.108)
4. The Final Years and the Performance of the Frei Administration, and
Planning.
1967 marked the end of both the "Revolution of Liberty" and Frei's
attempt to maintain the State in a "neutral" position over the class
struggle. (Stallings, 1978, p.108; Sigmund, 1977, pp. 5 7 & ff.)
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The same programs being implemented in the early years of the Frei
government produced a realignment of the political and social forces op-
posed to the administration, and new class alliances emerged.
The Liberal and Conservative Parties, badly defeated in the Congres-
sional elections of 1965, decided to join forces in 1966, forming the new
National Party. At the same time, together with SOFOFA and SNA, they
were trying to reinforce the National Confederacy of Industry and Commerce
under the symbolic leadership of Jorge Alessandri. They exerted strong
pressure in an attempt to stop, and then to reduce the impact of the
Constitutional Amendment on Property Rights. (Kaufman, 1972, pp.147-1
4 9 ;
Sigmund, 1977, p.17; Stallings, 1978, pp.102, 1 12 )
On the other side of the political spectrum, the Radical Party was
looking for a new alliance with the Left. In December of 1966, they sup-
ported the election of Salvador Allende as President of the Senate, and
in July of 1967, elected a new Directive with a platform of opposition
to the Christian Democrats and to the National Party and working in favor
of the "unity of all the forces of the Left". (Sigmund, 1977, pp.60-61;
Stallings, 1978, p.12 2 )
Apart from the pressures of Left and Right, three basic factors in-
fluenced the change in policy of the Frei Administration: the changes in
the Alliance for Progress and in the Latin American Policy of the U.S.;
the contradictions within the ideology and program of the Frei Administra-
tion; and the conflict inside the Christian Democratic Party.
After the death of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, both the structure
of the Alliance for Progress and the commitment of the U.S. to its objec-
tives and philosophy were still too weak to survive the change in the
U.S. government. President Johnson appointed Thomas Mann, former high
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officer of the State Department under Eisenhower, and Ambassador to
Mexico under Kennedy, to be in charge of the joint operations of AID
and the State Department in Latin America. With him a new approach
known as the "Mann Doctrine" was taken by the U.S. government in the re-
lations with Latin American countries. This pragmatic doctrine was
strongly favorable to private business, and had a clear preference for
economic growth over social reform. It also discarded the priveleged
treatment, previously given, to democratic regimes (such as the Chilean
one) over miliatry dictatorships. Now the U.S. government was indiffer-
ent to the nature of the political regime so long as it was not Commu-
nistic. (Levinson, 1970, p.88) The Committee of Nine was first dupli-
cated and then replaced by CIAP (Comite Interamericano de la Alianza para
el Progreso), an agency subordinated to the Economic and Social Council
of OAS. In lieu of the emphasis of the Committee of Nine on long-term
planning and social reform, CIAP established an annual review of the eco-
nomy and policies of each country. The CIAP report was discussed in a
meeting in Washington which required the attendance of high officers of
the country (generally one Minister) and representatives of AID and all
the international agencies of financial assistance. (Perloff, 1969, pp.
38-41)
The programs of the Frei Administration "were, in essence, a speci-
fic embodiment of the broad Alliance for Progress principles". (Perloff,
1969, p.228) In addition, Ralph Dungan, the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago,
made public his support of the Christian Democratic government. (Sigmund,
1977, p.40)
However, in 1966 the Mann Doctrine was reinforced by the appointment
of Lincoln Gordon as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Af-
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fairs. Gordon, as Ambassador to Brasil in 1964, had been instrumental
in providing support to the military coup to overthrow President Goulart,
and to the military dictatorship afterwards. The Brasilian military, in
turn, had been supportive of the United States' 1965 intervention in the
Dominican Republic, which had been denounced by Chile as contrary to the
OAS Charter. (Levinson, 1970, pp.90, 95-97; Sigmund, 1977, p.41)
In June of 1966, Senator Ernst Gruening presented a report to the
Sub-Committee of Foreign Aid of the U.S. Senate on Government Operations.
The report, "United States Foreign Aid in Action: A Case Study", used the
case of Chile to make a critical analysis of the Alliance for Progress.
As J.P. Morray notes, "the Senator's report is full of annoyance with the
Chileans and also with American aid officials who have failed to give to
the Chileans detailed and continuous supervision". (in Petras, ed., 1968,
p.101) In fact, Senator Gruening's report states that "Chilean agencies
cannot be depended upon to exercise adequate control over the end use of
investments". (Report, p.68) In addition, in spite of receiving the
highest amount of aid per capita among the members of the Alliance for
Progress, and being one of the eight countries to receive more aid from
the U.S., the report points out that Chile had not given an adequate re-
sponse to all that aid. "Disappointingly, there is little to indicate
that U.S. assistance is having a meaningful impact upon Chilean economic
and social development." (Id., p.12 1)
It is not surprising that in September of 1966 the CIAP annual re-
port on Chile was pessamistic, expressing concern over the low rate of
private investment and the inflationary pressures created by government
deficits and wage increases. (Sigmund, 1977, p.57) At the same time, the
U.S. government reduced its direct assistance to the Chilean government
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and replaced it with credits for purchasing capital goods in the United
States through the Export-Import Bank. (See Table 4.b)
The change in the policy of the U.S. toward Latin America was made
more specific still in the case of Chile when Ambassador Dungan resigned
in 1967, and was replaced by Edward Korry. Having been a Kenndy man,
Dungan openly supported the Christian Democratic administration and was
attacked by the Right for doing so. (Sigmund, 1977, p.40) Korry followed
the Gruening report and the CIAP analysis, and adopted a much harder po-
sition in relation to the Frei Administration, while trying to establish
better relations with the oligarchy and with the military, as alternative
forces which could stop the advance of the Left. (Uribe, 1975, pp,36, 65,
& 82-85)
Frei himself made a strong criticism of the new U.S. policy in his
essay, "The Alliance That Lost Its Way", published in Foreign Affairs,
in April, 1967. In his essay, Frei denounced the "unholy alliance of
the extreme right and left formed to prevent the implementation of the
Charter of Punta del Este." He also deplored that the United States "fell
into the trap" prepared by Latin American reactionaries to destroy the
true meaning of the national effort to accomplish the
tasks of the Alliance, and to make it a label for all
forms of aid.
He wrote,
Uncoordinated emergency loans became "Alliance loans";
technical and financial aid freely given to dictator-
ships was also "Alliance aid". The Alliance, in fact,
became just one more source of assistance instead of a
concerted program of mutual cooperation ... its ideolo-
gical significance was completely lost.
(The essay was reproduced in Horowitz,
ed., 1969, pp.457- 4 6 8 )
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Gabriel Valdes, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Frei AdMini-
stration, tried to engineer a progressive Latin American response to the
U.S. policy. He pushed for regional economic integration in the "Andean
Pact" (Cartagena Treaty of 1968), and for building an independent Latin
American position in the "Consensus of Vina del Mar" (1969). This was a
document which emerged from a meeting of Latin American foreign ministers
to set the "new basis for social and economic Inter-American cooperation"
from which the U.S. was pointedly excluded. (Sigmund, 1977, p.81)
But these were long-term measures with mostly symbolic value, since
they were to have practical results after the presidential period of Frei.
The Frei Administration was too dependent on the U.S. in financial matters,
As Harvey Perloff wrote,
There is little doubt that the external financial support
provided by the U.S. government and the international
lending agencies was very important in permitting Chile
to move ahead with some assurance in its large program
of investments, its stabilization policy, and its efforts
to promote social progress ... it is hard to emerge from
a close examiniation of the Chilean situation without
concluding that the Chilean "revolution" would be in
very bad trouble without substantial external financial
assistance.
(Perloff, 1969, p.237)
The Minister of Finances, Sergio Molina, presented the 1967 budget,
which represented a reduction in public expenditures, to Congress after
the 1966 CIAP meeting. In the customary "State of the Public Finance"
address to Congress, in November, Molina used the same analysis as in the
CIAP report to justify a basic change in economic policy. He mentioned
the inflationary pressures resulting from budget deficits and wage in-
creases, and the corrective measures to be taken -- a slowdown in mone-
tary expansion, and a shift in public investment from housing construc-
tion and social services to long-term ventures in productive activities
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such as copper, paper, cellulose, and petrochemical production. (Stallings,
1978, p.108)
However, the regrouping of the internal opposition and the external
pressures we're probably not enough to cause such a drastic policy change.
Actually, the Frei platform had made the claim that there is a basic com-
patibility between social justice and economic growth, that the dilemma
sustained by the Klein-Sacks Mission, by the IMF and by the Alessandri
Administration, between monetary stability and social progress, was a
false dilemma, that structural social reforms are a necessary condition
for economic development. (Stallings, 1978, p.7 1 )
But in practice, the Frei Administration had been short on the revo-
lutionary language of Frei and his platform. He put among the objectives
of the Alliance for Progress and the Latin American Revolution, "the par-
ticipation of people in government and the destruction of the oligar-
chies". (Frei, op.cit.)
However, the Christian Democratic conceDt of the State being "over"
the class struggle led the Frei Administration to adopt an attitude of
technocratic paternalism whereby low-income people were "helped from
above", but had very little opportunity to participate in the workings
of the government. (Feinberg, 1972, pp.67-68 )
Apart from the Agrarian Reform (which was supported by a sector of
the ruling class) no other component of the Frei program was directed to
the "destruction of the oligarchy". In spite of many speeches and pro-
jects, no big effort was deployed to achieve a "tax reform" or a "banking
reform". Actually, the way followed was one of policies which, by indi-
rect means, should produce structural changes in the long-term. Wage ad-
justments to re-distribute income and to increase demand; introduction of
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modern technology to increase productivity, and educationi reform to ex-
pand opportunities and to open education as a way for social mobility and
social progress were the main policies followed. They, together with the
agrarian reform and the Chileanization of copper, were expected to pro-
duce necessary, deep structural changes without disrupting production in
the short-term. (Stallings, 1978, pp.70-7 2 )
The ideological concept of marginality, used by the Christian Demo-
crats, contains the underlying assumption that marginal people are to be
incorporated into the social system as it is. The main effort of Popular
Promotion was to extend the already existing social institutions and ser-
vices to more people, not to create a new social system.
Moreover, the industrial development program of the Frei Administra-
tion was dependent on investments from the private sector, the established
ruling class, and foreign private investors. If the government, in view
of the changes in the Alliance for Progress, had decided to impose higher
taxes to the oligarchy to continue the programs of social reform, it would
have contradicted the main thrust of its industrial policy. (Stallings,
1978, p.65; Sigmund, 1977, pp.42-43)
The same contradictions between revolutionary rhetoric and conven-
tional policies were part of the increasing conflict within the Christian
Democratic Party, which weakened the political support of the Frei govern-
ment. In fact, the fast growth (from 4% of the popular vote in 1949 to
22% in 1963) and multiclass composition of the party formed a natural
base for conflicting ideological and political interests. (Gil, 1966, pp.
266-276; Stallings, 1978, pp.61-62) The apparent unity shown by PDC
since the first candidacy of Frei in 1958, began to disappear as soon as
the implementation of the 1964 platform was started.
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In the field of rural labor unions, the conflict mentioned extended
to the rest of the labor organizations when the Minister of Labor, William
Thayer, tried to promote the establishment of labor organizations, con-
trolled by Christian Democrats, parallel and rival to the existing labor
unions dominated by the Left. (Stallings, 1978, pp.102-103; Sigmund, 1977,
p.64)
The internal conflict gave shape to the discussion among the 1,540
delegates to the Second National Congress of the Party, which took place
on August 26-29, 1966. The National Congress was the supreme policy-
making body of PDC and defined issues of statutes and basic principles.
In it, three factions could be discerned. The left wing, or "Rebel" group,
rejected the submission of the party to Frei and criticized the admini-
stration's failure to fulfill the revolutionary objectives of the 1964
platform. The right wing, or "Officialist" group, argued for a categor-
ical support of Frei's government and the principle of unity of actions
between the party and the administration. In the middle, a third group,
"Terceristas", served as a mediator between the other two groups to pre-
serve the unity of the party. (Sigmund, 1977, p.53)
The Rebels represented many of the professionals working for the
government and had strong support within the machinery of the party,
especially the Labor Section and the Youth. They were mainly a group
of people who had entered politics after World War II and had a third
world perspective on development issues. By contrast, Frei and the Of-
ficialist group had started their political careers in between the two
World Wars, and because of their extended participation in the political
field, had acquired links with the ruling class. They also shared their
admiration for European models with the traditional politicians. (Kaufman,
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1972, pp.82-86; Stallings, 1978, pp. 61-6 2 & 109)
In the 1966 National Congress, the Officialists were able to get
approval for their policy position and elected Patricio Aylwin as presi-
dent of the party. But the elections for the National Council gave eight
members to the Rebels, nine to the Officialists, and two to the Tercer-
istas. This meant that Frei could be outvoted in the permanent directive
board of PDC. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.53-54)
When the change in the U.S. policy began to be felt, in the second
half of 1966, Frei was in a very difficult position. With a contradic-
tory program and promises difficult to fulfill, his major programs (cop-
per agreements, agrarian reform, and popular promotion) were still en-
tangled in Congress and his own party was weakened by internal conflict.
He was in no position to resist the recommendations of CIAP.
The change in economic policy, announced at the end of 1966, soon
had economic and political consequences. In economic terms, the change
led to a deep economic stagnation which made the record of Frei worse
than Alessandri's in economic development matters, as shown by the fol-
lowing table.
Table 4.c: CHILE: Economic Growth Indicators 1961-1970
(Annual rates of growth in percentages)
Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
GDP 6.2 5.0 4.7 4.2 5.0 7.0 2.3 2.9 3.1 2.5
GNP 6.1 5.4 4.2 4.6 6.1 9.2 0.8 3.5 5.1 2.5
GNP per
capita 3.6 2.4 2.1 1.6 2.4 4.6 0.0 0.6 0.7 1.0
(Source: ODEPLAN, Antecedentes sobre el Desarrollo Chileno 1961-70)
In political terms, the change in policy led to an increase in the
social tension and to a growing polarization of the Chilean population a-
long class lines. It led to a denial of the basic objectives of the Chris-
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tian Democratic program and ideology. The copper agreements and the
agrarian reform were finally approved by Congress early in 1967. In
January of that year, the Right and Left aligned in the Senate to reject
President Frei's request, according to the Constitution, to travel to
the United States by invitation of President Johnson. (Sigmund, 1977,
p.5 7 )
The Right and Left also capitalized on the increasing popular dis-
content with the Frei Administration. In the municipal elections of
April, 1967, the Christian Democrats dropped their percentage of the vote
from the 43% they had received in 1965 to 36%. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.5 8-59;
Stallings, 1978, p.108)
After the electoral defeat, the Christian Democratic Party tried to
revive the "revolution in liberty". A majority of Rebels and Tercerists
took control of the National Council of the party and voted to look for
an agreement with the Left to get prompt approval of the agrarian reform
law. A week later, the National Assembly appointed a Political-Technical
Committee, chaired by Jacques Chonchol, to design a new program for the
party which could return the government to the revolutionary track of the
early years of the Frei Administration. (Sigmund, 1977, p.59; Stallings,
1978, p.109)
The committee, integrated by a group of young planners and politici-
ans, prepared a report, entitled "Proposals for Political Action for a
Non-Capitalist Road to Development During the Period 1967-1979", which
was presented to the five hundred delegates to the National Assembly of
the party in July of 1967. The Assembly approved the report and elected
a National Council dominated by Rebels and Terceristas under the Presi-
dency of Senator Rafael Gumucio, one of the founders of the party and
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leader of the Rebel faction. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.62-63)
The new program of the party, generally known as "Plan Chonchol",
criticized the neo-liberal concept of development espoused by the Frei
Administration and the international experts as contrary to the Christian
Democratic principles. Jacques Chonchol later wrote that the simple mo-
dernization of the system without actual change would only insure the
priveleges of those in power. (Chonchol, in Burnell, ed., 1972, pp. 3 2 &
ff.) The report demanded recognition that the State was
the fundamental dynamic element in the economic develop-
ment of Chile, and requested effective control and use
of the instruments and mechanisms of the economic system.
Toward this end, the program demanded an increase of State control over
the copper mines, the nationalization of the coal and nitrate mines, State
acquisition of the privately held shares of CAP (the steel company), the
nationalization of the telephone company, and total control by the State
of the Central Bank. The program supported a banking reform project pre-
sented by the Youth of the Party, and renewed an old banner of the Chris-
tian Democrats, the participation of workers in the management of indus-
trial and commercial enterprises. This last was to be introduced gradu-
ally, beginning with the State owned enterprises. (Sigmund, 1977, p.62 ;
Stallings, 1978, p.10 9 ; W. Thayer, in Sigmund, ed., 1970, pp. 3 12-
313 )
The new executives of the party had a meeting with President Frei in
July of 1967, during which they presented the new program for a "Non-
Capitalistic Way of Development". They also requested Labor Minister
Thayer's resignation and an end to the efforts to create a labor organ-
ization parallel to the existing United Labor Central (CUT). Even though
some of the proposals of the program were later carried out or attempted
by the government (copper and telephone nationalizations, Central Bank
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control), in general, the president rejected the position of the party.
(Sigmund, 1977, p.64; Stallings, 1978, p.65)
The PDC new program was not made public by the Christian Democrats
to avoid an open conflict with the Frei Administration. But PEC, a CIA
financed magazine, obtained a copy, and published it on July 28, 1967.
(The CIA financing of PEC is docummented in the U.S. Senate report, "Co-
vert Action in Chile 1963-1973", pp.18 & 57) Frei responded by granting
an interview to El Mercurio on July 30, 1967. In his interview, Frei
searched for an understanding with the oligarchy and reasserted his call
to national and foreign private investors for further industrial invest-
ments. (El Mercurio, July 30, 1967)
In addition, some important members of the Officialist group criti-
cized the Plan Chonchol in public. The Minister of Finances, Sergio
Molina, said that it contained "a series of declarations on general po-
licy, but not coherent model", and he added that the techincal solutions
were "insufficient and superficial". (As quoted by Stallings, 1978, p.109)
Raul Sawz, the chief of CORFO and successor to Molina as the Minister of
Finances, qualified the program as "a complete and interesting study ...
for the moment impossible to apply". (As quoted by Sigmund, 1977, p.67)
William Thayer published a book in 1968 which rejected the concept of
workers' participation in the management of industrial State enterprises
as presented in the Christian Democrat program. Thayer sustained that
there was no way of insuring that the interest of the workers would al-
ways coincide with the requirements of the common good of the country.
He added that the idea may be well experimented in new enterprises owned
by the workers from the beginning as production cooperatives or similar
organizations. (W. Thayer, in Sigmund, ed., 1970, pp.312-313)
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This was the justification for a project of forced savings presented
by the Minister of Finances, Sergio Molina, in November of 1967. To re-
duce the inflationary pressures generated by wage increases, 5% of those
increases were to be sent to a "Workers Capitalization Fund". Employers
would match the savings of their employees. The fund would be managed by
representatives of the workers and of the State, and the money would be
destined to create new enterprises or to buy old ones, which would then
be property of the workers. The same project gave the workers a 20% in-
crease to compensate for previous years' inflation, but included a pro-
hibition of strikes and a suspension of collective bargaining rights dur-
ing 1968. (Stallings, 1978, p.110; Sigmund, 1977, p.65)
The issue of the "chiribonos", as the forced savings plan was called
by the Left, produced a new conflict between.the government and the labor
organizations that stimulated declaration of a general strike on November
23. The strike was successful and the country was paralized, but clashes
between the strikers and the police left four workers dead and sixty-four
injured. (Stallings, 1978, p.111)
The project of forced savings also increased the internal conflict
of the Christian Democrats. Edmundo Perez Zujovic, Minister of Public
Works and one of the personal links between Frei and the oligarchy, re-
quested, in public, that the party ask for the resignation of Pedro
Felipe Ramirez, the young engineer who was chief executive of the Service
of Technical Assistance, because he had criticized the "chiribonos". The
National Council of PDC rejected the request of Perez Zujovic and called
on him to defend his own conduct. This issue produced a split between
the Rebels and the Terceristas. Frei used the opportunity to call an ex-
traordinary session of the National Assembly of the party on January 6 and
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7, 1968. In the assembly, Frei gained the support of the Terceristas to
obtain control of the party, and a new National Council was elected under
the presidency of Jaime Castillo, a personal friend of Frei and ideolo-
gist of the Officialist faction. (Sigmund, 1977, p.66; Stallings, 1978,
p.113)
Frei then reinforced his administration's turn to the right by ap-
pointing the industrialist, Perez Zujovic, as Minister of Interior, in
control of the police and the public order. Later, when it became clear
that the Senate was going to reject the project of forced savings, the
bill was retired from Congress and Sergio Molina resigned as Minister of
Finances. Frei made use of this circumstance to also accept the resign-
ation of the Minister of Labor, William Thayer, as a concilatory gesture
toward his opponents in the party. However, to replace Molina, he first
appointed Raul Saez and then appointed Andres Zaldivar, both of whom had
strong links with the oligarchy. (Stallings, 1978, p.114; Sigmund, 1977,
pp.66-67)
After the failure of the forced savings project, the Frei Administra-
tion presented only two other important projects -- the so-called agreed
upon nationalization of the copper mines owned by Anaconda (June, 1969),
and the reforms to the Constitution which created the Constitutional Tri-
bunal to decide on the constitutionality of laws and decrees, and was al-
lowed to call a plesbicite in case of conflict between the President and
Congress (1970). These constitutional reforms were supported by the Right
after their electoral growth and public opinion polls appeared to favor
the return of Jorge Alessandri to the presidency in 1970. (Sigmund, 1977,
pp.87-88)
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These projects had no impact on economic stagnation, increased un-
employment (from 4.7% in 1967 to 6.0% in 1970), or growing inflation
rates (from 17% in 1966 to 35% in 1970). (ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 73;
Stallings, 1978, Table A.6)
Actually, all the programs of the Frei Administration fell short of
the goals postulated at the beginning. As a result, the last years of
the period were marked by increased social polarization and tension along
class lines.
The agrarian reform had promised to make 100,000 new farm owners, but
the actual number in 1970 was only 28,000. (Edwards, 1972, p.50; Petras,
1971, pp.242-245)
The housing program had promised 360,000 new houses, but only 250,000
had been completed in 1970. The program had been changed to provide
180,000 more "solutions" through the sites and services approach. (Edwards,
1972, p.50; Van Huyck, 1971, p.32)
The copper output was to increase by 90% between 1964 and 1970, but
the actual increase was only 10% due to the delays suffered by the copper
agreements in Congress. (Edwards, 1972, p.50; Perloff, 1969, p.232)
After two years of real increases in wages and salaries in 1965 and
1966, the re-distribution of income stopped. Even though the salaries of
agricultural workers were equalized with those of industrial blue collar
workers, the distance between these and the white collar workers actually
increased. In fact, white collar employees received better treatment
than the other workers from the Frei Administration. (ODEPLAN, 1971,
Table 30; Stallings, 1978, pp.216-217)
In accordance with the Christian Democratic ideology and the Frei
platform, the government favored grass-roots organizations of every kind.
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Labor unions of rural workers, which in 1964 had 2,000 members, had more
than 125,000 members in 1970. Industrial organizations that had 270,000
members in 1964 reached 553,000 in 1970, while popular promotion meant
the creation of many neighborhood councils, mothers' centers, and cooper-
atives. But these organizations were given restricted participation in
local issues, while they were excluded from national or regional decision-
making mechanisms. The Frei Administration appeared satisfied to maintain
political participation at the symbolic level of the electoral process.
Neither labor unions nor neighborhood councils were called on or admitted
to participate in the deliberations related to the design of policies ef-
fecting them, and the peasants were not included in the process of decid-
ing about expropriations for tbe agrarian reform. (Cusack, 1977, pp.21-23;
Petras, 1971, p.245; Friedmann, 1969, p.166; Stallings, 1978, pp.102-103)
In the absence of active participation in decision-making, the flour-
ishing of grass-roots organizations produced an increasing number of con-
flicts in all sectors. The number of strikes, which under Alessandri to-
taled less than 500 in any given year, reached more than 1,000 in 1966,
and as high a number in every succeeding year of the Frei presidency.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.61)
The peasants, frustrated with the slow pace of the agrarian reform
process, tried to push it through direct action, as the following table
shows:
Table 4.d: CHILE: Latifundio Occupations by Peasants







(Source: ICIRA, Barraclough, 1974, p.196)
On their side, the opponents of the agrarian reform increased their
violence from clashes with peasants to harassment of CORA and INDAP of-
ficers and murder of a regional chief of CORA, Hernan Mery, in the act
of the formal expropriation of a latifundio. (Feinberg, 1972, p.83;
Sigmund, 1977, p.98)
In the housing sector, even though the sites and services program
gave a solution to 181,000 families in addition to the dwelling units al-
ready mentioned, this was still short of the needs. The Left was able to
organize "houseless committees" (comites de los sin casa) that pressed
the government for a solution, and to organize "invasions" of vacant lots
to build self-made dwelling units. (Stallings, 1978, p.115) In one of
these land occupations in the southern city of Puerto Montt, the police
were sent to dislodge ninety-one families. They opened fire and killed
nine of the squatters in March of 1969. (Stallings, 1978, p.1 1 4 , Sigmund,
1977, p.77)
In the SABA incident of January, 1968, the workers took over the
factory during a strike after the owners threatened to take the machinery
out to install the plant in another place. The police were sent in to
evict the workers, and in the struggle, a small fire started in the fac-
tory. Twenty-eight workers were jailed and given tough sentences, but
the SABA case was followed by four similar cases in 1968, and by 24 occu-
pations of industries in 1969. (Stallings, 1978, pp.115-11 8 )
But the social tension was not restricted to these clear examples
of class conflict. In 1965, a group of University of Concepcion students,
under the leadership of Miguel Henriquez, a member of a well-known family
of Concepcion, organized MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left). MIR
rejected the electoral way and sustained the necessity of armed struggle
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for the revolution. It criticized the position of the Communist Party
and of the traditional Chilean Left, and engaged in organizing peasants
and urban dwellers to exert pressure on the system through acts of de-
fiance of the "bourgeois legality". In 1967, MIR appeared in Santiago
to "expropriate" some banks to finance their activities, and to steal
arms from the police. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.69-70; Stallings, 1978, p.114 )
Also in mid-1967, the Student Federation of Catholic University de-
cided to occupy the buildings of the University to press for a long-over-
due reform which no rational argument had made possible until then. The
President of the Federation, Miguel Angel Solar, was a member of the Rebel
faction of PDC. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.61-6 2 )
The movement of the students at Catholic University had national con-
sequences.
On one hand, it started a series of other movements which began at
the School of Education (Pedagogico) of Universidad de Chile, the same
year, and extended to all other colleges and universities in the country
during the next two years, leading to a general university reform. (Sigmund,
1977, p.61; Bonilla & Glazer, 1970, pp.302 & ff.)
On the other hand, the movement at Catholic University affected im-
portant elements of the traditional social structure. Catholic University
was more a symbol of the linkage between the oligarchy and the professions
than any other university in Chile. As a private college of restricted
admission, its student body was comprised mainly of the graduates from
private high schools. At the same time it constituted an important rela-
tionship between the Catholic Church and the ruling class. (Gil, 1966,
p.273)
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The buildings occupied included the studios and transmitter of the
TV Channel of the university, one of the three existing in Santiago,
The students allowed the TV Channel to work as usual, but made use of the
newscasts to explain their own position. Thus, they were able to discre-
dit the attacks of the rightist press, especially El Mercurio, the most
important publicity organ of the oligarchy. El Mercurio based it influ-
ence on the assumed "objectivity" of its information and its respect for
the truth. The students hung a banner in front of the university facing
Santiago's main avenue. The banner read, "El Mercurio miente" (El Mercurio
lies), and were able to demonstrate that the periodical carried false
stories with political purposes in two interviews. (Feinberg, 1972, p.92)
In March of 1968, Raul Saez, as Minister of Finance, presented a new
project on wage adjustment to replace the project presented by Sergio
Molina that had been rejected by Congress. Along with the new project,
Saez tried to reduce public expenditures further and cut the budgest of
CORA and INDAP by 25%. The peasants' department of PDC qualified this
as "freezing the agrarian reform", and the Rebel faction denounced it as
a betrayal of the electoral promises of Frei. Finally, Saez was led to
resign after only three months on the job. The cuts were reduced, and
CORA officers were sent to Washington to negotiate a loan of $20 million
to finance the continuance of the agrarian reform porcess. (Kaufman, 1972,
pp.239-242)
However, the cuts were felt with more intensity in INDAP, and in
November of 1968, Jacques Chonchol resigned as Chief of INDAP with a long
letter to President Frei. The letter had good words for the. Minister of
Agriculture Hugo Trivelli, but criticized the slow progress of the agra-
rian reform, as well as the obstacles placed in his own work path by
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other members of the government, in a clear allusion to the conflict
that had developed between him and Perez Zujovic. (Sigmund, 1977, p.72;
Kaufman, 1972, p.102)
In March of 1969, the congressional elections marked the further
descent of the Christian Democrats and polarization of the political
forces toward Left and Right, following social class. PDC attained only
29.8% of the vote (down from 36% in 1967 and 43% in 1965) while the
Right won in the high-income districts and the Left in the blue collar
neighborhoods. (Sigmund, 1977, p.74; Stallings, 1978, Table A.1)
Shortly after the elections, the Christian Democratic Youth attacked
Perez Zujovic as responsible for the "Puerto Montt Massacre" but the
National Council of the party defended the Minister. (Sigmund, 1977, p.78)
The internal division of the Christian Democrats reached its climax
in the meeting of the National Assembly of the party which took place on
May 1. The meeting had been called to decide on the strategy to be fol-
lowed by the party for the next presidential elections. The Officialist
faction was willing to enter in a combination with the Right to repeat the
situation of 1964. But the National Party, encouraged by the electoral
results of March and public opinion polls, was convinced that Alessandri
could repeat his triumph of 1958 with three candidates. (Sigmund, 1977,
p.74 )
The Terceristas were able to convince the Officialists that the only
candidate able to maintain the unity of the party was Radomir Tomic, the
former Ambassador to Washington, who was considered as the natural suc-
cessor to Frei. Local caucuses had made known their position as "a Tomic
candidacy or nothing".
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Tomic held a critical position in relation to the Frei Administration
akin to that of the Rebels. He was in favor of a coalition with the Left
which he called "popular unity". (Feinberg, 1972, p.97)
However, weakened as PDC had turned out to be in the March elections,
it was still too big to be a comfortable partner in any kind of coalition.
The Christian Democrats were in the position of being the dominant force
in a combination of parties and the Communists and Socialists were not
willing to repeat the bad experiences of the past, when the Left had sup-
ported presidential candidates of the Radical Party, Moreover, the Offi-
cialists refused to concede the authorization requested by Tomic to nego-
tiate an agreement with the Left, and obtained, from the assembly, the
approval of their thesis by a vote of 233 votes against 215. The assem-
bly also elected a new National Council presided by Jaime Castillo, and
almost all members from the Officialist faction. (Sigmund, 1977, p.79)
On May 6, a group of the Rebel leaders headed by Senator Rafael
Gumucio resigned from the PDC with a letter stating
The most advanced current of Christian thought is no
longer picked up by us and in fact, rather than an in-
strument of revolutionary change, we are an instrument
of the status quo, an administrator of the system, guar-
antor of the established order.
(As quoted by Stallings, 1978, p.115)
Along with Gumucio, the Senator Alberto Jerez, the Deputy Julio Silva,
Jacques Chonchol, and many of the leaders of the youth, the peasants, and
the labor sections of the party also resigned. (Sigmund, 1977, p.79)
They were accompanied by a large segment of the Triunfo Campesino peasant
confederation and by many of the young professionals who, while working
in the government to implement the "revolution in liberty", had become
increasingly frustrated by the obstacles that the Frei Administration put
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in the way of the structural changes proclaimed as necessary at the be-
ginning. (Stallings, 1978, p.109)
The group that resigned from PDC formed a new political movement
named Movement for Unitary Political Action (MAPU), with Jacques Chonchol
as its first Secretary General. MAPU later joined the coalition that sup-
ported the candidacy of Salvador Allende for the presidential elections
of 1970. (Sigmund, 1977, p.79)
In 1968 and 1969, the military also participated in the general cli-
mate of social tension. Problems which were not made public in May of
1968, led to conversations between the Christian Democrats and the Commu-
nists, and to the appointment of General Tulio Marambio as Minister of
Defense (the only military in Frei's cabinet). (Sigmund, 1977, p.67) But
in October of 1969, the newspapers of the Right published a letter sent
by the officers of the Army's First Division in Antofagasta, asking for
the withdrawal of the calling to retirement of the Division's Chief,
General Roberto Viaux. While the government sequestered the periodicals
and initiated prosecution against them, Viaux moved to Santiago and set
up quarters in the Tacna Artillery Regiment. He was supported by the
Academy of War and other units and was surrounded by regiments called by
the government even though their loyalty was doubtful. But Viaux declared
that his was only a tactical move directed to achieve some "professional"
demands, the resignation of the Minister of Defense and of the Chief Com-
mander of the Army, an increase in the salaries for the military, and the
improvement of the military equipment. (Stallings, 1978, p.120; Rojas,
1976, pp.63-65)
Frei took control of all the means of communication and received sup-
port from all the political parties except the Socialists. The Central
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Labor Organization (CUT) called for a general strike and the occupation
of the factories "against the reactionary coup".
After negotiations which took almost two days, Viaux and the goyern-
ment reached an agreement. Viaux and the officers supporting him were
retired and submitted to military trial for insubordination, but General
Marambio, the Minister of Defense, and General Castillo, Chief Commander
of the Army, presented their resignations and a project was sent to Con-
gress to increase the salaries of the military. (Sigmund, 1977, p.87;
Stallings, 1978, p.121; Rojas, 1976, p.64-65)
The task of planners was extremely complex within this changing and
conflicting environment. Even where planning was well-established, it
was unable to solve the internal ideological and political contradictions
of the Frei Administration, and the planning system was far from being
well-established in all its components as it was seen before. As a con-
sequence, the planning offices were unable to free the State bureaucracy
from the ties it had with the dominant class, nor could they transform
the State into an instrument of socio-economic development placed above
the class struggle. In fact, at the end of the Frei Presidency, the plan-
ning system was a new center of decision-making within the State bureau-
cracy, but the old centers continued to work and were only partially sub-
ordinated to the new structure. In general, the impact of the Frei Admi-
nistration in the modernization of the Chilean State appeared at the end
to be much less important than the total reform introduced by Arturo
Alessandri in 1925 or the creation of CORFO by the Popular Front in 1939.
(See Chapter I)
However, the planning system introduced some measure of functional
rationality and coordination in the operations of the public administra-
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tion, and provided an important element of the characteristic style of
the Frei government. Coming after the inability of Ibanez to manage the
State machinery, and of the attempt of Alessandri to reduce and dismantle
it, the young professionals of the Frei team appeared to know how to make
it work, thanks to the techniques and information provided by the plan-
ning system.
In contrast to the empty, flourishing formal speeches of the tradi-
tional politicians, the Christian Democrats liked to give a didactic or
academic tone to their public speaking. For this purpose, the figures
and technical analyses provided by the planners became very useful. Actu-
ally, ODEPLAN (and through it the other planning offices) was put in charge
of preparing the annual "State of the Nation Message" which, according to
the Constitution, the President had to deliver in the opening session of
Congress each 21st of May. The Ministers followed the example of the
President by asking for technical support and information from their re-
spective planning office whenever they had to make a major speech in pub-
lic.
But in more substantive matters, the planning system was less effec-
tive. Actually, planners who had participated in the design of the basic
programs of the Frei Administration were many times deprived of partici-
pation in the implementation of the same programs. Jacques Chonchol, for
example, who had been the main force behind the agrarian reform program
within the PDC, and who was considered by many to be the ideal chief of
the Agrarian Reform Corporation or the Agricultural Planning Office, was
instead appointed Chief of INDAP where he had only indirect impact on the
agricultural policies of the administration. On the other hand, some of
the most important decisions of the Frei government were taken out of the
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planning system entirely. This was true in the case of the copper agree-
ments and subsequent organization of the copper mines, and also in the
case of the change of economic policy at the end of 1966 under the pres-
sure of CIAP and the international financing institutions. In fact, only
after the decision was made to reduce the programs of structural reform
and to return to conventional policies, ODEPLAN was put in charge of the
annual budgetary process and its coordination with long-term policies and
programs. (Ossa, 1974)
Even when the planners had an opportunity to intervene in major po-
licy decisions, their technically-based proposals were distorted either
by the internal conflicts of the administration or by the increasing po-
larization of the country. The examiniation of the practical impact of
the already analyzed cases of MINVU and ODEPA is a good example of these
distortions.
As it was seen before, in 1967, when the planners of MINVU realized
that the original goal of 60,000 housing units per year was out of reach,
they decided to give more emphasis to a sites and services program called
PAP. At the time, PAP was the largest program of its kind attempted in
the world and was reasonably successful, according to the international
standards for this kind of program. (Van Huyck, 1971, p.33) However, the
implementation of it, and the lack of coordination between MINVU and the
transportation planners of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) translated
into unexpected negative results which discredited the program from the
political point of view.
In fact, the program was subject to political attacks since the be-
ginning of its implementation because of its association with the turn to
the Right of the Frei Administration in 1967. In this sense, the program
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was considered a cheap substitute for unfulfilled campaign promises. In
addition, the policy of providing houses to the petty-hourgeoisie and
only sites to the workers was considered discriminatory by social class.
Still, given the lack of apparent alternative solutions, these criticisms
were valid.
But the negative aspects of the program were accentuated by the im-
pact it had on the shape and distribution of the larger cities. The ten-
dency to locate housing projects where cheap land was available, segre-
gated low-income neighborhoods to the outskirts of the cities. This was
reinforced when the program was used for political patronage purposes,
and to remove shanty towns from high-income neighborhoods, attending the
petitions of real estate speculators. The resultant "poverty belts" were
far from the urban opportunities in employment, health care and education
that their occupants had in their previous location. No new services
were providing opportunity, nor was the quantity of old services increased
as required, as it was shown in a study by CIDU. (Merrill, 1971, p.13 )
This situation was made worse by the lack of coordination between
the architects and urban planners of MINVU and the engineers and trans-
portation planners of MOP. While the planners in MINVU had progressive
ideas that were distorted during implementation, the engineers of MOP re-
sponded to the tendency of their Minister, Perez Zujovic. They were in-
terested in replicating the models developed in industrialized countries
in Chile, and in providing business to the private engineering firms with
which they had been traditionally related. The government, interested in
attracting foreign private industrial investments, accepted the expansion
of individual car production, with little emphasis on bus production. As
a result, Santiago and the other large cities began to suffer traffic con-
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gestion with individual cars. MOP engaged in the large and expensive
project of building a subway for Santiago, while the great mass of the
population had few and poor means of public transportation. In spite of
the efforts of the experts of URDAPIC, the coordination of the planners
of MINVU and MOP was still poor in 1969. (R. Gakenheimer in Friedmann,ed,,
1969, pp.161-1 6 3 ) While the sites and services program added 181,000
additional "housing solutions" to the primitive housing program, the
land invasions by the "Comites de los Sin Casa" grew in number in the
last years of the Frei Administration. (Merrill, 1971, p.13 ; Stallings,
1978, p.115)
Published in the midst of the changing and conflicting environment
provided by the agrarian reform, the "Agricultural Development Plan 1965-
1980" appeared mostly irrelevant to the actors involved in the struggle.
Actually, the whole concept of "indicative" planning had little pro-
bability of being successful in this environment, and the technical ap-
proach of the plan was a mistake. In fact, the behavioral analysis of
agricultural producers during the previous thirty years had not predic-
tive value at all in the new conditions created by the structural reform
being carried out.
But even the interpretation of the historical behavior of agricul-
tural producers was difficult. For example, the analysis of the plan
showed a historical inverse relation between prices and production; a
high level of prices corresponded to a high rate of growth of agricultural
production. (ODEPA, 1970, pp.14-15) Apparently, when prices were high,
the owners of large farms cultivated a smaller section of their land to
reduce costs, but when prices were low, they extended the cultivated area
to compensate for the lower return by hectare. In these conditions the
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response of the producers to the manipulation of prices was very diffi-
cult to predict, more so if the producers were affected by the agrarian
reform. However, the plan attempted to use an increase of agricultural
prices in real terms as an incentive for higher production, (pp.1 2 8 & ff,)
This purpose was further obstructed by the confusing signals sent to the
producers as a result of the conflicting policies of the Ministry of Eco-
nomy in matter of prices. While the plan postulated a 5% rise of agri-
cultural prices for 1971, the prices of 1967 were 5% lower than those of
1966 in real terms. (ODEPA, 1970, Table 74, p.13 1)
It could not be expected that agricultural producers would be stimu-
lated to increase production and productivity with such contradictory of-
ficial price policies. In fact, in early 1969, a newly organized confed-
eration of small farmers blocked the main highways and assembled in front
of government offices to protest the "political" fixing of the price of
wheat. (Cusack, 1977, p.27)
In practice, more effective in increasing agricultural production,
was the impact of the increased taxation resulting from the agrarian re-
form. In fact, until 1964 agricultural taxation was maintained very low,
especially because the assessment of land for real estate taxes was far
below the commercial value of the land. Law 16,640 fixed the price of
expropriation by the tax assessment, and was preceded by a general re-
valuation which took place in 1965. As a consequence, agricultural
taxes for 1965 were four times higher than those of 1964, and even they
were still low in comparison with taxation in other sectors. Many farmers
were forced to increase their production to pay for the new taxes. (ODEPA,
1970, p.143)
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But the technical weaknesses of the plan were openly manifested in
1968, when an exceptional drought in most of the country took the base
off the production projections contained in it. When the so-called
"eternal snows" of the Andes Mountains disappeared, the lack of water
forced many cattle farmers to sacrifice their herds, while others changed
the water-consuming, high priced crops favored by the plan to wheat and
other products that required less water. This meant the actual reduction
of meat and wheat imports for 1968 and 1969, and a change in the composi-
tion of crops and the basic numbers of cattle which had served for the
plan calculations. (Sigmund, 1977, p.64; ODEPA, 1970, p.XXX)
Thus, a combination of technical errors, natural phenomenon, foreign
pressures, and political and bureaucratic obstacles made the task of plan-
ners, during the Frei Administration, increasingly frustrating. After
1967, a growing tendency appeared within the administration to utilize
planning as a formalistic rationalization to explain failures and to
justify conservative policies.
In addition, the public acceptance of planning in the early sixties
changed, following a world trend of disenchantment with the possibilities
of change within the bounds of "functional rationality". Still, in 1965,
the participants in a seminar of ILPES could state that "planning is in
fashion in Latin America", (ILPES, 1966, p.5) But the student movements
of 1968 in all the world, and also in Chile, placed the honored nations
of neutrality and objectivity of science and technology in jeopardy. Po-
litical activists, at the end of the sixties, were suspicious of experts
and scientists who did not have a clear commitment to social ends, while
academicians and intellectuals were arguing about the diverse paradigms
for the analysis and interpretation of reality. The practical experience
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of the Frei Administration had shown that it is very easy to cross the
boundary between technical proficiency and unjustified arrogance, and
that technocratic elitism is not enough to move the country toward de-
velopment.
All this put planners in a much more uncertain position than the
one they had enjoyed in the early years of the decade. Now "functional
rationality" was legitimate only if at the service of socially-accepted
objectives shared by the planners themselves. "Objectivity" now meant
making explicit the implict assumptions of the conventional scientific
methods and techniques, and being aware that more than one paradigm could
be valid for the analysis and solution of the problems faced by the plan-
ners.
Planners responded to the emerging new situation in differenty ways.
Some of them took refuge in the technical quality of their work and de-
veloped sophisticated models in the hope that some could be convinced to
apply them by their intrinsic value. Others maintained their loyalty to
the administration and served as it demanded, providing technical backing
for policy decisions until the end of the Frei Presidency. Some of these
were also responsible for the radical platform of the Christian Democrat
candidate in the presidential elections of 1970. (Feinberg, 1972, pp.100-
102)
Even URDAPIC, the technical assistance program of the Ford Founda-
tion, published planning proposals for the future decade, directed to
fill the gaps and to increase the impact of the programs in which the
international experts had participated. (Friedmann, ed., 1969) Several
members of this group, who were senior officers of the planning offices,
went to work for international agencies or to work in Chilean universi-
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ties at the end of the Frei Administration.
But a third group of planners felt that they had an ethical commit-
ment to economic development and structural changes. Many of them ac-
companied the Christian Democrats who formed MAPU and entered into the
coalition which supported the candidacy of Allende in the elections of
1970. They provided continuity to the planning system in the next admi-
nistration and information to prepare the platform of the coalition.
Even though the planning system, as it was seen before, identified
with the administration and therefore could be partially responsible
for the accomplishments and failures of the Frei government, this group
of planners allowed planning to survive as a new professional element in-
corporated into the Chilean social system with a permanent social function.
Not only the legal statute of the planning offices made them lasting com-
ponents of the State bureaucracy, but the same personnel served under
them for two different political regimes.
However, the role of the planners, the concept of the planning func-
tion, and the results and consequences of planning were different under
the Allende Administration, as will be shown in the following chapter.
276
Chapter V
ALLENDE (1970-1973), CLASS STRUGGLE, DIRECTIVE-PARTICIPATORY PLANNING
AND COUNTER-PLANNING
Introduction
The period under analysis was one of increasing social tension in
Chile, culminating with the Allende Administration and the counter-revo-
lution that ended the democratic regime in 1973.
Preceding chapters have shown how the Alessandri and Frei governments
failed to fulfill their originally stated goals, and how this failure in-
creased the polarization of social forces and intensified the class strug-
gle.
According to the program of the Allende Administration (also known
as the U.P. Program) planning and popular participation were two basic
elements of the struggle "to end the domination of the imperialists, the
monopolies and the landed oligarchy, and to start the construction of
socialism in Chile". (From the U.P. Program, NACLA, 1972, pp. 1 30 & ff.)
Therefore, planning had a directive-participatory character, or, as the
U.P. Program put it, "an executive and democratic character", during the
Allende Administration.
The U.P. Program specified the goals of the Allende government, which
included the accelerated completion of the agrarian reform; the national-
ization of the copper, nitrate, and coal mines; and the creation of the
"Social Area" of the economy by transfering the control of the major in-
dustries, private banks, and large distributing firms to the State, and
starting a new organization of production through coordinating the ac-
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tions of the State with the participation of workers in a planned system
which would constitute an embryo of socialism.
The Allende Administration found the national system of planning,
organized by the Frei government, within the Executive, and most of the
professionals still working, even though the office chiefs left with the
departing administration.
The implementation of the U.P. Program implied a change and expansion
in the role of planners. On one hand, the nationalizations and the re-
sultant organization of the Area of Social Ownership required a modifi-
cation and adaptation of the State bureaucracy. Planners were called to
design the new structure and functions of the State agencies and to for-
mulate the operational program for their administration of the Social
Area. This put Chilean planners in a similar position to that of cor-
porate planners working for a large conglomerate.
On the other hand, the planners were also in charge of designing and
operating the mechanisms through which the organized workers could parti-
cipate in the policy making and operational programming of the Social
Area since, as Allende explained, "It is up to the State to orientate,
organize and direct, but in no way to replace the will of the workers."
(First Message to Congress, 1971)
These participation mechanisms were necessary to solve the potential
conflict between the official line of the government and the unleashed
initiatives of the workers released from the fear of government repres-
sion, and to create the new structure of production based on the agree-
ment between the workers and their government.
In addition to the obvious technical problems involved in such tasks,
there were other, not so evident, difficulties which gave the planner's
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role a particular political and social sensitivity. The leaders of the
Left were conscious about the scarcity of well-trained professionals wil-
ling to work for a genuine working class government. Therefore, planners
were given special consideration and achieved particular prominence dur-
ing the Allende Administration, to the point that several professionals
with training and experience in planning were appointed as Ministers.
However, the same quality of being well-trained professionals made
planners suspect of lack of true commitment to the revolutionary process,
of being mere technocrats in the eyes of the political activists of the
Left. In particular, this happened when planners made the existing con-
straints for the implementation of initiatives emerging from grass-roots
organizations explicit. Many innovations were produced by the working
class in the environment provided by the Allende government which actu-
ally encouraged them.
Thus, in practice, planning became the difficult art of balancing
and coordinating the working class's freedom of initiative in its multi-
ple expressions with the government's central purposes and long-term
perspective. Planning provided the instrument for integrating these
particular expressions into the coherent framework of the long-term ob-
jectives, reformulating these objectives if necessary.
The planning tasks were made more difficult by the coordinated
counter-planning and action of the opposition forces. The Chilean domi-
nant class controlled Congress and had the support of the Judiciary, the
Comptroller General, most of the Armed Forces officer corps, the organi-
zations of the petty-bourgeoisie such as truck owners and small store
owners, plus the U.S. government, and the multinational corporations that
had investments in Chile. The Chilean dominant class and its foreign al-
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lies realized that the success of the Allende Administration implied the
end of the traditional social system that had been built for their own
benefit. Together they first tried to impede the working class from
gaining access to the Executive control, and later used all means to
deviate or stop the Allende government from achieving its objectives,
With the planning of CIA "technical" assistance, they developed two
tracks of action.
They used their control of Congress, the Judiciary, and the Comptrol-
ler General to impose paralytic legal restrictions and controls on the ac-
tions of the Executive. They used their economic power in a series of
attempts to paralyze the economy of the country, and they employed their
publicity as a means of creating an image of incompetence and economic
chaos to discredit the Allende Administration.
Ever since the 1970 elections, they were conspiring to produce a
military coup. In their second plan of action, they carried out many
terrorist attacks, first to obstruct the access of Allende to the presi-
dency, and later to overthrow his government.
Despite all these obstacles and difficulties, the organizations of
workers and the State agencies of the Executive under the Allende Admi-
nistration were able to fulfill most of the stated goals of the U.P. Pro-
gram by completing the agrarian reform, nationalizing the copper, nitrate
and coal mines, and organizing the Area of Social Ownership, including
many large industries, almost all the private banks, and several large
distributing firms. They also started to organize a new structure of
production that encouraged active participation of workers in the deci-
sion-making of the Social Area.
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After the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies failed to
stop the Allende government and the progress of the working class through
the use of their political and economic power, the only resource left to
them was the military. But Allende was able to maintain constitutional
loyalty of a small but important group of officers. Because of this, the
military plot failed on three occasions. Only when the loyalist group of
officers was displaced or assasinated could the counter-revolution even-
tually succeed. The counter-revolution took place on September 11, 1973,
killing Allende and a great number of workers and destroying the demo-
cratic regime.
After the counter-revolution, a group of economists, known as the
"Chicago Boys" because of their training at the University of Chicago
and their fidelity to the ideas of Milton Friedmann and Arnold Harberger,
assumed the main policy-making positions in economic and social affairs.
Helped by the military repression of the working class, they destroyed
the Social Area of the economy and restored the control of the Chilean
oligarchy and the multinational corporations over the Chilean social
structure.
The planning system still formally exists, but it has been reduced
to little more than an information service which provides figures for
the propaganda of the dictatorship. Any attempt to make independent so-
cial or economic research, or even to use the same official figures to
criticize the government is repressed. Many Chilean planners (including
this writer) were forced to emigrate, and those remaining in the country
have difficulties finding work because the military regime ia hard on any
manifestation of independent thinking.
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1. The 1970 Election and the Setting of the Struggle.
To the casual observer, the electoral campaign for the presidential
elections of 1970 could appear as a repetition of the 1958 campaign. The
same three parties -- the Right, the Left, and the Christian Democrats --
two of the same candidates -- Salvador Allende and Jorge Alessandri, and
platforms which expanded the same basic positions of the participant
forces.
However, there were some fundamental differences between the two
elections and the conditions in which the campaign took place had changed
drastically since the previous occasion.
Both the Right and the Christian Democrats had already enjoyed the
opportunity to apply their ideas in practice; and they had failed. This
failure had resulted in economic stagnation and social tension. This was
reflected by the growing number of labor conflicts, the occupations of
lands by peasants, the formation of extremist armed groups of Right and
Left who carried out terrorist actions, and the rebellion of the military
in the "Tacnazo" of October, 1969. (See Chapter IV)
The Left had continued to grow in the electorate and appeared the
big winner of the 1969 congressional elections. In addition, the inter-
nal contradictions of the two large political parties of the Centre --
Radicals and PDC -- in 1969, led to the division of both in Left-leaning
and Right-leaning factions which split to join other forces. In the case
of the Radical Party, the Leftist faction took control of the party and
expelled the leaders of the right wing who formed a coalition with the
Right. In the Christian Democratic case, it was the left wing which split
to enter the coalition of the Left.
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There were also some important changes in the international scene
which had an impact on Chile. In the United States, the liberal rhetoric
of the Alliance for Progress had been replaced by the "realpolitik" of
Nixon and Kissinger. The strategy of pushing for structural reforms
had been abandoned in favor of a new support of the Latin American status
quo and the military dictatorships which helped to maintain it under the
doctrine of "national security".
By contrast, the Catholic Church, after the Second Vatican Council,
was postulating a new position, separate from its traditional ties with
the dominant class. In the 1968 Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM)
in Medellin, Colombia, the Church officially denounced the "extreme in-
equality among social classes", and decided that the place of the Church
was to follow the Gospel and side with the poor. (Document on Peace)
The Medellin Conference also developed two theses which had very im-
portant consequences on Latin American politics ever since.
1) Not only individual human beings may generate injustice, social
structures may also generate and maintain injustice, "oppressive struc-
tures which emerge out of the abuse of having, of the abuse of power, of
exploiting the workers, of unjust dealings..." (Document on Justice)
2) Oppressive and unjust social structures constitute "institutional
violence". Revolutionary violence is only a second moment, a response to
institutional violence. Thus, to achieve peace and justice, it is neces-
sary to make urgent, comprehensive and deep changes in the social struc-
ture of Latin American countries. (Document on Peace)
These two theses generated a strong interest for the new "theology
of liberation" and, in practical terms, changed the political situation
of the Christian Left. Until then, Christian leftists were directed by
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the Church to generate alternative movements and programs to those spon-
sored by Marxists, and the Right was able to neutralize them by appealing
to the strong anti-communist stance of the Catholic Church. Now the
Medellin Conference appeared to legitimize potential strategic alliances
between Christians and Marxists for common programs of social change.
(McGrath, 1973, pp.86-87)
The new position of the Church led the Christian Democrats in Chile
to abandon their efforts of organizing labor unions parallel to those con-
trolled by Socialists and Communists, and to integrate those labor unions
into the central organization (CUT). It also facilitated the participa-
tion of Catholics in the new coalition of the Left, organized in 1969.
(Stallings, 1978, p.115)
After the congressional elections of 1969, the political forces re-
grouped to prepare for the 1970 campaign.
Frei and his faction within the PDC, tried to reach an agreement
with the Right to repeat the situation of 1964 in a joint Christian Demo-
crat-Right candidacy against the Left. After their strong recovery in
the congressional elections and based on the results of some public opi-
nion polls, the politicians of the Right had reached the conclusion that
a new candidacy of Jorge Alessandri would be successful in a field of
three, and that since the Christian Democrats would be forced to vote
with the Right anyhow, no previous agreement was necessary. (Stallings,
1978, p.115)
On their side, the Rebel faction of PDC failed to convince the en-
tire party of the benefits of a coalition with the Left. They also were
not helped by the Left, which was openly reluctant to enter into an agree-
ment with the Christian Democrats for reasons similar to those of the
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Right. (Stallings, 1978, p.115; Sigmund, 1977, ;p.79)
In May, the Rebel faction of PDC split to organize their own move-
ment (MAPU). In June, the Radical Party decided to approach the Left,
elect a new Directive and expel its more conservative elements. In Sep-
tember, 1969, a "Popular Unity" Congress was called to design a platform
and to select the candidate of the Left for the elections of 1970,
(Roxborough, 1977, p.65; Sigmund, 1977, pp. 8 8-8 9 )
In the meantime, the Right had started their campaign without a for-
mal declaration of candidacy but with the clear purpose of supporting
Jorge Alessandri. Public opinion polls pointed to him as the potential
winner in 1970, but the age and health of the former president were not
up to the requirements of a long campaign. However, the military revolt,
led by General Viaux in October of 1969, (Tacnazo) demonstrated that some
sectors of the Right favored a military coup, and Viaux appeared as a po-
tential substitute for Alessandri. This forced Alessandri to anticipate
the proclamation of his candidacy in November of 1969.
Making use of the most important means of mass communication con-
trolled by the dominant class, the campaign of Alessandri had been, un-
til then, a carefully paced and orchestrated campaign, based on the well-
known marketing techniques of appealing to the emotions of the public.
The basic theme of the campaign was order and security under the slogan,
"Alessandri is tranquility for tomorrow". The other candidates repre-
sented violence and chaos. Alessandri, in his propaganda, was "El Paleta",
a firm and solid man. This contrasted with the undecided and demagogic
Christian Democrats and the terror and violence of the Left. "Alessandri
will come back", said the publicity, and with him the country will return
to "normalcy" and peace. (Feinberg, 1972, p.83)
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The anticipated proclamation of Alessandri as a consequence of the
Tacnazo was disastrous for his campaign. It forced the ex-president to
expose his age and ill-health and demonstrated that the extreme Left did
not have a monopoly on political violence. This was the first presiden-
tial election in which television was a factor. Unfriendly cameramen
were able to show Alessandri as a very old man whose hands trembled at
the same time that he spoke about the necessity of a strong goyernment
for Chile. (Sigmund, 1977, p.102; Feinberg, 1972, p.82)
The image was further destroyed by the increasingly violent opposi-
tion of the Right to the agrarian reform. Armed "white guards" tried to
intimidate peasants and government officers and clashed with peasant or-
ganizations. One of these gangs, under the leadership of Gabriel Benavente,
a latifundio owner of the province of Linares, shot and wounded an INDAP
official, and later entered the local offices of the Agrarian Reform Cor-
poration (CORA) and killed the Regional Chief of CORA, Hernan Mery, while
Mery was proceeding to formally expropriate Benavente's estate. When the
killing of Mery was debated in Congress, Victor Carmine, a Deputy of the
National Party, shouted, "This is only the first death". He was expelled
from the National Party, but the Right's claim of being the lonely defen-
ders of law and order was discredited. (NACLA, 1972, p.68; Sigmund, 1977,
pp.9 8-99)
The Tacnazo also had the impact of unifying the Left by facing its
leaders with the actual possibility of a rightist military coup. Since
1964, Socialists and Communists had divided in matters of strategy. The
Communist Party sustained a "wide front" strategy. They wanted to ex-
pand the existing coalition of the Left (FRAP) to incorporate the "pro-
gressive elements" of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie, meaning
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Radicals and Christian Democrats. However, the Socialist Party rejected
this approach based on past experiences and repeated a popular saying,
"the Left wins the elections and the Right wins the government". They
considered that an alliance with the Radicals or Christian Democrats
would be for the benefit of the dominant class, not the workers. (Sigmund,
1977, pp.71-72; Roxborough, 1977, pp.63-64)
Moreover, a growing segment inside the Socialist Party was rejecting
the possibility of real social change through the electoral process. A
group of these Socialists left the party in 1965 to form the Revolution-
ary Left Movement (MIR) which sustained the inevitability of armed strug-
gle for the revolution.
In 1967, the most radical faction within the Socialist Party took
control of the party under the leadership of Carlos Altamirano, but they
could not stand the combined pressures of the "anti-dogmatic" elements
inside the party, led by Salvador Allende, and the Communist Party on
the outside, so acceded to participate in the Popular Unity Congress of
September, 1969.
Carlos Altamirano, himself, was able to evaluate the danger of a
military coup through a personal interview with General Viaux during his
rebellion in the Tacna quarters. After that interview, the radical fac-
tion of the Socialist Party was convinced that the conditions were not
favorable for a strategy of armed struggle and decided to support the
electoral way again. (Feinberg, 1972, pp.107-108 ; Stallings, 1978, p.120)
Apart from the Communists, Socialists, Radicals and MAPU, the Popu-
lar Unity Congress invited representatives from two small groupings of
former supporters of Ibaiez, the Independent Popular Action (API), led
by Senator Rafael Tarud who had good relations with the Arab community
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in Chile and with small store owners, particularly in provincial towns;
and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) of a similar base, (Roxborough,
1977, p.65; Sigmund, 1977, p.79)
The Popular Unity (UP) Congress debated three major issues; the or-
ganization of the UP coalition; the platform for the 1970 elections; and
the selection of the UP candidate for the elections.
In matters of organization, the collective character of the UP was
emphasized. The selected candidate would accept the platform and, if
elected, would serve as head of a multi-party government with a politcal
committee of the UP as consultant on government policy matters. To avoid
the formation of individual zones of influence by party, no single party
would have control of any particular branch or service of the public ad-
ministration. Ministries and high government positions would be assigned
according to a formula which would insure the participation of all the
parties in all the areas of government. For the campaign, Popular Unity
Committees (CUP) were established all over the country as seeds of more
permanent grass-roots organizations and as instruments for electoral pro-
paganda. (Roxborough, 1977, p.65; Feinberg, 1972, p.116)
After the agreement on the organizational scheme, and on a basic pro-
gram of government to be presented as platform for the electoral campaign,
the discussions extended for almost two months on the question of the can-
didate.
The Radical Party was uneasy because of its weak position in relation
to the two large working class parties, and tried to maintain the possi-
bility of a candidacy of someone other than a member of the Communist or
Socialist Parties. At the beginning, every party proposed one of their
own leaders as a candidate, but soon most of them were retired leaving
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only the leader of API, Rafael Tarud (supported by PSD and the Radicals)
and Salvador Allende for the Socialists, with the support of the Commu-
nists and MAPU. Finally, all parties agreed on the candidacy of Salvador
Allende in the early days of January, 1970. (Roxborough, 1977, p.67;
Sigmund, 1977, p.91)
Both the Right and the Left perceived the electoral campaign as a
classic confrontation along class lines, but the age of Jorge Alessandri
and the violence of the Right opened the opportunity for the Christian
Democratic candidate, Radomiro Tomic, to become a genuine third alterna-
tive and not only the standard bearer of the party faithful.
Tomic demonstrated a good campaign and introduced two new ideas in
Chilean politics, within a progressive platform akin to the UP Program.
They were his identification with the "Christian Left", and the proposal
of "autogestion", or worker's enterprises under self-management, to re-
place the capitalist structure of production. (Feinberg, 1972, pp.9 8-99)
Tomic was able to raise his possibilities from the low standing he
had in the polls at the beginning of his campaign to a respectable compe-
titor at the end, but he was unable to overcome the negative image of the
government and the internal divisions of the Christian Democratic Party.
However, the division of the dominant class between two candidates was
enough to allow the victory of Allende, in spite of the public opinion
polls which indicated Alessandri as a sure winner. On Septemeber 4, 1970,
Allende obtained 1,070,334 votes, or 36.2% of the total vote. Alessandri
obtained 1,031,159 votes, or 34.9% of the total, and Tomic had 821,801
votes or 27,8%. (Stallings, 1978, p.243; Roxborough, 1977, p.69)
According to the Constitution, since none of the candidates obtained
an absolute majority of the popular vote, Congress had to decide between
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the two highest voted candidates in a special joint session, within 50
days of the popular election. Whenever this happened in the past, Cong-
ress had followed the tradition of choosing the candidate with the high-
est plurality to be president, without too much uncertainty, in most of
the cases.
But in the case of Allende, the intermediate period between the pop-
ular election and the confirmation by Congress, was full of events that
anticipated the struggle of the Allende Administration, defining the par-
ticipant forces and settling the scenario before it was formally inaugu-
rated. On one side, the dominant class with its foreign allies, were de-
termined to maintain their control of the Chilean social structure, even
if this implied destroying the political regime of representative demo-
cracy and the rule of the law which was traditional in the country. On
the other side, the working class organizations achieved control of the
Executive through the democratic regime, and attempted to use this basis
to eliminate the supremacy of the dominant class and its foreign allies
in the country, and to substitute the traditional regime for a socialist
one.
The regrouping of forces started immediately after the September
4th elections. While Tomic, as defeated candidate and leader of the pro-
gressive wing of the PDC, visited Allende to concede his victory, politi-
cians of the Right were approaching the more conservative elements of
the PDC whose leader was President Frei, to obtain their support in Cong-
ress for Alessandri. In Congress, the Left had 80 votes and the Right
had only 45 out of the total of 200 members of the two chambers. Thus,
the 75 votes of the Christian Democrats were essential to decide the elec-
tion of the new president. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.110-111)
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On September 13, Allende replied in a public rally threatening with
a general strike which would paralize the country if the workers were de-
prived of their victory.
In the meantime, the U.S. government was studying the Chilean situ-
ation via communication with the multinational corporations that had in-
vestments in Chile, particularly ITT. In a meeting of the "Forty Commit-
tee" on September 14, the U.S. authorized "a massive anti-Allende cam-
paign, involving propaganda and economic pressure", including the desig-
nation of $250,000 as a contingency fund for any covert operations, such
as bribing Chilean congressmen, deemed important by the Frei team.
(Sigmund, 1977, p.ll3)
The same day, the Directive of the Christian Democratic Party found
a solution to the internal conflict between the Christian Democrats wil-
ling to vote Allende, and President Frei and his group opposing it. Ne-
gotiations with the UP to support Allende in Congress would begin if the
Left accepted the introduction of a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees"
as an amendment to the Constitution, to bind the Allende Administration
to maintain the pluralist regime of representative democracy. (Sigmund,
1977, p.120)
The economic pressures authorized by the Forty Committee and the le-
gal ties imposed by the Statute of Constitutional Guarantees, are two
good examples of the actions of the U.S. government and the Chilean domi-
nant class to control and stop Allende by "legitimate" means. These were
grouped later by the CIA under the denomination "Track I".
But on September 15, another set of actions was started under the
CIA denomination of "Track II". This consisted of clandestine operations
to subvert the legal regime and combine with the more peaceful means of
291
Track I to precipitate the "natural" demise of the government of the
working class, or to stop the process altogether through a military coup
as happened finally in 1973. (Thomas Karamesines, in U.S. Senate, 1975,
p.2 5 4 )
After the election, many members of the oligarchy ran to the banks
and left Chile, scared of the prospect of a Leftist government. But some
of the early emigrants had other motivations. Agustin Edwards, proprie-
tor of El Mercurio and President of the Edwards Bank, and the soft drinks
and beer monopoly, "Cervecerias Unidas", left the country and became a
high executive of Pepsi Cola Corporation in the United States. In a
paradoxical role, he was dealing with Soviet Union officials for the in-
stallation of the Pepsi-Cola franchise in that country and simultaneously
lobbying in Washington to mobilize the Nixon Administration against the
"Communist" Allende.
On the morning of September 15, Edwards, accompanied by Don Kendall,
President of Pepsi-Cola and personal friend of Nixon, had a breakfast
meeting with Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell. Later that same day,
Nixon, Kissinger and Mitchell discussed the ways to "save Chile" with
Richard Helms, Chief of the CIA. Helms was given orders to plan a mi-
litary coup, if necessary, "to prevent Allende from coming to power or
to unseat him". (U.S. Senate, 1975, pp.227-229)
Following these instructions, the CIA and the Military Attache of
the U.S. Embassy in Chile contacted potential participants for a coup and
helped organize a group of Chilean military officers and civilians for
that purpose. Thus, at the same time that the PDC and the UP were nego-
tiating the constitutional guarantees, the CIA and the U.S. Ambassador,
Walter Korry, were preparing a military coup to stop the constitutional
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process before the joint session of Congress elected the new president.
The plan involved the creation of a favorable environment for mili-
tary intervention by deepening the economic crisis already produced by
the situation during the last years of the Frei Administration, Presi-
dent Frei would resign under pressure by the military, a new election
would be called, and Frei could be elected again. To eliminate poten-
tial obstacles, General Camilo Valenzuela, the principle conspirator,
planned to have the four higher ranking Army chiefs abducted so that he
could assume the rank of Commander-in-Chief of the Army. (U.S. Senate,
1975, p.2 34 ; Sigmund, 1977, p.112)
The conspiracy included the Chief of the National Police, General
Vicente Huerta, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Hugo Barrios,
and of the Air Force, General Carlos Guerraty, and a group of officers of
lesser rank. Parallel to the military in active duty, the ex-General
Viaux, directed a group of civilian conspirators, among them Senator
Raul Morales and members of the fascist organization "Patria y Libertad"
(Fatherland and Liberty). (Sigmund, 1977, pp.120-121; U.S. Senate, 1975,
pp.234 & 239)
The first stage of the plan took place as scheduled. On September
23, the Minister of Finance, Andres Zaldivar, gave a speech, publicized
over a national television and radio network, in which he painted the
economic crisis in the darkest terms. The next day, "Patria y Libertad"
held a rally in Santiago during which its leader, Pablo Rodriguez, called
to defend the freedom of Chile "with our lives if necessary". After the
rally, his organization engaged in a series of terrorist bombings, while
it was receiving financial assistance from the CIA. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.
116-118)
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But President Frei was undecided in spite of the pressure of
the United States Ambassador, and was "double-dealing to preserve
his own stature and image as the champion of Latin American Demo-
cracy", as the ITT agents put it. Therefore, the negotiations be-
tween the Christian Democrats and the UP contined, until finally,
an agreement was reached and Congress was sent the project of con-
stitutional guarantees on October 8, (Sigmund, 1977, pp.116-119)
The constitutional guarantees did not contain anything that
was previously declared by Allende or the UP. However, they were
calculated by the Christian Democrats to impede the formation of
any kind of popular militias or grass-roots organizations, differ-
ent from the already, legally established Armed Forces or neighbor-
hood councils. They also restricted any attempt to change the exist-
ing situation on controlling the means of mass communications,
the statute of the Dolitical parties, or the educational system,
In short,
the Christian Democrats sought to buttress, with
constitutional amendments, Chile's existing po-
litical system against the incoming Allende Ad-
ministration's plans for a new institutional
regime.
(Loveman, 1979, p. 3 3 2 ; See also
Sigmund, 1977, p.119)
294
The agreement on the constitutional guarantees deprived the
Frei faction of the Christian Democratic Party of their arguments
against voting in favor of Allende in Congress, and increased
the pressure on the coup plotters
In addition, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Rene
Schneider, made public his position to support the Constitution
and communicated this position to the United States Military
Mission in Chile. Even though General Schneider was not sympa-
thetic to Allende, nor to socialist ideas, he had expressed his
support of the Constitutional process, whatever its results may
be, in an interview with the very important daily publication,
El Mercurio, before the elections.
After the elections, he went to visit Allende with two other
general and reDorted the events of this visit in a speech to the
Army's Polytechnical Academy on October 15. According to General
Schneider, Allende had given him assurances that he would "remain
within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws", and that his
program of change would "not pose a threat to out Western, Chris-
tian way of life". He also agreed with Allende that a government
like his was the only government that could "prevent a violent
and tragic people's insurrection from exploding." (Rojas, 1976,
p.72; U.S. Senate, 1975, p.234)
295
These agreements withthe Christian Democrats and with the Army
were, no doubt, constraining for the future action of the Allende
Administration, but appeared to pave his access to the presidency.
However, the conspirators went ahead with the planned coup.
On October 18, General Valenzuela reported to the U.S. Military
Attache that everything was prepared. That same day, the CIA provided
arms, ammunition, and gas grenades, sent from Washington by the diplo-
matic pouch, to the Chilean officers of the Army and Navy who had
requested them. On October 19 and 20, two attempts were made to
kidnap General Schneider but failed because the general changed
cars and lost his pursuers in the traffic of Santiago. During the
third attempt, made the morning of October 22, General Schneider
resisted the aggressors, and was shot by them in his car.
Schneider did not die immediately, but three days later in the
military hospital. This situation probably caused confusion for
the conspirators. While the bulk of the Armed Forces rallied to
support the new Commander-in-Chief, General Carlos Prats, whose
constitutional ideas were similiar to Schneider's, the conspirators
failed to act. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.122-123; U.S. Senate, 1975, pp.245-
247)
The same day of the attack on General Schneider, the Senate gave
final approval to the constitutional guarantees in a session which
Salvador Allende gave a farewell speech to the parliamentary body of
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which he had been a member for twenty-five years. He described the con-
stitutional guarantees as a "moral commitment". (Sigmund, 1977, p.119)
Thus, the period between the popular election and the confirmation
by Congress defined the terms and the participant forces for the struggle
which followed. The traditional legal formalism of the country and the
blunders of the conspirators allowed Allende to assume the presidency.
Tied by agreements with the military and the Christian Democrats, his
administration was constrained and had to strictly submit to the Consti-
tution and the law. But the Chilean dominant class and its foreign al-
lies did not feel as compelled to submit to the same legal and Constitu-
tional rules in their efforts to "destabilize" the Allende government.
The working class achieved access to the Executive, but suffered the
hostility of all the other branches of the Chilean State. The Judiciary
demonstrated its negative attitude very soon, when the Supreme Court re-
fused to grant the authorization required to indict Senator Raul Morales
for his participation in the assasination of General Schneider. For some
time, the progressive wing of the Christian Democrats maintained the in-
dependence of their party from the Right, but after a while PDC was con-
trolled by the Frei faction and made a common front with the Right to or-
ganize an opposition majority in Congress.
In the same way, the Armed Forces were, for some time, under the con-
trol of the "Constitutionalist" faction, and allowed the sacrifice of the
conspirators as scapegoats. But no independent investigation of the at-
tempted coup was authorized to uncover the whole network of officers in-
volved, their relations with the CIA and the U.S. Embassy, nor the in-
volvement of President Frei's team. Only the publication of the ITT Papers
by Jack Anderson, in March of 1972, opened the possibility of exploring
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those relations, and at this late time, the impact of the revelations was
very different than an earlier expose would have been. (Sigmund, 1977,
p.169; Boorstein, 1977, pp.183-184)
In the ensuing struggle, the dominant class was able to mobilize a
large share of the State together with the financial and productive re-
sources it owned. The traditional organizations such as SQFOFA and CPC,
the professional "Colegios" and politcal parties of the Right, and the
conservative factions of the Radical and Christian Democratic Parties
were involved. Also obtained was the support of the "gremios" or organ-
izations of the petty-boureoisie such as truck owners or small store
owners. In addition, the Chilean dominant class had the financial as-
sistance of the U.S. government and of the multinational corporations
which had investments in Chile, and included the "technical" assistance
and planning of the CIA.
The working class mobilized the labor organizations and the parties
of the Left, including the left-wing factions of the PDC and Radicals,
but the 600,000 members of labor unions in 1970 were only 30% of the sa-
laried workers. In addition, the Allende Administration, once in control
of the Executive, could make use of the legal and financial resources of
the State to implement the UP Program, and had some technical and finan-
cial assistance from Socialist countries, although not in the volume and
depth of the assistance provided to the dominant class by its foreign
friends. The participation of Chilean planners and planning in this
struggle will be analyzed in the following sections of this chapter.
2. The UP Program and Planning.
Allende was confirmed by Congress on October 24 and General Schneider
died the following day. The formal inauguration took place on November
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3, 1970. Less than three years later, on September 11, 1973, the body of
President Allende was carried out of the destroyed Presidential Palace,
where he died in defense of his regime against the military counter-revo-
lution. The period in between, as described by Barbara Stallings, is
"I never completely understood what Marx meant when he talked about class
struggle, until I found it here in the streets." (Stallings, 1978, p.viii)
The basic program of the UP was a didactice document which repeated
some key concepts again and again to dispel any doubts about their true
meaning. Even though its language was political, and purposely avoided
the use of technical jargon, its structure was a very familiar one for
planners. After an analysis of the Chilean situation, a general objective
was stated and several policies and programs were designed to achieve that
objective. (English translations of the UP Program are included as annex
to NACLA, 1972, and Feinberg, 1972, from where the following quotations
were taken)
The analysis of the Chilean situation was contained in the Introduc-
tion.
Chile is living a profound crisis which manifests itself
in social and economic stagnation, in general poverty,
in the injuries of every sort suffered by workers, pea-
sants and other exploited sectors. But, Chile's prob-
lems can be solved. Our country contains vast riches.
... Moreover, the Chileans possess the will to work and
progress, and have technical and professional capabili-
ties.
The Program continued,
What has failed in Chile is the System. Chile is a
capitalistic country dependent on imperialism and is
dominated by sectors of the bourgeoisie who are struc-
turally linked to foreign capital ... For a few, the
daily sale of a portion of Chile is a very lucrative
business. Making decisions for the rest of the people
is what they do every day. For the vast majority, on
the other hand, the daily sale of their effort, intel-
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ligence and work is a disastrous business, and this
majority is still, in large part, denied the right to
decide on its own destiny.
But the introduction also states that this situation is not a static
one.
The development of monopolistic capitalism halts the
expansion of democracy and exacerbates anti-popular
violence ... as a consequence of the expansion of world
capitalism, the submission of the national monopolistic
bourgeoisie to imperialism increases progressively ...
These dependent bourgeois are unable to solve the fun-
damental problems of the country, problems which arise
precisely from their class privileges that they would
never give up voluntarily.
This was the main argument of the UP against Alessandri, "the candidate of
the rich", but the Introduction included the rejection of the Christian
Democratic position.
The reformist and developmental (desarrollista) solutions
that the Alliance for Progress encouraged and the Frei
government made its own, have not succeeded in changing
anything of importance ... reformism is incapable of re-
solving the people's problems.
At the end of the Introduction, the Program formulated its own basic
objective.
The only alternative that is truly in the interest of
the people - and therefore the fundamental task for
the People's Government - is to end the domination of
the imperialists, the monopolists and the landed oli-
garchy, and to start the construction of socialism in
Chile.
After the Introduction, the UP Program was divided into four major
parts:
1) A political and institutional program which contained three sec-
tions, "On People's Power", Extending Democracy and Workers' Conquests",
and "A New Institutional Order, the Popular State".
2) An economic program in two parts, "The Construction of the New
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Economy", and "Economic Development Policy".
3) A social program which included two parts, "Social Tasks" and a
policy for "Culture and Education".
4) "The International Policy of the People's Government".
The headings of the different sections of the program point to its
comprehensive nature. In fact, the diagnosis made clear that the system
had to be changed as a whole, and therefore, the transformation of the
Chilean society had to include its economic, political and culturalele-
ments.
For the UP it was clear that the conquest of the presidency was not
enough to insure the transfer of the power of the dominant class to the
workers. A total change was needed in the nature and functioning of the
State. The property rights over the means of production and the mode of
production, the system of education and the means of cultural expression,
and the relations between the country and the rest of the world, also had
to be changed. However, the control of the executive power was conceived
as an instrument to start these changes because of the prominent role of
the presidency in the State machinery and because of the prominence of
the State in the country's activities of every order. (Roxborough, 1977,
p.72)
Perhaps the most important item of the UP Program was the creation
of an "Area of Social Ownership", which would constitute the dominant
nucleus of the new economic structure and replace the existing concentra-
tion of economic power in few monopolies and foreign enterprises. The UP
considered that the base of the power of the dominant class and the for-
eign capitalists associated with it was the concentration in the owner-
ship of the means of production. Therefore, the first step in the con-
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struction of the new economy, was to transfer such ownership to the State
and to the workers through deepening and extending the agrarian reform,
and through expropriating and nationalizing the monopolies and strategic
resources. According to the program these included:
1) The large mining companies of copper, nitrate, coal and iron;
2) The country's financial system, especially private banks and
insurance companies;
3) Foreign trade;
4) The great distribution enterprises and monopolies
5) The strategic industrial monopolies;
And, in general, all the activities required for the country's social and
economic development.
But the UP was not willing to build the new economy as a kind of
State capitalism, changing the traditional bosses with public employees
but maintaining everything else the same. On the contrary, the UP Program
and Allende made clear that parallel to the construction of the new eco-
nomy, was the building of a new institutional order. As Allende said
shortly after his inauguration,
I know that the connotations of the word "state" causes
a certain apprehension. The word has been much abused,
and it is often used to discredit a just social system.
Don't fear the word state because you, all of us, form
part of the state, of the people's government. Working
together, we should improve it and make it efficient,
modern, and revolutionary ... Much has been said about
the people's participation, and this is the time to put
it into practice. All Chileans, of any age, have a task
to fulfill.
(In Dale L. Johnson, ed., 1973,
p.158)
In fact, two themes are common to all the sections of the UP Program,
people's participation and planning.
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The political section of the Program explained,
The new power structure will be constructed from the
grass-roots, by a process of democratization at every
level and an organized mobilization of the masses ...
the unions and social organizations of the workers ...
will be called to participate in decision-making at
the appropriate levels in the institution of power.
This participation was to be the source of the government strength,
contrary to the concept of the oligarchy and imperialism
who equate power with the coercion of people.
In the same political section, the theme of planning was introduced
and related to the participation issue.
The Popular Government will immediately undertake a real
administrative decentralization, which combined with a
democratic and efficient planning will eliminate bureau-
cratic centralism, replacing it with a coordination of all
State agencies ... In the Popular State, the instruments
of economic and social policy will constitute a national
system of planning, they will be of an executive nature
and their mission will be to direct, coordinate and pro-
perly order the State action ... Workers'organizations
will have a fundamental participation in the planning
system.
This was repeated in the economic section of the UP Program.
In the new economy, planning will play an extremely im-
portant role. The central planning organizations will
be at the highest administrative level and their demo-
cratically generated decisions will have an executive
character.
In his first "Message to Congress", delivered on May 21, 1971,
Allende repeated the same concepts.
The establishment of the area of social ownership does
not signify the creation of a system of state capital-
ism, but the beginning of a truly socialist structure.
The social area will be managed jointly by the workers
and by representatives of the state ... The general cri-
terion to define the socially owned area is the necessity
of conceiving it as one single integrated unity, capable
of generating all its potentials ... This implies the
immediate establishment of a planning system with real
power to allocate economic surplus to the different sec-
tors of production ... Our transitional regime does not
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consider the existence of the market as the only regu-
lators of the economic process. Planning will be the
main guide for the productive processes.
(Allende, 1973, pp.159-166)
Allende inherited the national planning system, created by the Frei
Administration, in which the National Planning Office served as advisory
to the President himself, and the Sectoral Planning Offices were advisory
to the Ministers. They were influential, as their proximity to the deci-
sion-making sectors allowed them to be, but under Frei, they were unable
to control those centers and the autonomous development agencies of the
State. In any case, their goals and programs had an "indicative" charac-
ter for the private sector, which maintained the control over the most
strategic economic resources and activities. (See Chapter IV)
With Allende, the planning system became the center of the State
executive organization and had to change its character to serve the pur-
poses of the UP Program. In fact, at the beginning, the planners in the
Allende Administration were given three basic tasks: 1) to design the
mechanisms by which the participation of workers would be integrated into
the decision-making process; 2) to give technical assistance in the con-
struction of the Social Area by identifying the private activities which
should be incorporated into the Area and by organizing those already in-
corporated into a unified system; and 3) to adapt the organization of the
State, which had been created to support the traditional capitalistic,
dependent system, to play an active role in partnership with the workers'
organizations in the construction of a new socialist system.
In the process of implementing these three basic tasks, two others
emerged to be incorporated into the role of the planners. They were
4) the integration of the social and technical innovations generated by
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the participation of the workers into a unified framework, avoiding the
fragmentation of the process and reducing the inefficiencies resultant
from autonomous and independent local initiatives, and 5) the development
of devices to reduce the negative impact of the subversive counter-plan-
ning of the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies.
Planners, for the most part, were working simultaneously in all of
the five tasks. The complexity of the role and the identification of the
planning work with the government action in the construction of a new so-
cial system, required a total commitment to their work, by the planners.
As mentioned previously, planners, during the end of the Frei Admini-
stration, had divided into three groups, the third of which, integrated
mainly by the junior personnel of planning offices, felt that they had an
ethical commitment to economic development and structural change. The
Frei Administration, which initially had expressed the same commitment,
had changed to conservative policies after 1967. For this reason, this
third group of planners supported the UP in the 1970 campaign and formed
the nucleus of the planning staff of the Allende Administration. They
provided continuity in the planning system while most of the planning
chiefs of the Frei Administration went to work for international agencies
or for the Chilean universities.
Actually, two of the most influential members of the first cabinet
of President Allende, the Minister of Economy, Pedro Vuskovic, and the
Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Chonchol, were trained in planning.
In 1969, Vuskovic was elected Director of the Institute of Economics
of the Universidad de Chile. Shortly after the UP Program was adopted
by the political parties of the UP coalition, he and a group of the in-
stitute members started studies about the specific means of implementing
305
the program. These studies were based on the extensive research that had
been done since the professionals of the Left had prepared the programs
of ODEPLAN during the 1964 presidential campaign.
The group expanded with members of other university schools and some
Leftist professionals working for the government agencies. In mid-1970,
they had a general meeting in El Quisco (a resort near Santiago), which
was inaugurated by Allende himself. This was formally a technical group
of experts. The political parties were not represented officially, even
though the professionals affiliated with the diverse parties served as
links to them. But the leadership of CUT participated actively in it.
(P. Garcia, in Gil et al., ed., 1979, p.166)
After the meeting of El Quisco, several working permanent commissions
were organized to design the specific measures to be taken for the imple-
mentation of the UP Program, under the coordination of Pedro Vuskovic.
These commissions studied the definition of criteria and the legal means
of including foreign-owned and monopolist firms in the Social Area of the
economy, elaborating a preliminary list of 140 such enterprises. They
also studied the necessary reorganization of the State agencies (CORFO in
particular) and designed the draft of the mechanisms to be installed for
the workers' participation in the administration of the nationalized en-
terprises and in the general process of socio-economic planning of the
government. (P. Garcia, op.cit., pp.166-167)
After the victory in the popular election in 1970, and before the
confirmation of Allende by Congress, Pedro Vuskovic was officially desig-
nated economic coordinator with the government. He was also given the
specific task of designing the emergency short-term policies necessary
to respond to the economic crisis induced by the Chilean dominant class
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and its foreign allies in their efforts to stop Allende from assuming the
presidency. The working commissions were expanded with representatives
of the political parties, and became specialized organs of the UP coali-
tion which served as policy-setting bodies for the different sectors.
(Idem., id.,id.)
According to the UP Program, after the inauguration of Allende, plan-
ners and planning were placed at the center of the activities of the gov-
ernment, and the pre-election preparations helped to make the implementa-
tion of the program easier. However, that preparation could not elimi-
nate the big obstacles that had to be overcome, nor the paucity of re-
sources available to the Allende Administration.
The choice of the electoral and legal means for revolutionary changes,
the so-called "Chilean (or -Second) Way to Socialism", was a practical ne-
cessity, not an ideological imperative. Given the objective conditions
of the country, the Left was helped by the traditional myths about the
Chilean democracy and respect for the law, but this help had a price.
Elections were the means by which the UP obtained control of the Execu-
tive, and the UP expected that the actions of the Allende Administration
were going to expand and strengthen its electoral base as they did. But
the electoral way required a response to the immediate expectations of
the voters, which implied a conflict between short-term requirements and
long-term policies. (Roxborough, 1977, p. 7 4 )
On the other hand, the attachment to the Constitution and the exist-
ing laws would insure the response of State employees, in spite of their
traditional tendency to give preferential treatment to the dominant class,
and could also maintain the "neutrality" of the military. However, while
the existing legislation granted extense powers to the Executive, it had
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been designed to maintain and serve the established system, not to change
it. Congress, which had to dictate new legislation, and the Judiciary
and Comptroller General, which interpreted the existing one, were control-
led by the opposition. Therefore, the use of the existing legislation
for the implementation of the UP Program was necessarily restricted.
(Zammit, ed., 1973, pp.2 6-30)
For this reason, the strategy of the UP coalition was one of gradu-
alism. In a first move, the existing legislation was to be used to the
limits of its potential to implement the program. It was expected that
the results of this implementation would increase the electoral support
of the government as much as necessary to change Congress and dictate
new legislation for further advance toward the basic objective.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.74; De Vylder, 1976, pp.36-37)
In the following sections of this chapter, the means used by the
Chilean planners to implement the UP Program will be analyzed as well as
the impact of the implementation. Particular reference will be given to
the economic development of the country, the changes suffered by the la-
bor unions and the political parties, the counter-planning of the Chilean
dominant class and its foreign allies, and the new tasks which all these
impacts generated for the planners.
3. The Implementation of the UP Program.
The events that took place between the popular election and the con-
firmation of Allende refined the definition of some of the constraints
for the implementation of the UP Program described above, and added a new
one which was not expected at the time of the UP Program formulation.
The agreements with the Christian Democrats and the military rein-
forced the necessity for the UP to work within the established legal and
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constitutional rules as it has been predicted when the Left had chosen
the electoral way. But the economic crisis precipitated by the flight of
scared members of the oligarchy and accentuated by the conspiracy of the
attempted coup, was a new problem that could not have been predicted and
needed a solution.
The Left was not prepared to make use of the same economic depres-
sion to accelerate the State's takeover of the main productive activities
to organize the Social Area of the economy, which was the first priority
of the economic program, nor was the UP sure that the military would ac-
cept such an action. In the uncertainties which involved the confimation
by Congress and inauguration of President Allende, such anticipated imple-
mentation of the UP Program appeared very difficult in practice and poli-
tically dangerous.
Thus, the priorities were altered. In the original structuralist
view of the UP Program, the changes in the structure of production by the
formation of the Social Area would result in a gradual distribution of
income in favor of the working class. This redistribution was anticipa-
ted in order to reactivate the economy through the resultant increased
demand. A group of economists and planners under the direction of
Vuskovic, prepared in the midst of the economic depression, a plan for
the new government's first economic measures in a document dated October
19, and entitled "Orientaciones Basicas del Programa Economico de Corto
Plazo" (Basic Orientations of the Short-Term Economic Program). As ex-
plained by Pedro Vuskovic,
The short-run economic policy can, in very general
terms, be characterized as a policy of economic re-
activation based upon an income redistribution.
(De Vylder, 1976, p.53; Roxborough,
1977, p.79)
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The means utilized for the implementation of the short-term economic
program was the policy on salaries and wages and the policy on public ex-
penditures.
As it had been announced by the UP Program, the policy on private
and public remunerations was established by agreement between the govern-
ment and the national labor organization (CUT) signed on December 7, 1970.
(De Vylder, 1976, p.53; Stallings, 1978, p.128) The agreement was easy
since three blue collar workers and former labor leaders became Ministers
of Finance, Public Works, and Labor, and for the first time in the history
of Chile, CUT enjoyed the inside position in government which was restric-
ted to the organizations of the dominant class before the Allende Admini-
stration.
The agreement on remunerations contained three principles: 1) All
salaried workers, except the very highest paid employees, would receive
compensation for the loss of purchasing power resulting from inflation
since January, 1970; 2) A progressive scale would provide a higher read-
justment to the lowest paid workers; 3) A process of equalization would
be started of all the social benefits for all workers, including family
allowances and pensions. (De Vylder, 1976, p.54; Stallings, 1978, pp.127-
128)
The government planners expected that the income of workers would in-
crease more than the rate of inflation which was 34,9% for the year 1970,
since the agreement with CUT established only the minimum levels. In
practice, after all the local negotiations ended, the 1971 raise in sala-
ries and wages was nearly 55% over 1970, (De Vylder, 1976, p.54)
However, at the beginning, this was not clear and several foreign-
owned and monopolic enterprises were sabotaging the program by continuing
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the lock-outs and deliberate bankruptcies started in September. There-
fore, the income policies were reinforced with the expansion of the pub-
lic expenditures, particularly in projects which absorbed unemployed
workers and satisfied social needs such as housing, education and public
health, Fiscal expenditures grew from 19 to 33 billion escudos, and the
budget of the Housing Ministry increased by 150% in 1971 over 1970. (De
Vylder, 1975, p.55)
When Allende assumed the presidency in November of 1970, due to the
depressions, there were large margins of unused productive capacity in
all branches of industry, large numbers of unemployed workers, large
stocks of unsold consumer goods, and large reserves of foreign exchange.
The above mentioned policies produced an increase in demand which made
use of all these resources during 1971, and transformed the depression of
late 1970 into the spectacular expansion of the first year of the Allende
Administration.
Never, since 1952, had the Chilean economy grown so fast
in one single year. Real wages rose considerably and
personal consumption expanded by 12.9% over 1970. For
most of the Chilean people, and especially for the lowest
paid and for those unemployed who got new jobs in 1971,
the first year of the UP rule brought striking benefits.
(De Vylder, 1976, p.77)
Actually, the GDP grew 8.6% in real terms in 1971, in comparison
with 7% growth in the best years of Alessandri and Frei, and unemployment
was reduced from 7.2% in 1970 to 3.9% in 1971. Moreoever, this expansion
took place with a reduction in the rate of inflation, from 34.9% in 1970
to 22% in 1971, (Roxborough, 1977, p.97; De Vylder, 1976, p. 6 3 )
The forced change of priorities due to the economic depression of
late 1970, did not imply the abandonment of the original UP Program. On
the contrary, the short-term economic policies were designed to provide
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time for the implementation of the long-term structural changes. Even
though the very success of the short-term policies created some new ob-
stacles for the UP Program, at the beginning they allowed the Allende
Administration to start acceleraring the agrarian reform process, nation-
alize strategic resources, and organize the Social Area of the economy in
a favorable environment of general expansion.
The achievement of the goals of the UP Program was well advanced in
the first two years of the Allende government, though in different grades
in he diverse sectors of the economy. Copper and all other strategic
mineral resources were nationalized during 1971. 3,628 agricultural
estates were expropriated between November 1970 and March 1973, which
added to the 1,508 estates expropriated under Frei, and meant the prac-
tical elimination of the latifundio system. Four large foreign-owned
distribution firms were nationalized and served as a basis for a new
State owned system of distributing essential goods to the population.
Almost all the private banks were also acquired by the State, and in
May of 1973, 285 industrial firms were contolled by the Chilean State
and were being organized into the Social Area of the economy.
However, there were some differences in the means employed in the
diverse sectors to transfer control to the State.
The only case in which the Allende Administration attained support
from Congress was the nationalization of the large copper mines. Due to
the national conscience existing in regard to the necessity of control-
ling this strategic resource, producing most of the foreign exchange
revenues of the country, Allede sent the project to Congress in the form
of a constitutional amendment so it could be submitted to plebiscite if
rejected by the opposition majority. But Congress passed the project by
312
a unanimous vote on July 11, 1971. This day was then designated by the
government as "National Dignity Day" and posters proclaimed that "Chile
put his long pants on". (De Vylder, 1976, p.126; Stallings, 1978, p.132)
The constitutional amendment made the Chilean State owner of all the
copper mineral deposits within the country, and declared null and void
any previous rights or contracts over them. This added copper to the
State's already existing exclusive ownership of oil and radioactive mi-
neral deposits. It also ended the "Chileanization" program of Frei which
had established mixed companies between the Chilean State and the U.S.
based corporations that exploited the Chilean copper mines, namely
Kennecott, Anaconda and Cerro.
The nationalization of copper included a provision to compensate the
copper companies according to the 1970 book value of their interests in
Chile. But it also established the right of the Chilean State to make
deductions on such compensation because of poorly maintained or obsolete
installations that were a consequence of the negligence of former owners,
and also because of the "excess profits" obtained by the companies during
the last fifteen years. Deductions for the poor condition of the instal-
lations were to be calculated by the Comptroller General on the basis of
a technical evaluation. Excess profits were to be defined and calculated
by the President through a comparison of the profits obtained by the
companies in Chile and the returns from other investments in other coun-
tries. The criteria used was that Chilean profits should not exceed the
average profits received by the companies in their operations elsewhere.
(De Vylder, 1976, p.12 6 ; Stallings, 1978, p.132)
The constitutional amendment also established a special tribunal to
which the companies could appeal the deductions established by the Comp-
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troller or the President. But the tribunal confirmed the estimates of
the Comptroller and the President in August of 1972. (De Vylder, 1976,
p.128)
The criteria used to compute excess profits, also called "The Allende
Doctrine",, had a considerable impact on underdeveloped countries and was
utilized by the United States to justify its hostile attitude against the
Chilean government. However, this hostility preceded the election of
Allende, and the decision to nationalize was shared by all the powers of
the Chilean State and the great majority of the Chilean people, not only
by the Allende Administration, (0, Sunkel, in R. Williamson et al., ed.,
1974, p.14 9)
The control of other mineral resources by the Chilean State was
achieved through direct negotiations with the private owners, This was
the case when the State acquired the U.S. controlled majority interest
in the Anglo-Lautaro Nitrate Co., owner of the largest nitrate deposits
in Pedro Valdivia and Maria Elena, for a price of $8 million. This can
be compared with the $24.6 million paid by the Frei Administration for
only one-third of the same company, (De Vylder, 1976, p.13 2 )
Similar agreements were achieved with Bethlehem in acquiring its
iron ore mining interests, and with the Chilean investors who owned the
largest coal mines, "Lota-Schwager" in Arauco province. While in 1970,
the Chilean State owned and controlled only on large mine, 1972, the
number jumped to 34 large mines. The small mines which remained in pri-
vate hands, accounted for only 10% of the total mineral production.
(De Vylder, 1976, p.13 3)
In the case of the agrarian reform, the Allende Administration made
use of the same law passed under the Frei regime, but added some parti-
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cular modalities in its application in addition to the much faster pace
of the process of expropriations,
One of these modalities was the result of the commitment of the UP
Program to people's participation. During the Frei Administration, the
designation of estates to be expropriated was made individually, on the
basis of assumed "technical" reasons and on internal decisions of CORA,
frequently under pressure by the conservative friends of the administra-
tion who had access to President Frei. In contrast, during the Allede
Administration, the expropriations were the result of discussions between
the officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and the peasants' organiza-
tions during which the estates to be expropriated in a given year in an
entire province or zone were determined. (Steeland, 1977, pp.119-120)
A second such modality emerged in response to the great number of
land seizures by peasants that occured in 1971, which were directed to
press for the expropriation of the respective estate. Since the normal
process of expropriation was too slow to solve emergency situations, the
Allende government made use of another rule of the Agrarian Reform Law.
Article 171 authorized the intervention by the civil authority, that is
the assumption by a government officer of all the managerial powers, to
restore work in a farm paralyzed by a labor conflict, (Loveman, 1979,
p.338 ; Steeland, 1977, p.96)
This last instrument of intervention was also used by the Allende
government and the peasants to take over estates that were below the
80 "basic hectars" limit fixed by Law 16,640, and to reduce the number
and extension of the reserves that, according to the law, were left to
the former owners of the land,
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A special case of agrarian conflict emerged in the province of
Cautin where the general demand of peasants for land was added to the
historical claim of the Mapuche Indians (known as Araucanos by the Span-
ish Conquistadores), who had been disposed of their own land by the
white "huincas". The peasant branch of MIR known as MCR (Revolutionary
Peasant Movement) was very active in the zone organizing peasants for
land seizures and had sustained some clashes with the "white militias"
of armed landowners and with the police. (Steeland, 1977, pp. 6 9 & 85-95)
For these reasons, the Allende Administration choose the province
of Cautin to give an early and spectacular demonstration of the new rhy-
thm and mode of the agrarian reform. In January of 1971, Jacques Chonchol
moved the entire high command of the Ministry of Agriculture to Cautin
to organize the process of expropriations and to establish the future
relations of peasants with the government. For this purpose, the govern-
ment supported the creation of the peasant councils at the communal and
provincial levels. Peasant councils were representatived bodies of the
agricultural workers organizations. They existed in the respective com-
mune or province and were assigned functions inthe relations with the
State, particularly the annual decisions on expropriations. (Steeland,
1977, p.119; De Vylder, 1976, p.177)
In the commercial sector, the Chilean State had the monopoly on
foodstuff imports. The Agricultural Commerical Enterprise (ECA), which
was in charge of these imports, was also authorized to participate in the
internal commerce of the basic goods required by the population, to re-
gulate its market and to insure a basic price to agricultural producers.
The State acquired the control of four large distributing companies
owned by foreign interests, Duncan Fox, Agencias Graham, Gibbs & Co.,
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and Williamson Balfour, on whose base a new State company was organized,
DINAC. In groceries, DINAC's main field, the market share reached--29%
at the end of 1972.
These state enterprises were coordinated with the creation of thou-
sands of local supply and price committees known as "Juntas de Abasteci-
miento Popular" (JAP) which were in charge of enforcing price controls.
They later distributed the so-called "family basket" to the neighbors
of the respective sector. (De Vylder, 1976, p. 1 6 0 ! Loveman, 1979, p.337)
The purchase of shares from private investors was the strategy fol-
lowed to control most of the private banks and many private industries.
With the financial backing of the Central Bank, CORFO was able to offer
a good price for the stock of these firms in the depressed market of
late 1970 and early 1971. Thus the State acquired all the foreign owned
banks and 22 out of 24 private banks existing in Chile during the course
of 1971. (Stallings, 1978, p.132; De Vylder, 1976, p.158)
In the industrial sector, the UP Program made the distinction be-
tween monopolies and non-monopolies, and divided the projected new
structure of production in three subsectors; the Social Area, of enter-
prises controlled by the State; the Mixed Area of State and Private joint
ownership; and the Private Area. Strategic activities and monopolies
would be integrated into the Social Area, while most of the industrial
firms would remain in the Private Area. The Allende government made
several efforts to define the three areas in a new law. It defined the
criteria to include industry in the Social or Mixed Areas, and indemnity
to be paid to the owners. (De Vylder, 1976, p.136; Stallings, 1978, p.130)
According to the bill presented by the Executive to Congress, all
companies with a capital exceeding 14 million escudos in December, 1969,
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were to be put in the Social or Mixed Areas. These were some 253 firms
which included the mining companies, commercial firms and banks, plus a
series of industrial firms actually owned by the State. Even though they
represented only a small minority of the 35,000 industrial firms existing
in Chile, 150 manufacturing companies were to be included, because they
had an important share of the assests, value of production, and employ-
ment in the total sector, as the following table shows.
Table 5.1: Relative Importance of the Social and Mixed Areas in the
Industrial Sector as Planned by the Allende Administration
(in percentages) Social and
Social Area Mixed Area Mixed Areas
Value of Fixed Assets 53.3 16.1 69.4
Gross Value of Production 27.7 15.2 43.9
Industrial Employment 15.4 6.8 22.2
(Source: De Vylder, 1976, Table 6.15, p.149)
Congress rejected the bill in spite of the efforts to placate the
opposition. This led the government to reduce the list of industries to
be expropriated to only 91. Two Christian Democratic Senators, Juan
Hamilton and Renan Fuentealba, introduced a rival bill in the form of a
constitutional amendment which required congressional authorization for
each individual firm to be expropriated and provided that 11 companies
falling under State control after October 14, 1971, should be returned
to their private owners. The Hamilton-Fuentealba project was passed by
Congress, but was vetoed by Allende, and the Right did not have the two-
thirds vote necessary to overcome the President's veto. Thus, the issue
of defining the three areas of the economy by a new law was tabled.
(Stallings, 1978, pp.130-131; De Vylder, 1976, pp.135-138)
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However, the government was able to use several other resources to
incorporate the indicated industries into the Social Area. The instru-
ment of negotiations used with most of the subsidiaries of multinational
corporations, and the use of the powers of CORFO to acquire the stock of
private companies was previously mentioned. But negotiations were not
possible in some cases, and after some time, the Chilean dominant class,
with financial assistance of the CIA, made successful efforts to stop
the takeover of some specific companies, like the paper monopoly, direc-
ted by Jorge Alessandri, the oldest and most important of the private
banks, "Banco de Chile", and the holding company for El Mercurio.
(Sigmund, 1977, p.157; De Vylder, 1976, p.141)
But when direct negotiations failed and buying stock was not pos-
sible, the Allende Administration still had the resource of applying an
old and almost forgotten law, dictated during the short-lived "Socialist
Republic" of 1932, the so-called DFL 520. This law authorized the "re-
quisition" of expropriation of a firm because of speculation, hoarding
or failure to produce goods of basic necessity as defined by the Ministry
of Economy.
Besides this law, the Labor Code, and the Internal Security Law
authorized the government to decree the intervention of a firm which
ceased to work because of lockout or strike. In both cases, requisition
and intervention, the State assumed the administration of the company
with all the attributes necessary to manage it. Even though they had
been considered originally as short-term emergency measures, they served
the UP government in creating the Social Area in spite of the lack of
new legislation. (Stallings, 1978, p.131; De Vylder, 1976, p.139)
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The authorization of expropriation contained in the DFL 520 was wide
enough to allow the taking of all the enterprises planned to be incorpor-
ated into the Social Area. But because it required the previous full-
price payment by the firm it its former owners, it was a very expensive
procedure and was used only in four cases. Requisitions and interventions
were easier and less costly because they also served to respond promptly
to the lockouts and sabotage employed by the dominant class against the
economic policies of the Allende Administration. (De Vylder, 1976, p.139;
NACLA, 1972, p.22)
This was the case with NIBSA, a subsidiary of a U.S. producer of
brass fittings and valves; with the Chilean subsidiary of Ralston Purina,
and with the two largest producers of cement, which dropped production
and laid-off workers when their production was indispensible for the
short-term policy of reactivating the economy. In other cases, the re-
quisition or intervention came as the result of a previous action of the
workers of the firm, sometimes with the connivance of the government.
Two cases of this kind had particular importance. In one case, on May
24, 1971, the workers occupied fourteen textile mills in the province of
Santiago. This meant the subsequent intervention of a large share of
this industry. In the other case, the workers of the largest car assem-
bly plant in Chile, owned by the Ford Motor Co., in Casablanca, province
of Valpraiso, seized the plant when the company decided to close it and
end operations instead of negotiating with the Chilean government for
its transfer to the Social Area. The government ordered the requisition
of the industry and took over the day after the workers had occupied it.
(NACLA, 1972, p.22)
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The process of formation of the Social Areas was well advanced by
May of 1973, when 285 industrial establishments were under the control
of the State, in contrast with the 31 industries owned by the State in
1970. Of these 285, there were 165 owned by the State and 120 under
intervention or requisition. (De Vylder, 1976, p.1 4 5; Stallings, 1978,
pp.136-137)
The UP Program considered the nationalizations only as "an initial
step" which had to be followed by the establishment of a new structure
of production based on the joint participation of the workers with the
State in the administration of the Social Area.
The Chilean State had been active in economic development tasks
ever since the 1930's, and diverse, autonomous agencies had been desig-
nated to fulfill functions analogous to those required by the implemen-
tation of the UP Program. However, their scope of action had been much
more limited than the requirements of the rapidly growing Social Area,
and the dominant class had maintained them under control by denying them
the necessary financial support. By duplicating functions among them,
they also developed rivalries which reduced the efficiency of their ac-
tion.
In addition, the dominant class had imposed its ideology on the
State bureaucracy. It was assumed that the State was a poor administra-
tor and should leave the initiative to the private sector. Public em-
ployees were accustomed to treating the members of the oligarchy with def-
erence while they imposed authority on workers and peasants.
Therefore, two changes had to be made in the structure and workings
of the State machinery. One, duplications had to be eliminated to in-
crease efficiency, and the other, the perspective of public employees
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had to change to work together with the organized workers.
This last was perceived as a long and difficult process of education,
but the UP government had some starting leverage to carry it. The public
employees were socialized to follow the instructions of the President and
Ministers and could be legally punished for not doing so. The law defined
civil service as a service to the general public, not only for the privi-
leged elite. The Left had strong influence in public employee organiza-
tions and could mobilize these organizations to support the government .
The Left also was able to play the obvious increase in the importance of
the State bureaucracy implied by the UP Program, against the tendency of
public employees to identify with the dominant class. On this basis, it
was expected that the practice of the participatory mechanisms would com-
plete the change of attitude of the State bureaucracy.
In the meantime, the planners were asked to study and implement the
reorganization of the agencies necessary for the efficient administration
of the Social Area. As in the case of the formation of the Social Area,
each sector needed a different treatment and had a different legal status.
The same advantages of concentration that have the big conglomerates
and multinational corporations so attractive for investors and managers
in the most developed capitalist countries were useful to solve the prob-
lems mentioned above. CODELCO concentrated the scarce professional re-
sources remaining in Chile, serving all the mines instead of being dis-
tributed in each one of them. Thus, in spite of the flight of techni-
cians and the growing hostility inthe labor unions of supervisors, tech-
nicians and office personnel, which were controlled by the Christian
Democrats, the copper production actually increased in 1971 and 1972.
(De Vylder, 1976, pp.131-132)
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However, the legal status of the Ministry of Mines was an obstacle
to providing a better organizations for the mining sector. In the tradi-
tional system where the large mines were controlled by foreign corpora-
tions and had policies that were decided outside of the country, the
Ministry of Mines had little power and scarce personnel during the
Allende Administration mostly in adminstrative tasks. But with the na-
tionalization of the large mines, the Ministry became one of the most im-
portant branches of government and needed expansion. However, in its
original legal statute, there was little room for the new functions, and
Congress was not willing to change that statute. The lack of a sectoral
planning office for the mining sector made centralizing the policy de-
cisions in the Ministry difficult. This was accentuated by the autonomy
of CODELCO and COVENSA, and the dispersion of management functions in
other agencies of the State. CORFO in particular, had subsidiaries in-
volved in oil exploration and production, iron mining, and coal mining.
Borrowing personnel from the mining companies owned by the State,
the Ministry of Mines was able to achieve some measure of efficiency in
its complex task in 1973. But then the main concern of the Minister
turned out to be ending the strike provoked by the Christian Democratic
labor leaders. (Stallings, 1978, p.149; De Vylder, 1976, p.133)
Several other State controlled enterprises were developed to deal
in the marketing of some basic items: SOCOAGRO for the distribution of
meat; SACOOP for vegetables; ENAVE in the production and distribution
of poultry and eggs, and SOCORA in charge of the exports of agricultural
products of the reformed area, In January of 1973, a Secretary of Dis-
tribution was created to coordinate all these State enterprises, and to
serve as sectoral planning office for the supply and distribution of
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groceries and other essential goods, As in the case of the Ministry of
Mines, the lack of willingness of Congress to legislate on the subject
made the Secretary of Distribution dependent on personnel transfers
from other services of the State and from the same distibuting companies
mentioned before. (De Vylder, 1976, pp. 160-161)
In the industrial sector, the reorganization was easier due to the
past experience and the flexibility of the statute of CORFO. For the
purpose of managing the Social Area in industry, CORFO divided its pro-
fessional personnel among specialized "Committees" or task forces each
dealing with a particular branch of industry, such as the "Textiles
Committee", the "Automobile Industry Committee", etc. Each committee
was related to one of the nationalized banks which served as financing
channel for the respective branch of industry. All of them were coordi-
nated by CORFO's Division of Planning, which served as sectoral planning
office for the industrial sector and related it to the National Planning
Office and the National Committee of Economic Development. (ODEPLAN, 1972)
The only problem presented in this case were in the fringe areas
where CORFO had historical functions in areas other than industry, like
mining or agriculture. However, CORFO was reluctant to expand to fields
which could be covered by others because the task in the industrial sec-
tor became complex enough with the fast enlargement of the Social Area.
Thus, CORFO was willing to agree to put its Agricultural Division under
the control of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Division included two
committees, one on agricultural machinery and the other on agro-indus-
tries. There were also several programs of technical assistance.
The Agrarian Reform Law of 1967 had created the concept of "Agri-
cultural Public Sector" to give the Ministry of Agriculture control and
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coordination of all the agencies of the State dealing with agricultural
production and development. But because the Frei Administration never
dictated the decree that was needed to implement this norm, the Allende
Administration found the same situation that had motivated the legal
norm. This situation was described in a technical evaluation as follows:
This development of the agricultural institutions has
two essential characteristics, its growth "by aggregates"
and the service of particular "clienteles". This is,
the superposition of new agencies in each stage without
changing the old institutional structure, whenever the
service of new clients was imposed.
The process generated an excessive division of functions,
fulfilled by different institutions, many times in paral-
lel to each other, to attend the same of different clients.
(Barraclough, 1974, p.2 20)
Thus, several agencies under different Ministries and with diverse
legal statute, from centralized institutions to State controlled private
corporations, duplicated the action of the State in the most important
functions. In technical assistance to the farmer, for example, the three
largest agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture, CORA, SAG and INDAP, com-
peted with CORFO and with the State Bank. This resulted in the farmer
receiving different and sometimes contradictory advice from the diverse
State agency experts. Similiar situations occured in other sectors.
In spite of the creation of the Agricultural Planning Office during
the Frei Administration, CORFO had continued to plan for agricultural
development independently from the Ministry of Agriculture. The two
large autonomous agencies of the Ministry, CORA and INDAP had developed
their own planning staffs that tended to bypass ODEPA because of the con-
centration of the latter in long-term projections and policies. (See
Chapter IV; Also Barraclough, 1974, pp.220-2
2 3)
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To solve these problems, the Allende Administration decided to cen-
tralize the direction of the State's action for the agricultural sector
in the Ministry of Agriculture by implementing the authorization contained
in the Agrarian Reform Law. This was the purpose the decree was dictated
in November of 1970, defining the institutions which integrated the "Agri-
cultural Public Sector". (Barraclough, 1974, p.223) In addition, a com-
mission, integrated by experts who represented the different political
parties of the UP coalition, and chaired by a planner (this writer) who
represented the Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Chonchol, was designated
to study the distribution of functions among the diverse agencies in or-
der to eliminate duplications and competition among them,
To avoid submitting a new project of law which had little probabili-
ty of being approved by a Congress controlled by the opposition, the
Commission proposed that the diverse agencies sign an agreement to coor-
dinate their actions under a unified authority. The agreement proposed
by the Commission was submitted to the legal staffs of the different
agencies to give it a mandatory legal form. It was gradually implemented
in mid-1970 and was finally published in July of 1972, (Barraclough, 1974,
p.226)
The objective of the agreement was clearly expressed,
The National Unified Programs, put together similar
functions under unified direction, eliminating paral-
lel levels of authority, decision, and implementation;
saving human, material and economic resources, and, in
general, achieving the benefits of a rational organi-
zation.
(Article 1 of the Agreement as repro-
duced by Barraclough, 1974, p.2 2 6 . The
translation is mine)
The formulation of the agreement showed that the functions of the
State were conceived as programs of action, not in static abstract terms.
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They were distributed among the agencies as follows: 1) All planning
functions were concentrated in ODEPA; 2) The functions of land expropri-
ation and distribution, technical assistance for production, and construc-
tion of rural housing and other buildings, were given to CORA; 3) The
technical training and organization of peasants and the system of commu-
nications inside the sector, were functions charged to INDAP; 4) All agri-
cultural credit and the distribution of inputs for agricultural production
were assigned to the Agricultural Division of the State Bank- 5) SAG was
concentrated on the conservation of natural resources and the control of
animal and plant pests; 6) The two committees of CORFO under the control
of the Ministry of Agriculture were put in charge of all the functions
related to the import and administration of agricultural machinery, and
the development of agro-industries, respectively; and 7) The Institute of
Agricultural Research (INIA) concentrated all the projects and resources
for research of the sector. (Barraclough, 1974, p. 2 2 6 )
In addition, the agreement unified the territorial distribution of
the Agricultural Public Sector. It created the positions of Zonal Direc-
tor (at the provincial level) and Area Chief (at the communal level) as
direct representatives of the Minister in each Zone and Area, unifying
the direction of the State action in the agricultural sector at the local
level, where before every agency was independent from each other. Zonal
Directors were aided by zonal offices of ODEPA that assisted them in the
coordination and planning tasks of the respective zone. (Barraclough,
1974, p.2 2 7)
Streamlining of the State bureaucracy was a necessary but insuffi-
cient condition for implementing the UP Program in the agricultural sec-
tor.
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It should be remembered here that, according to the 1965 agricul-
tural census, of the 5.5 million hectares of arable land existing in the
country, only 2.8 million hectares were open to cultivation. Of these,
only 1.5 million hectares were actually put into production every year.
In addition, the particular extensive cultivation techniques used
by most of the latifundio owners were unable to produce the amount of
food required by the Chilean population, which resulted in ever-increasing
food imports. (See Chapter IV)
Moreover, the UP and the majority of the peasants were critical of
the implementation given to the Agrarian Reform Law by the Frei Admini-
stration. Before 1970, CORA had expropriated only estates which exceeded
the limit of 80 basic hectares. CORA also had maintained the individual
units of production ("fundos"), organizing in each one "asentamientos"
wich included only "inquilinos" (the permanent workers of the old lati-
fundio). However, the inquilinos of all the latifundios were fewer than
10% of the total workers, and the traditional units of production had
proved inefficient in maximizing the output of the available resources.
Therefore, added to the fast and massive program of expropriations,
the UP Program included the principle that the benefits of the Agrarian
Reform should reach all the agricultural workers. IT also proposed to
expand the cultivated area and to intensify cultivation in order to pro-
vide work and increased income to all the peasants, and to supply more
food for the rest of the Chilean population. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.177-
178; Barraclough, 1974, p.26)
These objectives required a change in the relations between the
agricultural sector and the other sectors of the economy. As explained
by Jacques Chonchol, the Chilean case was different than the traditional
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type of economic development where the surplus of agriculture hgd been
used to provide the starting capital for industrial investment, In con-
trast, Chile's agricultural sector required large amounts of capital from
other sectors to change the traditional system and to intensify the use
of the resources. (De Vylder, 1976, p.177; Chinchilla-Stenberg, 1974,
p.1 2 1)
However, this also meant changing the character of investment in the
agricultural sector. The emphasis of the UP Program was on capitalization
at the farm and the local levels rather than at the level of huge isola-
ted projects which was traditional. For example, in the past, the State
had engaged in large irrigation projects through the Ministry of Public
Works, and did not provide the necessary funds to make a proper use of
the water. Costly dams and canals were poorly used because the minor
works needed to prepare the soils and to carry the water to the farms
were never done. The UP government gave priority to these works because
they opened new areas to cultivation, made better use of the existing re-
sources, and at the same time, provided employment to more people than
the large projects did.
For the same purpose, two interrelated measures were taken by the
Allende government. One was a program of mechanization directed to in-
tensify the use of the natural resources. In 1970, there were 18,000
tractors in Chile. Most of them were in the hands of the traditional
landowners, while the reformed area and the small farm owners were with-
out machinery or other capital investments. Because of this, 10,000 new
tractors were imported in 1971 and 1972, with the goal of providing each
unit of production with the basic equipment and grouping the rest into
"Communal Tractor Pools" which served the respective area. The other
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measure was the direction of credit toward the agricultural sector, in
amount far larger than in previous times, in an effort to reach all the
producers with the amounts needed to finance the use of machinery, the
expansion of the cultivated area, and the change from extensive to in-
tensive crops. (De Vylder, 1976, p.177)
However, in the agricultural sector as well as in the other produc-
tive activities, machinery and money were not enough by themselves to
achieve the objectives of the UP Program, even with the help of a well-
organized and efficient State bureaucracy. Organized workers were the
most important factor of production, and at the same time, were the main
political support of the Allende Administration. Their will and mobili,-
zation were necessary, and for this purpose the UP government planners
created the participation mechanisms directed to incorporate the workers
in the planning and decision-making of the government and the Social Area.
In March of 1972, the Institute of Development Studies of Sussex
University (IDS) and ODEPLAN, organized an international "Round Table"
in Santiago to discuss "The Chilean Road to Socialism". In it, Luis
Figueroa, then President of CUT, defined participation in the UP govern-
ment as follows:
By workers' participation we mean participation in the
production and marketing mechanisms. But participation
should no be limited to the economic sphere. It must
extend to the whole of economic and social life, ranging
from the production committee in a section of the enter-
prise to the administration of the whole company, right
up to the level of regional and national economic plan-
ning. On this basis, different forms of participation
are being developed.
(ODEPLAN-IDS, 1973, p.18 7)
Actually, at the end of 1970, the same time that the agreement be-
tween the government and CUT on salary adjustments took place, a joint
committee was installed, coordinated by ODEPLAN, to prepare the "Basic
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Norms of Participation by the Working People in the Social and Mixed Sec-
tors". A project of "Basic Norms", which was submitted to the government
and to the National Council of CUT for its ratification, was published
and put into effect on June 28, 1971. But before these Basic Norms were
approved and implemented, representatives of CUT, as a national organiza-
tion of workers, were designated in all the high collective decision-
making bodies of government, and in the National and Provincial Develop-
ment Councils created to coordinate the planning activities of the differ-
ent sectors at the respective levels. Workers were also designated as
representatives of the President in the directive board of CORFO, the
State Bank, the Central Bank, CODELCO, and all the autonomous agencies
and large enterprises of the State. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.150-151;
Stallings, 1978, p.127)
The Basic Norms established guidelines for the participation system
in the industrial sector according to the scheme represented by Figure
5.1. Three levels of participation were possible in each firm incorpor-
ated in the Social Area: the General Assembly, the Coordinating Committee,
and the Management Council.
The Management Council was the highest executive authority within
the firm, and in a first stage, was conceived as a mixed body where re-
presentatives of the workers would meet the representatives of the gov-
ernment, with the State maintaining the uppermost control. But after a
time, the firms tended to divide into many particular forms of partici-
pation according to the different degree of labor mobilization, the at-
titude of the administration, the political affiliation of the workers,
and the information system within the firm. (Espinoza, 1975, p.311 & ff;
De Vylder, 1976, pp.150-152)
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The Chilean economist, Juan Guillermo Espinoza, made an empirical
study, in 1972 and 1973, of the process of participation and its results,
using a sample of 35 enterprises of the Social Area. He observed,
Towards the end of 1972, there existed great diversity
in advancement in matters of participation among the
firms making up the Social Area. At one extreme, there
were some that were completely managed by their workers,
and at the other extreme, there were some in which the
participation model had been set in motion in a faulty
manner or where participation organizations rarely met,
and the executives designated by the government made all
the decisions independently.
(Espinoza, 1975, p.71)
His evaluation also demonstrated that the structure of worker parti-
cipation worked better where the workers were more involved, and where
they decided on more important issues in the management of the firm. In
addition, he noted that the level of participation was directly related
to the performance of the industrial enterprise. High participation in-
tensity was associated with higher discipline, lower absenteeism, higher
investment rates, higher production and productivity, increased demand
for education and technical training, more equalitarian systems of remu-
nerations, and better social services for the workers and their families.
In addition, the firms in which worker participation was stronger, "were
the same firms that were pushing hardest for worker participation in sec-
toral and national planning". (Espinoza, 1975, pp. 32 0- 32 7 ; See also De
Vylder, 1976, pp.150-152, and Roxborough, 1977, pp.95-96)
Actually, the division of CORFO into specialized committees by
branches of industry implied a four level structure of planning and par-
ticipation: the individual firm, the branch committee, CORFO as planning
office for the whole industrial sector, and the national level of ODEPLAN
and the Economic Development Committee. Responding to the complexity of
the task, ODEPLAN prepared a series of handbooks for operational program-
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ming at the different levels tieing them into a coordinated process.
(ODEPLAN, 1972)
Given the good results of participation where it was well estab-
lished, the government introduced a bill in Congress related to worker
participation, in July of 1972. The bill included the joint management
of the Social and Mixed Areas by the State and the workers, and added the
possibility of worker participation in the Private Area, as well as the
creation of worker enterprises under self-management. At the same time,
CUT started to prepare a National Congress on Worker Participation di-
rected to analyze the experience and discuss the modification of the
Basic Norms, introducing majority worker representation into the manage-
ment councils of the individual firms. (Espinoza, 1975, p.317)
The formation of the Social and Mixed Areas and the participation of
the workers in their management, affected only 22% of the industrial and
mining workers directly. For this reason, the participation of all the
organized workers of the three areas and different sectors at the sector-
al and national levels was very important. In addition, the people
achieved participation in public policy through territorial organizations
which included the general population.
In June of 1971, the Minister of Economy, Pedro Vuskovic, was invi-
ted to a public meeting prepared by the Women's Federation and the Neigh-
borhood Councils of Santiago, to discuss the consequences of the high
prices and the supply and distribution of essential goods. The Minister
said,
This right is being exercised to demand that the govern-
ment report directly to the people; a right to summon
them to ask them for an explanation, to ask them what
the government is doing. It is not the Minister who is
calling you; it is the workers who are summoning and de-
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manding the presence of government officials ... We have
assumed our share of responsibility. But I must also
tell you that we are not capable of handling this situ-
ation as if it were only an administrative or bureaucratic
problem ... we feel we have the right to ask that this
responsibility be shared by you, by all of you ... It is
the people of Chile themselves who must help to attain
the success of the economic policy of the government of
the people, in the fields, at the factories, in the home,
in each center of activity.
(Johnson, ed., 1973, pp.45 8-4 71)
In that meeting, the Minister suggested the creation of local supply
and prices committees (JAP) which began to be organized with the support
of the technical agencies of the Ministry of Economy. Later, when the
tension increased, due to the violent opposition of the Right to the UP
government, the working class created other important territorial organ-
izations, such as the "Comandos Comunales" and the "Cordones Industri-
ales". (De Vylder, 1976, p.152; Loveman, 1979, pp. 3 3 7 & 342)
The territorial organization for participation were of particular
importance in the agricultural sector, due to the nature of the produc-
tive activities and their ties with the distribution of land. On the
other hand, the participation of the agricultural workers in the process
of planning for agricultural development was very important for coordi-
nating the practical knowledge and pressure for land of the peasants,
with the national requirements for increased agricultural production.
For this purpose, the UP government and its planners created the parti-
cipation mechanisms directed to achieve an agreement between the peasants
and the Allende Administration.
As it was mentioned before, in December of 1970, the Decree 481,
signed by President Allende and his Minister of Agriculture, Jacques
Chonchol, regulated the "Peasant Councils", which in some regions, ex-
isted previously as a spontaneous creation of the peasants themselves.
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According to the decree, the councils were to be organized at the nation-
al, provincial, and communal levels, to be integrated by representatives
of the labor unions, cooperatives, "asentamiento" committees, committees
of small farm owners, and any other such peasant organization existing
inthe respective area or region. Their objective was to give the opin-
ion of the peasants to the government on the preparation and formulation
of
all plans, policies, programs, and budgets, in matters
such as prices, credit, commercialization, taxes and
others related to agricultural production and the Agra-
rian Reform, or related to the social and economic con-
ditions of rural labor.
(Barraclough, 1974, p.206; Steeland,
1977, pp. 1 7 & ff.)
In January of 1971, the "Consejo Nacional Campesino" (CNC) was cre-
ated with representatives from the large organizations that grouped labor
unions and other peasant bodies. CNC was integrated by two representa-
tives from each of the confederations -- Triunfo Campesino, Ranquil, and
Libertad, Confederation of Asentamientos, Confederation of Peasant Coop-
eratives, and the Confederation of Mapuche Organizations. (Loveman, 1976,
p.286)
When the Minister of Agriculture moved the Ministry to the province
of Cautin, he had a series of meetingswith the recently convened Peasants
Councils, out of which two basic measures emerged. One was the partici-
pation of the Councils in the annual programming of expropriations for
the respective area or province. The other was the expansion of the Com-
munal Peasant Councils to include representatives of the agricultural
workers elected at large, in addition to the representatives of the or-
ganizations. (Barraclough, 1974, p.203; Steeland, 1977, pp.96-100)
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In Chilp there were some 260 communes in which there was some agri-
cultural production. At the end of 1971, there were Peasant Councils in
186 of them, and there were Peasant Councils at least at the communal
level in all the agricultural provinces of the country in 1973. (Steeland,
1977, p.1 8 )
As in the industrial sector, the Peasant Councils had many differ-
ences among them in spite of the common statute. The intensity of par-
ticipation varied in relation to their composition, the degree of pea-
sant mobilization, the political affiliation of the agricultural workers
and their organizations, and the attitude of the local officers of the
Ministry of Agriculture and its agencies. The CNC had an important role
at the highest national level and became the equivalent of CUT in the
agricultural sector in direct and close relation to the Minister and the
UP Agricultural Committee. As expressed by Kyle Steeland,
In counties where the Peasant Councils were strongest,
they effectively united the different strata of poor
peasants to the extent that this was possible. They
also exercised a good deal of real power, although
still in a very limited way.
(Steeland, 1977, p.18)
The most important practical problem found by Peasant Councils was
the lack of independent financing, since peasants were poor and in many
areas the meetings of the Council required transportation and lodging ex-
penses. The government tried to facilitate the autonomous financing of
the councils by giving them responsibility inthe managing of the Communal
Machinery Pool, and the infrastructure of commercialization existing for
the service of an area or region. Some of the Peasant Councils also
achieved a good relation with the workers of nearby industries and estab-
lished direct interchange of food for the industrial products needed in
the countryside, serving rural areas. (Steeland, 1977, p.18 )
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But the most important role assigned to the Councils was their par-
ticipation in the annual process of production planning for the next sea-
son, which was prepared by ODEPA and applied gradually since 1971. The
following diagram described the scheme of this process by which the ac-
tivities of the State and the peasants were coordinated to increase pro-
duction and to provide information on the technical and practical prob-
lems that had to be solved in order to achieve that increase.
In the following diagram, the Framework contained the proposed tar-
gets of production for the 25 most important agricultural products, and
was prepared by ODEPA on the basis of the historical performance of the
respective province and the results of the survey of the previous year's
harvest. In a first year it did not contain big changes but asked from
the peasants to repeat the best production they had obtained historically
for each product in the respective locality. However, it tried to con-
centrate some productions in particular zones in relation to the soil,
climate and water resources, instead of the traditional tendency to cul-
tivate the same products everywhere.
The Framework also contained the means that the State was willing to
provide to facilitate the achievement of the proposed production goals.
They included the seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery (the sup-
ply and distribution of which was controlled by State agencies and enter-
prises), as well as the financial aid represented by the special lines of
credit of the State Bank. It also indicated the constraints existing for
the State action insisting on the basic responsibility of the agricul-
tural workers for the result of agricultural production.
The Framework was prepared at the provincial level by ODEPA in
Santiago, and was sent to the Zonal Offices of the Ministry of Agricul-
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ture in each province, to be divided and detailed at the Communal level.
The Communal Framework served as basic discussion document for the Com-
munal Meeting in which the Peasant Council of the locality and the offi-
cers of the Ministry of Agriculture tried to reach an agreement on the
goals of production for the next season. The resultant Communal Plan
was a kind of pact between the peasants of the Commune and the government.
The peasants committed themselves to achieve the production targets a-
greed upon, and the Ministry of Agriculture assumed the responsibility
of providing the required inputs according to its possibilities.
Since the Communal Meeting generally took place in the midst of the
agricultural year, preceding the one considered in the Communal Plan, it
served also to control, at the local level, how the agencies of the State
were fulfilling their compromise of the previous year, and the peasants
frequently used the Communal Meeting to voice their complaints and pro-
vide suggestions for the State action.
The Communal Plans prepared in the Communal Meetings had a double
function. On one hand, they served as a basis for preparing the indivi-
dual production plans of each productive unit, including the old "asent-
amientos", the cooperatives of small farms, and the new productive organ-
izations created by the UP government. On the other hand, coordinating
Communal Plans at the provincial level into compatible Zonal Plans, and
of these at the national level, provided the basic elements to the oper-
ational programming for the agencies of the Agricultural Public Sector.
In some cases, it was necessary to return to the local level to refine
the information, since the aggregate Communal and Zonal Plans exceeded
the capabilities of the State machinery to provide the required input.
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The Left had criticized the "asentamientos" because of their ten-
dency to exclude a great number of workers from the benefits of the Agra-
rian Reform, creating a new petty-bourgeoisie of beneficiaries, with
many of the vices of the old system. For this reason, making use of
other dispositions of the Agrarian Reform Law than those utilized by the
Frei Administration, the UP government and the Peasant Councils designed
the program of expropriations by region, instead of expropriating indi-
vidual latifundios. (Barraclough, 1974, p.26 ; Loveman, 1976, p.320)
In the asentamientos, the individual latifundio was preserved as the
unit of production, and the "inquilinos" had a society with CORA (SARA)
for its administration, in which CORA retained the managing role. By
contrast, under the UP government, the diverse productive units of the
same area were integrated into Agrarian Reform Centers (CERAs), which not
only included the inquilinos of the expropriated estates, but also the
temporary workers of the same area, and even the "afuerinos" (seasonal
migrant workers) who could qualify according to the respective Peasant
Council. (Barraclough, 1974, p.27; De Vylder, 1976, p.1 8 7)
CERAs were managed by an executive committee of the peasants them-
selves, elected by the General Assembly that included all the workers and
women of the CERA. While in the original implementation of the Agrarian
Reform Law, the asentamientos could be divided into individual small
farms, CERAs were always conceived as transitional organizations moving
toward cooperative enterprises. (Barraclough, 1974, p.27; De Vylder,
1976, p.187)
Also created by the UP government making use of a forgotten dispo-
sition of the Agrarian Reform Law, were the "Production Centers" (CEPROs).
These productive organizations were specialized State farms, some 50 in
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number in 1972, distributed along the country to serve as demonstration
farms for the introduction of new technologies, and to carry out high-
cost strategic productions such as genetic seeds or pedigree reproducers.
(Barraclough, 1974, p.2 8)
The operational programming, included in the diagram of the yearly
process of agricultural planning presented above, involved all the agen-
cies of the Agricultural Public Sector. But the diagram shows only four
of them: the Sectoral Planning Office, the State Bank, the National Enter-
prise for Seeds, and the National Service of Agricultural Machinery.
These four were the institutions that directly intervened in providing
basic production inputs.
The State Bank concentrated the supply of credit for the agricultur-
al sector and had a long experience as a major importer and distributor
of fertilizers, pesticides and small machinery. ENDS was a subsidiary
of the State Bank, created by CORFO during the Frei Administration to
produce and distribute certified seeds in a long-term program of improve-
ment of the genetic stock. SEAM was the subsidiary of CORFO that impor-
ted tractors and other large machinery, managed the pools of combines
and other heavy machinery that served entire regions, and provided main-
tenance services and training for the operators of the Communal Machinery
Pools managed by the Peasant Councils. (ODEPA, 1970, p.120; Steeland,
1977, pp.170-171)
The policy of credit for the agricultural sector of the UP govern-
ment included a substantial increase in the amount of financial resources
directed to agriculture, the centralization of their distribution through
the State Bank, and their coordination with the general policies and the
annual process of planning. For this purpose, three basic lines of credit
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were established by the State Bank. One was directed to the acquisition
of the inventories of the expropriated latifundios by the peasant organ-
izations. Another was to finance the commercialization of agricultural
production through the buying powers of the State agencies. The third,
the "Credito Agricola Integral" (CAI: Comprehensive Agricultural Credit),
was to finance the productive activities of each productive unit in ac-
cordance with the respective production plans. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.190-
191; Instituto de Economia, 1972, pp.521-523)
This credit policy is a good example of the involvement of the plan-
ners in the Allende Administration, not only at the general level of de-
signing programs and policies but also at the level of the implementa-
tion details, The general ideas and basic design of the credit policy
had been developed in ODEPA under the direction of the Chief of the Fi-
nancial Division, Juan del Canto, during the Frei Administration, but
were not implemented then because of the conservative turn of the econo-
mic policy in 1967. Del Canto accompanied Jacques Chonchol when the
Christian Democratic Party divided in 1969, and was designated Director
of the State Bank in charge of agricultural credit by the Allende Admini-
stration. In this position, he was the principal responsible for adapt-
ing the same ideas to the new conditions and implementing them.
The favorite instrument utilized by Del Canto was the Comprehensive
Agricultural Credit (CAI). CAI provided advance financing to cover the
costs of the productive activities and input necessary to fulfill the
production plans in each productive unit, and was paid with the results
of the harvest at the end of the season. It replaced and expanded simi-
lar lines of credit previously managed by CORA and INDAP, and complemen-
ted the annual system of agricultural planning with a coordinated instru-
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ment of implementation.
CAI also served to introduce a measure of discipline in the credit
distributed to the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform. Since the be-
ginning of the Frei Administration, CORA had been replacing the salaries
paid to the peasants by the former landlords with a "credit" (anticipo)
supposed to be recovered at the balance of the agricultural year in the
respective asentamiento. However, in practice it had been a paternalis-
tic subsidy to the peasants since CORA was unable or unwilling to enforce
its payment, and the rates of recovery had gone down from 35.9% in 1968,
to 25.9% in 1970, and to 16.1% in 1971. The replacement of this old
credit by CAI established a more direct tie to the production results,
and resulted in an immediate improvement of the return rates to 40.8% in
1972. (Barraclough, 1974, pp.170-17 1)
The system of participation and planning in the agricultural sector
resulted in increases in production and productivity. In the harvest of
the 1971-72 season, the 80 Communes then included in the annual planning
process, increased their production from 8% to 12%, while the production
of the sector as a whole grew only 1.6%. In the 1972-73 season, again
the 80 Communes increased their production in contrast with the sector
as a whole which actually declined in production, due to the bad weather
conditions in the winter sowing time, and the impact of the truck owners
strike in the spring distribution of seeds and fertilizers. (De Vylder,
1976, pp.198-202)
4. The Impact of Implementing the UP Program.
The tasks given to planners in the Allende Administration were re-
lated to the changes in the relations of production contemplated in the
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relations of production contemplated in the UP Program. They were pro-
viding technical assistance in the formation of the Social Area; reor-
ganizing the State agencies to serve their new functions; and designing
and implementing the participation mechanisms. The preceding chapter
explained who the Chilean planners fulfilled these tasks.
The implementation of the UP Program implied deep changes in the
Chilean social structure and its international relations, and generated
a response from the major protagonists affected by it. This response
required new activities of the planners to maintain the process in the
direction required by the objectives of the UP Program.
It should also be considered that the nature of the planners' work
within the Allende Administration prevented them from producing detailed
blueprints of what was to be accomplished with anticipation. As explained
by the Minister Director of ODEPLAN, Gonzalo Martner,
A flexible dynamic system cannot be imposed by decree...
An overall strategy together with detailed planning in
certain strategic sectors is preferable to a closed
system. (In Zammit, ed., 1973, p.73)
This section will analyze three major aspects of the impact of the
implementation of the UP Program and the response of some of the prota-
gonists to it. They are:
a) The influence of the implementation of the UP Program on the eco-
nomic development of the country;
b) The changes suffered by the UP coalition and the politicians of
the Left; and
c) The process of class polarization and struggle, and the counter-
planning of the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies.
One of the most common expressions used in the U.S. press to refer
to the Allende Administration has been "economic chaos". Since this is
a concept normally used by the U.S press to describe any socialist regime
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or underdeveloped country, and it was also used by the Chilean military
to justify their counter-revolution, it could have been dismissed as a
mere piece of propaganda. However, some assumedly serious analysts of
the period, such as Alec Nove, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, or Paul Sigmund,
have taken a similar position, blaming the mismanagement of the economy
by the Allende Administration as the main reason for its tragic demise.
Even some left-leaning economists have been critical of the economic po-
licies of the Allende Administration. Although they tend to attribute
the final result to forces other than purely economic ones.
Aggregate conventional indicators similar to those employed to eval-
uate the economic performance of Frei and Alessandri in previous chap-
ters, are used in the following table to describe the period of Allende
and the following years.
Table 5.2: CHILE: GDP at Factor Costs and National Income 1970-1977
(millions of Chilean pesos at 1965 prices)
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
GDP 20.27 22.13 22.39 21.16 21.76 19.62 20.26 21.81
Index 100 109 110 105 107 96 99 107
National 18.49 19.83 20.23 19.60 19.66 16.09 16.66 17.81
Income
Index 100 107 108 106 106 87 90 96
(Source: ODEPLAN, National Accounts, in Varela and Michel, 1980)
The table above demonstrates that never in history has the Chilean
economy produced more than in 1972, and that the national income reached
was also an all-time high for that year. Since the distribution of in-
come in Chile was never more equitable than under the Allende Administra-
tion, it should be concluded that far from "chaos", the economic situa-
tion was better for the great majority of the Chilean population than in
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any other period. (Stallings, 1978, pp.215-224)
It must be considered in the analysis of the figures of the table,
that during the whole period of the Allende Administration, the Chilean
dominant class and its foreign allies were trying to sabotage the Chilean
economy. However, only the tragic events of 1973 and the accompanying
paralysis of economic activities could produce a drop in production and
income. Even this drop was far less important than the true economic
crisis produced by the "Chicago Boys" in 1975 through the implementation
of Milton Freidmann's "shock treatment" recipes. (The Economist, February
2-8, 1980)
However, the UP government planners did not expect that the deep
changes introduced in the areas of property and control of the means of
production were going to take place without disturbing the established
patterns of production and distribution. On the contrary, since the aim
of the implemented policies and programs was to change the existing sys-
tem, some of the problems emerging from such implementation were predic-
ted and appropriate measures were taken to solve them.
The expansion of demand in 1971 rapidly consumed the existing re-
serves and stocks, and the increases in production made full use of the
physical infrastructure, which made its gaps and bottlenecks apparent.
(De Vylder, 1976, pp.94-98)
These structural weaknesses were known in advance and had been de-
nounced in the analysis for the formulation for the UP Program. As in
every other underdeveloped country, the productive infrastructure of
Chile was unable to satisfy the needs of the general population. More-
over, it was designed to produce exports and to reproduce in the country
some goods and artifacts used by the Chilean dominant class to imitate
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the more developed countries, not to respond to the demands of massive
popular consumption. In 1972, the Minister of Economy, Pedro Vuskovic,
observed,
There has been much faster progress in income distribu-
tion than in adjusting supply to this new structure of
income ... the higher purchasing power of the workers is
not always matched by the availability of the products
they want or are in a position to buy.
(In Zammit, ed., 1973, p.53)
On the other hand, the private sector, as was also expected by the
Chilean planners, was unwilling to make use of the opportunities provided
by the expanded demand by making long-term investments. Foreign investors
were naturally unsure of a country that was nationalizing foreign-owned
enterprises. The Chilean owners of investment capital were more inter-
ested in sending their money to the exterior, or in making fast profits
from the black market speculation developed by the Chilean dominant class
to sabotage the economic policies of the UP government. Actually, priv-
ate investments, which had been on the average of $281 million per year
for 1961-1970, and had reached $260 million in 1970, dropped to $93 mil-
lion in 1971, and to $39 million in 1972. (Stallings, 1978, pp.16 1-1 6 2 ;
De Vylder, 1976, p.84)
Therefore the solution to the problems created by the gaps and bot-
tlenecks which were appearing in the physical infrastructure of produc-
tion was to be found in an increase of public investments. This was seen
by Chilean planners as an opportunity to change the general direction of
the development of the productive infrastructure. As the Director of
ODEPLAN explained in a planning seminar in 1972,
One of the new model's basic aspects consists in trans-
ferring the impetus for development from a wealthy mi-
nority, which generated an important proportion of the
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of the total demand in the economy, to the demand generated
by the bulk of the population.
(In Zammit, ed., 1973, p.72)
A National Committee on Investments was created by Decreee at the
end of 1971, to coordinate and expand the investments of all the State
agencies, and to formulate a National Investment Plan. It was presided
by the Director of ODEPLAN, acting as direct representative of President
Allende, and integrated by personal direct representatives of the Mini-
sters of Finance, Economy and Agriculture, and the Chief Executive of
CORFO, the Central Bank and the State Bank.
Even before the National Committee in Investments (NCI) was created,
the emphasis of public investments on satisfying the basic needs of the
majority of the population was implemented. A large proportion of the
expansion of public expenditures considered in the short-term reactiva-
tion policies of late 1970 was directed to the construction of housing
and community facilities. While under the Frei Administration, housing
construction starts had been on average of 42,000 units per year, they
increased to 80,000 units in 1971. Similar increases were registered
in the construction of schools, hospitals and health centers. (De Vylder,
1976, pp.68-70; Instituto de Economia, 1972, pp.27 4-2 77)
The strategy of the UP government planners was to use the increase
in demand for consumer goods as a "pulling" force to stimulate the deve-
lopment of a national production of the machinery, tools and spare parts
needed to produce those consumer goods. In turn, the intermediate in-
dustries producing consumer goods would generate the necessary demand
to sustain heavy industry. (G. Martner, in Zammit, ed., 1973, p.74 )
NCI added two sectoral priorities in the evaluation of investment
programs and projects. Copper and agricultural production investments
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were given preferences because of the impact of both sectors on the ba-
lance of payment to the country. Copper exports were the main source of
foreign exchange, and food was the largest item of import. Therefore,
they impinged on the external resources needed to import capital goods
for investments in other sectors.
NCI requested that every sector of the State agencies make a presen-
tation of their investment programs and projects through the respective
sectoral planning office. The presentation would contain a detailed de-
scription of the investment projects and their financial requirements in
national currency and foreign exchange.
NCI was supported by the technical staff of ODEPLAN and the Office
of the Budget for the analysis and evaluation of the programs and pro-
jects. In addition, it was assisted by the specialized personnel of
each sectoral planning office in the respective presentation. Only pro-
jects and programs approved by NCI were financed by the State through
the nationalized banks, and their foreign exchange component was included
in the foreign exchange budgets prepared by the Secretary of Foreign
Trade and Foreign Exchange (SEREX).
On these bases, NCI was able to prepare a detailed national plan of
investments which was completed in the early months of 1973. Several
large projects were started even before the plan was officially adopted.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.130; De Vylder, 1976, p.97)
One important aspect of the strategy of the Chilean planners in mat-
ters of investment for economic development was the increasing reliance
upon national engineering capabilities to reduce the problems associated
with the country's technological dependecy. In particular, it was neces-
sary to search for more appropriate small-scale, labor-intensive techno-
350
logies, rather than those usually recommended by foreign engineering con-
sultants. However, few of the Chilean engineers were industrial engine-
ers, with knowledge and experience in the design of industrial projects.
Most of them were civil engineers whose experience was concentrated in
construction and traditional public works. In addition, the majority of
the Chilean professionals were hostile toward the Allende Administration.
For these reasons, CORFO concentrated the engineers who had the necessary
skills and were willing to work in a special unit, to serve the needs of
all the sectors presenting projects to NCI. (Zammit, ed., pp.71 & 93)
Some of the projects approved by NCI and started under the Allende
Administration were directly related to the priorities mentioned above.
This was the case in the production of agricultural machinery and imple-
ments in Concepcion, and the production of industrial input and spare
parts for the copper mines in Antofagasta. (Zammit, ed., 1973, pp.162-165)
However, other projects involved the continuation of already started
important works such as the Santiago Subway, or projects of a special
nature such as the UNCTAD Conference building. This was a rather large
structure (over 40,000 square meters) which had to be built in less than
a year, and was the pride of the Chilean construction workers and archi-
tects who were willing to demonstrate to the world their capabilities and
efficiency. (De Vylder, 1976, p.70) This building, the Santiago Subway,
and the expansion in housing construction, increased the consumption of
construction materials, so the NCI also approved the construction of a
new cement plant in the south of Chile. But this project, which had the
financial aid of the Soviet Union, was never completed because the Allende
government was overthrown shortly after it had been started.
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Even though the expansion of public investments did not compensate
entirely for the decline in private investments, the activities gener-
ated by the development and construction of these and many other inyest-
ment projects approved by NCI were, to a large extent, responsible for
the low rates of unemployment prevalent during the Allende government.
(Sigmund, 1977, pp. 2 36 & 273)
Actually, the unemployment rates were lower under Allende than at
any time before or after. During the Alessandri Administration the in-
dustrial unemployment rate in the Greater Santiago area was on the ayer,
age 6.6% per year, and during the Frei period this average went to 5.2%.
Under Allende, this rate decreased to 3.9% per year. It should be noted
here that soon after the overthrow of Allende, the rate of unemployment
increased to 7% in December of 1973, and reached a high of 19.8% in March
of 1976. The average for 1978 was 14%, according to the official figures
of the present military dictatorship. (Stallings, 1978, pp.172-174 ; Varela
& Michel, 1980, p.10)
Most of the investment projects had long gestation periods and their
full impact could not be expected before some years. In the short-term
the gaps and bottlenecks of the productive infrastructure resulted in
shortages, distortions in the structure of imports, inflationary pres-
sures, and opportunities for the Chilean dominant class to develop a
parallel market with clandestine financing to avoid the government con-
trols. Three of these impacts were of particular importance and will be
further analyzed. They were the case of the demand for and supply of
food, the pressures on the external sector, and the problem of inflation.
Most economists have assumed that the income elasticity of the de-
mand for food is relatively low. They argue that low-income people will
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satisfy their nutritional needs first, before any other necessity, and
therefore, in the event of an income raise, they will spend more money
on other goods than on food which was the first priority in their origi-
nal expenditures. Thus a process of income redistribution in favor of
the lower income strata would have little impact on the demand for food,
and great impact on the demand for other not so essential goods. In
Chile, surveys on the consumption habits of the population made in 1968
and 1969, seemed to confirm this assumption, because they found that
high-income families employed only 10% of their income on food, while
low-income families used 67% of their income for the same purposel
(Bucher et al., 1973, pp.29-31)
However, a more detailed analysis of the same date showed these
figures to be misleading, because of the extreme difference in income
between the families compared above. Actually, in absolute terms, the
high-income families were spending three times more money on food than the
low-income ones. Poor people in Chile had a wide margin for improving the
quantity and quality of the food they consumed. Therefore, the redis-
tribution of income in 1971 resulted in a strong expansion in the demand
for food, particularly special items, like beef, which had previously
had been consumed only by the dominant class. (Bucher et al., 1973,
pp.88 & 93; De Vylder, 1976, p.202)
This situation provided the opportunity for the Chilean dominant
class to develop a black market of food, and to mount a political cam-
paign blaming the government for the assumed scarcities, and accusing
it of trying "to control the people by the stomach" because of the mea-
sures taken to insure the supply of food.
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The black market was based on hoarding the supplies proyided by the
traditional landlords, who owned medium-sized farms not affected by the
Agrarian Reform, and by peasants of the early asentamientos who sympath-
ized with the Christian Democrats. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.198-202; Steeland,
1974, pp.1 3 8-13 9)
Even though the agencies of the State substantially increased their
purchases of agricultural products, still in 1972, more than 70% of the
national production was commercialized through private channels. The
State had legal control over the commercialization of wheat, and had a
practical monopoly on the market for sugar beets and oil seeds, but tra-
ditional landlords and disaffected peasants changed their productions to-
ward items that were not easily controlled by the government and that
yielded high prices in the black market. Thus, in 1972, bad weather and
truck owners lock-out helped the production level of the cultivated wheat,
sugar beets, and oil seed, areas to fall far below the previous years,
while it increased for corn, other cereals and pulses. At the time,
poultry, pork, milk and egg production also increased. (Barraclough, 1974,
pp.122-123; De Vylder, 1976, pp.193-201)
Since the legal and politcal conditions of the country made it very
difficult to impose general controls on the marketing and distribution
of foodstuffs, the government increased the imports of agricultural
products to insure the supply of food to the general population. Actually
between imports and controlled national production, the total availabili-
ty of food for the Chilean population increased by 27% between 1970 and
1972. The creation of DINAC and the action of the JAPs made providing
the "family basket" at official prices to a growing number of working
class families possible since 1971. (De Vylder, 1976, p.202; Loveman,
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1979, pp.336-337)
However, the increased food imports, together with the growth of
imports of other consumer goods and services, reduced the availability
to import capital goods through foreign exchange. The international
copper price declined sharply in 1971 and 1972, from 60 cents per pound
in 1970 to 48 cents in 1971. This reduced the value of the Chilean ex-
ports despite the increases in copper production, as the following table
shows.
Table 5.3: CHILE: Balance of Payments 1970-1973
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973
Exports 1,254.7 1,132.8 978.2 1,429.3
Copper 839.8 701.2 618.2 1,055.7
Imports 1,160.2 1.225.1 1,330.9 1,625.6
Food 135.5 192.2 338.9 511.6
Capital Goods 276.2 248.0 165.1 243.3
Commercial Balance 155.7 -18.1 -188.8 -386.6
Balance of Payments 113.5 -299.8 -229.0 -111.9
(Source: Banco Central de Chile, in Varela & Michel, 1980, p.49)
The weak international economic position of the country was worsened
by the historical accumulation of external debt, which had grown from
$598 million in 1960 to $2,975 million in 1970. (ODEPLAN, 1971, Table 318,
p.54) Moreover, the renegotiation of the external debt and the short-
term loans contracted during the Frei Administration resulted in payments
due in 1971 and 1972 which presented 40% of the export revenues of those
years. (P. Vuskovic, in Zammit, ed., 1973, p.54)
In addition, the Nixon-Kissinger plan to "destabilize" the Allende
government included external economic pressures such as releasing copper
from the strategic stockpile by the U.S. government, depressing the in-
ternational price; and squeezing credit, which was denounced by President
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Allende as an "invisible blockade". From 1970 until 1973, Chile did not
receive new loans from the U.S., from EximBank, or from the World Bank.
The IDB reduced its loans to two small operations with Chilean private
universities, and the private banks also suspended their credits, even
the short-term operations customary in international trade. Thus, Chile
had to pay cash in advance for anything imported from the United States,
if a seller could be found because many U.S. firms refused to provide the
goods they had been supplying previously.
This was calculated to produce serious difficulties in the Chilean
economy, since the balance of payments of the country had been heavily
dependent of foreign financing, and because most of the productive mach-
inery existing in Chile, as well as the spare parts needed for mainte-
nance, were imported from the United States. (Stallings, 1978, p.135;
Sigmund, 1977, pp.174-175; De Vylder, 1976, p.99)
But the West European countries and the Socialist countries were wil-
ling to occupy the place vacated by the United States. They provided the
credits needed to maintain and increase the level of imports, as the table
shows. Even the deficit in the balance of payments was reduced in 1973,
when the international price of copper returned to is normal levels.
(De Vylder, 1976, p.105)
Since the beginning of the Allende Administration, the Chilean gov-
ernment tried to establish negotiations with the major creditor countries
to reschedule the payments due on the external debt. But since the U.S.
was opposed to any such negotiation, Chile decided to force the matter
by declaring a suspension of payments on the external debt. Shortly
after, in January of 1972, the private banks acceded to reschedule their
part of the debt. In April, another agreement was reached with the mem-
356
bers of the so-called "Paris Club", integrated by the U.S., Japan, Canada
and the Western European countries, to reschedule the payments due in
1972. The same agreement now called for a meeting in May of 1973 to
negotiate the payments due on this last year. (Sigmund, 1977, p.175)
The UP Program postulated the State control of all the operations
of foreign exchange, and the existing legislation authorized the govern-
ment to intervene in all aspects of foreign interchange. But, as in
other cases analyzed before, diverse laws dictated at different times,
had given overlapping, and often conflicting functions to several State
agencies in this matter. The Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs shared the policy-making powers with the Central Bank,
while CORFO, ECA, CODELCO, COVENSA, and the State Bank operated in for-
eign trade and foreign exchange with formal autonomy from the policy
making institutions. The main role of the State in foreign economic
affairs was its regulating function since the field was mostly given to
the private sector. (C. Dominguez, 1969)
For the purpose of implementing the UP Program, the Chilean planners
concentrated the powers of most of these state agencies into the newly
created Secretary of Foreign Trade and Exchange which began to operate
at the beginning of 1972. SEREX was able to secure the provision of for-
eign support for all the projects included in the National Plan of In-
vestments prepared by NCI. Through a better control of imports and a
rising copper price at the beginning of 1973, SEREX also achieved an ex-
ternal situation far less critical than that of 1972. but it was still
weak. (Roxborough, 1977, pp.154-156)
Chilean planners had more difficulties dealing with inflation, but
this "technical" problem was related to the internal ideological differ-
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ences within the UP coalition.
In the structuralist view of the Minister of Economy and most of
the Chilean planners, inflation was the monetary result of deeper econo-
mic problems, and monetary policies were ancillary to the program of
structural changes. In addition, during 1971, inflation was maintained
relatively under control by Chilean standards. Consumer prices rose
only 22% in 1971, thanks to a combination of price controls, increased
production and imports, and the consumption of previously accumulated
stocks. (De Vylder, 1976, p.71)
But in early 1972, the stocks had disappeared, and the limitations
of the productive infrastructure were emerging as gaps and bottlenecks.
This added to the hoarding and sabotage of the Chilean dominant class and
the "invisible blockade" resulting in increasing shortages of some con-
sumer goods and spare parts.
Since the Allende Administration was committed to maintaining the
gains made by the working class through the redistribution of income pro-
duced by the short-term economic policies, salaries and wages had been
raised 22% at the beginning of 1972 to compensate for the previous year's
inflations. But the opposition-dominated congress rejected the tax in-
creases propoed by the government, which meant an increase in the budget-
ary deficit from 10 to 26 thousand million escudos between 1971 and 1972.
(De Vylder, 1976, p.90)
These inflationary pressures and the black market organized by the
opposition were reflected in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the indica-
tor generally used to measure the purchasing power of wages and salaries.
In July, the CPI had indicated that the wage adjustment made at the be-
ginning of the year had practically disappeared during the first half of
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the year due to inflation. Both CUT and the government had to consider
the possibility of a new adjustment. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.88-89; Sigmund,
1977, p.176)
It should be noted here that CPI, as well as other conventional in-
dicators, were directly affected by the implementation of the UP Program.
They had been designed to measure the performance of the established sys-
tem but the basic objective of the UP Program was to destroy this system
and replace it with one of a different nature. In doing so, it destroyed
the basis of the traditional indicators.
This Index was calculated monthly by the National Institute of Sta-
tistics (INE) on the basis of a price survey of a sample list of consumer
goods in the stores. The weight of the different items in the Index was
revised periodically according to surveys on the consumption habits of
the population, which were generally conducted between population census.
The last survey in use during the period being studied was from 1965.
In spite of the expansion of demand and changes in its composition,
the weight of the different items in the CPI was not changed, which
deprived the Index of accuracy. In addition, because of the black market
and "family basket", many items considered in the calculation of the CPI
practically disappeared from the stores where the CPI survey was carried
on, and the survey became unrealistic. (De Vylder, 1976, p.88)
Chilean planners tried to solve the problems by creating new infor-
mation systems which could measure the emerging new conditions. They
developed new accounting systems for the enterprises of the Social Area,
for the CERAs, and other productive units of the agricultural reformed
area. ODEPLAN started to use input-output and material balances tech-
niques to serve the needs of the new structure of production, while the
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Office of the Budget and the Central Bank were also adapted to conrol
the money supply and public funds more efficiently under the new condi-
tions. (ODEPLAN, 1972, Zammit, ed., 1973, pp.71 & 99-100)
But these new information systems developed slowly and in mid-1972
CPI still continued to be considered the indicator of inflation by the
general public. The traditional indicators were used by the dominant
class and its foreign allies to demonstrate the "economic chaos" intro-
duced by the government policies, since they were able to register the
destruction of the old system but not the construction of the new one.
The problem of inflation had been present for a long time. Planners
could have dealt with it if it weren't for the differences in the UP
coalition. The impact that the introduction of the structural changes
by the Allende Administration had on the UP coalition itself and its so-
cial base was not realized in the beginning. The labor unions and the
political parties of the Left had been born and expanded within the same
social structure that the UP Program was directed to change, and there-
fore they were also affected by the dismantling of the traditional system.
Labor unions, for example, had traditionally considered the govern-
ment as an enemy. Their leaders had been trained to fight the "enter-
prise" for marginal advances, mainly wage increases. But under Allende,
they were called on to participate in the administration of the enter-
prise. They entered into formal agreements with a government that called
itself "government of the workers", and they had to decide on the design
and implementation of national policies of socio-economic development.
CUT made a good effort to adapt itself to the new conditions, in
spite of the strains imposed on its structure by the growth in the number
of affiliated unions. It had a very positive intervention in the design
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and implementation of the participation mechanisms, and also made impor-
tant innovations in developing non-monetary benefits for the working
class, such as the distribution of supplemental food for children or the
building of new schools, health centers and nurseries, (De Vylder, 1976,
p.111; Zammit, ed., 1973, pp.189&220)
It was difficult for CUT to control the demand of its affiliates
for higher wages, since this had been the major thrust of its action in
the past. The same participation mechanisms actually reduced the leading
role of the labor unions in the working class. Moreover, the workers and
peasants, free from the fear of government repression, developed new forms
of action and organization on territorial bases which cut across the ver-
tical organization by branches of industry of CUT. Thus, instead of lead-
ing the workers, CUT appeared following their initiatives and sometimes op-
posing them. (Roxborough, 1977, pp.161&ff; Stallings, 1978, pp.40-41)
The political parties of the UP coalition, whose leaders were trained
in parliamentary manouvers, electoral campaigns, and mobilization of peo-
ple against the established system and the government had similar diffi-
culties. Under Allende, with the best cadres serving the government,
the possibilities for maneuvers and compromises in Congress drastically
reduced, these parties had troubles defining their new role and functions.
Electoral campaign techniques were still needed, but they were of little
use inmobilizing people to implement the UP Program and to build a new
system.
Many politicians of the Left who had a Marxist perspective expected
that the destruction of the economic base of the dominant class would de-
prive the Right of its electoral power, more or less automatically. Even
though they had clearly stated that to win the Presidency was not the
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same as to conquer social power, they were surprised by the ideological
strength of the established system.
Since the salaried working class, including white-collar, blue-col-
lar, and agricultural workers, represented 75% of the total population,
UP politicians expected that in the long term, the measures in favor of
the working class of the Allende Administration would provide the elec-
toral majority needed to fulfill the basic objectives of the UP Program
within the framework of the Constitution.
In addition, the anti-imperialist and anti-monopolist government
program did not affect the interests of the petty-bourgeoisie in the UP
coalition's view where Radicals and other small groups actually repre-
sented those interests. (Roxborough, 1977, p.12 4)
Historically, the strength of the Left had been based on the well
organized, blue-collar workers of the large industrial and mining enter-
prises, precisely the group most directly involved in the organization
of the Social and Mixed Areas of the economy. But this group represents
only 22% of the industrial working force. It was an excellent core of
organized workers for social and political action, though it had limited
electoral weight. The Left had to compete with the Christian Democrats
for the support of other groups of workers such as the white collar em-
ployees, peasants, and non-organized industrial workers, and was parti-
cularly weak among female voters. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.49-50; Sigmund,
1977, p.107)
In addition, the UP coalition underestimated the strength of the
ties between the petty-bourgeoisie and the dominant class. Many of
the owners of small and medium sized firms had business relations with
the large monopolistic enterprises as sub-contractors or suppliers of
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goods and services. Even if they maintained their business with the new
administration of the nationalized enterprises, they felt threatened by
the disappearance of the people with whom they were accustomed to deal.
(Stallings, 1978, p.13 4)
Most of the members of the petty-bourgeoisie sustained an ideology
that identified them with the values of the dominant class, even against
their own objective interests. As Frederick Pike observed,
Because of their desire to assume upper-class attitudes,
middle groups have developed very little consciousness
of themselves as members of a distinct class. Almost
the only clear middle-class trait in Chile had been
the tendency to shun the lower mass and to embrace ari-
stocracy. (in Petras & Zeitlin, eds., 1968,
p.211)
On these bases, the Chilean dominant class, with the financial help
of the CIA and other foreign friends, was able to organize a wide poli-
tical front opposing the Allende government. It included most of the
petty-bourgeoisie, and even some elements of the working class, in the
name of the "defense of the democratic freedoms against the threat of
th Marxist dictatorship". (Stallings, 1978, p.139)
Still, the municipal elections of April, 1971, seemed to confirm the
analysis of the UP politicians. The opposition was still divided between
the National and the Christian Democratic Party, and the UP collected the
benefits of Allende's recent assumption of power and the early impact of
the short-term economic policies. The UP received 49.7% of the total
vote, the Socialist Party 22.3%, and the Communists 16.9%. All these
figures represented big gains since the last municipal elections. How,
ever, the Christian Democrats, with 25.7% of the vote, remained the lar-
gest individual party. The National Party received 18.5%, more votes
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than the Communists. (Sigmund, 1977, p.14 2 ; Stallings, 1978, pp.2 4 2-2 4 3)
The municipal elections settled the scenario for the political strug-
gle during the Allende Administration. The government clearly had more
popular support than that indicated by the Allende vote in 1970, and this
support was also larger than that enjoyed by Frei or Alessandri in their
best moments. However, the UP did not attain the clear majority needed
to call for a plesbicite as it was required by the Constitution when
changing Congress or the Judiciary, and they were controlled by the op-
position.
No general congressional elections were due before March, 1973, even
if the government obtained the same or a higher percentage of the vote in
the congressional elections, it did not insure a congressional majority.
Only half of the Senate was to be renewed, and the electoral system of
proportional representation was skewed in favor of the Right. The oppo-
sition won 914 seats in the municipal councils throughout the country,
while the UP obtained only 766 seats with a larger number of votes.
(Sigmund, 1977, p.143)
Shortly after the municipal elections, the political parties of the
opposition entered into an alliance which lasted until the end of the
Allende Administration. It also allowed them to win by-elections in
Valparaiso in July, 1971, and in O'Higgins-Colchagua and Linares in Janu-
ary, 1972, while the government won a by-election in Coquimbo in July of
1972. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.149, 165 & 171)
The alliance of the opposition also resulted in the split of the
Left wing from the Christian Democratic Party and the formation of a new
part, the "Christian Left" (IC), which joined the UP coalition in 1971.
But this split was compensated by a similar division of the Radical Party,
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whose right-wing separted to form PIR (Radical Left Party) and joined
the opposition in 1972. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.149-152)
But the opposition did not have the two-thirds vote required in
Congress to overcome the president's veto or to impeach the President.
Thus, the political battle appeared as a stalemate between two equiya-
lent forces which could only be solved by a clear definition of the elec-
torate in the Congressional elections of 1973. This conditioned the
government action and was a factor included by planners in their pro-
posals. As Predro Vuskovic explained in 1972,
There is an imbalance between the level of electoral
support with which the government came to office and
the size of the groups which will benefit from the gov-
ernment programs. Accordingly a central objective of
economic policy is to widen political support for the
government, to the extent this is compatible with other
aspects of the program.
(in Zammit, ed., 1973, p.50)
However, the politicians of the UP were concerned about the results
of the by-elections of Janurary 1972 which seemed to indicate that the
government was losing electoral support after the municipal elections.
They were unable to measure the strength of the reactionary ideology of
the petty-bourgeoisie, nor the concern of a large segment of the popula-
tion, women, who felt uneasy about a process that was destroying the old
modes and patterns while the new ones were not still well-established.
Also, the UP politicians were not able to perceive the substantial clan-
destine financial support that the Chilean dominant class was receiving
from the CIA and other foreign friends for electoral and other political
purposes. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.165, 173 & 285)
Therefore, the UP politicians tended to underestimate the impact of
implementing the UP Program. In their analysis, if some social groups
joined the oppositions in contradiction with their own objective inter-
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ests, this was an indication that the measures taken had not affected
the traditional system in depth. Two opposite positions emerged from
this analysis within the UP coalition.
On one hand, the Communist Party, supported by the Radicals, fol-
lowed a thesis on stages in the process of peaceful transition to so-
cialism. This thesis, which had been formulated long before the Allende
Administration, considered the process as divided into discrete periods
that had to be "consolidated" before proceeding to the next. (De Vylder,
1976, p.39; A.Joxe, in Sammit, ed., 1973, p.225)
At the beginning of 1972, the Communists sustained that the anti-
imperialist and anti-monopolist components of the "first stage" of the
UP Program, that is, the nationalization of the monopolies and foreign-
owned enterprises, the formation of the Social Area of the economy, and
the expropriations of the Agrarian Reform, were not still completed.
Therefore, an agreement with the "progressive elements of the bourgeoi-
sie", meaning the Christian Democrats, was necessary to complete this
stage and "consolidate" the gains already made. Without this, further
advances would only alienate the "middle sectors" whose participation
was needed to complete and consolidate the process. (A.Joxe, op.cit;
Sigmund, 1977, p.166)
On the other hand, the majority of the Socialist Party, led by Sena-
tor Carlos Altamirano, and supported by MAPU and the Christian Left, sus-
tained a "revolutionary" thesis. This thesis considered that the possi-
bilities of advancing through the legal powers of the Executive were li-
mited, and almost exhausted at the beginning of 1972. Any conciliation
or agreement with the Christian Democrats or any other segment of the
reactionary forces would be useless and damaging to the basic objectives
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of the UP Program. If the actions already taken by the Allende goyern-
ment had not completed the destruction of the power of the dominant
class, it was necessary to adopt truly socialistic measures by deyelop-
ing "People's Power" through the establishment of grass-roots organiza-
tions of workers and peasants. (Roxborough, 1977, pp. 1 6 1 & ff.; De Vylder,
1976, p.86)
The differences inside the UP coalition presented a complex problem
for President Allende and his administration. The emergence of the grass-
roots organizations of workers and peasants that served as a basis for
"People's Power" had actually been encouraged by the government. Allende
was not willing to repress the movements of the working class by force,
even if they exceeded the limits desired by his administration. He had
proclaimed many times that his was "the government of the workers". It
was Allende, himself, who coined the phrase "people's power" to describe
his regime in this inaugural speech. (Johnson, ed., 1973, pp.157-158;
Debray, 1971, pp. 9 3 & ff.)
However, the President was also determined to avoid a direct violent
confrontation with the dominant class that could result in a bloody civil
war. Moreover, he felt constrained by the "constitutional guarantees",
and by the agreement that he had made with the military before his con-
firmation by Congress. (Johnson, ed., 1973, p.156; Debray, 1971, pp.119-
120)
President Allende had a long experience with similar conflicts among
the political parties of the Left, and was able to make use of his well-
known parliamentary ability to maintain the unity of the UP coalition
despite the above-mentioned differences. But he considered the policial
parties of the Left as genuine and effective channels of communication
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with the working class, and was not aware of the potential conflict be-
tween the directives of those parties and their social base emerging
from the implementation of the UP Program. (Debray, 1971, pp.93-95)
No one in the Left was willing to discard the advantages of being
in control of the Executive, and Salvador Allende had a large personal
popularity which excluded the possibility of a revolutionary parallel
power, as MIR found in practice. Therefore, the President felt free to
use his political skills in an attempt to divide the opposition through
manipulating the "middle class" myth. He was always making the distinc-
tion between the "middle sectors" (meaning the petty-bourgeoisie), the
professionals, and some white-collar workers on one hand, and the oli-
garchy and its foreign allies on the other. (Roxborough, 1977, pp. 7 5-76
& 166)
However, this attempt led him to coincide with the Communists over
the need to keep the possibilities of dialogue with the Christian Demo-
crats open, long after the polarization of the countryhad made such a di-
alogue useless. This separated him from the great majority of the working
class who felt interpreted by the "People's Power" position, had little
interest in theoretical "stages" or consolidation, and felt no constraint
from Constitutional guarantees to the dominant class. (De Vylder, 1976,
p.143; Roxborough, 1977, p.16 2 )
The UP tried to solve its internal differences and find a common di-
rective for future action in two high level meetings of political and
government leaders, which took place in El Arrayan in February of 1972,
and in Lo Curro in June of the same year. But these meetings were not
very successful and actually added new problems to the tasks of the plan-
ners.
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Planners tended to coincide with the analysis of the "revolutionary"
position, even though their professional bias kept their interest in in-
troducing the order and control which coincided with the position of the
Communists, Moreover, in spite of their own personal position, they were
serving the administration and therefore were many times denounced as
"technocrats" by the political activists who sustained the "revolution-
ary" position.
In Lo Curro, the government planners proposed, through the Minister
of Economy, three basic measures to deal with inflation and the black
market.
1) More frequent and discriminate wage adjustments. In 1971 wages
had increased once during the year and had favored all the workers, but
they had preserved the traditional system which favored some workers over
others. The planner sustained that a more refined policy was needed to
discourage the "economist" tendencies of the most powerful labor unions,
and to rationalize the social security system and family allowances.
Thus, it was proposed to increase the minimum wages faster than the in-
come of better paid workers, while making allowances to maintain the pur-
chasing power of the professionals and technicians who were needed in the
new situation. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.90-91; Stallings, 1978, p.223)
2) Increased control by the State of distribution mechanisms, and
discriminatory price adjustments. This meant drastically raising the
prices of luxury items and goods for the conspicuous consumption of the
dominant class, and favoring the agricultural producers, while at the
same time maintaining the consumer price of essentials at a low level.
(Stallings, 1978, p.135; Boorstein, 1977, p.188)
Since the government controlled imports and a large part of the in-
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dustrial productive capacity of the country, it was able to set many of
these prices directly. But the development of a parallel market by the
dominant class made the control of inflation through fixed prices im-
possible unless the State controlled a larger part of the distribution
mechanisms. For this purpose, the planners proposed the follwing point
in which they coincided with the "revolutionary" position.
3) The mobilization of the working class for the control of the
black market through the JAPs and vigilance committees in the Social
Area and in the reformed agricultural area to impede the sabotage, hoard-
ing, and transfer of production to the parallel market by the dominant
class and its friends. (Roxborough, 1977, p.167; Stallings, 1978, p.135)
The last two points were rejected by the Communists who argued that
Chile was still a capitalist society and therefore some capitalist mea-
sures were needed to consolidate for advances achieved during the first
20 months and to put some order in the process. In accordance with this
analysis, they recommended, through Hernan Millas, 1) To limit the Social
Area to 90 firms and define the three areas of the economy, giving guar-
antees to small and medium size firms so as to win the support of the
petty-bourgeoisie; 2) To hold down wage increases, and the government
deficit in particular, with a more efficient management of the Social
Area; and 3) To raise prices and devalue the Escudo in order to achieve
"stability at a higher level". (Stallings, 1978, p.135; Boorstein, 1977,
pp.187-189)
In a typical parliamentary compromise, President Allende and the UP
coalition adopted the Communist proposals, but added an agreement with
CUT to raise wages as much as needed to compensate for past inflation,
and to introduce the new price increases. Still, the contradiction of
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these measures with the general direction followed until then by the gov-
ernment, required a change in the economic team of Ministers. The Mini-
ster or Finance, Americo Zorrilla, and the Minister of Economy, Pedro
Vuskovic, were replaced by Hernan Millas and Carlos Matus, respectively,
even though Vuskovic remained as head of the Economic Development Commit-
tee of the Cabinet and as Chief Executive of CORFO. (Stallings, 1978,
p.136; Roxborough, 1977, p.127)
The meeting of Lo Curro and the issue of inflation and the measures
taken demonstrated how the politicians of the Left, including President
Allende, underestimated the degree to which the process they began had
advanced. As Barbara Stallings explained, the analysis of the Commu-
nists and the measures adopted in Lo Curro by the UP and the President
"failed to realize that the class struggle had brought the opposing for-
ces to such a level of polarization that, until the question of political
power was resolved, conventional measures could only make the situation
worse". (Stallings, 1978, p.136)
Not only the analysis was faulty, the implementation of these mea-
sures required practical steps which made them contradictory to their own
objectives.
On one hand, the effort of the Millas-Matus team to finance the en-
terprises of the Social Area through prices that reflected the real costs
of their products, required a series of detailed studies by industrial
branches. These studies were not all finished at the same time because
of the lack of enough technical personnel. Therefore, the price increases
did not coincide with the devaluation of the Escudo, as the original in-
tention had been. Instead of the expected "shock" impact which would
stop the growth of the money supply and the inflationary mentality of
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of the public, the impact was gradual, extending over three months.
Each day carried the news of price rises in diverse products. Instead
of stopping inflation at a higher level, this measure actually fueled
the inflationary psychology of the public and merchants who hoarded goods
while waiting for their new price.
The CPI, which had increased by 33.2% from January to July, jumped
22.2% in September, and the rise affected not only luxury goods, but es-
sentials as well, because the price increases given to the agricultural
producers were passed to the consumers. Therefore, the food price index
rose 38.1% in August, and 30.4% in September. (Boorstein, 1977, p.189 ,
De Vylder, 1976, p.88)
The wage adjustment agreed upon with CUT, consisted of a flat rate
bonus of 700 escudos in September, followed by a percentage adjustment
in October, to compensate for inflation during the nine months of the
year. After the price increases reached 99.8%, this had to be approved
by Congress. The majority of Congress once again approved the expendi-
tures but rejected the new taxes requested by the Executive to finance
them. Thus, the fiscal deficit increased, instead of diminished, as the
objectives of the new policy had been. (De Vylder, 1976, p.93; Boorstein,
1977, p.190)
In summary, as Stefan De Vylder put it,
The formula, "stabilization on a higher level", launched
by the Millas-Matus economic team, proved inoperative
... The "higher level" was no doubt reached, but not the
'stabilization" part of the project.
(De Vylder, 1976, p.88)
The erroneous analysis of the Communists, and the mistake of Presi-
dent Allende and the UP coalition in Lo Curro, were clearly criticized
by the same group of the petty-bourgeoisie which the new policies were
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supposed to attract. These groups were the spearhead of an opposition
campaign which began in July when they impeached the Minister of Inter-
ior, labor leader Hernan del Canto of the Socialist Party, because he
was accused of smuggling arms from Cuba. (Loveman, 1979, p.341; Sigmund,
1977, p.171)
This campaign was followed by a movement of the Confederation of
Retail Commerce in August, and a mobilization of the secondary students
controlled by the Christian Democrats and supported by the Students Fed-
eration of Universidad Catolica in September. The students of the oppo-
sition clashed with UP students and workers in Santiago, Valparaiso and
Concepcion. Patria y Libertad and other right-wing extremist organiza-
tions, added to the climate of violence several incidents, such as the
assault on the radio stations which supported the government in the pro-
vinces. (Chinchilla-Sternberg, 1974, p.122; Sigmund, 1977, p.183)
The opposition campaign culminated on October 12, with the lock-out
declared by the Truck Owners Confederation, which was followed within 48
hours by a similar stoppage of the retail merchants, the industrialists
of SOFOFA, and the professional organizations of lawyers, engineers, phy-
sicians, dentists and architects. Later, all the participants in this
lock-out joined the so-called "Frente Gremialista" presided by the head
of the truck owners, Leon Vilarin.
The National Party supported the movement from the beginning, and
the Christian Democratic Party endorsed it on October 14, declaring that
any repression of the participants in the stoppage would be a violation
of the Constitutional guarantees. With the financial aid of the CIA, the
movement was prepared to go on indefinately, in an effort to paralyze the
country and to overthrow the government, or at least to stop the imple-
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mentation of the UP Program and submit the Executive to the control of
the majority of Congress. (Sigmund, 1977, pp.185-186; Stallings, 1978,
pp.141-142)
In a coordinated action, Congress started impeachment proceedings
against four ministers, and passed a law, introduced by Senator Juan de
Dios Carmona of PDC which gave to the military complete control of fire-
arms in the country. This included all the authorization to conduct
searches if the illegal possession of such arms was suspected. (Sigmund,
1977, p.183, Loveman, 1979, p.342 ) But at the same time, Patria y Liber-
tad and other right-wing terrorist groups were attacking the stores
which remained open and the trucks and buses which were still running.
The rightist violence included the sabotage of railroad tracks, oil
and gas pipelines, and the spread of millions of "miguelitos" (bent nails
with three or more points of which one always points upwards) on the
roads to blow out the tires of running vehicles. Trucks going from one
city to another had to form convoys under guard to protect them from the
terrorist attacks. Similar protection was also needed for cargo trains.
(Steenland, 1977, p.152; Rojas, 1976, p.117)
The government declared the state of emergency in 18 provinces,
which put the armed forces in control of the public order. They imposed
a curfew from midnight to 6 AM, took over all the radio stations of the
country, and ordered the requisition or intervention of all the stores,
shops, and factories which were closed and considered essential, such
as food stores. (Sigmund, 1977, p.186)
But it was the extraordinary mobilization of the working class that
really sustained the government and practically defeated the objectives
of the stoppage. The workers took over the factories and shops and made
374
them work in the absence of their bosses. Calls of CUT for volunteers
were answered by enough people to maintain the essential transportation
and distribution services in operation by working around-the-clock on
the State railroads and on the few trucks that did not join the lock out.
New working class organizations, such as the "Industrial Belts" and
"Communal Commandos", emerged from the grass-roots organizations to coor-
dinate solutions to the problems created by the stoppage in respective
areas. New communications were established between peasants and urban
workers that resulted in a direct supply system in both directions. Even
Christian Democratic blue-collar organizations rejected the official line
of their party and joined the UP workers in the mobilization against the
lockout. (Stallings, 1978, pp.142-143; Steenland, 1977, pp.151-152)
To the extent that the working class mobilization grew, the govern-
ment action appeared to be replaced by it. Many government agencies re-
duced their paperwork to a minimum so as to allow the employees to join
the volunteer brigades in emergency tasks. Planners and other government
professionals and technical personnel were organized into special emer-
gency task forces to coordinate the resources of the government with the
mobilization of the working class, and to maintain the system of infor-
mation and communications necessary to overcome the crisis.
This mobilization actually defeated the objectives of the lockout.
Instead of stopping all the activities of the country, it generated a
new network of productive activities and social relations which main-
tained the basic functions. In the words of Robinson Rojas,
The country was on the move. Haltingly, to be sure,
but it was moving. The bosses and the supervisors
sat at home, but the workers were walking to the fac-
tories. The great landowners remained in the city but
the peasants went out to till the crops.
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As Barbara Stallings explained, "The economy was still functioning, and
the working class and its allies were gaining confidence in their own
ability to resolve problems." (Rojas, 1976, p.117; Stallings, 1978,
p.142)
The October crisis demonstrated where the allegiance of the petty-
bourgeoisie and the so-called "progressive elements of the bourgeoisie
really rested. The illusion of conquering the "middle groups", which
had been the rationale for the Lo Curro decisions, was destroyed by the
joint attack of the truck owners, retail merchants, owners of small and
middle sized industries, and most of the professionals. As Stallings
put it,
October was also important because it clarified the
struggle between the government and the opposition.
Its nature as a class struggle between the bourgeoisie
and the workers became more obvious than before.
This was so evident that the editor of El Mercurio felt it necessary to
explain to his readers that the Chilean conflict was not the class strug-
gle which Karl Marx had written about. (Stallings, 1978, p.141)
The same crisis made it clear to the Chilean planners that the op-
position to the Allende government was not a series of isolated responses
to specific situations, but a carefully orchestrated effort directed to
stop the government from achieving its objectives. In fact, to analyze
the impact of the implementation of the UP Program will be incomplete
without considering, at least in summary form, the counter-planning of
the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies.
After the fiasco of the assasination of General Schneider, and the
subsequent inauguration of Allende as President, the Chilean dominant
class was divided and in confusion. The extreme Right blamed the Chris-
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tian Democrats for the confirmation of Allende by Congress, and the
Christian Democrats were divided between Frei's Right-wing and the
Christian Left. Even though most industrialists were scared of the na-
tionalizations, interventions and requisitions of the UP government,
many of them were attracted to using the excellent opportunities for
profit created by the short-term economic policies. Thus, they took a
passive and defensive positions which "shocked foreign financial circles",
according to the report given to SOFOFA by one of its most prominent
members who traveled abroad in the early months of 1971. (Stallings,
1978, p.138; De Vylder, 1976, pp.6 2-63)
However, the foreign allies of the Chilean dominant class were any-
thing but passive in relation to the Allende government. The "Forty Com-
mittee", under the direction of Henry Kissinger, authorized the CIA to
spend up to $8 million to "destabilize" the Allende government. In Jan-
uary of 1971, the multinational corporations threatened by the announced
nationalizations organized an "ad-hoc committee on Chile to apply pres-
sures through the office of Henry Kissinger, to make it clear that a Chil-
ean takeover would not be tolerated." The first meeting of this commit-
tee was attended by representatives of Anaconda, Kennecott, ITT, Ralston
Purina, W.R. Grace, and Pfizer Chemical. (U.S. Senate, 1973, Part 1,
p.44)
The coordinated program of action of the multinational corporations
and the U.S. government, included three basic elements:
a) External economic pressures which included the "invisible block-
ade" described before, and the efforts of Kennecott to disrupt the sales
of Chilean copper through legal actions in buying countries to embargo
payments on Chilean copper exports. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.104-105; Sigmund,
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1977, p.191)
The credit squeeze and the embargo of the revenues of Chilean ex-
ports were overt measures, open since all of them could be justified on
seemingly logical grounds. For example, the "lack of creditworthiness"
was cited by Robert MacNamara, President of the World Bank, as justifi-
cation for the denial of new loans to Chile. However, at the time these
measures were taken, they were anticipating rather than following events
which could justify them. The "self-fulfilling prophecy" was a widely-
used instrument of attack against the Allende Administration.
These measures were accompanied by a massive publicity campaign.
President Allende was never mentioned in press reports without a comment
about his being a Marxist, and his government was always associated with
the phrase "economic chaos". (Sigmund, 1977, pp.174-175)
But the other two elements of the external campaign against the
Allende Administration could not be implemented in the open. They were
clandestine operations directed to support the internal political and
economic opposition; and moblizing the Chilean military against the
Allende government, known today due to the publication of the "ITT Papers"
by Jack Anderson in 1972 and U.S. Senate hearings from 1973 to 1975.
Between 1971 and 1973, the CIA directly gave the opposition parties
(PDC, National Party, and Patria y Libertad) $4 million, and also helped
to finance- splinter groups from the Left, such as the Popular Socialists
or the factions of the Radical Party which passed from the UP coalition
to the Rightist front of the opposition. (Cusack, 1977, p.ll2; Sigmund,
1977, p.285)
During this period, the CIA financially supported SOFOFA and other
associations of the Chilean dominant class, which served as a basis to
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organize a "non-political", "gremialist" front which united profession-
als, women, small businesses, truck owners, and some secondary and uni-
versity students, against the Allende government. (Sigmund, 1977, p.286,
p.11 7)
It should be noted that the CIA did not have to "buy" Chilean busi-
nessmen, or "bribe" Chilean politicians to change their views. There
was a clear coincidence of objectives between the Chilean dominant class
and its foreign allies, and the CIA had achieved very good contacts
during its long intervention in Chilean affairs since before the 1964
elections. Moreover, the Chilean dominant class was not short of money
to finance most of its own political and economic actions, the expansion
of the market in 1971 provided it with plenty of cash.
Therefore, even though the CIA money served to "convince" some re-
luctant individuals, it was mostly used as a catalyst to mobilize the
funds of wealthy Chileans who were not willing to put money in the risky
business of opposing the government and preferred other, less dangerous,
and more profitable ventures. In addition, the CIA provided planning,
coordination, and technical assistance on specific means to be used
against the Allende Administration. As many observers noted later, many
of the tactics used in the struggle against Allende were identical to
those employed previously by the Brasilian bourgeoisie to overthrow
President Goulart. (Cusack, 1977, pp. 1 0 1-10 8 & 121)
Since the Chilean inquiry on the assasination of General Schneider
stopped short of uncovering the involvement of the U.S. government in
it, the CIA and the military attache to the U.S. Embassy in Santiago were
able to restore their contacts with the Chilean military immediately af-
ter the inauguration of President Allende. During the complot of October,
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1970, the CIA made it known to the Chilean military that the U.S. govern-
ment was in favor of a coup against Allende. When Allende assumed the
presidency, U.S. military assistance to Chile was increased every year,
in spite of the prohibition established by President Nixon of any other
type of financial or technical aid. (Cusack, 1977, pp.117-li8)
In addition to the support of the U.S. government and the mutlina-
tional corporations, SOFOFA was also able to obtain the financial aid
and solidarity of the industrialists of other Latin American countries,
Brazil in particular. (Stallings, 1978, p.1 4 2 ; Rojas, 1976, p.125)
With this external help, the Chilean dominant class was able to re-
group and organize its struggle against the Allende Administration.
The agreement reached between the political parties of the opposition
after the municipal elections of 1971 has been mentioned before. This
alliance was to last for the rest of the Allende period, and it estab-
lished a division of labor between the large parties. While the Chris-
tian Democrats assumed the role of "constructive opposition", maintaining
a formal dialogue with the government but introducing initiatives directed
to reduce the powers of the Executive, in Congress, the National Party
adopted a "hard line'' of impeachment proceedings against Ministers and
other government officers, and coordinated with the terrorist groups of
the extreme Right. (Stallings, 1978, p.138; Sigmund, 1977, p.149)
On their side, the two major traditional organizations of the dominant
class, the National Agricultural Society (SNA) and SOFOFA, abandoned their
old elitist ways and opened to a wide coordinated front with the profes-
sional "colegios", and petty-bourgeois "gremios" such as the "Truck Owners
Confederation", the "Confederation of Retail Commerce and Small Industry",
and the "Association of Small and Medium Size Industries". SNA and SOFOFA
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elected, as their leaders, two yound executives, Benjamin Matte and
Orlando Saenz respectively, both of whom were later discovered to be
members of the neo-fascist and terrorist organization, Patria y Libertad.
Under their direction, the traditional organizationas were founders of
the "Frente Nacional del Area Privada" (FRENAP: National Front of the
Private Sector), a coordinating organizations which included all the
"gremios" mentioned previously. FRENAP had its first public meeting in
December of 1971, and Orlando Saenz was the main speaker. (Stallings,
1978, pp. 3 9 & 139)
The counter-planning of the Chilean dominant class and its foreign
allies designed two lines of action. One was a permanent series of de-
fensive and hostile measures directed to interfere in the implementation
of the UP Program. The other consisted of several counter-offensive waves
directed to overthrow the government, which increased in intensity until
they culminated in the violent military counter-revolution which destroyed
the democratic regime in Chile in September of 1973.
Some of the permanent measures against the government policies were
of an economic nature, and consisted of closing factories, sabotaging pro-
duction, and the organizing of black markets mentioned before. In addi-
tion, SOFOFA, with the help of the CIA, was able to organize a "Freedom
Fund" to fight CORFO's acquisition of private firms, by directly buying
their stock. Orlando Saenz was a pioneer in developing shadow corpora-
tions where the capital of firms susceptible to nationalization was si-
phoned. (Stallings, 1978, pp.139-140; De Vylder, 1976, p.141)
By these means, the Chilean dominant class defended some strategic
enterprises from the government's takeover. Among them were: a) Banco
de Chile, the oldest and largest private bank in the country, which served
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as clearinghouse for the transactions among the diverse financial groups
of the Chilean oligarchy, and as the main link with the international
financial centers; b) the paper monopoly, which served as basis for the
Alessandri-Matte financial group, and was the only supplier of paper for
the periodicals published in the country; c) CODINA, the major distribut-
ing company which controlled the largest share in the commercialization
of essentials; d) the main publicity instruments of the opposition.
El Mercurio, the daily publication was in danger of bankruptcy because it
depended on the advertisements of the large corporations which were na-
tionalized by the Allende government, therefore, the CIA made a special
allocation of $1.5 million to save it. (Sigmund, 1977, pp. 1 5 6- 15 7 & 285-
286; Cusack, 1977, p.112)
Other resources, used in a permanent way by the Chilean dominant
class against the Allende Administration, were of a legal or institu-
tional nature. The Courts and the Comptroller General made the use of
the existing legislation to achieve government objectives more and
more difficult, and Congress rejected every major bill introduced by
the government, except the nationalization of the copper mines. As
Eduardo Novoa, the Chief Counsel of the State under Allende, explained,
the legal system is neither inert nor neutral. It has
its own internal dynamics and serves particular ends,
the defense of the particular historically determined
society in which the system is in force. This defen-
sive action also tends to cast as illegal, all those
who are against this particular form of society.
(in Zammit, ed., 1973, pp.2 8-2 9 )
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The courts were very active in defending the property rights of the
Chilean dominant class through injuctions against the requisition of pri-
vate business by the government, and the Comptroller began to reject the
government decrees for requisitions and interventions. The latter forced
the government to make use of the Constitutional mechanism of "Insistence
Decrees", whereby the Comptroller's objections were overcome through the
signing of the decree by all the Ministers. The Comptroller then was
forced to accept such decree, but had to send the antecedents to the
Chamber of Deputies, preparing the field for impeachment proceedings.
(Sigmund, 1977, pp.1 5 6 & 158; Roxborough, 1977, pp.lll-ll 2)
The majority of Congress approved more impeachment proceedings
during the Allende period than in the entire Constitutional history of
Chile, which forced Allende to frequently change his Ministers. But he
used a defensive move which consisted of interchanging Ministries be-
tween two of his Cabinet members when one of them was under the threat
of impeachment. This move was popularly known as "enroque". (Sigmund,
1977, p.16 4)
Some of these impeachments were also signals for the beginning of
the first and second waves of the counter-offensive of the dominant
class. Actually, the first impeachment proceedings were initiated by
the National Party in September 1971 against the Minister of Economy on
the basis of his participation in the formation of the Social Area of
the economy. The Christian Democrats used the threat of the impeachment
to achieve a formal compromise with the government by which they agreed
to vote down the accusation on the condition that the Executive intro-
duce a bill defining the three areas of the economy.
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The government did so on October 19 of that year, but the Congres-
sional members of PDC did not consider it, and introduced their own pro-
ject instead. This was a Constitutional amendment directed to reduce the
governmental powers by requesting Congressional approval of each projec-
ted transfer of a private enterprise to the Social or Mixed Areas, and
making null and void any other transference, including CORFO's buying
stock. This amendment was clearly more restrictive than the Agrarian
Reform Law which had authorized the expropriation of all the landholdings
fulfilling some generic conditions. In addition, this amendment excluded
some strategic activities such as the distribution of fuels and energy,
and protected the enterprises of the Alessandri-Matte group, such as
the paper monopoly. (Stallings, 1978, pp.130-131; Sigmund, 1977, pp.
158-159)
Actually the amendment was the core of the first counter-offensive
of the Chilean dominant class, and it was accompanied by a general pub-
licity campaign directed to deprive the government of popular support by
the exploiting assumed food shortages in which the technique of the
"self-fulfilling prophecy" was employed. El Mercurio, for instance, an-
nounced "from a reliable source", that a shortage of some basic consumer
goods, in the market was expected. The same day, organized groups of
women appeared in the stores and supermarkets early, to buy large quanti-
ties of the same goods and explain to other consumers that El Mercurio
had announced it scarcity. This naturally tended to produce a run on
the particular item by unsuspecting, scared customers, and enabled
El Mercurio to publish the next day, photographs of the empty shelves
as a demonstration of the veracity of its reports. (Roxborough, 1977,
p.106)
384
Other periodicals were less sophisticated in this campaign. The
front page headline of the Christian Democrat daily La Prensa proclaimed
that the food situation in Chile was worse than in Biafra. This publi-
city effort had a climax in the well-publicized "March of the Empy Pots"
of December 1, 1971. Several thousand elegant women marched toward the
center of Santiago from the suburbs, beating empty pots (bought just for
the occasion) to protest the assumed food scarcity. They were protected
by young men who provoked several violent incidents when the protestors
were prevented from approaching the Presidential Palace by the police.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.115; Sigmund, 1977, p.163)
The marching women of the "empty pots" were clearly members of the
social class that did not suffer any basic deprivation, and most of them
never used those pots personally, because they could and did afford do
mestic service. Actually, the only shortages worth mentioning at the
time of the march were the results of the hoarding by the same marchers
and the black market being developed by the dominant class. (De Vylder,
1976, pp.202-203; Roxborough, 1977, p.115)
However the incidents resulting from the march served as an excuse
for the opposition to start impeachment proceedings against the Minister
of Interior Jose Toha, who was responsible for the "police brutality"
employed in the control of the demonstration. Allende moved Toha to the
Ministry of Defense, but the publicity campaign was effective, particu-
larly among women. It had an impact on the by-elections of January, 1972
of one Senator for O'Higgins and Colchagua, and of one Deputy for Linares.
Both candidates of the united opposition won their respective elec-
tions and they proclaimed this as an indication of the declining support
for the government. Actually, the female vote was decisively in favor
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of the opposition candidates. The elected Senator, Rafael Moreno,
received less votes among men than the UP candidate, Socialist labor
leader, Hector Olivares. Women voted two-to-one infavor of Sergio
Diez of the National Party in Linares, even though the UP candidate
was a woman, Eliana Mery of the Christian Left. (Sigmund, 1977,
pp.164-165)
The government tried to achieve an understanding with the
Christian Democrats about new legistlation for the three areas of
the economy during the same month of January. According to the pro-
ject presented by the Executive to Congress in October, about 253 firms
fulfilled the criteria to be included in the Social Area, but the gov-
ernment reduced this number to a list of 91 commercial and industrial
enterprises (later reduced to 90) many of which were actually under
State control. (De Vylder, 1976, p.137; Stallings, 1978, p.131)
The UP's formal retreat was criticized by the revolutionary wing
of the coalition but was officially endorsed by the National Associ-
ation of Small and Medium Sized Industries, whose members had little
to fear from the Allende government in any case. CORFO started a
drive to acquire stock in all the firms included on the list which
were still not controlled by the State. (De Vylder, 1976, pp. 1 3 7 &
141)
However, SOFOFA responded with a strong campaign against the whole
idea of a Social Area which included publicity by various means to
create public opinion against State ownership; the "Freedom Fund" to
fight CORFO's acquisition drive; and direct pressures on shareholders,
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such as publicizing the names of the "traitors" who had sold to the
government. On February 9, 1972, the politicians of the Right, en-
couraged by the results of the by-elections of January, approved the
Constitutional amendment presented by the Christian Democrats to re-
strict the powers of the Executive and to submit to Congress the con-
trol of State takeovers, including all those made after October, 1971.
(Stallings, 1978, p.140; De Vylder, 1976, p.138)
As it was expected by the opposition, President Allende vetoed
this amendment, and his veto was transformed into a Constitutional
conflict. The government was charged with a violation of the Consti-
tution.
The Constitution specified that a Constitutional amendment should
follow the same transmittance as any other bill, with the exception
of some added features like the requirement of ratification by a
joint session of both chambers of Congress for approval, or the pos-
sibility of calling a plebiscite in case of disagreement between the
President and Congress. But these special rules did not indicate
which quorum was required by Congress to overcome the President's
veto of a Constitutional amendment.
The government, in this case, sustained that the general rule
for vetoes of ordinary laws applied to Constitutional amendments
too, that is Congress required two thirds vote to override the Pre-
sident's opinion. The opposition had poor legal logic but good poli-
tical sense. With majority in Congress but not the two-thirds vote,
they sustained that simple majority was sufficient. (Sigmund, 1977,
p.16 8 ; De Vylder, 1976, p.138)
337
The opposition projected to utilize this pre-fabricated constitu-
tional conflict as the climax of its counter-offensive, in combination
with a series of mass meetings in the major cities of the country,
which were to take place in early April under the common name of
"March for Democracy". During these meetings, the assumed "trans-
gressions to the Constitution" of the Allende government would be
denounced, and a plebiscite would be called for to ask for the resig-
nation of the President, to force him to step down, or to submit to
the control of Congress. (Stallings, 1978, p.140; Rojas, 1976, pp. 97-
99)
The opposition was helped from inside the government by the mem-
bers of the dissident faction of the Radicals (PIR) who Allende had
tried to maintain as allies by giving them two Ministries, among them
the Ministry of Justice, which was in charge of negotiations with
the Christian Democrats about the three areas.
The Minister of Justice, Manuel Sanhueza, arranged with the nego-
tiators of PDC, an agreement which was clearly unacceptable for the
UP coalition. Then, on April 6, PIR left the government, blaming
the Socialists and the extreme Left for the failure of the negoti-
ations. This was four days before the "March for Democracy" was to
take place in Santiago. President Allende qualified this move as
"a dirty stab in the back". (Sigmund, 1977, pp.168-169; Stallings,
1978, p.140)
The government was preparing its own popular mobilization, and
CUT had a meeting for this purpose on March 24. The UP made it clear
that, according to the Constitution, the only plebiscite possible
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was related to the UP Program, not the Presidency nor the relations
between the President and Congress. (Roxborough, 1977, p.166)
The government had unexpected help from the publication, in late
March, of the "ITT Papers", in Jack Anderson's column, "Washington
Merry-go-Round". The documents demonstrated that ITT had been in-
volved in a conspiracy to stop Allende from gaining the Presidency
through a military coup, and implicated Frei and other politicians
of the Right in the same complot. This publication deprived the op-
position campaign of much of its public support, and forced Frei to
make a public statement denying both his involvement and that of the
Christian Democrats in any attempt to stop the democratic process
by military intervention. (Sigmund, 1977, p.170)
The "ITT Papers" produced internal conflicts among Christian Demo-
crats. While some of them adopted a hard line, like Senator Juan de
Dios Carmona, who advocated "civil disobediance" against the govern-
ment while speaking in Santiago's "March for Democracy", others now
refused to go along with the planned confrontation on the Constitu-
tional issue. As Senator Renen Fuentealba did, some tried to reestab-
lish negotiations with the government through peronal contacts with
the Minister of Justice, Jorge Tapia. (Sigmund, 1977, p.170)
In practical terms, the proposed new legislation for the three
areas of the economy was tabled, and the government recovered the ini-
tiative. The Christian Democrats lost their image as the genuine de-
mocratic alternative for the working class. The gradual decline of
electoral support suffered by the government since the municipal elec-
tions of 1971, was stopped and reversed to some extent, as shown by
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the electoral surveys of Eduardo Hamuy in Santiago in June, and by the
victory of the UP candidate in a by-election for one Deputy in Coquimbo
in July, 1972. (Sigmund, 1977, p.171; Stallings, 1978, p.244)
As the dictator Pinochet declared to a magazine in 1974, it was in
April 1972 that the military became convinced that the political struggle
had no Constitutional solution and started planning for an internal war,
even with war games on the "occupation of Santiago". (Sigmund, 1977,
p.170; Rojas, 1976, p.84)
But the opposition was still not prepared to appear involved in a
military coup, particularly at the time when Chile was serving as host
to the UNCTAD Conference taking place in Santiago in April and May of
1972. Even the U.S. government, wanting to avoid appearing as if it
were strangling the economy of a small country in front of the world
forum which was discussing the relations between industrialized, deve-
loped countries and underdeveloped ones, acceded to defer the payments
due on Chile's external debt in 1972 in the Club of Paris.
The military was divided since the beginning of the Allende Admini-
stration. Some of them, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
General Carlos Prats, felt in his "professional position, that the best
policy through which the military institution could obtain advantages
and improvements was to attach itself closely to its proclaimed "tradi-
tion" of respect for the Constitution and the elected civil government.
(Nunn, 1976, p.267; Rojas, 1976, pp.77-82)
A second group, probably the majority of the officers, expected that,
given time, the Allende Administration was going to displace the old po-
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liticians, whom they blamed for the ascendance of the working class,
which would facilitate the military takeover on their own terms and
for their own purposes. In the meantime, they were willing to colla-
borate with the Allende government to train themselves and to gain ex-
perience in the technical aspects of ruling the country. (Rojas, 1976,
pp.77-82)
Still a third group of officers who had close ties with the tradi-
tional politicians of the opposition parties, took a "hard line" and
tried to push their colleagues into immediate action against the UP
government. They helped to organize and gave training and arms to the
right wing para-military terrorist groups financed by the CIA, such as
Patria y Libertad and the "Commando de Ex-Cadetes".
These hard-liners also provoked incidents like the refusal of the
Director of the Military School, Colonel Alberto Labbe, to render honors
to Fidel Castro as Chief of State, on the occasion of the Cuban leader's
official visit to Chile in December of 1971. In March, 1972, the police
discovered that Colonel Julio Canessa, another hard-liner, was the local
leader of Patria y Libertad in Temuco. He was engaged in an effort to
sabotage agricultural production in the Cautin province with the help of
several latifundio owners affected by the agrarian reform.
The inquest found that Canessa was in contact with Labbe and with
Generals Hernan Hiriart and Alfredo Canales, and all of them were in-
volved in preparing a military coup. This investigation was helped by
other military officers who considered that the situation was not yet
ripe for a military takeover, particularly after General Canales made
indiscreet remarks at a party, which threatened the internal security
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of the military establishment. Thus, all the plotters identified by
the civilian police were called to retirement in September, at the same
time that the civilian opposition was developing another wave of its
counter-offensive toward the lockout of October which was described
before. (Rojas, 1976, pp. 1 0 6 & 113-115; Nunn, 1976, p.273)
From the beginning of his administration, President Allende tried
to attract the military to support that government through their parti-
cipation in government tasks, and by making repeated references to their
"Constitutional tradition" and to the role of the military in economic
development. In his speeches he developed two military themes: the
basic link between national security and economic and social development,
and the proletarian origin of the soldiers.
He tried to demonstrate to the officers of the Armed Forces that
there are not well trained and equipped military in backward countries.
Technological advances are a component factor in modern armies, and a
country cannot be developed and technologically advanced if its people
are unemployed and undernourished. "We must remember that those who
go to the barracks are the sons of farmers and workers." (Nunn, 1976,
pp.270-271)
Thus, a permanent link was established between the planning system
and the military, both at the level of ODEPLAN where national security
elements were incorporated into the national development plans, and in
several regional planning offices where the military had prominent par-
ticipation. In addition, a series of government jobs were given to mi-
litary personnel, particularly in some large enterprises of the Social
Area such as the copper mines, the steel mills of CAP, and the nation-
alized explosives industry, formerly owned by Dupont. (G. Martner in
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Zammit, ed., 1973, p.71; Nunn, 1976, p.277)
Shortly after the call to retirement of General Canales and his fel-
low conspirators in September of 1972, General Prats reaffirmed the Armed
Forces' allegiance to the Constitution. On Independence Day, September
18, 1972, President Allende called the military to help transform Chile
into a more modern nation. However, the armed forces had maintained
their autonomy and avoided any political link with the Allended Admini-
stration until the October crisis. (Nunn, 1977, p.2 7 7 ; Sigmund, 1977,
p.184)
At the beginning of the truck owners lockout, the military appeared
to take a neutral position. They formally assumed the responsibilities
of the State of Emergency, but did not force anyone to return to work,
and found every good excuse to deny help to the government in solving
the practical problems created by the lockout. Since this was a stop-
page of truck owners and there were plenty of truck drivers willing to
work, the government ordered the requisition of the trucks and buses.
General Herman Brady, who was in charge of the measure, declined to
carry out the order arguing that there were 3,500 private buses in
Santiago and that the Santiago garrison had only 7,000 men. To put one
soldier in each bus or truck to protect it from the terrorist attacks
from the supporters of the stoppage would leave the rest of the city un-
protected. (Rojas, 1976, p.116)
The military never demonstrated much activity controlling Patria y
Libertad or the other right wing terrorists. But they used the oppor-
tunity provided by the crisis to practice control techniques over the
territory and public order in the whole country. It had been a long
time since the last time the State of Emergency had been extended simul-
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taneously to so many provinces. (Rojas, 1976, p.116; Steenland, 1977,
p.151)
However, the Armed Forces as well as the leaders of the dominant
class and their foreign friends, soon realized that the growing mobili-
zation of the working class was overcoming the crisis and threatening to
establish an irreversible revolutionary process. The central bureaucracy
of the State had apparently been replaced by an emergent network of ter-
ritorial self-reliant units, coordinated but not controlled by the tradi-
tional government mechamisms. As Ian Roxborough and others put it,
People's power in Chile was never sufficiently strong
to become an alternative to the State apparatus; but
the Christian Democrats and the Army, were vividly
aware that it could play that role.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.190; Rojas,
1976, pp.ll8-119)
The military, therefore, exerted pressure on President Allende to
search for a political solution to the crisis, and not to veto the Arms
Control Law which had been passed by the opposition majority in Congress
during the stoppage. The President responded to the pressure with a ty-
pical parliamentary-type move. He did not veto the Arms Control Law,
but he convinced the military to enter the government to help him solve
the crisis.
The President reorganized his Cabinet on November 2, and designated
three high ranking officers to serve as Ministers. General Carlos Prats,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, was appointed Minister of Interior,
which made him Chief of the Cabinet and Vice-President in case of the
President's absence. He was accompanied by Admiral Miguel Huerta as
Minister of Public Works, and Air Force General Claudio Sepulveda as
Minister of Mines. Together with them, the two top leaders of CUT, Luis
394
Figueroa and Rolando Calderon, were designated Ministers of Labor and
Agriculture respectively. This accomplished the alliance between the
workers and the military that the President had been pursuing, at least
in a symbolic form. (Stallings, 1978, p.144; Nunn, 1976, p.277)
General Prats explained to the press that the new cabinet had two
main objectives, to restore order and to administer free and honest
Congressional elections in March, 1973. Actually the new cabinet and
the presence of the Armed Forces in it had the impact of a cold shower
on the mobilization of the working class, and the truck owners, mer-
chants, professionals, and industrialists returned to work and entered
negotiations with the government willingly, as soon as the new Ministers
were sworn in. The planners and other government officials left their
emergency posts and returned to the more routine functions and paper-
work. (Sigmund, 1977, p.188, Stallings, 1978, p.144)
The apparent normality was such that on November 30, President
Allende departed for a two-week trip to Peru, Mexico, Cuba, the United
Nations, the Soviet Union, Algeria, and Venezuela, leaving General Prats
as temporary Chief Executive.
To the dismay of the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies,
Allede was very well-received everywhere. He used his visit to the
General Assembly of the U.N. to explain to a worldwide audience the
principle of "excess profits" as applied in the nationalization of the
copper mines. In the same speech, he denounced the conspiracy of the
multinational corporations and the "invisible blockade" against Chile.
(Sigmund, 1977, pp.192-19 4)
General Prats did not use the opportunity, as many in the opposition
had hoped, to take over the government. On the contrary, he responded
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to the confidence of the President by calling for the unity of the
Chilean people for the good of the country, and criticizing Congress
for the bitterness of its opposition. He returned power to the Presi-
dent, when he arrived back, as an almost routine formality. (Nunn, 1976,
pp.278-279)
However, under the external calm, the class struggle which had
clearly emerged in October of 1972, was to remain present until long
after the end of the Allende Administration.
Even though the government left the participants in the lockout
without sanctions, the leader of the truck owners, Leon Vilarin, de-
clared to the press, with arrogance, that they had only "suspended"
their stoppage. The workers did not dismantle their new organizations,
nor did they return to the factories occupied during the October crisis.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.174)
A proposal, presented by the Minister of Finance, Hernan Millas, to
return these industries as a means of restoring the dialogue with the
Christian Democrats, was rejected by the working class in public demon-
strations involving the Socialists and other political parties of the UP
coalition. On the other hand, the same Millas was impeached by the op-
position majority of Congress because he fired some professionals from
the Central Bank who had joined the stoppage in October. (Sigmund, 1977,
pp.194-195)
The worst result of the October crisis was the reduction in the area
sowed with wheat. Bad weather conditions had reduced the sowing of the
so-called "winter" varieties which constituted the largest share of wheat
production in Chile. The October stoppage was an obstable in distribut-
ing the seeds and fertilizers needed to offset that decline in spring
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sowing. Thus, the area cultivated with wheat, which was usually over
700,000 hectares, was reduced to less than 500,000 hectares, and the
production of the grain went down from 1.2 million tons in the harvest
of 1972, to 827,000 tons in 1973. (De Vylder, 1976, pp.190-200)
The prediction of this reduced harvest and the need to compensate
for it with increased imports of wheat to cover the demand, gave new
life to the proposals for a planned distribution of essentials, In ad-
dition, the October crisis practically imposed a new system of distri-
bution of essentials, due to the stoppage of the private merchants and
distributors. Therefore, the projected expansion of the State control
in the marketing of food and other essentials, and the distributions of
a "family basket" through the JAPs and other grass-roots organizations
presented by the planners, had better luck with the military in the
cabinet than with the UP politicians in Lo Curro.
A National Secretary of Distribution was created in January 1973,
to plan and control the distribution of essential goods through DINAC
and the grass-roots organizations, and the "family basket" was announed
as an official policy by the Minister Fernando Flores. (Stallings, 1978,
p.145; Sigmund, 1977, p.195)
Air Force General Alberto Bachelet was aDDointed Director of the
National Secretary of Distribution, which led to the resignation of Luis
Inostroza, a Socialist economist and planner who was the Chief Executive
of DINAC. In that position, Inostroza had been one of the main authors
of new policy and had anticipated its implementation, creating more than
100 "popular supermarkets". While El Mercurio celebrated the designa-
tion of Bachelet as a victory, Inostroza and the "revolutionary" faction
of the UP coalition considered it as a symbol of military control over
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the Allende Administration. (Roxborough, 1977, p.177)
However, General Bachelet became one of the strongest supporters of
the UP government and program among the military. lie died in prison
after the overthrow of Allende. While many other military people were
opposed to the new policies, their adoption led to the resignation of
Admiral Huerta as Minister of Public Works. Huerta was replaced by
another admiral. (Roxborough, 1977, p.2 11; Sigmund, 1977, pp. 1 9 5 ,12 4 &
269)
In fact, since November, 1972, the military officers of the "hard-
line" faction were planning a coup "without Prats". They received help
from the U.S. military through the personal support of the military
attaches to the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, and through a report prepared
in Washington with an analysis of the October crisis. The conclusions
of the report coincided with the concern of many of the Chilean mili-
tary who felt threatened by the mobilization and strength demonstrated
by the working class. If the organization and mobilization of the people
continued growing, as the October crisis had shown, the report projected,
in two or three years, the working class organizations would be able to
run over the Armed Forces. Moreover, the ordered behavior of the people
during the emergency, and their ability to overcome the difficulties pro-
duced by the lockout, had gained the admiration of some of the military
who were now willing to cooperate openly with the Allende Administration.
(Rojas, 1976, pp.118, 119, & 121-122)
To this survival motivation, the U.S. analyst added a "patriotic"
one that served the Chilean hard-liners to attract other officers to
their position. Assumed U.S. intlligence reports, showed that Peru,
Bolivia, and Argentina were making military preparations to make use of
398
the internal conflict in Chile, to recover territory lost to Chile in
the wars of the past century, and to settle, by force, in their favor,
some pending border disputes. (Jonathan Kandell, The New York Times,
September 27, 1973; Rojas, 1976, pp.121-123)
However, the military was willing to wait until after the elections
for Congress in March since many of them exepected that they were going
to give a "Constitutional" solution to the struggle. Many members of
the Chilean dominant class were convinced of their own publicity about
the government's assumed lack of electoral support, and expected to ob-
tain two-thirds of the seats in Congress to be able to impeach the Pre-
sident. For this purpose, they had the financial help of the CIA which
had been authorized to spend $1.5 million in the electoral campaign.
(Sigmund, 1977, pp.197-198)
It should be noted here that because of the division of the Radical
Party and the joining of PIR to the opposition, the UP had just over
one-third of the seats in Congress. The proportional representation
system of the electoral law allowed two-thirds of the seats in Congress
to win with much less than two-thirds of the total popular vote. The
optimism of the Right was reinforced by the subdued spirit of the UP
coalition which felt cornered by the presence of the military in their
own government.
The UP leaders were aware of the lack of enthusiasm the working
class had for the solution given by Allende to the October crisis, and
that the government needed no less than 40% of the popular vote to im-
pede the opposition from obtaining the two-thirds of the Congressional
seats. Thus, the UP developed an electoral campaign based on the de-
fense of the "workers' government" against those who were trying to de-
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stroy it. Perhaps the best symbol of this campaign was one of its
slogans, "This government may be shit, but at least it's ours".
(Stallings, 1978, pp.145-14 6 ; Sigmund, 1977, pp.196-198 )
By agreement of both sides at the beginning of 1972, government and
opposition presented a unified list of candidates. All the UP parties
included their candidates in the list of the "Federated Party of the
Popular Unity", and the opposition parties did the same in the list of
the "Democratic Confederation" (CODE). (Sigmund, 1977, pp. 1
6 7 & 172)
In spite of the shortages, inflation, the mistakes of the government,
and the far more intense publicity of the opposition, the campaign of the
UP was successful. The government candidates obtained 44% of the popular
vote and the UP had a gain of two seats in the Senate and six in the
Chamber of Deputies. It was a limited victory for the government, since
it did not achieve the absolute majority needed to change the legislation
for the implementation of the UP Program, or to call for a plebiscite to
change the Constitution. However, it was a clear defeat for the politi-
cians of the opposition. Their counter-offensives had not reduced the
popular support of the government. On the contrary, the core of firm
supporters of the Allende Administration had grown since the Presidential
election, and the Socialists and Communists received a higher percentage
of popular vote and Congressional seats than in any previous Congressional
election. (Sigmund, 1977, p.199; Stallings, 1978, p/14 6)
Paradoxically, the electoral results were well-received by the mili-
tary conspirators. As one of them explained to the New York Times,
Many of us gave a sigh of relief when the Marxists re-
ceived such a high vote because we felt that no poli-
tician could run the country, and that eventually the
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Marxists might be even stronger.
(Jonathan Kandell, The New York
Times, September 27, 1973)
In fact, the electoral results put the government in a much better
situation than it had enjoyed since mid-1972. Its supporters had de-
feated the economic counter-offensive of the dominant class and had also
defeated the electoral publicity of the opposition. The Communist Party
and CUT had finally accepted the need to rest on the grass-roots organi-
zations and initiatives, and the illusions of attracting the petty-
bourgeoisie through conventional economic measures had disappeared.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.216)
In the international scene, the price of copper was on the rise, and
the countries of the "Club of Paris", with the exception of the U.S.,
had accepted to enter into bilateral negotiations to reschedule the pay-
ments due in 1973 on the Chilean external debt. The West European coun-
tries demonstrated their willingness to replace the U.S. as providers of
industrial technology and investments to Chile, and negotiations were
started between CORFO and Citroen, Peugeot, and Pegaso to establish mixed
motor vehicle assembly companies in Chile. (Stallings, 1978, p.177)
Making use of the experience acquired during the October crisis, the
government planners searched for new efficient means for the Social Area
and the State to coordinate with the grass-roots organizations of the
working class. In addition to the National Investments Plan, the Foreign
Exchange budget, and the sectorial planning done by ODEPA, CORFO, or the
Secretary of Distribution, ODEPLAN prepared a Long-Term Strategy which
coordinated all sectors and related all resources to regional develop-
ment and population distribution, and a National Economic Plan in six-
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teen detailed points which included prices, wages, distribution, plan-
ning, and controls. (Roxborough, 1977, pp.129-130)
But these plans were never implemented because the Chilean dominant
class and its foreign allies launched their final wave of attacks on the
government, which led to the overthrow of President Allende and the end
of Chilean democracy in September, 1973.
5. Foreign Experts, Professions and Planners under the Allende Admini-
stration.
One of the basic characteristics of the Allende Administration was
the deep nationalism of its intended structural changes. The UP Program
mixed the theme of anti-imperialism with the call for building a new
system based on the self-reliance of the Chilean people. President
Allende explained many times than the Chilean process did not follow any
foreign models, but attempted to build "socialism smelling of red wine
and empanadas", the traditional smell of popular social gatherings in
Chile. (Morris, 1973, p.3; NACLA, 1972, p.19)
Actually, because it was an unprecedented event for a self-confirmed
Marxist with a program of revolutionary changes to be elected President
in free elections within a well-established representative democracy,
there were no models to follow. Moreover, as Allende said,
Each country has its own particular circumstances and,
it is in light of these circumstances that one must act.
There is no set formula.
(Debray, 1971, p.127)
The unique characteristics of the Chilean process, however, attrac-
ted world attention and many experts arrived to the country during the
Allende years, not as advisors to the government but as researchers wil-
ling to study this new phenomenon. In addition, the Allende Administra-
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tion gave refuge to many Latin American Leftists who had to leave their
own countries due to the political persecutions, and some of them found
employment in technical tasks in the State bureaucracy.
On the other hand, the Communist Party, which was mostly a proleta-
rian organization, made use of the "proletarian international solidarity"
of the Communists of other countries to obtain technical assistance in
some fields. The government itself requested assistance from the UN.,
and also received technical assistance associated with the financial aid
provided for some investment projects.
Thus, in spite of the strong nationalism of the UP Program, and the
prominance of Chilean experts and workers in its implementation, the
foreign experts played some important roles in the Allende Administra-
tion, though with less notoriety than in other more traditional regimes.
The mining experts from France and the Soviet Union, for example,
had an important role evaluating the condition of the machinery and in-
stallations left by Anaconda, Kennecott, or Cerro corporations in the
nationalized copper mines. On basis of their report, the Comptroller
General fixed the deductions that would be made on the book value of
the mines for depreciation, poor maintenance and obsolescence and sub-
stracted the indemnization that would be paid to the companies for the
expropriation of the mines. (Sigmund, 1977, p.153; De Vylder, 1976,
pp. 126-127)
The Soviet Union also provided technical assistance and leased four
modern trawlers to the nationalized Arauco Fishing Company, where Chilean
fishermen learned modern techniques. With them, the catch of Chilean
fisheries increased by 44% in two years, and seafood, for the first time,
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played a significant role in the supply of protein to the population.
However, the same increase in production made the deficiencies in stor-
age, processing and transportation of the seafood from the harbors to
its largest market in Santiago, apparent. (World Affairs Report, Vol.2,
No.4, p.269; De Vylder, 1976, p.97)
Other foreign experts were not so successful, and produced conflicts
with their Chilean colleagues which added to the natural difficulties
faced by the Allende Administration.
Some Mexican and Brazilian agricultural economists who worked for
CORA found that the production goals posted by ODEPA in agreement with
the peasant organizations for the agricultural season 1972-1973, were
too conservative because they represented the cultivation of only 45,000
hectares more than the previous year. They argued that the potential use
of the existing land and water resources was far larger than the actual
use of these resources, and therefore, they postulated a production cam-
aign which incorporated 300,000 new hectares of land for cultivation.
200,000 of these new hectares were located within the large farms expro-
priated by the Agrarian Reform.
Due to their insistence, the goals were reformulated but ODEPA re-
quested to check their feasibility with the producers themselves through
the local officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and the peasant organ-
izations. This checking demonstrated the lack of realism of the proposed
"production campaign" and the goals returned to their original amounts.
(Barraclough, 1974, pp.141-142)
Since Bulgary is the country that specialized in agricultural pro-
duction with the COMECON, the Chilean Communists invited some Bulgarian
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experts to study Chilean agriculture and to make recommendations on
increasing production. Despite their real expertise and good will, the
Bulgarians could not improve the existing diagnosis and recommendations
in a field that had been deeply analyzed for more than ten years.
Their only substantial contribution was to offer financial and tech-
nical assistance in building three large high technology poultry produc-
tion centers, each able to produce 10,000,000 chickens per year. How-
ever, the existing Chilean plans included government aid to small farm
owners to build and operate chicken coops of a capacity of 10,000 to
30,000 chickens each. These small operations gave employment and in-
come to many more people than the Bulgarian complexes and could produce
the same amount of poultry meat per year. They also improved the situ-
ation of the peasant sector that the government was interested in incor-
porating into the agrarian reform process, the sector that was partici-
pating actively in the agricultural planning process.
Thus, in spite of the pressure of the Communists, the National Com-
mittee on Investments approved only one of the Bulgarian projects, and
sustained the existing assistance program for small producers.
More useful was the evaluation of the Agrarian Reform made by ICIRA
in 1972 under the direction of Solon Barraclough at the request of the
Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Chonchol. This critical analysis to
correct the mistakes and to find new solutions for the emerging problems
is still a good reference on the problems of rural development and agri-
cultural transformation today. Some of the Chilean professionals who
worked for ICIRA on this study, such a Jorge Echenique and Sergio Gomez,
worked at ODEPA afterward to apply their own recommendations. The ICIRA
report was published in 1974 in Mexico under the title, "Diagnostico de
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la Reforma Agraria Chilena". (Barraclough, 1974)
Of similar importance was the study on the changes in the consump-
tion habits of the population in relation to income levels, that has
been mentioned before. This study was directed by the FAO expert,
Flavio Machicao, and served as one of the basic documents employed in
formulating the Secretary of Distribution's policy on distribution of
essentials.(Bucher et al., 1973)
In planning technical matters, ODEPLAN received assistance from
ILPES and the Soviet Union, particularly in formulating a long-term
strategy through the establishment of material balances and input-output
techniques. Soviet experts had difficulties adapting fairly sophisti-
cated techniques and mathematical models elaborated through long years
of experience to the rather primitive stage of the Chilean process and
planning system. In addition, the Soviet planning experts remained for
a short time, during which they tried to train Chilean planners in their
techniques through seminars and workshops, which limited their impact.
(Zammit, ed., 1973, pp.97-100)
Of a longer and more permanent nature was the relation with ILPES,
since this UN institute is located in Santiago. Dr. Estevam Strauss in
particular developed a methodology to relate natural resources and de-
mographic trends to socio-economic planning which was used in formulat-
ing a long-term strategy for development by ODEPLAN. (ODEPLAN, 1973)
Probably the most notorious of the foreign experts advising the
Allende Administration was the Professor of Political Science of FLACSO
Joan Garces, who became personal advisor to President Allende. Many
members of the "revolutionary" faction of the UP coalition tended to
406
hold Garces responsible for the President's tendency to side with the
Communists in negotiations with the Christian Democrats and attempts to
attract the petty-bourgeoisie, and in particular, for the gross mistake
of Lo Curro. Actually, in his writings during and after the end of the
Allende Administration, Joan Garces always presented the rationale for
supporting the positions of the President at all times. This may be a
reflection of his own influence on these positions, or simply his loyal-
ty to the President whom he served. (See J. Garces, 1971, in Medhurst,
ed., 1972, pp. 2 7 & ff.)
Garces was not alone in his arguments. In discussions which took
place in 1971, the Minister Director of ODEPLAN Gonzalo Martner, the
Minister of Economy Pedro Vuskovic, and the Director of the Institute of
Development Studies (IDS) of Sussex University (England) Dudley Seers,
agreed to organize an international meeting of economists, sociologists,
political scientists, historians and planners to evaluate the Chilean ex-
perience and its future prospects. Since the Chilean process looked at
from inside could be confusing, (and there were differences inside the
UP coalitions in the interpretation of the events it appeared logical to
invite non-involved, qualified observers to render an objective appraisal
of the advances achieved and to suggest the appropriate means to go for-
ward. This "Round Table" meeting took place in Santiago in March, 1972.
It lasted for ten days and was preceded by preparatory workshops and
visits of the foreign participants to places of their interest in Chile.
(Zammit, ed., 1973, p.5)
The Round Table was inaugurated with a speech by President Allende.
Five Ministers and several high officers of the Allende Administration,
ODEPLAN in particular, participated, in addition to politicians and ex-
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perts from the Chilean opposition and private institutions. They were
faced by experts from fifteen countries, socialistic and capitalistic,
developed and underdeveloped. Among these experts were Hollis B. Chenery
of the World Bank, Joseph Grunewald of the Brookings Institution, Celso
Furtado, two adademicians from the Institute of Mathematical Economics
of Moscow, and the Minister of Planning of Ceylon. The proceedings of
the Round Table were edited by J. Ann Zammit of IDS, and Gabriel Palma
of ODEPLAN, and were published in 1973 under the title, The Chilean Road
to Socialism. (Zammit, ed., 1973)
In the Round Table meetings, the Chileans explained what the Allende
government was doing in relation to planning, participation, and econo-
mic policy, with particular references to the industrial sector, the
copper mines, and the agricultural sector. The foreign experts provided
background papers on the "International Context of the Chilean Road to
Socialism", with particular reference to the experiences in Hungary,
Cuba, Yugoslavia, and Tanzania. The French political scientist, Alain
Joxe, provided the basic framework for discussion in the second half of
the meeting with a paper entitled, "Is the Chilean Road to Socialism
Blocked?". (Zammit, op-git.)
In the discussions, the foreign experts were critical of the apparent
contradictions between the short-term economic policy and the long-term
objectives of the UP Program, and of the reduced importance given in
ODEPLAN documents to foreign exchange and foreign trade policies. Solon
Barraclough anticipated in the meeting some of the critical points later
included in ICIRA's evaluation of the Agrarian Reform. Other foreign ex-
perts analyzed in detail the problems of participation, although they
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recognized that the historical analogies had doubtful validity given
the specificity of the Chilean conditions, they were clearly skeptical
about the Chilean mechanisms, in view of the historical experience of
Yugoslavia, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. (idem)
All these observations were debated by the foreign experts with the
Chilean officers and planners, and influenced the ensuing decisions of
the Allende Administration and the UP coalition. The change in economic
policy of Lo Curro and the calling of the military to solve the October
crisis coincided with the analysis made during the Round Table about the
future prospects of the Chilean Road to Socialism, particularly in Alain
Joxe's paper, which serves as a framework for the discussion of this
point.
Joxe's paper departed by recognizing the extent and intent of the
advances made by the Allende Administration,
Successive reforms have been carried out at a rate, and
with a political purpose ... which are leading towards
a real and irreversible political and social confronta-
tion -- the transition to socialism. The forces now on
the move are no longer electoral forces.
(Zammit, ed., 1973, p.224)
He indicated that an electoral majority in the Congressional elec-
tions of 1973 and the Presidential elections of 1976 would
fulfill the same role as, generally, armed struggle does
in the destruction of the bourgeoisie.
But, he considered that
... a Popular Unity victory in the 1973 Congressional
elections can in no way be regarded as a certainty...
and the prospect of an electoral defeat inevitably




... the struggle for political power, which would change
the existing balance of forces, is not a political struggle
within the framework of the established institutions of the
middle-class State, but a political struggle at the level
of new institutions for the masses, which signify the be-
ginnings of dual power.
(idem, p.229)
This analysis was similar to that of the "revolutionary" faction
within the UP coalition, but neither Joxe nor the other foreign experts
of the Round Table agreed with this faction's proposals for action.
Joxe and the other foreign experts were highly critical of the re-
distribution of income resulting from the short-term economic policies
adopted at the beginning of the Allende Administration. Since Pedro
Vuskovic had explained that one of the objectives of the economic policy
was to increase the electoral support of the government, they considered
that the short-term economic policies had been "a failure in their own
terms" because they had not produced the electoral majority needed to
break in favor of the government the political impasse between the Exe-
cutive and Congress. (idem, p.244)
Joxe added,
The discontent created by supply difficulties cancels
out the satisfaction normally associated with a real
increase in the workers' purchasing power.
(idem, p.229)
And the redistribution of income
... will inevitably mean a lowering, for the first time,
of the real living standards of the privileged classes
and, consequently to a natural intensification of the
class struggle.
(idem, p.230)
However, Joxe rejected the acceleration of the process as proposed
by the Ministry of Economy, Pedro Vuskovic, because of its external im-
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pact, "... it is not compatible with the reasonable middle-class image
necessary to reassure Chile's foreign creditors". (idem, id.) This po-
sition was confirmed by the rest of the foreign experts who unanimously
discarded any "radical approach" as "romantically appealing" but "com-
pletely unrealistic". (idem, p.240)
In addition, Joxe doubted any possibility of agreement between the
UP coalition and the exteme Left (MIR) because of the Communist Party's
opposition. But he also denied the feasibility of an agreement between
the Allende government and the Chrisitian Democrats because they were
controlled by the conservative faction led by ex-President Frei. There-
fore, he proposed approaching the military, since, in his opinion, the
Army was
... ready to step in to ensure the replacement of middle-
class politcal groups where issues of modernizing politi-




There will, therefore, be a Chilean Road to Socialism.
But without confrontation -- victorious confrontation
-- this road will inevitably be via the slow conversion
to socialism of the Armed Forces, of the Christian De-
mocrats and of the middle classes, detaching them from
the imperialist pole of attraction. And that will not
be a question of a legislative agreement.
(Zammit, ed., 1973, p.236 )
The "international middle class" perspective of the Round Table ex-
perts was reinforced shortly thereafter by the celebration, in Chile, of
the UNCTAD Conference which implied the confluence in Santiago of many
other experts and diplomats with similar ideas. It is obvious that there
was a strong coincidence between the analysis of Joxe and the Round
Table, and the decisions and activities of President Allende and the
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Communist Party at Lo Curro and after.
However, it should also be considered that the position of the Com-
munists and the Radicals within the UP coalition was always similar to
that of Joxe in relation to the need to attract the "middle class" and
to reject the "revolutionary" proposals, much before the Round Table.
But until January, 1972, the UP and the President had supported the fast
pace of the process and had accepted the consequences as the normal cost
of it. It was only during the defeat in the by-elections of O'Higgins-,
Colchagua and Linares in that month, the strategy for which the UP coal-
ition began to have second thoughts about, that the Round Table served
as a strong rationale to justify the position of those who were willing
to reduce the speed and depth of the process.
The impact of the foreign experts' opinions was increased by the
traditional cultural dependency of the Chilean society which could not
be changed as fast as the ownership of mines, industries and agricultur-
al land. This was helped by the reduced number of Chilean professionals
who were willing to support the UP Program and were able to provide an
alternative rationale to that of the foreign experts.
In fact, even though the number of professionals who supported the
Allende Administration grew from 26.3% in August, 1970, to 32.6% in
June of 1972, according to the electoral surveys of Eduardo Hamuy, the
large majority of the professionals and their organizations were active
participants in the opposition activities developed by the Chilean domi-
nant class and its foreign allies. This is not surprising because the
Allende Administration threatened to destroy the traditional role and
privileges of the professionals and professions together with the estab-
lished system. (Stallings, 1978, pp.54-55; Roxborough, 1977, pp.84-85)
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It has been mentioned before that in the traditional social struc-
ture, the professions were functional groups within the dominant class.
They served the established system, providing it with a measure of for-
mal rationality and technical efficiency, and legitimacy to the status
of the dominant class by its association with scientific and technical
expertise.
It was also mentioned that the dominant class had privileged access
to higher education which restricted members of other social classes from
becoming involved in the professions. Traditionally in Chile the univer-
sities, the professions, and the State were integrated. This meant that
the professionals schools were related to the professional organizations
and to the specialized agencies of the State in the respective profes-
sional field. (See chapter 2)
Since more than 70% of the Chilean professionals worked for the
State, and the UP Program represented a considerable increase in ex-
tension and depth of the State activities, it could be expected that
professionals would be attracted to the new opportunities for profes-
sional practice that this expansion implied. In addition, the Allende
Administration tried to give special treatment to the professionals and
technicians to avoid problems such as those suffered in Cuba at the be-
ginning of the revolution.
In practice, the Allende government was never devoid of professional
help. Some of the young professionals and university students accepted
the challange represented by the emergence of innovative new areas of
professional work such as the local health centers, the housing construc-
tion brigades, or the experimental neighborhood courts, with enthusiasm.
(Morris, 1973, pp. 2 2 1 & 245)
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However, many other professionals working for the State resented
both the loss of their dominant position because of the participation
of workers in decision-making, and the new assertiveness of the working
class in governmental relations. Those professionals, whose main source
of income was the private practice, had a strong solidarity with the
businessmen and latifundio owners who were their clients. Thus, most
of the professionals felt that same hostility as the rest of the domi-
nant class toward the Allende Administration.
Professional organizations were instrumental in the developing of a
"gremialista" opposition to the Allende government and participated
actively in the lockouts of truck owners in October of 1972 and July of
1973, but their campaign started much earlier.
Soon after the inauguration of President Allende, a debate was
started around a critical essay of the new State Counselor, Eduardo
Novoa, entitled "Justicia de Clase", which was an indictment of the
judiciary because of its bias in favor of the dominant class. The ob-
servation that the existing courts tended to impose stern sentences on
workers and peasants, and to be lenient toward white-collar crimes and
members of the dominant class was justified in a public declaration by
the "Colegio de Abogados" (Bar Association). The professional organiza-
tion defended the judiciary, arguing that to denigrate the courts "ham-
pers plans for collective progress" and "accentuates the deterioration of
the democratic regime and the state of law of which we are so proud".
(Medhurst, ed., 1972, p.83)
This debate became harsher when the Supreme Court denied the neces-
sary Constitutional authorization to include Senator Raul Morales in the
judicial inquest about the assasination of General Schneider. Again,
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the Colegio de Abogados appeared in defense of the judiciary in front of
the public outcry against the incredible decision which practically
stopped the investigation much before it could be completed.
The Colegio de Abogados assisted the Christian Democrats and Nation-
al Party Congressmen to defeat the project of neighborhood courts pre-
sented by the government. The project tried to open people's access to
the administration of justice by eliminating many formal rituals, and
by creating minor claims courts at the local level. These courts would
be served by three judges, two of whom would be elected by the residents
in the neighborhood, and the third by the local governor among the par-
ticipants in some neighborhood organization such as Neighborhood Councils
or Mothers' Centers.
The main argument of the opposition against this project was that
to be elected one of the proposed neighborhood judges, it was not neces-
sary to be a lawyer. In addition, the designation of one of the judges
by the government violated the Constitutional separation of powers. As
with many other projects of the Allende government, this one was rejec-
ted by the opposition majority in Congress, which deprived the neighbor-
hood courts, which had emerged experimental;y in several localities of
legal sanctions and regulations. (Morris, 1973, pp.220-2 2 1)
Colegio de Abogados appeared once more in public against the govern-
ment in July, 1971, when the government failed to exclude lawyers from
the fixed maximum income. It protested for the "lack of consideration
shown by the government to our Orden", and the "unjustified and offen-
sive contempt" with which lawyers had been treated and resented in view
of "the dignity of their profession". (Medhurst, ed., 1972, p.83 ;
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Roxborough, 1977, p.8 6)
In August, 1971, the Supervisors of the copper mines declared a
strike demanding participation in the management of the mines. Their
strike was supported by the "Junta de Profesionales de Concepcion" which
united the members of several professions and of the faculty of the Uni-
versidad de Concepcion. At the end of the same month, all professionals
were called to join the Confederacion Unica de Profesionales de Chile
(CUPCH: United Chilean Confederation of Professionals), one of the
starting elements of the opposition front organization being coordinated
by SOFOFA and the political parties of the opposition. The main theme of
attraction to CUPCH was defending the professional roles and privileges
against their displacement by the new system being implemented, in the
name of "respect for the freedom to work". (Medhurst, ed., 1972, pp.83-
84; Roxborough, 1977, p.86)
The UP coalition responded with the organization of a "Frente
Patriotico de Profesionales" (Professional Patriotic Front) which was
effiecient in stopping some of the maneuvers of the opposition inside
the professional organizations. This was a minority group, and could
not stop their alignment with the rest of the dominant class. This was
also reflected in the elections for authorities within the universities
which were won by Christian Democrats in all cases except in the State
Technical University.
A significant conflict developed inside Universidad de Chile at the
end of 1971. The new Rector, Edgardo Boeninger, former Budget Director
of the Frei Administration, opposed a project of new structure within
the university approved by the Supreme Council in which the UP had ma-
jority. Actually the project had been elaborated for several years in
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response to the University Reform movements of 1968 and 1969, but the
election of Allende in 1970, had changed the perspective in the academic
community. Many Left-leaning professors entered to work in the Allende
Administration, while many former officers of the Frei Administration
entered or returned to the university. The project of new structure
threatened to affect the distribution of political forces inside the
university.
One of the main points of conflict was the proposed incorporation of
the Law School into a new Faculty of Social Sciences, together with
anthropology, sociology, and economics. The suggestion that legal
studies are an aspect of social science was interpreted by the lawyers,
law students, and El Mercurio as an "attack against the rule of law which
is the basis of the Western civilization". (Roxborough, 1977, p.87) At
the beginning of 1971, this writer, at the request of the Dean of the
Law School, prepared a paper analyzing the relations between social
change and the legal system. This analysis demonstrated that the theo-
retical fundamentals and formal rules of the Chilean legal system, which
had been adopted in the XIX Century and before, were inadequate to serve
the requirements of the changing social reality of the present. It post-
ulated the need for social scientists to make use of the objective ana-
lysis of such reality in constructing a new, more flexible legal system,
and that this should be the main task of legal studies given the re-
quirements of the country. (C.E. Dominguez, April 1971)
However, most of the lawyers and Law School professors were unable
or unwilling to make the distinction between the symbolic and abstract
importance of the law, and the specific legal system inherited from the
past. Instead of accepting the integration between law and social sci-
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ence, they forced the professors of sociology of law at the Law School to
be transfered to the School of Sociology in another campus of the uni-
versity. (Sigmund, 1977, p.1 6 3 )
In November, 1971, the "Colegio de Ingenieros" (engineers profession-
al association) in a public declaration claimed the "right of leadership"
for engineers "who must in no way be submitted to political changes".
Shortly after, the same organization protested against assumed "viola-
tions of the human rights of businessmen" in preparation for the first
public meeting of FRENAP (National Front of the Private Sector) which
took place at the beginning of December. (Medhurst, ed., 1972, p.83;
Stallings, 1978, p.139)
In general, as one author put it,
The professionals became some of the most vociferous
opponents of Popular Unity. For many, this was under-
standable, as they depended for their wealth on the un-
equal distribution of incomes which Popular Unity was
pledged to change ... The professions were jealous of
their corporated privileges and status.
(Roxborough, 1977, p.86)
For example, the hatred demonstrated by physicians against the doc-
tors who worked in hospitals and health centers during the stoppage of
October, 1972, surprised observers. Probably the two Ministers of the
Allende Administration most hated by the opposition, and with good rea-
son, were two who had high professional qualifications and training in
planning, Pedro Vuskovic and Jacques Chonchol. Chonchol had been, for
a long time, considered the main theoretical and practical force behind
the "fast and deep" Agrarian Reform. Since he was Chief of INDAP under
Frei, he appeared as a strong supporter of the new militancy and organi-
zation of agricultural workers. (Loveman, 1979, p.342) Vuskovic appeared
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as the principal responsible for the organization of the Social Area of
the economy, the redistribution of income in favor of the working class,
the support of the JAPs, and the increasing socialization of the distri-
bution system.
Because of their central position in the Allende government, plan-
ners were exposed to harsh criticism for their real or assumed mistakes.
Hostile analysts naturally considered the whole UP Program as a mis-
take, and consequently, the means used for its implementation were ne-
cessarily flawed. Given the difficulties found by the Allende Admini-
stration and its tragic end, many sympathetic observers also labeled
these failures as internal causes for the final outcome.
An early example of the first group is Paul Rosestein-Rodan, who at-
tributed the overthrow of Allende to "poor leadership, poor planning and
lack of economic realism". (Rosestein-Rodan, 1974) Much later, Paul
Sigmund followed the same line.
After recognizing that "Allende's economic policy, under the direc-
tion of Pedro Vuskovic, had appeared to be a great success during the
first year," (Sigmund, 1977, p.172) Sigmund asserts that, "... the favor-
able economic indicators for inflation, employment, and agricultural and
industrial production concealed the basically unsound nature of the
Vuskovic policy until it was too late." (id., p. 1 77 )
But these analyses had little objectivity as the authors themselves
tried to demonstrate, since Rosestein-Rodan started with the proposi-
tion, "Allende died, not because he was a socialist, but because he was
an incompetent". And Sigmund sustains,
Allende, with his characteristic lack of concern for
(and ignorance of) economics, had left the inflation
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problem to his economy minister until it finally
became evident, in mid-1972, that his policy was
a failure. (idem., p.177)
Since Sigmund is a political scientist, it is clear that he cannot claim
more expertise than Vuskovic in economics, and that his evaluation about
the knowledge of President Allende is purely subjective.
But, more important, is the opinion of those analysts who had no
personal hostility against President Allende, and they also criticized
the planning aspect of his administration. The criticisms of the
ODEPLAN-IDS Round Table in March, 1972, regarding apparent contradic-
tions between the short-term economic policy designed to recover the
country from the depression at the end of 1970 and the long-term ob-
jectives of the UP Program had been mentioned before.
The basic point of their critical analysis was the Keynesian nature
of the short-term measures which sparked the consumerism of the working
class, instead of creating a more "socialist" conscience towards pro-
duction and productivity. This had results in shortages of some items
due to demand increases, and had failed to produce the intended elec-
toral majority necessary to further implement the UP Program. (Zammit,
ed., 1973, pp2 2 9 & 244)
A similar observation was made by Stefen De Vylder. He wrote,
It proved, in fact, to be the most difficult to make a
planned transition from a policy based on an overall in-
crease in consumption and quite indiscriminate effort to
mobilize idle resources, to a more sophisticated develop-
ment policy based on capital accumulation and economic
planning. In part, the increase in output and consump-
tion in 1971 took place at the expense of possibilities
of future growth.
He characterized the situation of the economy in the second half of the
Allende Administration as "a system of neither plan nor market", result-
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ing in stagnation and inflation. (De Vylder, 1976, pp. 7 8 & 101)
In a similar way, planning under Allende was described by other
writers in the following terms,
The declared intention was to establish a planned mixed
economy, in which the private sector was subordinate to
the planned social sector. Yet, although the government
planning agency, ODEPLAN, had devised numerous plans on
paper, the translation of theory into reality remained as
difficult as ever. For the success or otherwise of plan-
ning, depended on the outcome of the political struggle,
on whether Popular Unity could gain control of the eco-
nomy. (Roxborough, 1977, p.94)
The same analysis added,
From 1972 onwards, Popular Unity faced a precarious poli-
tical and economic situation ... Faced with the dilemma
of a powerful opposition and an expectant working class,
Popular Unity seemed incapable of imposing any coherent
economic policy ... It was not that UP lacked competent
economists able to devise technical solutions. It was
that the UP lacked the powers to implement its policies.
As a consequence, at a time when firm and decisive poli-
cies were needed, the economy simply drifted.
(Roxborough, 1977, pp.125-126)
The same perspective is adopted by Barbara Stallings,
It is somewhat difficult to characterize government po-
licy during the last year of the UP, because it had little
coherence or focus. Rather, it consisted of trying to
survive on a day to day basis, of reacting to the initi-
atives of others, of floating some trial balloons and
pulling them as soon as they encountered rough going.
(Stallings, 1978, p.144)
These criticisms may be resumed in two basic points which required
separate analysis: 1) The short-term economic policies were a mistake.
2) Planning in the second half of the Allende Administration was non-
existent or ineffective for lack of implementation.
In a previous section of this chapter, it was explained that the
short-term economic policies were emergency measures taken to solve the
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economic depression resulting from the Frei government policies and from
the effort of the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies to pro-
duce an economic chaos which would justify the intervention of the mili-
tary to stop Allende from assuming the Presidency. Even though Stefan
De Vylder and the experts of the 1972 Round Table considered it as "one
example of a choice of policy which created more problems than it
solved", (De Vylder, 1977, p.215), neither he nor the experts were able
to indicate which alternative policy they had taken if in the place of
Chilean planners.
It is true that the planners underestimated the imDact of the mea-
sures adopted to reactivate the economy, but at the end of 1970, it was
impossible to estimate, in advance, the response of the businessmen and
workers to these policies, given the political uncertainties of the mo-
ment. The policies had to be Keynesian in nature since they had to op-
erate in a capitalistic system, not yet affected by the structural
changes introduced later.
Actually, two alternative policies were considered at that time.
One was to do nothing but wait for the economic crisis to run its
course, and the other was to anticipate the structural changes, making
use of the crisis itself to take immediate control of the enterprises
considered to be included in the Social Area. These alternatives were
rejected because both of them had a high probability of attracting mi-
litary intervention.
The short-term economic policies were far from being the mistake as
they were considered by the analysts mentioned above. They provided the
necessary breathing space to start the implementation of the structural
changes of the UP Program in an environment of economic growth. They
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convinced the population that the Allende Administration was serious
in its intention to redistribute income in favor of the working class.
Even though short-term economic policies did not change the entire
electoral distribution immediately, they introduced a clear trend which
transformed the 36% vote of Allende in 1970 into the 44% vote of the UP
in the March 1973 elections.
The commentators mentioned before analyzed the short-term policies
as if they were "the economic policy" of the Allende Administration in
1971, to be replaced by a non-coherent drift in 1972 and 1973. But the
short-term measures were not "the" economic policy. As it was indicated
before, they were complementary to the implementation of the structural
changes contained in the UP Program, which was the basic economic and
social policy of the Allende Administration, and which was carried on
during the whole Allende period, except the last month before the mili-
tary counter-revolution.
Even the decisions of the UP coalition and President Allende in Lo
Curro, and the lock-out of the opposition in October of 1972 did not
stop the process of formation of the Social Area and the Agrarian Reform
which continued until July, 1973. In January, 1973, the National Secret-
ary of Distribution was created to direct the planned distribution of
food and other basic goods. In April of that same year, the National
Investments Plan was completed while many of its elements had already
been implemented. At the beginning of 1973, the participation mecha-
nisms were revised and improved through the benefit of past experience,
and the annual economic program was prepared to coordinate with the
State budgetary process, with the Investments Plan, and with the foreign
exchange budget prepared by SEREX.
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Far from drifting in a non-coherent fashion or responding only to
the initiatives of others, the government planners and the organiza-
tions of the working class were slowly shaping a new economic structure
by implementing the UP Program. Perhaps the analysts mentioned above
were misled by the conventional indicators. As it was observed before,
those indicators were designed to serve the traditional system and
therefore could detect its destruction, but not the construction of the
new structure.
Maybe they were also confused by the unconventional nature of the
planners' work under Allende. In most cases, planning is done within
the parameters of an established social system; in the Allende Admini-
stration, planning was directed to change the parameters and the whole
traditional system. Thus many of the conventional technical instruments
used by planners were either practically useless for implementing the
UP Program, or they had to be substantially modified to serve their new
functions.
A good example of this is Stefan De Vylder's use of the concept
"disequilibria", used to describe the economy in 1972 to 1973. This
term was also employed by ICIRA in its evaluation of the Agrarian Re-
form. (De Vylder, 1977, pp.209-210; Barraclough, 1974, p.99) The concept
was used to describe the process of rapid growth which naturally unba-
lances the economic system, particularly in a program geared toward de-
stroying the system and replacing it with a new one. It does not make
too much sense to criticize this policy for creating disequilibria but
many economists trained in the equilibrium models of classical and neo-
classical economic theory tended to apply them to a situation which, by
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nature, was of disequilibrium and social conflict.
It was explained before that the economic policies adopted in Lo
Curro by the UP coalition and by President Allende were efforts to
achieve "equilibrium at a higher level", and how those policies neces-
sarily failed. Some of the economists involved in the design of these
policies, such as Carl Matus, and some associated foreign advisors, such
as Edward Boorstein, continued using the same analytical paradigm. Still
in July, 1973, they were attempting to find measures to control infla-
tion through monetarism from the Central Bank. However, they only suc-
ceeded in providing good material for the publicity of the anti-Allende
forces. (Boorstein, 1977, pp.195-203)
But most of the Chilean economists were able to overcome the draw-
backs of their training. Boorstein himself found that investment plan-
ners rejected his recipes for controlling inflation through monetary ba-
lances. (op.cit., p.203) On the contrary, the conscience was formed at
the highest level in the direction of the Allende Administration that
conventional economic measures were useless and could be damaging.
For example, the Chilean economist, Sergio Bitar, of the Planning
Center (CEPLAN) of Universidad de Chile, became economic advisor of the
Cabinet and of President Allende in 1972, and was appointed Minister of
Mines at the beginning of 1973. In a series of memorandums with ana-
lyses and proposals between November 1972 and June 1973, Bitar repeated
the same position defended by Pedro Vuskovic in Lo Curro. He used the
concept of "disequilibrium" to describe the monetary and financial situ-
ation, and he worried about the dangers of hyperinflation, but he ex-
plained, "In these conditions, many conventional instruments of economic
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policy naturally demonstrate to be insufficient or inefficient".
(Bitar, 1979, p.338)
His proposals for action were based on the proposition that "there
had been advances but they are not enough". They included the expansion
of the Social Area; the centralization of planning; and the control of
the distribution system by the State. This last was proposed through
the expansion of the Secretary of Distribution, the reinforcement of the
controls of DIRINCO, and the organized cooperation with grass-roots or-
ganizations, JAPs in particular, to attack the black market and specula-
tion in the supply of basic goods. (op.cit., pp.351-353)
Actually, the Chilean planners frequently had to specially design
new techincal instruments for the task they were carrying on under a
constant pressure. The process, once started, acquired a dynamism of
its own which threatened to catch the planners unprepared to respond to
the new situations which continually emerged. A good image of this was
given by the UNCTAD building situation. The construction workers were
faster than the draftsmen who prepared the blueprints; the first blue-
prints for the building were ready three months before the construction
started, but the last blueprints were provided with only 24 hours of an-
ticipation to their actual use.
On the other hand, even though the UP ideologically favored science
and technology, scientific rationality and objectivity had no other
value in themselves but as instruments at the service of the process.
The pressures of the work to be done left little time for planners to
engage in elaborate research or model-building. However, planners
were supposed to maintain a clear mind in the midst of the turbulence,
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to be able to discern long-term trends, and to perceive the consequences
of the whole process, out of the multiple details of the day-to-day op-
erations of the Social Area and the State agencies. (P.W. Fagen, 1973,
p.29)
The peculiar conditions of the planning work in the Allende Admini-
stration may be well illustrated by the process of defining the policy
of agricultural machinery distribution.
It was mentioned before, that in 1970 there existed in Chile some
18,000 tractors serving agricultural production. Most of them were con-
centrated in the private farms not affected by the Agrarian Reform,
since the law allowed the former landlords to conserve their machinery
in the case of expropriation. 10,000 new tractors were imported in
1971-1972, destined in part to provide the productive units of the re-
formed area with a basic equipment which included one tractor per unit.
However, the expropriated latifundios totalled only 4,700 as of June,
1972, and several of them had some machinery including tractors. Actu-
ally, the figure of 10,000 had been adopted to insure that the govern-
ment could support agricultural production without being dependent on
the assumedly hostile traditional landlords. But a conflict developed
over the distribution of the tractors not assigned as basic equipment to
the productive units.
Peasant organizations pressed for distribution to the productive
units in relation to their "needs", which meant more tractors to the
larger farms. But SEAM, the specialized subsidiary of CORFO, sustained
that it was more efficient and "socialist" to maintain the tractors
under State control in the machinery pools managed by SEAM.
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The Allende government was interested in maintaining and increasing
the support of the peasant organizations, but was interested, particu-
larly, in favoring the cooperatives of small farms which would be de-
prived of machinery if it was distributed to the large farms. In addi-
tion, there was concern over the case of some beneficiaries of the Agra-
rian Reform who leased their machinery to their neighbors instead of
using it to cultivate the land that they had been assigned.
The general strategy of the Allende Administration was to favor
labor-intensive technologies instead of more mechanized ones, but no
precise definition had been made about the level of technology to be
adopted as ideal in the agricultural sector. Some of the countries
which supplied the new tractors, Rumania in particular, were interested
in increasing their sales and offered credits and other favorable com-
mercial conditions. These incentives seemed very attractive to SEAM
and the other officers in charge of importing agricultural machinery
because they tended to see a direct relationship between agricultural
machinery and agricultural production and productivity. (Barraclough,
1974, p.132; Zammit, ed., 1973, p.13 2 )
Thus, two decisions, each having complex consequences, had to be
made: How many tractors were to be imported? How were they to be dis-
stributed? This writer was charged by the Minister of Agriculture with
designing a policy that included these two decisions, and time was pres-
sing because the imported tractors were already arriving.
A procedure was developed to estimate the requirements of machinery
at the then-predominant level of technology in order to fulfill the pro-
duction goals agreed upon with the peasant organizations. This procedure
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demonstrated that the 10,000 new tractors added to the previously
existing ones exceeded the needs of the production program and there-
fore, no new imports were necessary in the near future, except in spe-
cial cases.
However, the discussion about distributing the new tractors that
were arriving continued. A draft of new policy was submitted to the
Agricultural Commission of the UP to solve the conflict, but the Com-
mission did not act on it. The opportunity for formalization of the new
policy, however, emerged suddenly when the Minister of Agriculture,
Jacques Chonchol, was called by President Allende to discuss the pending
problems of the sector. In less than 24 hours, the drafted policy had
to be reduced to a three page memorandum so the President could read it.
The new policy included the creation of the Communal Machinery Pools
under the administration of the Peasant Councils, with the technical
assistance and maintenance services of SEAM. The bulk of the new trac-
tors would be assigned to these Communal Pools. Under the control of
the peasants, they would serve all the productive units of the locality
according to their needs, not only the large ones. They would also
provide an economic base for the Peasant Councils independent of the
government.
The approval of the President made this an official policy to be
implemented by SEAM and the Ministry of Agriculture. But this approval
came shortly before the crisis of October, 1972, which resulted in a
shortage of fuel for tractors and other machinery in the rural areas.
In addition, the solution of the crisis by calling the military to gov-
ernment implied the change of the Minister of Agriculture. It has also
been indicated before that there were differences among Peasant Councils
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in relation to their strength and capabilities. Thus, the implementa-
tion of the new policy was delayed until the new Minister could be in-
formed, the distribution of fuel was assured, and the first Peasant
Councils capable of assuming the new responsibility were identified.
However, at the beginning of 1973, the first Communal Machinery Pools
were starting and the National Investments Plan included the maintenance
centers and fuel supply installations related to them. (Steeland, 1977,
pp.170-171)
The description above indicates some of the specific characteristics
of the role of the planner under Allende, and how the technical and po-
litical elements, coupled with the time constraints, synthesized into
innovative solutions that advanced the process of creating the new
socio-economic structure.
Even though the 1965 Agricultural Census and the import registers
allowed a fairly precise estimate of the existing machinery, until 1970
the introduction of tractors in Chile had been a function of both the
effectiveness of the sales personnel from the foreign producers, and of
the availability of foreign exchange in the country, not of the needs of
agricultural production. Therefore, the planners had to create the
technical procedure to estimate these needs in order to justify their
position in the conflict between the peasants and the technocrats. This
was not easy since, as it was indicated before, there were some experts
who were pressing for a fast expansion of the cultivated area, and no
previous definition had been made about the level of technology to be
favored inthe agricultural sector. Thus, the solution to the technical
problem required an innovation that defined the technological level.
This responsibility had deep socio-economic consequences.
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But the solution of the technical problem was easier than the poli-
tical one, which implied also a definition of the socialization level
within the agricultural sector, and confronted not antagonistic but di-
vergent views inside the UP coalition. The planners in this conflict
were in a fairly typical position of their role in the Allende Admini-
stration. That is, they were in the center between the State agencies
which had a well-defined tradition of their own role, and the workers
who rejected the State's exchange of their old bosses and aspired to
control their own means of production as a basis for their own self-
determination.
However, both parties were locked in old modes of control, and there-
fore, the planners could overcome the conflict by creating a new struc-
ture of relations between the peasants, the State, and the agricultural
machinery.
The example above also indicates that it was a mistake to sustain,
as Roxborough and other analysts did, that the planner's work remained
on paper without implementation under Allende. This study has shown be-
fore that the UP Program was actually a planned strategy for action, and
that there were planners who coordinated action between the State agen-
cies and the working class organizations in order to implement the
program.
The scarcity of available resources in the Allende Administration,
and the big obstacles that had to be overcome, should be remembered.
The UP never counted with the sympathy of more than one-third of the
professionals and white-collar employees who worked for the State agen-
cies, and suffered the hostility from the Comptroller General, Congress,
and the Judiciary. In addition, the public employees were traditionally
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accustomed to giving preferential treatment to the members of the do-
minant class while assuming an authoritarian or, at best, patronizing
attitude towards blue-collar workers and peasants.
Moreover, the politicians of the Left had been for a long time in
the opposition and therefore had little practice in running the govern-
ment. The UP coalition was an heterogeneous political alliance with in-
ternal conflicts over the pace and depth of the measures to be taken in
implementing the UP Program; the workers and peasants who the UP Program
called in to participate in the government tasks naturally had much less
knowledge about the inner workings of the State agencies.
In addition, the Allende Administration was confronted with a plan-
ned counter-offensive of the Chilean dominant class and its foreign
allies, which in successive waves of operation tried to stop the process
of implementating the UP Program and to destroy the Allende government.
Despite all these difficulties, the Allende Administration was able
to advance the UP Program quickly and deeply towards its central ob-
jective "to bring to an end the rule of the imperialists, the monopo-
lists, and the landed oligarchy, and to initiate the construction of
socialism in Chile." (Zammit, ed., 1973, p.259)
In less than three years, the Allende government nationalized the
copper mines and all the other strategic economic activities which were
foreign owned; completed the process of expropriations of the Agrarian
Reform; nationalized most of the banks and large industrial and commer-
cial enterprises, and started the organization of the Social Area of
the economy; rescued the country from the economic depression of 1970,
increased production and redistributed income in favor of the working
class; organized the participation of workers in the management of the
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nationalized enterprises and in government planning; started to install
a planned system of distribution of basic goods, and increased substani-
ally, the construction of housing for low-income people and the provi-
sion of education and health services for the large majority of the
population.
It is clear that without planning, it would have been very difficult,
if not impossible, to attain all these achievements. Actually, it was
the implementation of the UP Program that transformed the Allende Admini-
stration from a potential threat to the traditional system of control by
the Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies to an actual danger;
planners had a major role in this process of transformation, as it had
been described previously in this study.
From his "equilibrium" perspective, De Vylder arrived at the conclu-
sion "that by the time the armed forces won their easy military victory,
the UP had already been defeated on most other battlegrounds". (De Vylder,
1976, p.214) However, this is actually the opposite of what really hap-
pened. As it was shown before, the legal, political, and economic as-
saults of the opposition against the Allende government failed to stop
the process; the only resource left to the Chilean dominant class and
its foreign allies was the violent military counter-revolution which
killed President Allende and destroyed the democratic regime.
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6. Epilogue: A Planned Counter-Revolution.
After the Congressional elections of March 1973 the Military Minis-
ters presented their resignations to President Allende with the public
explanation that they had accomplished their mission of guaranteeing the
normal and free elctoral process. There were, however, two other reasons.
The first was the rejection by the Comptroller of the requisition
decree of 45 enterprises that had been occupied by the workers since
the October crisis. The President was willing to overcome the Comp-
troller's objections through "'insistence decrees", but the signature of
such decrees made the Ministers "personally responsible" for their ef-
fects. Most of the UP Ministers were commited to the process and, in
any case, had little wealth to lose if the affected businessmen tried
to execute that responsibility through the opposition dominated courts.
But the military Ministers felt the threat more intensely and were re-
luctant to endorse the "insistence decrees", which were easily signed
by their civilian replacements at the beginning of April. (Bitar,
1979 p.234)
The second silent reason for the resignation of the military
Ministers was the perception by General Prats that he was in danger of
losing control of the Army because of his absortion in the Ministerial
tasks. On April 13, General Prats had a meeting with a large number
of officers of the Army at the Acadamy of War, where he defended the
Allende Administration and proposed the idea of an alliance between the
workers and the military. His argument was that the nationalism of the
armed forces coincided with the anti-imperialistic and anti-monopolistic
objectives of the UP Program. (Sigmund, 1977 p.20 8 . Rojas, 1976 p.132)
But Prat's move was too late. Immediately after the March
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elections, the hard-line conspirators had reached an agreement with
Pinochet. Pinochet appeared in public as a "Constitutionalist", loyal
to General Prats and to President Allende until September 1973. But
he confessed in 1974 that since May 1972 he had been open to the idea
of military intervention to solve "the breakdown of our society". Thus
he accepted to join the conspiators on two conditions; one, that all the
armed forces were involved, including the national Police ("Carabineros")
which was the only competitor of the Army for physical control of the
national territory; and the other, that he, Pinochet, would be the
leader of the coup. (Sigmund, 1977 p. 2 0 8 . Rojas, 1976 p. 132)
For the final offensive against the Allende Administration, the
Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies put together all their
resources in a planned effort which involved four programs:
1.) To present the government as violating the Constitution and
the laws.
In April 1973, the Constitutional conflict over the three areas of
the economy was resurrected by the opposition, accompanied by another
conflict of the same kind resulting from the introduction of a second
Constitutional amendment by Senator Rafael Moreno of PDC. This amend-
ment was apparently directed to stop the Agrarian Reform as it was
carried out by the Allende Administration; however, its main purpose was
to create new "evidence" of Constitutional "violations" by the Executive.
(Sigmund, 1977 p.182)
At the same time, the National Party started impeachment pro-
ceedings against four Ministers, on the basis of the "insistence
decrees" mentioned above. The Supreme Court made public a formal pro-
test against assumed "illegalities" of the Executive, while simultaneous-
ly ignoring the growing wave of terrorist activities of right-wing
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groups, and the open calling of the National Party and the opposition
press for the overthowing of the government. (Roxborough, 1977 p.2 10
Sigmund, 1977 p.210)
These maneuvers had their climax at the end of August, when the
majority of Congress passed a resolution accusing the government of at-
tempting to impose a totalitarian system in Chile by violating the
Constitution and the law, and called for the military intervention.
(Sigmund, 1977 pp.232-233. Lovemen, 1979 p.334)
2.) To create social and economic chaos.
This program began in April with a protest of the Secondary Stu-
dents, an organization that was controlled by the Christian Democrats,
over a projected reform of the educational system being discussed be-
tween the government and the Catholic Church. Even though a basic
agreement had been reached between the Minister of Education and the
Church representatives, and a joint commission had been formed to re-
vise the project, the High School students publicly demonstrated, and
with the help of Patria y Libertad, developed violent incidents in
Santiago. (Sigmund, 1977 p.204)
They were followed on April 19, by the strike at the copper mine
"El Teniente", one of the large nationalized mines. The copper miners
were among the best paid workers in the country, but the Christian
Democrat labor leaders who controlled the white-collar unions at the
mine were able to convince the workers to make use of an omission in the
text of the wage law to request a 150% wage increase, instead of the
100% adjustment received by all the other workers as compensation for
inflation.
The UP labor leaders managed to get most of the workers to return
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to work in 24 hours, but a group of Christian Democratic workers, par-
ticularly white-collar employees and technical supervisors, continued
to strike and provoked violent incidents in the city of Rancagua. Later,
they marched over to Santiago where they were received by Congress and
the Christian Democratic Party, and were assisted with food and other
supplies by the same elegant ladies who had participated in the "March
of the Empty Pots". (Roxborough, 1977 pp.208-210. Bitar. 1979 pp. 232-233)
The Chilean dominant class used the El Teniente strikers to pro-
claim nationally and internationally that the Chilean working class was
against Allende. This publicity was accompanied by a growing wave of
terrorist attacks by Patria y Libertad and the "comando de Ex Cadetes".
in the one week period from June 17 to June 24 they were responsible for
77 bomb attacks throughout the country. (Roxborough, 1977 p.210)
The "miners of El Teniente" left the scene at the beginning of
July, once they accomplished their publicity objective, but at the end
of the same month, the truck owners staged a new lockout with similar
characteristics to the previous one in October 1972. Merchants and
professionals followed them with "solidarity" stop'oages, and the lock-
out was accompanied by terrorist attacks against oil and gas pipelines,
railroad tracks, and high tension electric lines. The leader of the
truck owners, Leon Vilarin, proclaimed that this lockout was to last
until the end of the Allende government. (Stallings, 1978 p.1 50 .
Roxborough, 1977 p.218 )
The two programs described above were civilian actions which re-
peated previously attempted moves. This time they were not assumed to
overthrow the government by themselves, but to provide a favorable
environment for the military actions which also followed two programs
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3.) To neutralize the potential armed resistance of the working
class.
The most important instrument employed for this purpose was the
Arms Control Law of 1972, which authorized the military to conduct
searches in places where they suspected the existence of illegal deposits
of firearms.
Since the end of 1972, and with increasing extension and intensity
in 1973, the military carried on sustematic searches in factories of the
Social Area, and other places where the organizations of the working
class developed their activities. Until June 1973, there were about
3 searches per week; but in July there were 24, and in August, 45 oper-
ations of this kind. (Rojas, 1976 p.141. Roxborough, 1977 p.201)
The political orientation of these searches was clear. Of the 24
operations in July 10 were in factories; 4 against offices of the UP
parties; 3 against grass-roots organizations; 3 against government
offices, and only 2 against right-wing terrorist groups. However in the
same month these terrorist groups made 128 armed attacks against govern-
ment officials, UP leaders, UP party offices, periodicals, and radio
stations which supported the government. (Rojas, 1976 p.141)
The purposes of these operations were quite different from the
apparent objectives of the law. They were conducted as a way of testing
the fighting capabilities of workers and peasants; of training the
troops in fighting civilians: of carrying joint operations of all the
armed forces to test their coordination in the field; of detecting UP
sympathizers among the military, and of challenging the political re-
sponce of the UP. (Rojas, 1976 p.141. Roxborough, 1977 p.201)
All these elements were present in what was probably the largest
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operation of this type which took place in the southern city of Punta
Arenas on August 4, as a kind of dress rehersal for the September coup.
About 2,000 soldiers and sailors with tanks, armored cars, helicopters
and airplanes under the command of the local Chief of the Army, General
Manuel Torres de la Cruz, surrounded and searched the whole industrial
sector of the city. The operation lasted for eight hours and left one
worker dead and costly material damaged due to the brutality of the
military. The only arm found was a small pistol of a night watchman who
had a legal permit for it. (Rojas, 1976 pp.142-143. Roxborough pp.201-202)
4.) To consolidate the internal unity of the armed forces.
The officers at the Academy of War in their "war games" prepared
the strategy and tactics to be followed to "occupy" Santiago and the
other large cities and to control the national territory, in order to
destroy the "enemy", that is the UP coalition and the organizations of
the working class. (Rojas, 1976 pp. 8 4 & pp. 194-199)
But to insure the victory in this "war" it was necessary to avoid
the internal division of the Armed Forces, by controlling the sympathizers
of the government among the military and the members of the "Constitu-
tioalist" faction, particularly the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
General Carlos Prats.
President Allende and the UP were confident that most of the sol-
diers would be 18 year old working class men recruited through the
armed draft. A majority of working class soldiers and non-commissioned
officers together with a commanding faction of "Constitutionalist" of-
ficers, would be enough to maintain the loyalty of the military to the
Constitutional government.
However, the armed forces were physically unable to train all the
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potential recruits during the respective year, and therefore had to make
a selection among the registered men of age each year. Traditionally
this had been a good excuse to free the youth of the dominant class and
the petty-bourgeoisie from military service. It had also provided the
military service with some social justification in peace times, since
the draftees from the working class received some basic education and
technical training through the service, which otherwise was out of the
reach of poor families.
But since 1970, the Recruitment Service of the Armed Forces
changed this policy in the name of the "democratization" of the military
service. Anticipating their opposition to the Allende Administration,
the military had insured that a large number of draftees would be of
the dominant class or the petty-bourgeoisie by giving preference to those
who had more education, particularly high school graduates. Moreover,
in 1972 and 1973 the military instructors screened their trainees and
discharged any recruit who appeared to be an UP sympathizer.
Since May 1973, some officers of the Army and the Navy began to
indoctrinate their troops against the UP and the Allende governemnt.
They gradually increased their attacks on the President and the organi-
zations of the working class in order to condition the response of the
soldiers, and to provoke the open reaction of the Leftists among them.
(Rojas, 1976 p.167. Roxborough, 1977 p.198)
In June they started to include in their talks to the troops the
idea that the UP was preparing a general onslaught on the military, with
a plan to kill most of the officers and many of the soldiers, This same
idea was reproduced as "Plan Z" after the overthrow of Allende, in
publicity directed to explain that the military had acted in "self-
defense". This rather crude invention was discredited by Pinochet
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himself. (Rojas, 1976 p.ix. Sigmund, 1977 pp. 256-257)
But some civilians and junior officers were impatient, and apparent-
ly the CIA too misjudged the preparedness of the military, and they tried
to act before everything was ready. (Rojas, 1976 pp.160-161)
Patria y Libertad increased the frequency of its terrorist attacks
at the beginning of June, and on June 26 staged an incident directed to
discredit General Prats, and to kill him if possible.
While the General was going by car to his office, he was encircled
by three other cars. Two crossed his car in front and bumped it; from
the third, a rather masculine-looking woman from a well-known family of
the oligarchy, Virginia Cox, tried to annoy him with insults and obscene
gestures.
As the authors of the incident expected, General Prats believed
that he was under an attack similar to the one which resulted in the
death of General Schneider in 1970. He stopped and left his car, firing
two shots from his revolver toward the other cars. Immediately he was
assaulted by a mob that accused him of trying to kill "a lady". He was
only saved from being lynched by the cool reaction of a taxi-driver who
took him away in his cab at full speed.
Patria y Libertad made sure that reporters from El Mercurio and
the opposition radios were present, and the daily published the incident
under the heading: "GENERAL PRATS ATTACKS A WOMAN WHO STUCK OUT HER
TONGUE AT HIM." (Rojas, 1976 pp. 1 6 2 - 1 6 3 . Sigmund, 1977 p.213)
The great publicity created around the incident and the calls
for General Prats resignation were accompanied by the sending of white
feathers (as a symbol of cowardice) to Prats and other "Constitutionalist"
officers. This publicity served to reduce the impact of the announcement
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made by the Army Chief Commander in Santiago, General Mario Sepulveda
and the Minister of Defense, that a complot and a coup involving some
military officers and Patria y Libertad and including the killing of
President Allende had been uncovered.
One of these officers, Colonel Roberto Souper, Commander of the
Second Armored Regiment in Santiago, was advised that he was going to
be relieved of his command and arrested. Thus, on the morning of June
29, after killing some opposing subordinates, he mobilized his Regiment
and directed six tanks to attack the Presidential Palace (La Moneda)
and the nearby buildings. He expected to kill the President, to free
the other plotters who were arrested in the Ministry of Defense and to
precipitate the military coup since he knew that many officers had
decided to overthrow the government.
However, Allende was not at La Moneda, and the Generals who were
planning the coup were not yet prepared for it, One of the conditions
that they had agreed on with Pinochet was missing. The Police were not
included in the plot, and its elite corps, which served as Palace Guard,
successfully defended La Moneda against Souper. Therefore, the conspiri-
tors joined the "Constitutionalists" who helped General Prats in defeat-
ing the rebellion. On the way, he demonstrated that he was not a coward,
as the publicity of the opposition had planned. (Sigmund, 1977 pp. 2 1 3-21 5 .
Rojas, 1976 pp.164-166)
Colonel Souper was arrested and the leaders of Patria y Libertad,
including the President of SNA Benjamin Matte, found political asylum
in the Embassy of Ecquador. But the aborted coup showed the conspirators
the type of organization which the mobilization of the working class had
to face in a military movement. The actions to control the rebellion
confused the intelligence of the UP over the real position of the
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military officers in relation to the government. Several of the prin-
cipal conspirators, such as Generals Pinochet, Brady and Bonilla, appeared
as "loyal" supporters of General Prats and President Allende. (Rojas,
1976 pg.165. Steenland, 1974 p.13)
However, the military conspirators felt that their time was run-
ning short. They could not deceive the President and the UP permanently,
and the industrial belts and other grass-roots organizations of the work-
ing class appeared to be preparing for a final confrontation. Therefore,
they pressed their civilian friends into declaring the "illegitimacy" of
the government, and starting a new truck owners lockout, while they in-
tensified the searches for "arms control". On July 26, a group of the
"Comando de Ex Cadetes" assasinated the Navy Attache to the Presidency,
Commander Arturo Araya, who had been a good source of intelligence in
the Armed Forces for Allende, and was due to return to active service
in the near future. (Rojas, 1976 p.1 7 2 . Sigmund, 1977 pp.222-223)
Moreover, on August 7, the Navy announced that it had discovered
a plot which involved low-ranking officers and sailors and some positions
of the Left such as Senator Carlos Altamirano, leader of the Socialist
Party, Deputy Oscar Garreton, leader of MAPU, and Miguel Henriquez,
leader of MIR.
Actually some sailors had denounced to the politicians the con-
tinuous indoctrination against the government to which they were sub-
jected by the officers; the Leftist leaders were talking to the sailors
and non-commisioned officers to prepare them to disregard the orders
of the officers in the event of a coup against the government.
The "plot" was "investigated" by Admiral Toribio Merino who was
the Navy leader of the coup conspirators. Merino requested lifting the
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parlimentary immunity of Altamirano and Garreton, and submitted the 50
sailors and petty officers involved to harsh interrogations and tortures
which were denounced by the Leftist press. (Sigmund, 1977 p.226. Rojas,
1976 p.175)
On August 9, Allende made a final effort to defuse the possibility
of a military coup and save his government, by appointing the Commanders-
in-Chief of all the Armed Forces as Ministers in a Cabinet named by the
President "National Security Cabinet". This time, General Prats was
designated Minister of Defense; Admiral Raul Montero was appointed Minis-
ter of Finance, Air Force General Cesar Ruiz was named Minister of Pub-
lic Works, and the Chief of the National Police (Carabineros) was ap-
pointed Minister of Lands and Colonization. (Sigmund, 1977 pp. 225-226.
Rojas, 1976 p.174)
But this cabinet disintergrated within the same month. General
Ruiz tried to anticipate the coup in order to take the leadership from
the other conspirators, but he was discovered by President Allende who
called him to retirement on August 18. He was replaced by Air Force
General Gustavo Leigh who, unknown to the President, was one of the
leaders of the conspiracy against his government. (Rojas, p.14)
All the parlimentry ability of President Allende was unable to
solve the emerging conflict between the military and the working class
in incidents such as the "siege of Punta Arenas" or the attacks of the
Navy on Senator Altamirano and Deputy Garreton which were mentioned
before.
The fate of the Allende Administration was sealed with the resig-
nation of General Prats. On August 21, a group -of women, among them
several wives of high officers of the armed forces, staged a demons-
tration in front of General Prats house, shouting insults and calling
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for his resignation. General Prats, who was sick in bed, later received
the visit of General Bonilla who, in the name of the corps of Generals,
asked for his resignation, because his loyalty to the President was "a
disgrace for the Army". Bonilla was followed by the President himself,
who reiterated his confidence in General Prats and discussed with him
the means of stopping the conspiracy within the Armed Forces.
The next day General Prats had a meeting with 22 Generals and re-
quested from them a public declaration against the woman's demonstration.
From photographs he was able to show that the wife of General Bonilla
was among the demonstrators. But 18 of the 22 Generals rejected his re-
quest. Feeling he could no longer insure the loyalty of the Army to the
President, General Prats submitted his resignation the same day. The
President, believing in the loyalty of General Pinochet, who had voted
in favor of Prats in the meeting of the Generals, accepted the Prats'
resignation and designated Pinochet as Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
(Rojas, 1976 pp. 1 7 7- 1 7 9 . Sigmund, 1977 p.231)
Two other Generals who had helped Prats to defeat the Souper re-
bellion and had voted with him in the meeting of the Generals, Sepulveda
and Pickering, went into retirement expressing that they could not stay
in an Army commanded by the wives of the officers. Admiral Montero re-
signed from his Ministry even though he remained as Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy. However, the Admirals under the leadership of Toribio
Merino requested his resignation too on August 30. Allende rejected
his resignation "for the good of the country", but in practice, Merino
acted as Commander-in-Chief since that day, and Admiral Montero was put
under house arrest on the day the coup finally-took place. (Rojas, 1976
p.180, Sigmund, 1977 pp.237-238)
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After the meeting of the Generals that resulted in the resignation
of General Prats, President Allende was willing to use his Constitutional
powers to call to retirement the Generals who appeared more clearly in-
volved in the movement against the former Commander-in-Chief. But Pinochet
convinced him to wait until the Army's Qualifications Council which was
due to take place during the second half of September. This way, Pinochet
argued, the retirements would not be attributed to political motives but
purely professional ones. This was a familiar reasoning that had been
used by General Prats to delay until September the retirement of General
Canales, Colonel Canessa, and other hard-liners in 1972. (Rojas, 1976
p.180)
However, Pinochet's real reasons were that the military coup was
programmed for September 14, the date of the National Day's military
parade rehersal, which would justify the movement of troops along the
country. But on September 7, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
were informed by the President that he had decided to call for a plebis-
cite to give a final solution to the conflict between the Executive and
Congress, and was preparing a public speech for this purpose to be de-
livered by radio and TV on September 12.
The conspirators who were already prepared for the coup, decided
to prevent the political impact of such an announcement. General Leigh
of the Air Force, General Mendoza of the National Police, and the rep-
resentatives of Admiral Merino, met on September 9 in the house of
General Pinochet who was celebrating the birthday of his daughter.
There they signed the proclamation which they made public on September
11. the day of the coup. (Rojas, 1976 pp. 1 8 5-18 8 . Sigmund, 1977 p.240)
Most of the Chileans, and many foreign observers were surprised
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by the extreme violence developed by the military on September 11 and
the following week and months. It seemed entirely unnecessary from a
military viewpoint to bomb and destroy the Presidential Palace where
President Allende died defending his government in a rather dramatic
last stand. He was totally encircled by hostile forces far superior
in number and arms than his small group of body guards and personal
friends, and could not expect any help from outside.
In a similar fashion, during the wide searches conducted to arrest
or kill the leaders of the working class organizations, the military
demonstrated indiscriminate brutality which far exceeded the reasonable
response to the scattered and weak resistance offered by some partisans
of the UP government. Entire working class neighborhoods and "pob-
laciones" were surrounded by tanks and helicopters; all houses were
searched and occupants beaten, sometimes killed, and many of them ar-
rested, generally in a random fashion which mixed grass-roots leaders
and UP sympathizers with ordinary citizens.
Between September 1973 and March 1974, no less than 60,000 people
had been arrested, and 10,000 of them remained in prisoner camps at the
end of March 1974, according to the International Commission of Jurists
report on Chile. The military had lists of the government employees and
therefore searched the houses of those who were considered dangerous
(among them this writer). But their knowledge of the working class
organizations was limited and therefore they tried to capture grass-
roots leaders through widespread arrests and the use of torture and in-
formers to detect them, (O'Brien (ed.) 1976 p.275 . Loveman, 1979 pp.349-
350)
This brutality was part of the planned effort of the military to
terrorize the working class into submission. Air Force General Gustave
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Leigh, one of the leaders of the counter-revolution, explained to the
press on September 17, 1973; "We are taking this course because 100,000
dead in three days is preferable to 1,000,000 dead in three years."
General Pinochet, the present dictator of Chile, declared also that
they expected at least 50,000 dead, and were surprised by the scarce
resistance that reduced the killing to "only 30,000", as explained by
Julio Duran, representative of the Chilean dictatorship to the U.N.
Committee on Human Rights. (Rojas, 1976 p.196 . O'Brien pp.274-275)
In their original declarations, the military stated that they
had been moved by the "moral duty" of deposing a government which "had
fallen into flagrant illegitimacy ... destroying fundamental rights,
and placing itself outside the Constitution." They promised that "what
the workers had obtained will continue and will be maintained."
However, very soon the real nature of the counter-revolution was
manifested.
The Constitution was abrogated and replaced by the will of the
military who legislated "Constitutional Acts" that tended to change from
day to day in the beginning. Congress was closed and the political
parties were declared illegal or in "recess" indefinetly, including
those which had supported the counter-revolution such as the Christian
Democrats. Even though the judiciary proptly demonstrated its grati-
tude to the military for not being disolved as the other State powers
had been, it was practically ignored; all the important cases were
submitted to the Military Courts because of the "State of War". When a
normally acquiescent Comptroller General tried to make legal observa-
tions to some decrees of the military, he was replaced with another more
ductile lawyer. (Sigmund, 1977 pp.248-251)
All the newspapers which supported the Allende Administration and
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the Left were closed, and even the Christian Democratic's La Prensa
survived the counter-revolution for only a short time. But the publisher of
El Mercurio was one of the first civilians appointed to a Ministry by
the military dictatorship. Fernando Liniz was put in charge of the
Ministry of economy and became in practice the main economics policy-
maker of the new regime. He was accompanied by a group of economists,
some of them professors of the School of Economics of Catholic Univer-
sity, who were generally known as the "Chicago Boys" because some of them
graduated from Chicago University. All of them were dogmatic followers
of the monetarist doctrines of Milton Friedmann and Arnold Harberger.
Their main task was to restore the control of the Chilean dominant class
and its foreign friends over the Chilean social structure, and this was
made easy by the political environment provided by the military dic-
tatorship. (Sigmund, 1977 p.264)
CUT was dissolved, its leaders exiled, and the Labor Code and the
rest of the Labor legislation were replaced by decrees that fixed wages,
repressed strikes, and eliminated labor unions. While wages were fixed,
prices were unfrozen and most of the State price controls were disman-
tled. This resulted in a drastic and deep redistribution of income from
the workers to the dominant class. Before the counter-revolution, in-
flation was projected to be about 200% for the year 1973, but the price
increases between September and December represented an increase of
at least 300% by themselves, and official inflation reached 375% in 1974
and 350% in 1975. But the military dictatorship did what the Allende
Administration could not do: it changed the IPC base and manipulated the
figures to demonstrate their "success" in fighting inflation. (BIC, 1975
pp.54-55 . Varele & Michel, 1980 p.65)
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The wage and salery adjustments did not follow the rise in Drices,
and therefore the index of real wages on base 1970 = 100 went down to 51.9
in 1974; wages which constituted 52% of the GDP in 1970 went down to 42%
of the GDP in 1974. (Varela & Michel, 1980 pp.12-1 3 . The Economist,
February 2-8,1980: Chile Survey)
The military dictatorship dismantled the Social Area of the economy
and adopted a policy of "privatization" of all economic activities which
implied not only the return to the private sector of the enterprises
nationalized by the Allende Administration, but also the transfer to
private owners os many other State economic activities including educa-
tion and health services, and the social security system. Many of the
latifundios expropriated by the Agrarian Reform were divided into indi-
vidual farms assigned to the peasants without any additional support from
the State. Thus many of the small farm owners were forced to sell for
lack of resources to work their property and a new process of concen-
tration of land ownership was started directed to the installation of
export agribusiness. (The Economist op.cit.)
Despite its professed "nationalism", the military dictatorship
devaluated the Chilean currency, eliminated import controls, and reduced
tariffs to allow foreign products to compete freely with the locally
produced goods in the Chilean market, without "artificial" protection-
ism of the Chilean industries. The Country was opened to foreign in-
vestments in such favorable conditions that Chile had to retire from the
Andean Common Market, which has more restrictive rules. (BIC, 1975
pp.81-82 . The Economist, op.cit.)
The dictator Pinochet and the Chicago Boys expected that their
avowed anti-Marxist position was going to provide them with preferential
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treatment from the United States. Their willingness to pay indemnization
to ITT and the copper companies for the nationalization of their Chilean
operations by the Allende Administration added to the repression of the
labor movement and tax incentives which would attract private foreign
investments.
However, the high rates of inflation of 1974 and 1975 contributed
to their poor international image which restricted the possibilities of
foreign assistance and investmants, and their regime of terror con-
flicted with the new "human rights" policy of the Carter Administration.
The Chilean market was naturally reduced, and their policies reduced it
more, depriving it of any possibility to sustain a similar economic
development policy to that of Brasil. Thus, even though Chile was able
to renegotiate the external debt, and the United States, lDB, and the
World Bank restored the channels of financial aid suspended during the
invisable blockade, the aid actually received initially was more direc-
ted to the regime's survival rather than to economic development.
Therefore, the Chicago Boys invited their former Professors,
Arnold Harberger and Milton Friedmann, to advise the Chilean dictator-
ship in economic matters. The foreign advisors approved in principle
what their disciples were doing but recommended intensifying the measures
in what Friedmann called a "shock treatment" to control inflation. This
was basically a deep cut in public expenditures, from which only the
military was excluded, targeting the reduction of 100,000 public em-
ployees. The recipe also included a cut in taxes and the elimination
of all State subsidies to private activities, which already had been
reduced substantially., (Gunder Frank, 1976 . The Economist op.cit,)
As the result of this "treatment", Chile suffered in 1975-1976 the
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worst economic depression since 1931. It is true that inflation was re-
duced to 63% in 1977 and 30% in 1978 according to official figures; but
production dropped by 12% from 1974 to 1975, and in 1978 it had not yet
recovered the 1972 levels, Unemployment, according to the same official
figures, reached almost 20% in 1976, and was still over 14% in 1978.
Not only the politically repressed working class suffered the consequen-
ces; most of the small businesses and members of the petty-bourgeoisie
who had enthusiastically supported the counter-revolution, went bankrupt
in the deep depression. (The Economist op.cit. Varela & michel, 1980 p.10)
In a significant way, the U.S. press and news agencies which had
always associated the Allende Administration with the phrase "economic
class", never did mention the true economic chao of the Chilean economy -
during recent years. On the contrary, the Chicago Boys received favorable
coverage in the Wall Street Journal and other financial publications,
which helped them to obtain large credits from private banks and some
foreign investments. However, the bulk of the foreign investments (90%)
has been in mining, that is the production of primary products for ex-
ports rather than industrial development. The service of the expanded
external debt is still taking 38% of the annual export earnings, (The
Economist op.cit.)
The worst impact of the economic policies of the Chilean dictator-
shiphas been suffered by the bulk of the working class which represents
the large majority of the population. The share of the lowest fifth in
the distribution of the national income went down from 8% in 1969 to 5%
in 1978; the consumption of calories and proteins went down by 12% and
18% respectively between 1970 and 1978. The number of children who com-
pleted primary education was reduced 40,00 from 1973 to 1978; public
housing construction went down to 9,000 units per year (average 1974-
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1978); private house construction was also reduced to 14,000
per year, while the incidence of infectious diseases such as typhoid,
tripled. (The Economist op.cit.)
On the other hand, the "privatization" of the economy has been
used by the Chilean dominant class to restore the old system of financial
groups. This system of economic control has combined some of the old
financial groups, which were able to survive the impact of the policies
of the Allende Administration, with some new groups that emerged from
both the clandestine operations of the black market under Allende and
the new concentration of ownership of the means of production resulting
from the acquisition of State controlled activities and bankrupt busi-
nesses during the economic depression of 1975-1976. (Varela & Michel,
1980 pp. 27-36)
The dictatorship of Pinochet was made "Constitutional" this year
(1981) by the imposition of a new Constitution which institutionalizes
the replacement of civilian politicians with the military in the admini-
station of political issues. Thus, the planning of the counter-revo-
lution appears to have been successful to restore the control of the
Chilean dominant class and its foreign allies over the Chilean social
structure. However, it has also restored the charaterization of Chile
as a dependent, underdeveloped country which was given at the beginning




On Reason, Revolution and Counter Revolution.
Some Points of Planning Theory
Caminante no hay camino,
Se hace camino al andar
( Popular Spanish song )
Introduction
At the beginning of this study it was stated that planning
knowledge is based on the practice of planning. Therefore the purpose
of this study was to analyze the practice of planning in Chile under the
Administrations of Presidents Alessandri, Frei, and Allende ( years
1958 to 1973 ), in order to extract the knowledge which that experience
could provide about the process of planning, the role of the planners,
and the content of planning.
This wasa dramatic period in Chile's history in which a con-
servative government was followed by a liberal government, and this by
a socialist one, in a sequence of growing social tension leading to
the violent counter-revolution of 1973, which killed President Allende,
destroyed the political regime of representative democracy, and instal-
led the present neo-facist military dictatorship.
The situation of the Chilean planners, as a small group of
professionals with similar characteristics, working in direct relation
to the decision-making process of the Chilean State, through three
different successive political environments, constituted a natural
experiment or quasi-experiment. A control group was provided by
comparing the attitudes and behavior of planners with other more
traditional professionals in relation to the changes in the socio-
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economic environment.
This was however a dialectical experiment since the planners and
other professionals had an active role in the production of the socio-
economic changes, and in turn, they were changed themselves by the
events of the period.
1. - The Chilean Social Structure and the Historical Context.
This study has shown that under the formal appearance of a
representative democracy until 1973, and in a more explicit form since
that year, the Chilean social structure has been a rigid hierarchical
system controlled by a small professional elite. This elite is the
external expression of the dominant class which concentrates wealth
and property and is tied to the international system of the most
developed capitalist countries and their multinational corporations.
Apart from this dominant class, the Chilean social structure
included a small petty-bourgeoisie integrated by owners of small
business, and a large salaried working class ( 75% of the total
population ) divided into three segments: white collar employees,
blue collar industrial workers, and agricultural workers or peasants.
The social organization and participation of these other social classes
in the system has been subjected to the formal and informal norms
imposed by the dominant class.
The Chilean dominant class is an oligarchy which imitates the old
aristocracies of Europe by its disdain for manual labor and its acute
sense of class distinctions. It inherited these aristocratic cultural
traits from the Spanish colonial administrators, together with the
social structure based on the exploitation of the working class in
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farms, mines, and industries for the benefit of the small privileged
elite.
The Chilean dominant class has traditionally identified progress
and development with the import and reproduction of ideas, formal
models and fashionable trends generated in the most developed capitalist
countries, rather than native discoveries or innovations.
The most developed capitalist countries have provided the financial
and technical assistance necessary to maintain the control of the oligarchy
over the Chilean social system and to establish the formal institutions
of a mordern State.
This study has shown that foreign experts designed many of the
basic institutions of the Chilean social organization, including the
universities and the educational system, the armed forces, the Civil
Code, the Central Bank and the Office of the Budget. These foreign
experts have trained the Chilean professionals and have provided the
theoretical and practical framework for the setting of economic policies.
In exchange, the Chilean dominant class has granted to the multi-
national corporations access and protection to control the export
producing activities of the country and to achieve decisive influence
in industry, commerce, communications and some basic services.
The lack of dynamism of the Chilean dominant class and its
dependency from foreign investors and entrepreneurs resulted in the
low rate of growth and high vulnerability of the Chilean economy to
the changes in the international market.
In addition, the same dependency has served as vehicle for the
introduction to the country of ideas and institutions which have been
in conflict with the interests of the oligarchy. These included the
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political regime of representative democracy, and the Liberal, Marxist
and Christian Left ideas which inspired the political parties and
organizations of the other social classes.
One such institution was planning for socio-economic development
in relation to the participation of the State in economic activities.
This study has shown that the impact of the great depression of
the 1930's, and the division of the Chilean dominant class resulting
from its association with the competing forces in World War II allowed
the introduction of planning as a State function by the creation of
the State Economic Development Corpoation ( CORFO ) in the early 1940's.
CORFO started a tradition of successful industrial development
through planned State action. But it was restricted in its action
during the late 1950's by the conservative policies of the second half
of the Ibanez government and the initial policies of the following
Alessandri Administration which were analyzed in the study.
The practice of planning expanded rapidly however during the early
1960's under the pressure of the " structuralist " ideas of ECLA and
the Alliance for Progress. They considered planning as a necessary
instrument to carry out the changes needed to eliminate the structural
obstacles for socio-economic development.
This expansion of planning for socio-economic development and
structural changes divided the Chilean dominant class. The most con-
servative elements of it, such as those who controlled the Alessandri
Administration, had little interest in structural changes and accepted
planning only as it was required to obtain aid from the United States
or the international agencies of financial assistance. But the most
progressive elements, including President Frei and the Christian Demo-
cratic Party leaders, felt identified with the aims of the Alliance for
457
Progress. They considered planning as a rational alternative to the
violent repression of the working class.
On the other hand, the political parties and organizations of the
working class which supported the Allende Administration, had always
sustained the necessity of using planning as an instrument to replace
the market as vehicle of social and economic distribution and to intro-
duce revolutionary changes by peaceful means.
Even though the concept of planning is not necessarily contradictory
with the use of violence, and there are military planners whose means
of implementation are violent by nature, in the period under analysis
planning was considered as an alternative to violent action. Moreover,
it was considered that the use of reason is always more human and
civilized, and has a lower social cost than the use of brutal force.
2. - Chilean Professionals, Planners, and Three Modes of Planning.
Since the past century the Chilean dominant class adopted the
tradition of sending its children to the university to acquire the
learned skills necessary to rule the country. It also established the
norm of requiring a university degree to occupy high positions in
government or in business. This standard served to legitimize the
social status of the oligarchy by its association with technical
knowledge and professional skills. But the highly selective educatio-
nal system made sure that admission to the university was restricted to
children of the dominant class. Therefore the professions were
conceived as instruments of preservation of the established social
system.
The Chilean planners as university graduates were members of the
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dominant class, and because of their work they were close to the formal
and informal power centers of the social system. However, in contrast
with the more traditional professions, planning was associated with a
national and international movement for socio-economic development
and structural change.
Thus, the role of planners during the period analyzed was contra-
dictory with the interests of their own social class and of the estab-
lished system. The traditional professionals and politicians tended
to consider planners as dangerous revolutionaries who threatened the
existing positions and relations in the power structure.
On the other hand, in the eyes of the working class, planners
were identified with the dominant class because of their social origin
and their work for the State. The political activists of the Left
tended to disregard planners as mere " technocrats ", and considered
the technical restrictions for the achievement of their objectives as
" artificial hurdles ".
In this study, planners were defined by their formal training
in international planning schools, ( there was not formal training
in planning in Chilean universities until the late 1960's ), by their
work in planning jobs, and by their particular professional mentality
resulting from their training and their position and functions in the
State bureaucracy.
Planners maintained a long-term and comprehensive professional
perspective which integrated different specialities in multidisciplinary
work, and tended to maximize the rigor of their analysis in tasks al-
ways associated with the State action. In contrast, the traditional
Chilean politicians tended to act, more or less intuitively with a
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short term perspective related to the then frequent national elections.
While the traditional professionals tended to interpret the issues
from the specialized viewpoint of their trade, and to combine private
practice with their service to the public sector.
Thus planners could be differenciated from other members of the
Chilean professional elite who served similar functions. In addition,
a basic characteristic of the planning work is to be expressed in formal
documents, many of which were used as direct sources of information
for this study.
During the period analyzed, planning was a function of the Executive
which expanded rapidly, but planners had to compete with other power
centers already established within the State bureaucracy. In addition,
the Executive was only one of the State's powers, and the State was
only one of the major protagonists of the historical process, the other
being the social classes, their organizations and their foreign allies.
On the other hand, the practice of planning during the period was asso-
ciated with the socio-economic development and structural changes of the
Chilean society. For these reasons, this study related the analysis
of the planning experience to the context provided by the social struc-
ture, the class struggle, and the participation of the State and of
the foreign sector in it.
The three Administrations analyzed, each had a different concept
about the role of the State in the process of socio-economic develop-
ment, and this conditioned the practice of planning and the planner's
role in them.
The Alessandri Administration had originally an ideology of free-
trade and restriction of the State's intervention in the economy of
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the country. It accepted planning only as the result of the external
pressure of the Alliance for Progress and its own dependency on foreign
financing for the implementation of its initial economic policies.
This resulted in a reluctant mode of planning which was largely
of a symbolic nature. The businessmen-politicians who controlled the
government under Alessandri maintained planners outside the decision-
making process as mere technical advisors, in a role similar to that of
local planners in the U.S. who write proposals to obtain Federal funds.
But the Frei Administration was a showcase for the Alliance for
Progress. Therefore it believed that planning and the intervention
of the State were necessary means to introduce the reforms needed to
rescue the established system from the danger of a socialist revolution
such as that of Fidel Castro in Cuba.
Even though Frei's government plan was presented as a " Revolution
in Freedom ", it was directed to correct the failures of the established
socio-economic system in order to save it from the impending crisis,
rather than to change the traditional structure. In addition, the
Frei Administration considered the State as a neutral arbiter above the
class struggle, therefore it adopted a mixed mode of planning which was
directive for the State bureaucracy and only indicative for the private
sector.
Thus, the planning activities under the Frei Administration were
concentrated in improving the efficiency of the State organization
through the use of " institution building " techniques, and installing
the National Planning System itself. But it put the Chilean planners
in a position similar to that of the Council of Economic Advisors in
the U.S. in relation to the private sector; setting policies and
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incentives and expecting the people to behave in a predicted way.
In contrast to the preceeding administrations, the Allende govern-
ment made use of planning as an instrument to dismantle the established
socio-economic system and to begin the construction of a new one based
on the joint action of the working class and the State through a direc-
tive and participatory mode of planning. The Chilean dominant class
and its foreign allies opposed this effort by means of a planned reaction
in stages that culminated in the military neo-facist counter-revolution
of 1973.
Therefore the practice of planning under Allende became the difficult
art of coordinating the free initiative of the working class in its mul-
tiple expressions with the central purpose and long-term perspective
of the government for the common task of implementing the government
plan ( the UP Program ), and defending the progress of this process
from external attacks.
The role assigned to planners in the Alessandri and Frei Adminis-
trations was compared above with modes of planning existing in the U.S.,
but the role of the Chilean planners under Allende had no analogies any-
where. The nearest similarity that may be found in the U.S. will be a
mixture or combination of the role of corporate planners working for a
large comglomerate with the community organizers and advocacy planners
of the late 1960's.
This study has shown that the planning practice during the period
analyzed was conditioned by three basic contradictions:
a) The class struggle resulting from the class polarization of
the Chilean social structure, the lack of economic growth of the country,
and the exploitation of the Chilean working class by the dominant
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oligarchy and its foreign allies.
b) The ideological conflicts between the more conservative and the
more progressive elements within the Chilean dominant class, and
c) The contradictions in the U.S. policies toward Latin America
in general, and in particular in the support of the different factions
of the Chilean dominant class, going during the period from the more
progressive elements to the most conservative ones.
All these contradictions were reflected in the basic task of the
planners in the period, which was contradictory in itself. On one hand,
planning was directed to push the process of socio-economic change and
development, that meant unleashing the inititives of the Chilean people,
in particular the working class. On the other hand, planning is by
nature a controlled process and was assumed to make these initiatives
compatible with a pre-determined framework of ideas.
Despite the difficulties of the planning tasks and the conflicting
nature of the planner's role, planners and planning increased in impor-
tance during the period analyzed, in parallel to the growing intensity
of the class struggle. The planners went from a position of external
technical advisors under Alessandri, to official participants in the
decision-making process under Frei, and to a central role in the govern-
ment actions during the Allende Administration.
Three means helped the planners to overcome the conflicts and dif-
ficulties, and to expand their work within the contradictory and tur-
bulant environment of the period:
The first was political support. The Left had an ideological
commitment to planning, and the Right was forced to accept planning
by the Alliance for Progress. Therefore planners had friends on both
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sides of the political spectrum and the three administrations analyzed
explicitely accepted and engaged in the practice of planning.
The second was the implicit social legitimacy of the planner's
role as a result of being planning members of the Chilean dominant
class. Professionals in Chile were traditionally considered "entitled"
to occupy the highest positions in the social structure. Moreover,
because of their international training, planners were assigned the
highest rank among professionals.
The third was the particular professional ideology associated with
planning in the formulations of the Economic Commisssion for Latin
America of the U.N. (ECLA) and of the Alliance for Progress. Planning
was conceived as a necessary instrument to carry out the structural
changes needed to eliminate the existing obstacles for socio-economic
development. This ideology was based on two assumptions: that history
is the result of conscious human actions, and that the decision-making
process of social organizations and institutions would be improved by
the introduction of scientific rationality and knowledge in it.
A combination of these supporting means allowed the small group
of professional planners to work continuously during most of the per-
iod in spite of the changing Administrations, and to carry tasks from
one government to the next one. This study has shown that, with the
exception of the armed violence of the military, the Chilean planners
were able to solve most of the problems resulting from the above men-
tioned contradictions and difficulties.
However these solutions implied basic changes in the professional
concepts about the process of planning, the planners' role, and the
content of planning, including a substantial modification in the
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initial ideas of rationality and socio-economic development. These changes
will be analyzed in detail in the following sections.
3. - The Conventional Paradigm of Planning and its Changes in Practice.
This study has shown that most of the Chilean planners were trained
in the United States, and they were helped by a good number of planning
consultants from the U.S. during the Alessandri and Frei Administrations.
The Latin American Institute for Social and Economic Planning (ILPES) in-
stalled in Santiago by the U.N. agencies in the early 1960's, incorporated
some European and Socialist elements in an emerging Latin American perspec-
tive on planning issues, but most of the members of the faculty of ILPES
had been also trained in the United States.
Therefore for most of the Chilean planners, the planning knowledge
learned at school was based on that which was predominant in the U.S.
schools of planning in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
The historical tradition of U.S. planning was akin to the first
approach of the Alessandri Administration; that is, it was focused on
physical development and land use. The New Deal had concentrated on
public works and construction projects, and after World War II, the Inter-
State Highway System, Federal mortgages, and Urban Renewal programs,
continued in the same tradition. Even today in the United States the
word "development" is associated with real estate and construction activities.
The basic concepts about planning emerged out of the so called
"liberal reform". The beliefs that the introduction of scientific know-
ledge and rationality would improve the intuitive decision-making of trad-
itional politicians and businessmen, and that it was necessary to avoid
the collapse of the established system which was confronted with increas-
ingly dangerous crises, was contradicted by the perception of planning
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as a "totalitarian" tool identified with Communism or Facism. Therefore,
planning had to be "subjected to democratic control" as Karl Manheim
proposed. (Manheim, 1950 p.29)
Thus, planning was concentrated on physical development, planners
were assigned the role of mere technical advisors, serving the democratical-
ly elected decision-makers, and scientific objectivity and functional rat-
ionality were emphasized as sources of the social legitimacy of planning.
In this planning paradigm the planning process was a linear and
circular succession of logically related stages which were refined through
iterations. The process started with some externally given goals and a
scientific and comprehensive analysis of the reality to be affected by the
decisions to be made. Goals and analysis would be followed by policies,
programs, and projects, interrelated according to the functional ration-
ality of adequacy of means to ends. Policies were means to achieve the
goals; programs were means to implement the policies, and projects were
means to fulfill the objectives of the programs.
Since the planners were only advisors, and the decision-makers
provided the goals at the beginning of the process, and made the final
decision choosing from the alternative proposals submitted by the plan-
ners at the end of it, the three moments of the planning process, analysis,
design and implementation, were considered "value free" scientific and
technical activities, detached from partisan politics and the class
struggle. In the use of Max Weber's paradigm of functional or instru-
mental rationality, planning shared the same assumptions of neo-classical
economics and functional sociology. Planners coincided with these dis-
ciplines in the use of some of the same analytical tools and equilibrium
models to explain reality.
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The triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba and the response of the Al-
liance for Progress resulted in a new interest for underdeveloped countries.
From this, other elements were added to the above mentioned planning
tradition, with the specific purpose of helping in the training of plan-
ners from Latin America and other developing regions, using such theories as
Rostow's stages of economic growth, or the concept of "growth poles".
This coincided also with the introduction of new technical concepts and
instruments for the planning practice, like system analysis and com-
puterized information systems.
The same paradigm of functional rationality served ECLA and the
Alliance for Progress in introducing planning to the dominant classes
of the Latin American countries. Socio-economic development was the
necessary response to the threat of a socialist revolution, and plan-
ning was a necessary instrument for socio-economic development. Plan-
ning could be used by any political regime because planners were only
technical advisors to the political authorities already established.
Moreover, due to the social structure predominant in the Latin American
countries, planners would be recruited from among the members of the
same dominant classes which controlled the political and economic
system. Therefore they could be expected to serve the interests of their
own social class, as it had been traditionally done by the other pro-
fessionals. (See Chapter II above)
For example, this is how Lincoln Gordon described planning to the
oligarchy of Brasil in 1961:
"Development planning does not mean socialization.
What it does mean is the establishment of targets
for public investment in fields of high priority
(and by implication the elimination of those of
low or no priority); the application of sound
engineering and economic standards to public
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public investment projects; an appraisal of the
balance-of-payments problems involved in the program;
the provision of adequate machinery for public ad-
ministration and for cooperation between government
and private organization; and the adoption of fiscal
and monetary policies to promote development without
inflation." (Gordon, 1963 pp. 13-14)
Gordon presented planning as a purely technical activity. He focused
on "engineering and economic standards" since the priorities that he men-
tioned appeared to be determined outside the planning process. Therefore
planning was a "neutral" instrument that could be used by the military
dictatorship of Brasil, even though all countries signatures of the
Charter of Punta del Este had subscribed the " Declaration to the Peoples
of America" which stated;
"This Alliance for Progress is established on the basic
principle that free men working through the institution
of representative democracy can best satisfy man's as-
pirations, including those for work, home and land,
health and schools." (Gordon, 1963 p. 114)
This study has shown that the three moments of the planning process:
analysis, design and implementation, were present in the planning activ-
ities of the whole period. However they were not related in an ordered
sequence according the rules of formal logic and functional rationality.
Planning was a continuous process during the whole period in which three
types of planning activities were present;
a) The making of formal "plans" or planning documents;
b) The formulation of government plans as electoral platforms for
presidential elections; and
c) The design and implementation of the policies, programs, and
projects, including the bureaucratic reorganizations needed to carry out
those platforms when the candidate was elected.
These three types of activities were sometimes parallel to each
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other, and they fed on each other in a planning process which had feed-
back loops in each of its steps.
Formal plans such as the Ten Year Economic Development Plan 1961-
1970, or the Agricultural Development Plan 1965-1980, tended to have
little implementation; but the studies made for them were used in the
formulation of the political platforms, which by their very nature had
source possibilities of research and analysis of their own. In the 1964
and 1970 presidential elections the platforms of the major candidates
were actually government plans. They were technically formulated with
the active participation of planners, and intended to be implemented if
the respective candidate was elected, as it happened with president Frei
and Allende.
The implementation of these electoral platforms as government plans
required in most cases the design of new formal planning documents. For
example, once formulated the UP Program required planners to study the
private activities that would be included in the Social Area. They were
also required to develop an agreement with the working class organizations
for the design and installing of the participation mechanisms. In ad-
dition, the UP Program was translated into a series of planning documents
by ODEPLAN for implementation by the State agencies.
One particular example of this continuity of the planning process
was the educational reserch made by the Educational Planning Commission
under Alessandri and used by the educational reform of the Frei Admin-
istration. It was also continued in parallel to this reform to serve
as a basis for the new reform of the educational system (ENU) proposed
by the Allende Administration at the beginning of 1973.
In a similar way, the legal statute of CONSFA and the Aerophoto-
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grametric studies done during the Alessandri Administration were used by
the Frei Administration to organize ODEPA and to provide basic data to
the Agricultural Development Plan 1965-1980. Also some of the planning
consultants working on the reconstruction of the cities effected by the
earthquakes of 1960 noted a lack of community facilities in the housing
projects of the Chilean government, This observation led to the creation
of the Community Facilities Planning Program funded by the Ford Found-
ation.
It was indicated above that the government plans prepared during
the presidential electoral campaigns constituted an important part of
the continuous planning process. Planners who participated in form-
ulating these plans were called in to prepare discussion papers designed
to select goals and objectives, and to define strategies and priorities;
therefore, the goals and priorities were not external to the planning
process, but a component of it.
Thus, the planning process was not "neutral" in relation to partisan
politics and the class struggle. On the contrary, it was directly re-
lated to the modernization of the political process. The analysis of
the socio-economic reality necessary for planning purposes had a direct
bearing on the political debate, even if the plans were not implemented.
Ever since the Ten Year Plan figures served a frame of reference
for the debate between government and opposition in the second half of
the Alessandri Administration, there was a close and continuous relation
between planning and politics. Still scientific rationality and ob-
jectivity served as the basis of the planner's role and of the legitimacy
of planning, but they had no absolute value in themselves; objectivity
and rationality were instruments serving the process of socio-economic
development and structural change.
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On the other hand, sophisticated technical skills and scientific
analysis were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the profes-
sional effectiveness of planners. The most elaborate mathematical model
could not solve the lack of oportune information, nor insure the political
support necessary for the implementation of the plans. A large part of
the work of planners was directed to achieve the cooporation of other
professionals and bureaucrats, and of the working class organizations
for the fulfillment of the established goals.
All the above mentioned characteristics of the planning process
conditioned directly the role of the planners. As this study has shown,
the role of the planners was not " to make plans ", because making plans
and implementing them was the work of many people. The pressures of the
work to be done left little time for planners to concentrate on elaborate
reserch and model building. But professional planners had a central
position in the planning process; they were expected to discern long-
term trends and the consequences of decisions, out of the seamless web
of complex interactions within a turbulent socio-economic environment.
On the other hand, because of their social status as members of the
dominant class, the planners were reluctant to accept the role of mere
technical advisor. They were committed to socio-economic development
and structural change; as a consequence during the period analyzed their
role combined the requirements and expectations of the socio-political
environment with their own professional motivations.
Therefore, the role of the planners exceded and modified the con-
ventional definitions and had in practice three dimensions; Chilean
planners were analysts, catalysts and synthesizers during the period
considered in this study.
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Analysis for planning purposes is different than "pure" scientific
research. It is directed to change the situation and therefore includes
the study of the present reality and its problems, the study of the means
and steps needed to change that reality, the study of the planning process
itself, and the evaluation of the results obtained.
It is characteristic of planning analysis to be comprehensive in
nature, that is it tends to consider together the physical, economic and
social aspects of the reality, and the links and relations among these
different aspects. But the traditional professionals in Chile tended to
segregate the knowledge of each particular field of expertise, which made
it very difficult to intergrate the information provided by diverse special-
ists and to build a comprehensive understanding of the established socio-
economic system. Even within the same sector, the historical division
of functions made it sometimes impossible to coordinate the information
gathered from multiple agencies with different origins and traditions.
In addition, the nature of the task of planning for socio-economic
development and structural change involved the need for gathering infor-
mation about previously uncharted territories. The conventional formal
analytical methods failed to respond to this need.
For example this study has already mentioned the mistake made by the
Agricultural Development Plan 1965-1980 of basing agricultural produc-
tion projections on the historical behavior of the procducers, at the same
time as the Agrarian Reform was modifying substantially the structure of
land tenure and the social relations of agricultural production.
Also noted was the lack of validity of equilibrium models in anal-
yzing development problems, and in particular a revolutionary situation
like that of the Allende Administration which by its very nature is
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directed to produce disequilibrium.
Therefore the Chilean planners as "analysts" were not only judges of
given data; they also had to build their own information systems, had to
determine what data was to be collected and how it was to be processed,
and had to design their own methods of analysis.
During the Alessandri Administration and in the second half of the
Frei government when the planners were restricted in their participation
in the implementation of their plans, they always could take refuge in
research and improving their information systems for future use. As in-
dicated earlier, the "analyst" dimension of the planners' role had an
impact which exceded the planning process itself, since these studies
were basic for planners' participation in preparing government programs
of the major canidastes in the presidential elections of 1964 and 1970.
This study also has shown that the studies done during the last campaign
were major factors in the successful implementation of most of the goals
of the UP Program in less than three years, despite the initial weaknesses
of the Allende Administration and the strong opposition of the Chilean
dominant class and its foreign allies.
This impact of the analyst dimension of the planners' role relates
also to the second dimension of this role; that of catalyst of the process.
Planners were "catalysts" who mobilized the resourcesthat initiated
and facilitated the change process. This was the main function of the
foreign planning consultants during the period analyzed; they were ex-
ternal technical advisors who helped the process of change without get-
ting involved in it. This dimension of the planners' role coincides with
the conventional definition of the planner role in the United States where
it has been sometimes called "the professional change agent".
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According to the conventional paradigm of planning, planners as change
agents or catalysts should remain detached from the struggles and conflicts
of the change process in order to facilitate it by application of func-
tional rationality to its problems. The assumed "neutrality" of science
and technology is considered as the major source of social legitimacy of
the so-called Professional Managerial Class (PMC) located in between
capital and labor in the most developed capitalist countries for the
administration of the complex system.
But in Chile the social legitimacy of the planners' role was the
result more of their social status as members of the dominant class and
their position in government, than of their technical or scientific pro-
ficiency. It was also explained that planning was directly and continuous-
ly related to politics and was not neutral from the conflicts and struggles
of the process of socio-economic development and structural change.
However this dimension of the planners' role as "catalysts" is in
reality a result of the nature of the planning task itself. Planning
is a function that can be distinguished from the process of production
of the goods and services that carry out in practice the planned change.
No plan can be really evaluated unless it is implemented, but implemen-
tation from a planning viewpoint means operational programming and bud-
geting; selecting and gathering the resources needed; choosing the tech-
nology to be used; designing the administrative organization and the formal
regulations required; organizing people and assigning responsibilities,
and the development of evaluation procedures.
All these functions help to execute the plans in practice but they
stop where the actual process of production begins. The peasants part-
icipated together with planners in the process of planning of agricul-
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tural production under Allende, but were only the peasants who cultivated
the land to fulfill the production goals agreed upon.
However, in Chile the role of planners as "catalysts" included some
less conventional tasks. The program of peasant organization and training
carried out by INDAP under the direction of Jacques Chonchol with the
technical assistance of Paulo Freire, during the Frei Administration, is
an example. This was a program directed at enabling agricultural workers
to participate actively in the process of socio-economic development and
structural changes. (See Chapter IV above)
The design of the mechanisms for the working class to participate
in the decision-making process during the Allende Administration may be
considered as another expression of the catalytic dimension of the plan-
ners role. In this case the intervention of planners had a more direct
impact than merely providing a vehicle for expressing the initiatives
of the workers; planners often served as government representatives in
the actual functioning of these mechanisms. (See Chapter V)
In general terms, perhaps the most important function of planners
as catalysts to the process was to make the concept of socio-economic
development and structural change operative. The original definitions
of ECLA and the Alliance for Progress were too general and abstract to
be translated directly into policies, programs and projects. In addition,
one of the traits of the Latin American culture which constituted an ob-
stacle for change and development was the tendency to elaborate in ab-
stract discussions about what is to be done, showing little interest or
ability to design practical ways of action. This is favored by the con-
servative elements who are interested in preserving the status quo and
who try to relegate any innovative idea to the eternal arguments of the
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so-called "revolucionarios de cafe" (coffee house revolutionaries).
But planners, by training and professional inclination, were able
and willing to translate general statements of objective goals into
policies, programs and projects which could be implemented, and to de-
velop the means for their implementation. Planners not only demonstrated
the practical feasibility of socio-economic changes, but also were able
to provide the prestige associated with science and technology to the
proposed changes. Moreover, when allowed, they showed that their pro-
posals worked in practice, as it was dramatically done by the fast ex-
pansion of the sites and services program of the Ministry of Housing in
the late part of the Frei Administration, or the implementation of the
UP Program under the Allende Administration.
However this translation of abstract ideas into operative measures
implied that it was planners who actually defined in practice the content
of socio-economic development and structural change. Therefore planners
were not detached from the process but substantially involved in it. This
led to a change in the concept of socio-economic development and is re-
lated to the third dimension of the planners' role which is explained
below.
Planners were "synthesizers". They had to design solutions to the
contradictions of the process in order to direct its advancement toward
the general objective of change and development.
As analysts planners had the company and cooperation of social
scientists, economists, and evironmental experts; as catalysts, they
coincided, and sometimes competed with political activists and managerial
experts; but as synthesizers they were alone in a distinct position and
professional responsibility.
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The design of a planned synthesis is not to reach consensus through
compromise. Such agreement in most of the cases consists of a minimum
common denominator for the parties in conflict, and is frequently too
general and abstract to serve as a basis for social action.
In Chile, during the analyzed period, planning was directed to fur-
ther socio-economic development and structural change, and therefore the
syntheses had a Hegelian character; they solved the contradictions by
raising the process to a higher level, which included the elements of the
former conflict but changed their nature and added some new elements gen-
erated by the solution.
In part, this dimension of the role of the planners consisted of
designing policies, programs and projects to implement particular goals,
and solving the technical conflicts over feasibility, shape, and com-
position of these policies, programs and projects. But it also included
the solution to the ideological conflicts regarding goal selection, and
the political conflicts resulting from policy, program and project im-
plementation.
An example of this is the case of the distribution of agricultural
machinery policy under the Allende Administration. The two parties in
conflict, the peasant organizations and the specialized agency of the
State (SEAM), were locked in their support of old modes of distibuting
and controlling machinery. The planners solved the conflict by creating
the Communal Machinery Pools. This new organization established a new
framework of relations between the peasants and the State for the con-
trol and use of agricultural machinery, which increased the efficiency
in the use of the machines and generated new job opportunities at the
local level. (SEE Chapter V above)
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This study has shown that during the period under analysis, the plan-
ners had to deal with three basic contradictions of the process: the class
struggle, the ideological conflicts inside the Chilean oligarchy, and the
contradictions of the U.S. toward Latin America. All these were reflected
by the most imediate contradiction that the planners had to solve which
was inside the planning process itself.
Planning is by nature a controlled process, and as a function of the
State it was associated with authority. In this sense, the use of plan-
ning to introduce socio-economic changes in Chile was obviously a process
"from above". But the essential purpose of the changes introduced through
planning was to give power to the people so they could direct the process
"from below" controlling their own destiny.
A similar conflict affected the interpretation of the legal require-
ment of "citizen participation" in the Federal programs of the 1960's in
the U.S. Public agencies interpreted the requisite in terms of "citizen
involvement", that is "the orderly channeled input into agency decision-
making by low income people, through appropriate structure set up for
this purpose." But participant citizens tended to interpret the legal
requirement as an opportunity for "citizen action", that is:
"the effort of low-income people to influence or-
ganizations to act in ways that give first priority
to the needs and wishes of low-income people - as
defined by low-income people, and to consider as
secondary such constraints as organizational via-
bility and rationale." (Warren, 1974 p.112)
In the United States, the official policy adopted the "citizen
involvement" interpretation, and a similar position was taken in Chile
by the Frei Administration. Popular Promotion was clearly a program
to be directed from above since the "marginals" were assumed to be un-
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able to overcome their situation by themselves. (See Chapter IV above)
Actually this was a position implicit in the formulations of ECLA and
the Alliance for Progress about socio-economic development and struc-
tural change.
But the Chilean planners tended to take a different position nearer
the "citizen action" interpretation. Their rationale was to consider the
socio-economic development of the country as a function of the active
participation of the whole population. In addition, it was sustained by
them that the working class had the creativity needed to find solutions
to the country's problems, given long practical experience of its mem-
bers in solving basic problems within an environment of scarce resorces.
In practice this meant the creation of a new concept of socio-
economic development which was the basis of the UP Program implemented
under Allende. Paradoxically, the very professional proficiency of the
Chilean planners in the fast implementation of the UP Program, and their
ability to overcome the contradictions of the process, led the Chilean
oligarchy and its foreign allies to forsake all pretenses of democracy
and rationality and to make use of brutal force to restore their control
over the social system.
The Chilean planners were unable to solve the contradiction existing
between their concept of socio-economic development through people's par-
ticipation and the extreme hierarchical formalism and neo-facist ideas
of the military. The military did not understand that the real "National
Security" is based on a well fed and well educated participant population.
Like the other traditional professionals, they felt that these ideas en-
dangered their privileges.
Thus, the counter-revolution of 1973 put an end to this natural ex-
479
periment and forced many planners, such as this writer, to leave the
country. However the international relations of the Chilean planners,
resulting from their training and from the support of international
agencies to their activities, helped them to spread their ideas outside
the country, and provided them the means to make use of knowledge acquired
through their experience in Chile in spite of their forced emigration.
The following and last section will analyze some of those ideas, in
particular the concepts of rationality and development as they emerged
from the Chilean experience.
4. - Of Reason in History: Planning and Development.
It was indicated before that the expansion of planning during the period
analyzed under the auspices of ECLA and the Alliance for Progress was
associated to a concept of socio-economic development and structural
change, and was based on the assumption that the introduction of scien-
tific rationality and objectivity would improve the decision-making pro-
cess of social organizations and institutes. But the practice of plan-
ning resulted in a change of the very concepts of rationality and devel-
opment.
The conventional planning paradigm was based on Max Weber's concept
of functional or instrumental rationality, that is, the adequacy of
means to ends. In it the goals, objectives or priorities, (the ends)
were determined outside the planning process and with them the value
judgements, normative propositions, and ethical statements were left
outside the realm of planning. Formal logic and systematic methods
would increase the efficiency of public institutions eliminating the ob-
stacles for socio-economic development in any political regime or socio-
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economic structure.
This was the idea reluctantly accepted by the Alessandri Adminis-
tration, and was the basis for the "institution building" techniques em-
ployed in planning during the Frei Administration. But this study has
shown that planning was associated with politics during the whole period;
the effectiveness of planning was directly related to the political sup-
port of the planned proposals, and the planners maintained a strong com-
mitment to an ideology of socio-economic development and structional
change.
Planners were called upon to discuss goals, objectives and priorities
with the politicians and their constituencies, and the competing social
forces tended to have each a different paradigm of scientific rationality.
Planners were expected to make explicit the contradictions of the system,
but the Chilean dominant class expected also of them to solve these con-
tradictions in order to overcome the impending crisis, while the organ-
izations of the working class were willing to use the same contradictions
to dismantle the existing system and to build a new one.
As it was indicated before, in practice it was the planners who ac-
tually defined in operational terms the real meaning of socio-economic
development and structural changes. Therefore the practice of planning
was not a "value free" discipline detached from political and ideological
allegiances. On the contrary, planners had to master the substantive
rationality of designating appropriate means to achieve these ends.
In practice, the objectivity of planners consisted in making ex-
plicit their own assumptions rather than being neutral in relation to
the political debate and the class struggle. Actually planners were
radicalized by their own analysis of the Chilean social reality and the
frustrations they suffered under Alessandri and Frei.
4 31
From the viewpoint of substantive rationality, the formal logic
of functional rationality is shallow and primitive because of its distinc-
tion between form and content. The separation of subject and object
actually denies access to real knowledge because true knowledge is the
identification of the consciousness of the subject with the object as
it is in itself. While on a first level of understanding formal logic
may appear as a condition of knowledge, on a higher level the content of
the object will condition and determine its logical form.
An example of this is the already mentioned inability of equilibrium
models to serve the needs of planning for socio-economic development.
These models either assume that the environment is in stable state, or
postulate as an objective of the model to achieve a stable state of some
sort. Moreover, the formal logic of these models is based on the Aris-
totelian principle of no contradiction. But a stable state does not ex-
ist in a process of socio-economic change. Development is by nature a
contradictory process; in Hegelian terms is a "becoming" in itself.
Planners trained according to the conventional paradigm of func-
tional rationality did not receive education on the matters needed to
deal with problems of substantive rationality such as social philosohpy
or political economy. They had to invent solutions for unpredictable
and contradictory situations in a process which was not an ordered se-
quence of logically related stages, but a continuous process with feed-
back loops at each step.
In particular planners had to overcome the shortcomings of the
original ideas about socio-economic development as they had been for--
mulated by ECLA and the Alliance for Progress.
The original concept of socio-economic development was based on
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the assumption that the existing situation of the most developed capitalist
countries was a model or universal standard desirable for any society.
Following Rostow's ideas, the basic problem of development planning was to
find a stategy capable to produce the "take off" of self sustained growth,
since the underdeveloped countries would follow the same stages in their
process of development as the U.S. or the Western European countries. For
the same reason, the experts of the most developed capitalist countries
knew better how to solve the development problems, which meant the impos-
ition of their idea of development from above.
The Chilean planners in contact with the socio-economic reality of
the country, found these concepts to be self defeating. Despite the
elitism of some professionals, the planners maintained that there was no
reason to believe that intelligence, creativity and initiative are qual-
ities concentrated on the dominant class. A caste-like social system,
such as the Chilean one, which does not allow vertical social mobility
and maintains oppressed the majority of the population, actually deprives
the country of a large part of its development potential.
This deprivation cannot be compensated by any amount of foreign
technical or financial aid. Moreover, in a situation of dependency like
the one described in Chile, such foreign aid would frequently reinforce
and contribute to the perpetuation of the situation of economic stagnation
and social oppression.
Therefore planning for development had to include the rupture of
the dependency feedback cycles by establishing control over the strategic
resources of the country, and had to start with the liberation of the
people. Liberation in this context meant raising the conciousness of the
oppressed people in order of enabling them to overcome by themselves
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their adaptative belief that their oppressed situation was a "natural law",
and their tendency to reproduce the model of oppression when they achieved
power.
Development planning meant also helping the people to organize for
their full participation in the decision-making process of society. This
was not only an ethical imperative given their basic human rights, but a
practical requirement as well. Only this participation insured the com-
mitment of the population to the intense work necessary for a process of
accelerated development. In addition, the solution of the basic needs
of the population in the matter of food, health, housing and education
was related to the growth of production in concrete social organizations
and direct programs rather than in abstract indicators.
These ideas were elaborated during the whole period analyzed in
this study and they appeared to be supported by the Frei Administration
during its early years, before it turned into a more conservative position.
However the same ideas had explicit expression in the UP Program and its
implementation under the Allede Administration.
The concepts of contradiction, dependency, and liberation utilized
by the Chilean planners in their tasks during the period analyzed in this
study, all refer to collective phenomenon. Moreover, even though some
authors such as Paulo Freire in Latin America and Frantz Fanon in Africa
have been of particular importance, the generation and expansion of the
new concepts about socio-economic development planning were also col-
lective tasks in which many people participated. The Chilean experience
had a deep influence but the same concepts have been discussed in the
international conferences of UNCTAD and of the Non-Alligned Countries,
and have been used in experiences such as the Ujama villages in Tanzania.
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The concept of dependency is used today universally for the analysis
of situations of underdevelopment, and even some authoritarian regimes
in Africa and the Arab countries have taken back control of their countries'
strategic resorces. While the Catholic Church is using the idea of liber-
ation as theological and moral base for its opposition to the military
dictatorships of Latin America.
It was indicated before that the Chilean planners could not be con-
sidered as members of a separate social class such as the "PMC" of the
most developed capitalist countries, or the "new class" of the Milovan
Djilas, since they were clearly members of the Chilean dominant class.
However as members of the dominant class with professional ideology
which contradicted the interests of their own social class and of the
established system, the Chilean planners could be considered as the in-
carnation of a State organization independent from the dominant oligarchy.
Moreover, it was shown in this study that the planning process was a
continuous process and some planning studies were carried out along the
whole period.
But the counter-revolution of 1973 interrupted this continuity at
the national level, eliminating those studies, forcing many planners to
leave the country, and making explicit the source of that continuity.
It was shown by this study that the expansion of the practice of
planning in Chile during the period analyzed was supported by ECLA, the
Alliance for Progress and several other sources of international tech-
nical assistance such as AID or the Ford Foundation, and that most of
the Chilean planners were internationally trained. For this reason they
were able to achieve external support for their studies and had working
opportunities outside of the country or in international agencies which
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were not open for other more traditional Chilean professionals.
The same international relations of the Chilean planners helped
them to spread their ideas outside of the country and provided them the
means to make use of the knowledge acquired through their experience in
Chile in spite of their forced emigration.
Making use of the terminology of Argyris and Schon, the Chilean
oligarchy and its foreign allies could not correct their mistakes through
single loop learning. They had to inquire into their own learning systems,
but the change they introduced was a regression; they discarded their
espoused democratic theory of action, and made explicit their authorita-
rian theory in use. However the world community, in particular the dev-
eloping countries and the international agencies had the opportunity of
positive learning through double loop dialectics
The natural experiment analyzed in this study generated new ideas
about planning and about development. Despite the efforts of the Chilean
oligarchy and its foreign allies to suffocate these ideas in a bloodbath,
they could not supress the collective international learning about the
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